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Abstract			2014	 was	 a	 politically	 interesting	 and	 eventful	 year	 in	 Scotland	 due	 to	 an	independence	 referendum	 taking	 place.	 The	 referendum	 also	 provided	 a	sociologically	 interesting	moment:	 as	 the	 ‘Scottish	 nation’	 was	widely	 debated	 and	reflected	upon	both	prior	and	after	the	referendum,	this	political	context	provided	an	opportune	moment	to	consider	how	nationalist	narratives	are	constructed,	expressed	and	experienced	both	from	above	and	below.	Thus,	drawing	on	data	collected	before	and	 after	 the	 referendum,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	make	 an	 original	 contribution	 to	 the	broad	field	of	nationalism	studies.	Specifically,	it	focuses	on	the	relationship	between	nationalist	narratives	and	‘ethnicity’,	‘race’,	and	belonging	in	Scotland.	The	fieldwork	took	 place	 between	May	 2014	 and	 September	 2015,	 and	 this	 thesis	 draws	 on	 data	gathered	using	a	number	of	qualitative	methods:	interviews,	observation	and	content	analysis.	Though	the	findings	emerge	within	the	political	context	of	the	referendum,	this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 situate	 them	 in	 a	 historically	 informed,	 post-devolutionary	framework.	This	thesis	has	two	broad	aims:	on	the	one	hand	it	seeks	to	 interrogate	the	post-devolutionary	relationship	between	nationalism	and	minority	communities	within	Scotland.	In	relation	to	this,	it	seeks	to	uncover	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	narratives	are	constructed	and	publicly	expressed	 from	above	by	 the	SNP,	and	how	individuals	from	different	ethnic	minority	backgrounds	interpret,	make	sense	of	and	potentially	 challenge	 nationalist	 narratives	 in	 and	 through	 their	 daily	 lives	 and	experiences.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 understand	 and	 investigate	 the	legislative,	 institutional	and	structural	contexts	 for	 the	management	and	creation	of	‘the	nation’	and	who	belongs	to	it,	as	well	as	the	individual,	subjective	understandings	and	negotiations	of	‘the	nation’	and	how	one’s	place	within	it	is	understood.	Contrary	to	much	existing	scholarship,	 this	 thesis	argues	 that	 the	SNP’s	nationalism	does	not	take	a	wholly	 civic	 form	(and	 indeed	 that	 the	 civic/ethnic	dichotomy	 is	 analytically	unhelpful).	 Further,	 it	 underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘values’	 and	 emotions	 to	nationalist	 narratives,	 and	 the	 centrality	 of	 England	 as	 Scotland’s	 ‘national	 other’.	Finally,	the	findings	shed	light	on	ethnic	minorities’	complex	and	often	contradictory	experiences	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 —	 the	 findings	 support	 Smith’s	 (2016)	argument	that	the	capacity	to	experience	the	everyday	as	unreflective	is	a	privilege.	Ethnic	minorities	encounter	continuous	implicit	and	explicit	challenges	to	their	sense	of	 belonging	 —consequently,	 in	 a	 ‘hyper-nationalist’	 context	 the	 nation	 merely	becomes	louder.	 	
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Chapter	1	Introduction					
1.1.	Scottish	independence	referendum	2014		Living	 in	 Scotland	 in	 the	 lead	 up	 to	 the	 2014	 independence	 referendum	 was	 an	exciting	time	for	anyone	interested	in	social	and	political	issues.	It	seemed	practically	impossible	to	escape	the	referendum;	you	read	and	heard	about	it	in	the	media	daily,	you	overheard	heated	debates	in	shop	queues	and	cafés,	and	you	ended	up	discussing	it	with	 taxi	 drivers	 and	 strangers	 in	 pubs.	 The	 referendum	was	 everywhere:	 there	were	Yes	and	No	campaigners	on	Glasgow’s	Buchanan	Street;	rallies	at	the	‘Freedom	Square’	 (George	 Square	 in	 Glasgow);	 ‘Yes’	 and	 ‘No	 Thanks’	 stickers,	 posters	 and	banners	around	towns,	cities	and	the	countryside	as	well	as	people	walking	around	wearing	‘Yes’	and	‘No	Thanks’	badges	on	their	lapels	and	bags.	What	was	noticeable	about	the	referendum	was	its	pervasiveness.				Importantly	 for	 this	 thesis,	 beyond	 being	 an	 exciting	 and	 intriguing	 moment	politically,	the	independence	referendum	also	provided	a	favourable	—	and	a	unique	—	context	in	which	to	study	nationalism	and	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	narratives	are	produced,	experienced,	understood,	and	challenged.	The	fieldwork	—	which	I	will	discuss	 in	more	detail	shortly	—	took	place	prior	 to,	and	after,	 the	referendum.	Fox	(2017),	 drawing	 on	 Garfinkel’s	 ethnomethodology,	 writes	 about	 the	 significance	 of	moments	 when	 the	 edges	 of	 the	 nation	 become	 newly	 visible.	 The	 Scottish	independence	referendum	offered	such	a	context	where	the	parameters	of	the	nation,	and	 how	 it	 is	 constituted	 and	 understood,	 became	more	 easily	 discernible.	 During	times	when	there	is	heightened	awareness	of	the	nation,	or	the	‘imagined	community’	(Anderson,	 2006),	 it	 can	 be	 easier	 to	 tap	 “into	 people’s	 otherwise	 self-evident	assumptions	about	what	the	nation	is”	(Fox,	2017:38).				This	 thesis	 is,	 thus,	 concerned	 with	 nationalism.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 concerned	with	 understanding	 and	 explaining	 the	 intersection	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 and	
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ideas	with	‘ethnicity’,	‘race’,	belonging	and	difference.	That	is:	who	does,	and	does	not,	belong	to	the	Scottish	nation	and	why?	How	are	nationalist	narratives	experienced?	How	 is	 the	 Scottish	 nation	 imagined?	 As	 per	 Fox’s	 arguments,	 the	 referendum	provided	 an	 opportune	moment	 to	 explore	 these	 questions.	 As	 argued	 by	multiple	authors	(e.g.	Triandafyllidou	1998	and	Göl	2005),	nationalist	narratives	—	in	order	to	be	 effective	—	 usually	 require	 ‘an	 Other’.	 These	 ‘others’	 have	 often	 been	 ethnic	 or	racialised	minorities,	 and	 these	 groups	 and	 the	 ‘traits’	 attributed	 to	 them	 come	 to	represent	 that	which	 (supposedly)	 the	nation	 is	 not.	 Thus,	 by	 studying	nationalism	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 independence	 referendum	 (though	 I	 consider	 and	 situate	the	 discussion	within	 the	 broader	 post-devolutionary	 context),	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	contribute	to	an	improved	understanding	of	how	nationalist	narratives	are	mobilised	and	 shaped	 from	 above	 vis-à-vis	 ideas	 around	 ‘ethnicity’,	 ‘race’,	 belonging	 and	difference,	 and	 how	 those	 narratives	 are	 experienced,	 understood	 and	 potentially	challenged	from	below	by	ethnic	minorities	themselves.				
	
1.2.	The	political	context		Before	discussing	the	original	contribution	of	this	thesis	in	more	detail,	it	is	useful	to	briefly	contextualise	the	independence	referendum.	The	prospect	of	an	independence	referendum	 in	 Scotland	 became	 reality	 following	 the	 Edinburgh	 Agreement.	 On	 15	October	2012,	 the	Scottish	First	Minister	(FM),	Alex	Salmond,	and	the	British	Prime	Minister,	David	Cameron,	signed	the	Agreement	alongside	the	Secretary	of	State	 for	Scotland,	 Michael	 Moore	 and	 the	 Scottish	 Deputy	 First	 Minister	 (DFM),	 Nicola	Sturgeon.	This	agreement	—	which	was	reached	between	the	Scottish	and	the	British	Governments	 led	 by	 the	 Scottish	 National	 Party	 (SNP)	 and	 the	 Conservatives	respectively	—	set	out	the	terms	for	an	upcoming	Scottish	independence	referendum.	Scottish	 self-determination	 and	 sovereignty	 were	 (and	 of	 course	 continue	 to	 be)	SNP’s	key	political	goals	and	were	their	key	2011	election	pledges	(SNP,	2011),	and	now	—	 in	 2012	—	 the	 party	 had	 secured	 a	 future	 vote	 on	 the	 matter.	 The	 draft	legislation	on	 the	 independence	vote	was	brought	before	 the	Scottish	parliament	 in	March	2013,	and	the	date	for	the	referendum	was	set	for	18	September	2014.		 	
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The	 pro-	 and	 anti-independence	 sides	 were	 spearheaded	 by	 two	 mainstream	campaigns.		Better	Together	(led	by	Labour	and	the	Conservatives),	with	their	slogan	‘No	Thanks’,	were	campaigning	against	independence,	while	Yes	Scotland	(led	by	the	SNP)	 campaigned	 for	 Scotland	 to	 become	 independent	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 United	Kingdom.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 mainstream	 campaigns,	 the	 Radical	 Independence	Campaign	emerged	as	a	socialist,	non-party-political	pro-independence	campaigning	group	which	argued	 for	a	 “radical	yes”	and	 that	 “Another	Scotland	 is	possible”.	The	Scottish	 Green	 Party	 —	 though	 allowing	 for	 its	 individual	 Members	 of	 Scottish	Parliament	 (MSPs)	 to	make	up	 their	minds	 regarding	 independence	—	nonetheless	campaigned	on	an	official	platform	for	a	‘Green	Yes’.	In	addition,	especially	on	the	Yes	side,	we	witnessed	a	proliferation	of	grassroots	groups	ranging	 from	 ‘Trade	Unions	for	 Independence’	 to	 ‘NHS	 for	 Yes’.	 Moreover,	 many	 of	 these	 grassroots	 groups	organised	 around	 ‘ethnicity’:	 thus,	 there	 were	 groups	 such	 as	 ‘Scots	 Asians	 for	Independence’,	 ‘Africans	 for	 an	 Independent	 Scotland’,	 ‘English	 Scots	 for	 Yes’	 and	‘Poles	for	Yes’.				The	independence	referendum	saw	the	highest	ever	voter	turnout	for	an	election	or	referendum	since	the	introduction	of	universal	suffrage	in	the	UK.	Altogether	84.6	per	cent	 of	 the	 population	 in	 Scotland	 turned	 out	 to	 vote.	 Included	 in	 those	 entitled	 to	vote	 were	 16	 and	 17-year-olds,	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 nationals	 as	 well	 as	Commonwealth	 citizens	 with	 a	 leave	 to	 remain	 or	 those	 who	 do	 not	 require	 such	leave.	 In	 the	 end,	 a	 majority	 of	 55	 per	 cent	 voted	 against	 Scotland	 becoming	 an	independent	 country,	 with	 45	 per	 cent	 voting	 in	 favour	 of	 independence.	 Though	most	 local	 government	 areas	 voted	 against	 independence,	 Dundee,	 Glasgow,	 North	Lanarkshire	and	West	Dunbartonshire	voted	for	it.	It	is	safe	to	say	that	a	voter	turn-out	 of	 84.6	 per	 cent	 is	 remarkable,	 and	 a	 general	 political	 galvanisation	 could	 be	clearly	witnessed	during	the	referendum	period.				However,	 while	 the	 referendum	 represented	 an	 exciting	 moment	 of	 political	engagement,	 others	 pointed	 to	 the	 divisiveness	 of	 the	 campaigns	 and	 the	 vote.	 In	particular,	 Scottish	 Labour	 and	 its	 (now	 former)	 leader	Kezia	Dugdale	 voiced	 their	opposition	 to	 any	 future	 independence	 referendums	 (Scottish	 Labour	 22/5/2017)	arguing	that	“Scotland	is	already	divided	enough”	(Scottish	Labour,	21/3/2017:	n.p.)	
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1.3.	Nationalism,	‘ethnicity’	and	racialised	minorities	in	Scotland	and	beyond		Besides	the	referendum	offering	a	favourable	moment	in	which	to	study	nationalism,	Scotland	—	more	broadly	—	presents	an	interesting	context	within	which	to	explore	nationalism	and	its	relationship	to	‘ethnicity’,	‘race’,	belonging	and	difference.	This	is	the	case	for	at	least	four	different	reasons.				Firstly,	nationalism	(and	especially	that	of	the	SNP)	continues	to	be	widely	hailed	as	taking	a	‘civic’	form	in	Scotland	(that	is,	as	open	and	inclusive,	following	the	idea	of	ius	
soli)	as	opposed	to	an	ethnic	form	(namely,	exclusive	and	closed,	following	the	idea	of	
ius	 sanguinis).	 Such	 claims	 are	made	 not	 just	 by	 SNP	 politicians	 but	 also	 by	many	academics,	as	will	be	explored	in	Chapter	4.	Thus,	as	the	argument	goes,	anyone	living	within	the	confines	of	Scotland	is	effectively	‘Scottish’,	as	Scottishness	is	purportedly	to	do	with	residence	rather	than	‘blood’.	As	a	way	of	illustrating	this,	let	us	consider	the	 current	 First	 Minister	 Nicola	 Sturgeon’s	 address	 to	 the	 2017	 SNP	 spring	conference.		In	it	she	rearticulated	the	idea	of	‘Scottish	civicness’	as	she	looked	back	at	the	late	Bashir	Ahmad,	a	Pakistani	migrant	who	became	the	first	Asian	MSP.	Sturgeon	(2017)	went	on	to	say,		
	
The	 first	 time	 he	 addressed	 an	 SNP	 conference,	 Bashir	 articulated	 this	 simple	
message.	“It’s	not	where	we	come	from	that	is	important…’	he	said.	‘It’s	where	we	
are	 going	 together.”	 Today,	 with	 the	 forces	 of	 intolerance	 and	 xenophobia	
seemingly	on	the	rise	across	the	world,	Bashir’s	words	have	never	seemed	more	
appreciate.			These	 supposedly	 ‘civic’	 conceptions	 of	 Scottish	 nationhood	have	 nonetheless	 been	publicly	and	explicitly	challenged.	At	the	2017	Labour	Party	conference,	the	London	Mayor	Sadiq	Khan	argued	that	“there	is	no	difference	between	those	who	try	to	divide	us	on	the	basis	of	whether	we’re	English	or	Scottish	and	those	who	try	to	divide	us	on	the	basis	our	background,	race	or	religion”	(Kerr,	2017:	n.p.).	Though	Khan	did	end	up	qualifying	his	statement	by	saying	that	“of	course	I’m	not	saying	that	nationalists	[referring	to	Scotland]	are	somehow	racist	or	bigoted”	(Kerr,	2017:	n.p.),	his	remarks	were	nonetheless	met	with	an	outcry	from	the	SNP.	An	SNP	spokesperson	went	on	to	say	that,		
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Sadiq	 Khan	 is	 quite	 right	 to	 highlight	 the	 dangers	 of	 prejudice	—	 but	 it	 is	
spectacularly	 ill-judged	 to	 compare	 supporters	 for	 Scottish	 independence	 to	
Trump	 or	 Brexiteers,	 and	 indeed	 it	 is	 an	 insult	 to	 many	 former	 and	 current	
Labour	voters.	(Carrell,	2017).		Thus,	 the	 first	 important	 point	 to	 note	 in	 relation	 to	 understanding	 nationalism	 in	Scotland	—	as	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	4	in	relation	to	my	findings	—	is	the	way	in	which	it	is	framed	as	being	an	exemplar	of	a	‘civic	form’.				The	second	specific	point	regarding	‘race’	 in	Scotland	relates	to	the	Irish	experience	in	 Scotland.	 This	 theme	 also	 recently	 arose	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Khan’s	 comments.	Following	 the	 London	Mayor’s	 remarks,	 Claire	 Heuchan	—	 a	 Scottish	 black	 radical	feminist	 writer	 —	 argued	 in	 The	 Guardian	 that	 the	 “parallels	 are	 clear”	 between	“Scottish	nationalism”	and	racism	or	religious	intolerance	(2017:	n.p.).	Consequently,	Heuchan	received	a	barrage	of	racist	and	misogynistic	abuse	online,	which	led	to	her	quitting	Twitter	 for	 some	 time.	While	Heuchan	made	 some	 important	points	 in	her	comment	 piece,	 there	 were	 issues	 with	 some	 of	 her	 arguments.	 She	 rightly	highlighted	 the	 links	 between	 ‘Scottish	 exceptionalism’	 vis-à-vis	 England	 and	Englishness.	 England	 is	 frequently	 positioned	 as	 Scotland’s	 ‘other’	 in	 nationalist	narratives	which,	 in	 turn,	allows	 for	 the	creation	of	a	portrayal	of	Scotland	as	more	‘progressive’	 and	 ‘inclusive’	 than	 its	 Southern	 neighbour.	 This	 is	 a	 theme	 which	emerged	strongly	 through	my	data,	and	which	 I	will	 take	up	 in	Chapter	5.	Heuchan	did,	however,	argue	that	“white	SNP	supporters	and	allies	have	never	been	subject	to	racism”	while	“Khan,	a	second-generation	Pakistani	immigrant,	has”	(2017:	n.p.).				This	remark	was	then	criticised	by	columnist	Angela	Haggerty	from	The	Herald	who	argued	 that	Heuchan	“effectively	eras[ed]	 the	horrendous	experience	of	 the	 Irish	 in	Scotland	for	decades”	(2017:	n.p.).	Therefore,	secondly,	in	order	to	understand	‘race’	in	 Scotland,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 historical,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 continuing,	Irish	 experience.	 From	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 onwards	 the	 British	 state	 was	avowedly	Protestant,	 relegating	 the	Catholic	minority	 to	 the	position	 of	 a	 religious,	and	 purportedly	 subversive,	 ‘other’.	 The	 immigrant	 Irish	 tended	 to	 be	 shunned	 or	perceived	 as	 a	 threat	 on	 account	 of	 their	 ethnic	 origin	 or	 religion	 (although	not	 all	Irish	were,	 or	 are,	 Catholic)	 (Knox	&	Houston,	 2001:xxii).	 There	were	 anti-Catholic	
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riots	 in	 Scotland’s	 major	 cities	 in	 the	 late	 1680s	 and	 late	 1770s,	 while	 anti-Irish	societies,	such	as	the	Loyalist	Orange	Order,	flourished	in	the	West	of	Scotland	(Knox	&	 Houston,	 2001:xxii).	 Building	 on	 this	 long	 history	 of	 sectarianism,	 a	 process	 of	racialisation	 took	 place:	 for	 example,	 in	 1923	 the	 Church	 of	 Scotland	 released	 a	pamphlet	titled	‘The	Menace	of	the	Irish	Race	to	Our	Scottish	Nationality’.	The	vestiges	of	 these	 events	 and	 ideas	 can	 still	 be	 found	 in	 the	 chants	 and	 taunts	 of	 Celtic	 and	Rangers	 supporters	 and	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 separate	 Catholic	 schools	 (Knox	 &	Houston,	2001:xxiii),	for	example.			The	third	point	relates	to	Scotland’s	‘significant	other’	(Williams	and	de	Lima	2006),	namely	 England	 (and	 Englishness).	 Understanding	 what	 Scotland	 is	 and	 is	 not,	 is	intimately	connected	to	how	England	is	imagined	to	be	or	what	‘Englishness’	is	seen	to	 entail.	 Importantly,	 this	 is	 also	 where	 a	 classed	 understanding	 of	 Scottishness	becomes	 apparent:	 while	 the	 SNP	 are	 careful	 to	 refer	 to	Westminster	 rather	 than	
England	in	their	political	rhetoric,	I	found	that	in	everyday	interactions	Westminster	is	frequently	read	as	connoting	England	or	Englishness.	This	coding,	further,	is	closely	connected	with	classed	understandings	of	Scotland	by	which	the	nation	is	presented	as	 ‘progressive’,	 ‘egalitarian’	 and	 ‘leftist’,	 while	 England	 is	 regarded	 as	 more	conservative	and	as	having	a	less	obvious	appetite	for	equality.		Though	I	will	argue	in	detail	in	Chapter	6	that	‘anti-Englishness’	should	not	be	regarded	and	understood	as	a	form	 of	 racism,	 accounting	 for	 anti-Englishness	 is	 crucial	 to	 any	 effort	 to	 fully	understand	how	Scottish	nationalist	narratives	are	mobilised	and	constructed.	I	will	consider	the	significance	of	England	and	Englishness	in	light	of	my	data	in	Chapters	5,	6	and	7	in	particular.				Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that	The	Scottish	Government,	led	by	the	SNP,	have	included	the	 following	as	one	of	 their	sixteen	national	outcomes:	 “We	 take	pride	 in	a	strong,	fair	 and	 inclusive	 national	 identity”	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	 ‘national	 identity’:	n.p.).	The	national	outcomes	describe	what	 the	government	wants	 to	achieve	 in	 the	next	 ten	 years.	 The	 government	 argues	 that	 this	 particular	 national	 outcome	 is	important	because,	
Scotland's	national	and	cultural	identity	is	defined	by	our	sense	of	place,	sense	of	
history	and	sense	of	self.	It	is	defined	by	what	it	means	to	be	Scottish;	to	live	in	a	
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modern	Scotland;	to	have	an	affinity	to	Scotland;	and	to	be	able	to	participate	in	
Scottish	society.	(The	Scottish	Government,	‘national	identity’:	n.p.)		Therefore,	 due	 to	 the	 Government’s	 explicit	 commitment	 to	 ‘inclusive	 national	identity’,	 issues	 around	 belonging	 are	 prominently	 included	 in	 the	 political	 elite’s	agenda.			In	sum,	these	 factors	make	Scotland	an	analytically	 interesting	case	 for	the	study	of	nationalism.	 This	 is	 especially	 the	 case	 because	 of	 the	 starting	 the	 point:	 that	 is,	because	of	the	political	elite’s	strategic	framing	of	Scottishness	as	‘civic’	as	opposed	to	articulating	—	on	the	face	of	it	—	a	more	‘primordialist’	understanding	of	the	‘nation’.					
1.4.		Aims,	objectives	and	justification	for	the	research	
	As	 argued	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter,	 the	 referendum	provided	 an	 opportune	moment	 for	 studying	 the	 experience,	 social	 construction,	 and	 expression	 of	nationalism.	More	specifically,	the	referendum	also	provided	a	favourable	context	for	studying	 the	 relationships	 and	 interconnections	 between	 nationalism,	 ‘ethnicity’,	‘race’,	belonging	and	difference.	In	order	to	improve	and	deepen	our	understanding	of	how	nationalist	narratives	are	used	 in	 the	construction	of	 ‘a	nation’,	and	how	those	narratives	are	experienced	by	those	residing	within	the	confines	—	geographical	or	otherwise	 —	 of	 the	 nation,	 analysing	 this	 signal	 political	 event	 was	 crucial.	 More	specifically,	 it	 provided	 a	 useful	 moment	 to	 interrogate	 how	 those	 whose	membership	 of	 a	 nation	 is	 not	 non-problematic	 or	 not	 unquestioned	—	 i.e.	 ethnic	minorities	 —	 relate	 to	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 national	 identity	 is	 imagined	 and	ascribed.	 Furthermore,	 it	 also	 allowed	 for	 an	 investigation	 of	 how	 nationalism	 is	experienced,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 those	 narratives	 may	 both	 materially	 and	immaterially	shape	the	lives	of	racialised	minorities.				Thus,	this	research	seeks	to	better	understand	nationalism	and	its	relationship	with	‘ethnicity’,	‘race’,	belonging,	and	otherness.	Firstly,	this	thesis	aims	to	interrogate	the	wider	 post-devolutionary	 relationship	 between	 nationalism	 and	 minority	
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communities	within	Scotland.	 In	relation	to	this,	on	the	one	hand,	 I	seek	to	uncover	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	narratives	are	constructed	and	publicly	expressed	from	above.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 also	 seeks	 to	 uncover	 how	 individuals	 from	different	 ethnic	 minority	 backgrounds	 (including	 more	 recent	 migrants	 as	 well	 as	those	whose	parents	or	grandparents	migrated	to	Scotland	in	the	past	—	see	Chapter	3	 for	 an	 extended	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 concepts	 of	 ‘ethnic	 minority’	 and	‘migrant’)	interpret,	make	sense	of	and	potentially	challenge	nationalist	narratives	in	and	through	their	daily	lives	and	experiences.			With	regard	to	the	construction	and	expression	of	nationalist	narratives	from	above,	I	have	 taken	 the	conscious	decision	 to	 focus	on	 the	SNP,	and	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	narrate	an	idea	of	the	‘Scottish	nation’	and	‘Scottishness’;	that	is,	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	 SNP’s	 version	 of	 Scottish	 nationalism.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 —	pragmatically,	 focusing	on	 the	SNP	allowed	me	 to	demarcate	 clear	 contours	 for	 the	study	 in	 terms	 of	 data	 collection	 in	 particular,	 and	 my	 focus	 more	 broadly.	 More	importantly	 however,	 the	 SNP	 are	 absolutely	 central	 to	 contemporary	 Scottish	politics	and	the	ways	in	which	ideas	of	‘the	Scottish	nation’	are	imagined,	constructed	and	articulated	 in	 the	public	 sphere.	The	SNP	are,	 of	 course,	not	 the	only	 source	of	nationalist	 rhetoric	 and	 imagery	 in	 Scotland,	 but	 due	 to	 their	 visibility,	 power	 and	status	 as	 a	 key	 political	 party	 —	 and,	 crucially,	 as	 a	 nationalist	 party	 —	 it	 is	analytically	 interesting	 to	 focus	 on	 them.	 The	 SNP	were	 established	 in	 1934	 as	 an	amalgamation	of	 two	parties:	 the	National	 Party	 of	 Scotland	 and	 the	 Scottish	Party	(Hassan,	2009:1).	Since	2007,	the	SNP	have	been	in	government,	forming	a	minority	government	in	2007	and	2016	and	a	majority	government	in	2011.	Crucially,	the	SNP	were	 a	 pivotal	 voice	 within	 the	 independence	 referendum	 —	 which	 this	 thesis	focuses	 on	—	 insofar	 as	 they	 were	 the	 most	 prominent	 constituency	 calling	 for	 a	referendum	 to	 take	 place,	 were	 involved	 in	 formally	 agreeing	 the	 conditions	 for	 it	with	 the	 UK	 government,	 and	 then	 spearheaded	 the	 Yes	 campaign.	 As	 will	 be	demonstrated,	 the	 SNP,	 through	 their	 public	 rhetoric,	 seek	 to	 construct	 a	 specific	understanding,	and	image	of	the	‘Scottish	nation’.	What	is	of	interest	are	the	ways	in	which	ethnic	and	racialised	minorities	are	or	are	not	included	in	this	narrating	of	the	nation.	Thus,	the	focus	is	very	much	on	the	SNP’s	narratives	and	constructions	of	the	‘Scottish	nation’	and	who	does	(not)	belong	to	it.				
	17		
Secondly,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 understand	 and	 investigate	 the	 legislative,	institutional	and	structural	contexts	for	the	management	and	creation	of	‘the	nation’	and	 who	 belongs	 to	 it,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 individual,	 subjective	 understandings	 and	negotiations	of	‘the	nation’	and	how	one’s	place	within	it	is	understood.	Through	the	course	of	the	thesis,	I	seek	to	answer	the	following	research	questions:		
1. How	have	different	projects	and	narratives	of	nationalism	been	imagined,	mobilised	
and	contested	in	the	context	of	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	in	particular,	
and	 in	 the	 context	 of	 devolution	 more	 generally,	 by	 the	 SNP?	 What	 are	 these	
narratives’	essential	components?		
	
2. What	are	the	particular	ways	in	which	the	public	rhetoric	of	the	SNP’s	nationalism	
has	 addressed	 questions	 of	 ‘diversity’,	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 ’belonging’	 in	 Scotland;	 how	
has	it	addressed	and	engaged	with	ethnic	minorities	post-1999	and	in	the	context	of	
the	independence	referendum	more	specifically?		
	
3. How,	if	at	all,	have	the	SNP’s	nationalist	narratives	intersected	with	the	formation	of	
policy	 with	 regard	 to	 minority	 communities,	 anti-racism	 and	 so-called	 ‘race	
equality’,	and	with	approaches	to	the	treatment	of	recently	arrived	migrants?	
	
4. How	do	nationalist	narratives	contribute	to	the	shaping	of	the	experiences	of	ethnic	
minorities,	if	at	all?	How	do	minority	communities	respond	to,	interpret	and	possibly	
challenge	nationalist	ideas	and	narratives?		
	
Posing	these	questions	is	important	because	not	only	will	the	answers	shed	light	on	and	improve	our	knowledge	of	nationalism	and	nationalist	narratives	in	Scotland	in	particular,	but	 they	will	 also	help	us	build	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	how	 nationalist	 narratives	 are	mobilised	 and	 drawn	 upon	more	 broadly.	 It	 is	 also	interesting	to	explore	the	construction	of	nationalist	narratives	from	above,	and	what	effect,	 if	 any,	 they	 have	 on	 the	 everyday	 lives	 and	 experiences	 of	 ethnic	minorities	living	 in	 Scotland.	 Moreover,	 I	 believe	 understanding	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	intersect	with	these	issues	is	important	for	a	normative	reason	as	well:	by	exploring	how	nationalist	 ideas	make	use	of	different	processes	of	 othering	and	exclusion,	 as	well	 as	 inclusion,	 and	 how	 those	 ideas	 and	 processes	 are	made	 sense	 of	 by	 ethnic	
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minorities	 on	 the	 ground,	 we	 can	 continue	 the	 struggle	 to	 dismantle	 racialising	structures	of	oppression.			My	PhD	journey	began	in	September	2013,	and	my	fieldwork	took	place	between	May	2014	 and	 September	 2015	 —	 i.e.	 from	 four	 months	 before	 to	 a	 year	 after	 the	independence	 referendum.	 In	 terms	 of	 data	 collection,	 I	 used	 a	 combination	 of	methods.	 Firstly,	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 uncover	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 SNP	 construct	 and	imagine	the	‘Scottish	nation’	I	analysed	key	SNP	independence	publications,	and	key	SNP	figures’	speeches	(most	notably	those	made	by	First	Minister	Alex	Salmond	and	Deputy	 First	Minister	 Nicola	 Sturgeon).	 Secondly,	 I	 also	 conducted	 interviews	with	Yes	 and	 No	 campaigners	 as	 well	 as	 representatives	 of	 different	 race	 equality	organisations	in	Scotland.	Thirdly,	in	order	to	understand	how	nationalist	narratives	affect	 ethnic	 minorities’	 experiences	 of	 living	 in	 Scotland,	 I	 interviewed	 ‘ordinary	voters’	 from	 different	 ethnic	 backgrounds	 (African,	 English,	 Indian,	 Pakistani,	 and	Polish).	 Finally,	 I	 attended	 and	 observed	 a	 number	 of	 independence	 debates	 and	meetings.	My	observations	helped	me	gauge	the	different	ways	in	which	ideas	around	‘the	 nation’	 featured	 and	 took	 shape	 in	 independence	 debates,	 and	 how	 attendees	responded	to	and	engaged	with	these	ideas.		
	
	
1.5.	Defining	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’		I	have	outlined	 that	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 relationship	of	nationalism	 to	ideas	 around	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 ‘race’.	 Therefore,	 before	 explaining	 the	 importance	 of	operating	 from	 a	 historically	 informed	 frame	 of	 understanding	 when	 studying	nationalism,	it	is	useful	to	briefly	define	‘ethnicity’	and	‘race’,	and	the	ways	in	which	I	understand	and	use	these	concepts.	 	 It	 is	especially	 important	to	do	this	early	on	as	Miles	 (2000)	 notes	 that	 much	 of	 the	 writing	 pertaining	 to	 ‘race’	 does	 not	 actually	define	what	is	meant	by	the	concept.			
Indeed,	my	understanding	of	 ‘race’	 is	 strongly	 influenced	by	 the	writings	 of	Robert	Miles	 (e.g.	 1989;	 1993).	 Miles	 (2000:137)	 notes	 that,	 historically,	 certain	 somatic	
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features	 	—	both	 real	 and	 imagined	—	 “were	 socially	 signified	 as	natural	marks	 of	difference	(e.g.	skin	colour),	a	difference	that	became	known	as	difference	of	 ‘race’”.	Consequently,	 “these	marks,	 conceived	as	natural,	were	 then	 thought	 to	explain	 the	already	 existing	 social	 position	 of	 the	 collectivity	 thereby	 designated	 by	 the	mark”	(Miles,	2000:137).	Miles,	from	whom	I	take	the	practice	of	using	inverted	commas	in	order	to	highlight	the	social	construction	of	‘race’,	goes	on	to	say:	
This	social	process	of	signification	was	(and	remains)	an	 important	 ideological	
moment	 in	a	process	of	domination.	The	 idea	of	 ‘race’	 thereby	came	to	express	nature,	 something	given	and	 immutable,	with	 the	 result	 that	what	was	 in	 fact	
the	consequence	of	social	relations	became	understood	as	natural:	and	so	‘race’	
was	thought	of	as	a	determinate	force,	requiring	social	relations	of	domination	
to	 be	 organised	 in	 a	 specific	 form,	 thereby	 obscuring	 the	 human	 construction.	(2000:137	—	original	emphases)	
	
	Like	 Miles,	 I	 resist	 using	 ‘race’	 as	 an	 analytical	 concept.	 However,	 “this	 does	 not	require	denying	that	the	idea	of	 ‘race’	is	a	constituent	element	of	everyday	common	sense”	—	 thus,	 there	 exists	 a	 belief	 that	 ‘races’	 exist	 (Miles,	 2000:135).	 Because	 of	this,	rather	than	a	tool	for	analysis,	‘race’	“should	be	used	only	to	refer	descriptively”	to	the	ways	in	which	the	term	is	used	in	everyday	understandings	(Miles,	2000:135).	Our	focus	should	be,	therefore,	directed	towards		“the	active	determinant	of	exclusion	and	 disadvantage”,	 namely	 processes	 of	 racialisation	 	 —	 i.e.	 “the	 attribution	 of	significance	to	certain	patterns	of,	or	the	imagined	assertion	of,	difference	and	the	use	of	 that	 process	 of	 signification	 to	 structure	 social	 relationships”	 (Miles,	 2000:139).	Thus,	I	do	not	wish	to	reify	‘race’,	but	to	remain	cognisant	of	its	social	construction.	At	the	same	time,	I	acknowledge	that	it	has	‘everyday	purchase’;	that	is,	as	Eriksen	puts	it,	 “concepts	 of	 race	 can	 nevertheless	 be	 important	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 inform	people’s	actions”	(1996:29).	Thus,	it	is	the	different	processes	of	racialisation	—	how	ideas	 around	 ‘race’	 are	 appropriated,	 mobilised	 and	 operationalised	—	 that	 are	 of	interest.		‘Ethnicity’,	 in	 turn,	 is	 notoriously	hard	 to	define.	Weber	 connects	 ‘ethnic	 groups’	 to	custom,	physical	type	and	language	(1996:35);	Nash	argues	that	the	core	elements	of	‘ethnicity’	 are	 kinship	 (“the	 presumed	 biological	 and	 descent	 unity	 of	 the	 group”),	commensality	(“the	propriety	of	eating	together”),	and	a	common	cult	(“implicating	a	
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value	 system	 beyond	 time	 and	 empirical	 circumstance,	 sacred	 symbols	 and	attachments”)	 (1996:25);	 and	 Eriksen	 notes	 that	 “the	 term	 ‘ethnicity’	 refers	 to	relationships	between	groups	whose	members	 consider	 themselves	distinctive,	 and	those	groups	may	be	ranked	hierarchically	within	a	society”	(1996:30).	Importantly,	Eriksen	 also	 points	 out	 that	 although	 ‘ethnicity’	 is	 often	 used	 to	 denote	minorities,	“majorities	and	dominant	peoples	are	no	‘less’	ethnic	than	minorities”	(1996:28).				Definitions	 of	 ‘ethnicity’	 are	 thus	 “broad	 and	 loose”	 (Fenton,	 2010:3).	 Further,	 the	way	in	which	‘ethnicity’	is	officially	recorded	in	censuses	does	not	make	matters	any	clearer.	 Looking	 at	 the	 Scottish	 census,	 for	 example,	 the	 tick-box	 options	 combine	elements	 relating	 to	 ‘race’,	 nationality,	 and	 geography.	 Indeed,	 in	 everyday	interactions,	‘ethnicity’	is	often	used	as	a	more	‘politically	correct’	way	of	referring	to	‘race’	 (Baumann,	 1996;	 Davidson,	 1998).	 Similarly	 to	 the	 points	 made	 above	 with	regard	 to	 ‘race’,	what	 is	 important	 for	 the	purposes	of	 the	 current	 study,	 I	 think,	 is	understanding	the	processes	through	which	people	view	—	or	come	to	view	—	their	‘ethnicity’	as	either	constitutive	of	who	they	are,	or	as	constitutive	of	who	others	are;	that	is,	how	they	come	to	conceive	of	a	‘them’	who	are	of	a	different	‘ethnicity’	to	‘us’.	Certain	ethnic	groups	or	‘ethnicities’	are,	then,	attributed	political,	social	or	historical	significance	either	by	themselves	or	by	others.				As	 Fenton	 puts	 it,	 we	 can	 think	 of	 “ethnicity	 as	 referring	 to	 social	 identities	 —	typically	 ‘descent’	 and	 ‘cultural	 difference’	 —	 which	 are	 deployed	 under	 certain	conditions”	 (2010:3).	 Importantly,	 “ethnicity	 refers	 to	 the	 social	 construction	 of	descent	and	culture,	the	social	mobilization	of	descent	and	culture	and	the	meanings	and	 implications	 of	 classification	 systems	 built	 around	 them”	 (Fenton,	 2010:3	 —	original	emphasis).		Thus:	
People	or	peoples	do	not	just	possess	cultures	or	share	ancestry;	they	elaborate	these	into	the	idea	of	a	community	founded	upon	these	attributes.	Indeed,	it	is	
entirely	possible	 for	people	 to	 elaborate	an	 idea	of	 community	despite	 the	 fact	
that	claims	to	sharing	descent	and	culture	are	decidedly	questionable.	 (Fenton,	2010:3	-	original	emphasis)		Thus,	 ‘ethnicity’	 —	 either	 ‘ours’	 or	 ‘theirs’	 —	 is	 attributed	 meaning	 in	 everyday	interactions,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 meaning	 and	 the	 processes	 of	 attribution	 that	 are	significant.	What	is	of	particular	interest	to	this	project	are	the	ways	in	which	these	
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processes	of	ethnic	identification	or	attribution	intersect	with	ideas	of	the	‘nation’.				
1.6.	Importance	of	history	to	nationalist	narratives		
	Throughout	the	research	process	I	was	careful	to	situate	my	discussion	and	findings	in	a	historically	informed	framework	of	understanding	and	analysis.	Though	my	focus	is	very	much	on	the	 ‘here	and	now’	(Fox	and	Miller-Idriss,	2008b),	 I	was	mindful	of	both	 history	 (that	 is,	 how	 current	 events	 relate	 to	 and	 should	 be	 understood	 in	relation	to	the	past)	as	well	as	political	representations	and	mobilisations	of	history	(namely,	 how	 history	 is	 made	 use	 of	 and	 appropriated	 for	 contemporary	 political	aims).		
The	latter	point	is	especially	pertinent	as	contemporary	nationalist	ideas	rely	heavily	on	 the	 use	 of	 history	 as	 a	 narrative	 and	 legitimising	 tool.	 As	 Lawrence	 puts	 it:	“nationalism	 has	 always	 been	 intimately	 connected	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 past”	(2013:713).	 As	 part	 of	 its	 analytical	 framework	 of	 understanding,	 this	 thesis,	 thus,	recognises	 the	 importance	of	 history	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 it	 is	 narrated	 as	 a	 key	building	block	for	nationalist	discourses:	it	is	therefore	important	to	consider	what	or	who	 is,	 and	 is	 not,	 remembered	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	 the	 nation.	 Silences	 can	 be	 as	revealing	as	—	or,	even	more	revealing	than	—	the	events,	people	and	places	that	we	choose	 to	 incorporate	 into	our	national	 stories.	Ernest	Renan	 famously	argued	 that	“forgetting,	I	would	even	go	so	far	as	to	say	historical	error,	is	a	crucial	factor	in	the	creation	of	a	nation”	(1990:11).	 In	her	wonderful	essay,	Himani	Bannerji	notes	 that	the	writing	of	history	is	not	a	transparent	affair,	but	entails	issues	of	representation	which,	in	turn,	entail	issues	of	epistemology	and	ideology	(1998:287).	She	goes	on	to	elaborate	that	‘representation’	has	a	double-edge	to	it:	
By	claiming	to	re-present	someone,	some	moment	 in	time,	some	situation	—	 in	
fact	 all	 three,	 all	 at	 once	—	 through	 our	 reporting,	 recording,	 or	 narration,	
“representation”	 implies	 both	 epistemological	 and	 (re)constructive	
responsibilities.	(1998:287)	Therefore,	 Bannerji	 points	 out	 how	 remembering	 history,	 or	 representing	 the	 past	(be	it	people	or	events),	has	a	normative	element	to	it;	historical	memories,	which	are	
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often	 misrepresented,	 can	 serve	 specific	 political	 and	 ideological	 ends.	 Moreover,	when	 she	 talks	 about	 ‘responsibilities’	 she	 highlights	 the	 burden	 that	 those	 in	powerful	 positions	 have	 in	 regard	 to	 representing	 the	 past	 in	 a	 fair	 and	 truthful	manner.			
As	the	research	went	on,	it	became	clear	to	me	that	this	thesis,	and	the	contemporary	understandings	of	what	Scotland	and	Scottishness	are	 imagined	to	be,	needed	to	be	historically	 contextualised	 and	 situated.	 The	 centrality	 of	 history	 to	 both	 the	nationalist	narratives	emanating	from	the	SNP,	which	‘storify’	the	nation,	as	well	as	to	the	 understandings	 and	 views	 coming	 from	 the	 participants,	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 an	awareness	 of	 the	 uses	 and	 implications	 of	 history,	 and	 by	 extension	 heritage	 and	tradition,	 (or,	 more	 accurately,	 how	 these	 three	 things	 are	 constructed	 and	appropriated)	need	to	be	at	the	centre	of	this	project.			Two	underlying	 arguments	will	 be	 advanced	 throughout	 this	 thesis:	 firstly,	 that	 by	drawing	 on	 history,	 regardless	 of	 the	 ’truthfulness’	 of	 that	 history,	 nationalist	narratives	seek	to	demarcate	the	contours	of	the	nation	—	that	is,	define	those	who	(do	not)	belong.	These	contours	are	fuzzy	and	open	to	challenge;	thus,	they	are	by	no	means	rigid	or	unchanging.	Depending	on	what	history	is	remembered	and	forgotten,	and	 how	 it	 is	 remembered	 or	 forgotten,	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 nation	 can	 shift	 and	change	drastically.	Secondly,	once	history	is	used	to	demarcate	the	nation,	the	nation	then	requires	its	‘content’,	its	spirit,	and	its	shape.	Here,	‘heritage’	and	‘tradition’	are	crucial	 and	 extensively	 drawn	 on	 –	 by	 relying	 on	 historical	 understandings	 and	nationalist	 narratives	 as	 to	 what	 the	 nation	 is	 imagined	 to	 be	 	 (see	 specifically	Chapter	5),	‘the	national	community’	is	given	its	defining	features	and	its	character.			
1.7.	Contribution		This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	make	 a	 contribution	 on	 three	 different	 but	 interrelated	 fronts.	Firstly,	 drawing	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 my	 data,	 this	 thesis	 will	 critically	 assess	 the	
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analytical	 usefulness	 of	 the	 predominant	 civic-ethnic	 dichotomy	 evident	 in	nationalism	studies.	Importantly,	much	of	the	existing	academic	literature	pertaining	to	nationalism	in	Scotland	tends	to	place	it	firmly	in	the	‘civic’	camp	(see	examples	in	Kearton,	 2005).	 Due	 to	 the	 normative	 element	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 political	movements	lay	claim	to	civic	nationalism,	and	the	normative	quality	of	the	judgement	when	researchers	label	nationalisms	as	being	of	the	‘civic’	as	opposed	to	the	‘ethnic’	kind,	I	argue	that	a	rethink	is	needed	in	how	nationalism	is	analysed	and	understood.			
Thus,	 I	 suggest	 we	 move	 towards	 conceptualising	 nationalism	 and	 studying	nationness	as	an	‘event’	as	Brubaker	(1996:19)	puts	it	—	as	fluctuating,	unfixed,	and	ever-changing.	 To	 this	 end,	 this	 thesis	 will	 map	 out	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 SNP’s	nationalism	—	 and	 other	 nationalisms	 beyond	 Scotland	 —	 can	 be	 understood	 by	utilising	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	 ‘process	 oriented	 approach’	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	mechanisms	 through	which	 national	 boundaries	 are	 constructed,	 and	 the	 symbolic	resources	used	to	demarcate	those	contours	of	the	nation.	Thus,	rather	than	fixating	on	the	end	product	and	asking	whether	certain	nationalisms	are	civic	or	ethnic	—	or	on	 labelling	parts	of	 those	nationalisms	either	civic	or	ethnic	—	the	focus,	 I	believe,	should	be	on	understanding	the	processes	by	which	such	identifications	come	to	be	salient.	Here	the	two-pronged	argument	I	advanced	at	the	end	of	the	previous	section	becomes	 especially	 relevant.	 That	 is,	 I	 explore	 how,	 by	 drawing	 on	 the	 symbolic	resources	of	history	and	heritage,	nationalist	narratives	sketch	out	the	contours	of	the	nation	(who	belongs).	On	the	other	hand,	I	examine	how	drawing	on	history	enables	people	—	both	 from	above	and	below	—	to	construct	 the	content	and	 the	 ‘spirit’	of	that	nation.	Here,	the	idea	of	national	values	(even	when	they	are,	indeed,	universal!)	becomes	especially	important	in	terms	of	forging	a	claim	to	uniqueness	and	identity.		
Secondly,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 make	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 fairly	 recent	 but	 quickly	expanding	 literature	on	 ‘banal’	 and	everyday	nationalism	 (e.g.	Billig,	 1995;	Fox	and	Miller-Idriss	 2008a	 and	 2008b;	 Skey,	 2011;	 Fox	 2017;	 Antonsich,	 2016;	 Skey	 and	Antonsich,	2017).	This	area	of	study	emerged	in	order	to	provide	nuance	with	respect	to	 the	 grand	 tradition	 of	 nationalist	 theorising,	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 macro	 level,	often	at	 the	expense	of	understanding	micro	 level	processes	and	 the	experiences	of	
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‘ordinary	 people’.	 However,	 what	 has	 been	 missing	 from	 everyday	 nationalism	literature	 is	 a	 sustained	 focus	 on	 ethnic	 minorities.	 So	 far,	 everyday	 nationalism	studies	 have	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 those	 participants	 who	 are	generally	viewed	as	being	part	of	 the	 ‘majority’	or	 ‘indigenous’	nationality	 (most	of	the	research	focuses	on	western	white-majority	nations)	experience	nationalist	ideas	in	 their	 everyday	 lives.	 That	 is,	 it	 seeks	 to	 uncover	 the	 banal,	 taken-for	 granted	nationalist	narratives	and	the	ways	in	which	these	are	experienced,	reproduced,	and	how	 they	 structure	 and	 affect	 people’s	 lives	 in	 the	 everyday.	However,	 turning	 the	analytical	focus	on	to	the	experience	of	ethnic	minorities	whose	national	membership	may	 come	under	 challenge	 offers	 us	 a	 novel	way	 of	 uncovering	 the	 lived	 reality	 of	nationalism.	From	my	data	analysis	it	quickly	became	clear	that	issues	pertaining	to	invisibility,	 visibility	 and	 inconspicuousness	 (see	 Chapter	 6)	 dominated	 the	participants’	 experiences	 and	 reflections	 as	 regards	 ‘ethnicity’,	 difference	 and	belonging	across	various	social	spaces	and	contexts.		
Finally,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 bring	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 analysis	 —	 those	 focused	 on	nationalism	from	above	as	well	as	below	—	together	and	 in	dialogue	 in	an	effort	 to	build	a	comprehensive	picture	of	nationalist	narratives	at	work.	As	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	2,	so	far,	most	literature	—	in	particular	on	nationalism	in	Scotland	—	has	mainly	pertained	to	either	elite	nationalist	discourses	or	constructions,	or	to	ordinary	people’s	 understandings	 and	 experiences	 of	 nationalism.	 Understanding	 the	 two	 in	tandem	 will	 provide	 new	 insights	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 elite,	 strategic,	institutionalised	narratives,	and	the	messy	reality	that	is	our	everyday	lives.				
1.8.	Structure	of	the	thesis		This	thesis	is	divided	into	eight	chapters.	This	first	chapter	has	outlined	the	political	context	 for	 the	 research,	 as	well	 as	 introduced	 its	 aims,	 objectives	 and	 the	 central	research	 questions.	 Further,	 following	 this	 outline	 of	 the	 structure,	 it	 provided	 a	rationale	 and	 justification	 for	 the	 research	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 contribution	 it	 seeks	 to	make.	 Chapter	 2	 will	 locate	 the	 current	 study	 within	 the	 broader	 theoretical	
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discussions	 of	 nationalism	 and	 will	 offer	 a	 critical	 engagement	 with	 existing	literature.	 Moreover,	 it	 will	 seek	 to	 identify	 the	 gaps	 and	 omissions	 within	 this	literature	and	will	address	definitional	issues.	While	introducing	the	classical	theories	of	 ethnosymbolism	 and	 modernism,	 it	 will	 argue	 that	 post-classical	 theories	 of	nationalism	pertaining	to	gender	and	everyday	nationalism,	for	example,	have	begun	to	 fill	 in	 gaps	 in	 knowledge	 evident	 in	 earlier	 theorising.	 I	 will	 also	 discuss	 the	dualistic	 categories	 of	 ‘ethnic’	 and	 ‘civic’	 nationalism	 (which	 I	 will	 revisit	 in	 more	detail	 in	Chapter	4),	and	the	ways	in	which	 ‘the	Other’	 is	understood	in	nationalism	literature.	 Finally,	 Chapter	 2	 will	 focus	 on	 Scotland	 specifically,	 and	 explain	 how	literature	on	Scottish	nationalism	has	mainly	focused	on	nationalist	discourses	from	above,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 people’s	 lay	 understandings	 and	 experiences	 of	 the	nation,	on	the	other,	without	the	two	levels	being	effectively	related.				Chapter	 3,	which	 focuses	 on	methods	 and	methodology,	 explains	 how	 the	 research	was	conducted	using	a	multimethod	approach,	and	it	revisits	the	aims,	objectives	and	research	 questions	 already	 touched	 upon	 in	 this	 chapter.	 This	 chapter	 will	 also	discuss	 the	 sample,	 explain	 the	 data	 analysis	 process	 in	 detail,	 and	 consider	 the	limitations	of	the	study.			Chapter	 4	 is	 the	 first	 of	 four	 chapters	 to	 discuss	 the	 empirical	 findings,	 which	emerged	 from	 an	 inductive	 process	 of	 data	 analysis.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 civic/ethnic	distinction	and,	firstly,	revisits	the	debates	around	the	dichotomy.	It	will	consider	the	ways	in	which	the	SNP’s	nationalism	is	framed	as	civic	in	both	political	and	academic	commentaries,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 SNP	 framed	 the	 Scottish	independence	referendum	specifically	as	an	example	of	civic	nationalism	in	practice.	The	chapter	will	also	critically	 interrogate	whether	 the	predominant	 framing	of	 the	SNP’s	nationalism	as	 ‘civic’	 is	warranted.	As	 the	 Scottish	 independence	 referendum	coincided	with	the	second	Year	of	Homecoming,	this	made	it	an	opportune	moment	to	consider	 the	 ‘civicness’	 of	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 within	 this	 political	 and	 cultural	context.	Finally,	based	on	the	findings,	I	will	reassess	the	analytical	usefulness	of	the	civic/ethnic	dichotomy.			Chapter	 5	will	move	 the	 discussion	 towards	 ‘national	 values’	 and	will	 demonstrate	
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how,	 during	 the	 referendum,	 a	 specific	 framing	 of	 supposedly	 Scottish	 values	 was	advanced.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 introduce	 and	 make	 use	 of	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	framework,	which	suggests	moving	beyond	the	civic/ethnic	frame	of	understanding.	On	the	one	hand,	he	argues	for	an	analytical	framework	that	—	rather	than	labelling	nationalism	as	 ‘civic’	or	 ‘ethnic’	—	accounts	for	the	mechanisms	social	actors	use	to	reconstruct	 “the	 boundaries	 of	 national	 identity	 at	 a	 particular	 point	 in	 time”	(2003:178).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 framework	 considers	 the	 symbolic	 resources	social	actors	draw	on	when	reconstructing	 these	boundaries	 (2003:178).	Chapter	5	will	thus	explore	how	social	actors	(both	from	above	and	below)	construct	Scotland	as	a	distinct	 ‘value	community’	 and	how,	as	part	of	 this	process,	 they	 interpret	and	operationalise	certain	symbolic	resources.				Chapters	6	and	7	shift	the	focus	firmly	onto	ethnic	minority	participants’	experiences	of	 Scotland,	 Scottishness	 and	 nationalism,	 both	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Scottish	independence	 referendum	 (Chapter	 7),	 and	 more	 broadly	 (Chapter	 6).	 Chapter	 6	emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 studying	 the	 everyday	 and,	 crucially,	 for	 the	importance	of	understanding	the	capacity	to	be	unreflective	in	our	everyday	lives	as	a	privilege.	Chapter	7,	in	turn,	highlights	the	importance	of	accounting	for	emotions	and	affect	in	our	understandings	of	how	nationalist	narratives	are	experienced.	As	will	be	shown	in	Chapters	6	and	7,	the	participants	would	often	present	their	experience	of	Scotland	and	Scots	as	being	‘friendly’	and	‘welcoming’	but,	as	the	interviews	went	on,	this	narrative	was	often	disrupted.	Importantly,	this	demonstrates	the	purchase	that	predominant	framings	of	Scotland	as	more	inclusive	have,	but	also	how	this	frame	of	vision	comes	under	challenge	in	and	through	everyday	interactions.	Consequently,	a	complex	picture	begins	to	emerge	which	this	thesis	seeks	to	map	out	and	analyse.			Finally,	 Chapter	 8,	 which	 is	 the	 Conclusion,	 will	 reflect	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	thesis	has	made	a	contribution	to	literature	as	well	as	to	empirical	understandings	of	nationalism.	 It	will	 also	 consider	 potential	 further,	 future	 areas	 of	 investigation,	 as	well	as	the	potential	broader	implications	of	this	thesis	beyond	academic	merit.	For	these	broader	implications,	I	take	my	cue	from	Dorothy	Smith.	Here	she	discusses	the	importance	of	understanding	women’s	personal	lifeworlds	although	this	excerpt	can	be	read	as	relating	to	other	forms	of	oppression	beyond	gender:	
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The	 sociologist	 is	 not	 an	 astrologer	 giving	 private	 consultations.	 Rather	 the	
approach	attempted	here	offers	something	comparable	to	consciousness-raising.	
Perhaps	indeed	it	is	a	form	of	it,	aiming	to	find	the	objective	correlates	of	what	
had	 seemed	a	private	 experience	 of	 oppression.	 Like	 consciousness-raising	 it	 is	
also	 to	 be	 shared.	 The	 strategy	 of	 institutional	 analysis	 explicates	 generalized	
bases	of	 the	 experience	of	oppression.	Hence,	 it	 offers	a	mode	 in	which	women	
can	find	the	lineaments	of	the	oppression	they	share	with	others	and	of	different	
oppressions	rooted	in	the	same	matrix	of	relations.	(1987:248)				 	
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Chapter	2	Nationalism	Studies:	From	grand	narratives	to	the	minutiae	of	the	everyday				
2.1.	Introduction		Though	nations	are	central	to	understanding	the	ways	in	which	the	vast	majority	of	different	 societies	 are	 organised,	 nationalism	 studies	 have	 remained	 somewhat	isolated	 from	wider	 social	 theory.	 This	 seems	 curious,	 especially	 as	—	 on	 the	 one	hand	—	Smith	argues	that	“a	fundamental	way	to	grasp	the	nature	and	shape	of	the	modern	 world	 is	 through	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 origins	 of	 nations”	(1989:420).	Consequently,	 social	 theorists	 can	often	be	guilty	of	 taking	nations	and	nationalism	for	granted	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:4-5).	On	the	other	hand,	Billig	points	out	how	sociologists	often	fail	to	define	‘society’,	and	when	they	do	offer	a	definition,	it	is	difficult	to	distinguish	from	that	of		 ‘nation’	“as	peoples	with	a	culture,	a	limited	territory	 and	 distinguished	 by	 bonds	 of	 action”	 (1995:53).	 Indeed,	 for	 Smith	 the	“study	 of	 society	 is	 always	 ipso	 facto	 the	 study	 of	 the	 nation”	 (1983:26).	 Thus,	nationalism	 studies	 have	 remained,	 to	 a	 considerable	 degree,	 removed	 from	 what	gets	 constituted	 as	 ‘canonical’	 sociological	 theory.	 This	 is	 important	 because	 the	context	in	which	such	theorising	takes	place	remains	‘national’	–	yet,	limited	attention	is	paid	to	the	relationship	between	‘society’	and	‘nation’.	Thus	we	might	ask:	what	is	the	 impact	 of	 nationalist	 ideas	 on	 the	 myriad	 social	 phenomena	 studied	 by	sociologists?	How	could	drawing	on	nationalism	studies	aid	social	theorising?				This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 offer	 a	 critical	 overview	 of	 key	 literature	 pertaining	 to	nationalism	studies,	and	therefore	to	put	nationalism	studies	 front	and	centre	—	as	advocated	by	Smith	above.	It	will,	in	other	words,	try	to	accord	the	literature	the	care	and	attention	it	often	fails	to	attract	elsewhere.	By	way	of	introduction,	it	will,	firstly,	discuss	 the	 development	 of	 nationalism	 studies.	 Following	 this	 introduction,	 the	chapter	will	 then	move	 on	 to	 discuss	 common	 definitions	 found	 in	 literature	 –	 the	focus	will	be	on	the	key	concepts	of	nation,	state,	nationalism,	and	national	identity.	Interrogating	the	key	terms	is	important	in	order	to	have	a	solid	conceptual	base	to	build	 on,	 and	 I	will	 comment	 on	 the	definitions	 and	understandings	utilised	 in	 this	
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thesis.				Having	covered	the	conceptual	field,	this	chapter	will	subsequently	briefly	turn	to	the	classical	 debate	 waged	 mainly	 between	 ‘modernists’	 such	 as	 Gellner	 and	‘ethnicists’/‘ethnosymbolists’	such	as	Smith,	before	addressing	post-classical	theories	(e.g.	 theories	 around	 everyday	 nationalism,	 and	 nation	 and	 gender).	 Because	 a	 key	concern	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 understand	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 potentially	contribute	to	the	shaping	of	ethnic	minorities’	experiences	and	how	such	narratives	are	made	sense	of	and	possibly	challenged	by	ethnic	minorities,	the	focus	will	be	on	the	 latter	 theories.	 Chapters	 6	 and	 7	 in	 particular	 seek	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 ever-expanding	literature	within	the	field	of	everyday	nationalism	studies.				As	will	be	seen,	Scottish	nationalism	(especially	the	SNP’s	nationalism)	 is	habitually	defined	as	‘civic’	in	nature.	Thus,	after	discussing	(post-)classical	theoretical	debates,	the	focus	will	then	turn	to	the	key	trope	of	dualistic	categories	of	nationalism	such	as	Eastern/Western,	 political/cultural,	 and	 importantly,	 ethnic/civic	 nationalism.	 Both	Chapters	4	and	5	will,	especially,	build	on	a	critique	of	the	civic/ethnic	framework	of	understanding.	Subsequently,	 the	overarching	 themes	of	 this	 thesis	will	be	covered,	namely	the	relationship	between	nationalism	and	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’	more	broadly,	as	well	 as	 how	belonging,	 diversity	 and	difference	 are	 addressed	 in	public	 political	rhetoric	in	Scotland.	Because	this	project	is	situated	within	the	Scottish	context,	it	is	necessary	 to	 offer	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 nationalism	 studies	 pertaining	 to	 Scotland.	Finally,	 as	 way	 of	 conclusion,	 this	 chapter	 establishes	 the	 theoretical	 framework	within	which	the	present	study	is	situated.	Therefore,	the	broader	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	ground	the	subsequent	discussions	in	historical	and	theoretical	understandings	of	 nationalism	 studies	 and	 nationalist	 narratives,	 and	 to	 consider	 the	 areas	 in	nationalism	studies	to	which	this	study	seeks	to	contribute.				
2.2.	An	overview	of	nationalism	studies	and	its	place	in	sociology	
	
	As	a	point	of	departure,	it	is	important	to	have	a	clear	view	of	the	field	of	nationalism	
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studies	in	an	effort	to	understand	the	background	against	which	more	recent	theories	have	emerged.	Understanding	how	the	field	has	evolved	and	developed	might	help	us	to	decipher	its	weaknesses,	strengths	and	the	direction	it	might	take	in	the	future.				It	was	not	until	the	mid-19th	century	that	nationalism	became	the	subject	of	historical	inquiry,	and	not	until	 the	early	20th	 century	 that	social	 sciences	became	engaged	 in	nationalism	 studies	 (Hutchinson	 &	 Smith,	 1994:3).	 Prior	 to	 World	 War	 I,	 it	 was	mainly	 historians	 and	 social	 philosophers	 that	 studied	 nationalism,	 and	 their	concerns	 were	 largely	 ethical	 and	 philosophical	 in	 nature	 (Özkirimli,	 2000:12).	Historians	like	Hayes	(1931),	Kohn	(1944),	Snyder	(1954)	and	Shafer	(1955)	carried	out	 encyclopaedic	 surveys	 of	 the	 differing	 forms	 of	 nationalism	 found	 around	 the	world,	 while	 Cobban	 (1944)	 and	 Carr	 (1945)	 contributed	 from	 the	 field	 of	international	 relations	 (Day	 &	 Thompson,	 2004).	 Indeed,	 Hayes	 and	 Kohn	 are	regarded	 by	 some	 as	 the	 ‘founding	 fathers’	 of	 the	 academic	 scholarship	 on	nationalism	(Özkirimli,	2000:13).				However,	even	if	these	scholars	did	contribute	to	this	developing	field,	contemporary	theorists	 take	 a	 rather	 critical	 stance	 towards	 their	 early	 predecessors.	 Anderson	(2006)	 criticises	 their	 historical	 reach	 and	 theoretical	 power,	 while	 Smith	 (1996,	1998)	sees	the	absence	of	general	theoretical	models	as	a	great	weakness:	although	the	ideology	of	nationalism	is	analysed,	what	led	to	its	rise	and	spread	is	not.	Though	the	 field	 saw	 a	 rise	 in	more	 sustained	 investigation	 after	World	War	 I,	 nationalism	studies	 really	 took	 off	 from	 the	 1960s	 onwards	 (Hutchinson	 &	 Smith,	 1994:3).	Kedourie’s	Nationalism	 and	 Gellner’s	 essay	 on	 nationalism	 in	 Thought	 and	 Change	were	 published	 in	 1960	 and	 1964	 respectively,	 and	 are	 regarded	 by	many	 as	 “the	pioneering	works	of	the	modernist	approach”	(Özkirimli,	2000:52).				Where,	 then,	 was	 sociology	 during	 this	 early	 period	 of	 nationalism	 studies?	 The	‘founding	 fathers’1,	Weber	 and	Durkheim,	 although	being	 	—	 to	varying	degrees	—	influenced	by	national	thought,	did	not	dwell	on	it	as	a	subject	of	analysis.	For	Weber,																																																									1	See,	however,	important	criticisms	of	the	ways	in	which	the	‘sociological	canon’	is	constructed	and	who	is	included	in	it	—	e.g.	Connell	(1997),	Bhambra	(2007)	and Connell	(2007).	
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the	 turn	 to	 ideology	 could	be	understood	as	 a	way	of	 attempting	 to	 escape	 the	on-going	 rationalisation	 of	 society.	 Early	 social	 theorists,	 such	 as	Marx	 and	Durkheim,	did	not	see	nationalism	as	integral	to	the	forms	of	social	change	which	they	identified	(Day	 &	 Thompson,	 2004:4-7).	 Out	 of	 these	 theorists,	 it	 was	Weber	 who	 discussed	nations	 and	 nationalism	 in	 most	 detail.	 He	 very	 much	 links	 nationalism	 to	 the	historical	attainment	of	 ‘power-positions’	 (1994:21),	and	 therefore	sees	elites	—	or	those	in	power-positions	—	as	central	to	the	development	and	diffusion	of	nationalist	ideas.	Weber	goes	on	to	say	that	the	attachment	to	this	‘political	prestige’	“may	fuse	with	 a	 specific	 belief	 in	 responsibility	 towards	 succeeding	 generations”	 (1994:21).	Consequently,	those	groups	holding			
…the	power	 to	 steer	common	conduct	within	a	polity	will	most	 strongly	 install	
themselves	with	this	ideal	fervor	of	power	prestige.	They	remain	the	specific	and	
most	reliable	bearers	of	 the	 idea	of	 the	state	as	an	 imperialist	power	structure	
demanding	unqualified	devotion.	(Weber,	1994:21)				Here,	 the	 word	 ‘unqualified’	 is	 very	 interesting	 as	 it	 signifies	 ‘total’	 or	 ‘limitless’	devotion;	 that	 is,	 Weber	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 nationalist	 ideas	 speak	 to	 people’s	deepest	senses	of	loyalty	and	commitment.	I	will	pick	up	this	thread	in	Chapter	7	in	relation	 to	 the	 affective	 quality	 of	 nationalist	 narratives.	 Furthermore,	 Weber	contends	that	the	political	prestige	serves	direct	and	material	imperialist	interests,	as	well	 as	 “partly	 ideological	 interests	 of	 strata	 that	 are	 in	 various	ways	 intellectually	privileged	 within	 a	 polity	 and,	 indeed,	 privileged	 by	 its	 very	 existence”	 (1994:21).	These	 strata	 comprise	 “especially	 all	 those	 who	 think	 of	 themselves	 as	 being	 the	specific	 ’partners’	 of	 a	 specific	 ‘culture’	 diffused	 among	 the	members	 of	 the	 polity”	(1994:21).	Here,	“the	naked	prestige	of	‘power’	is	unavoidably	transformed	into	other	special	 forms	 of	 prestige	 and	 especially	 into	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 ‘nation’”	 (1994:21).	Weber’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 elites’	 role	 is	 shared	 by	 Hutchinson	 and	 Smith	 who	argue	that	nationalist	movements	start	with	an	elite	of	 intellectuals,	 then	expand	to	include	 professional	 classes	 who	 often	 act	 as	 political	 agitators,	 and	 finally	 engulf	masses	(1994:5).				As	mentioned,	it	was	from	the	1960s	onwards	that	sociologists	and	political	scientists	began	 to	 increasingly	 take	 part	 in	 discussions	 pertaining	 to	 understanding	 and	
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studying	 nationalism	 (Özkirimli,	 2000:13).	 In	 addition	 to	 Kedorie’s	 and	 Gellner’s	work,	Deutch’s	writings	“gave	a	 fresh	 impetus	 to	 the	debate	on	nationalism”	during	the	1960s	(Özkirimli,	2000:52).	Though	Smith	wrote	extensively	in	the	1970s	(1971;	1973;	1976;	1979),	the	1980s	marked	a	turning	point	as	this	decade	gave	rise	to	the	‘core	 debate’	within	 the	 classical	 approach	 (e.g.	 Armstrong,	 1982;	 Anderson,	 1983;	Gellner,	 1983;	 Smith	 1986)	 which	 was	 further	 consolidated	 in	 the	 1990s	 by	 key	works	 integral	 to	 the	 classical	 approach	 (e.g.	 Greenfeld,	 1992;	 Llobera,	 1994;	Guibernau,	1996)	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:8).	I	will	consider	 the	classical	and	post-classical	approaches	in	due	course,	but	following	this	introduction	I	will	next	turn	to	key	concepts	and	definitional	issues.						
2.3.	Defining	the	key	concepts	
	There	are	multiple	factors	that	complicate	the	study	of	nationalism.	Day	&	Thompson	note	that	the	study	of	nationalism	uses	a	language	and	a	conceptual	apparatus	of	its	own	while	 referring	 to	 historical	 and	 case	 specific	 literature	 (2004:2)	 and,	 thus,	 as	Smith	 (1983)	 points	 out,	 an	 interdisciplinary2	training	 is	 needed.	 Hutchinson	 and	Smith	(1994:3)	identify	as	a	further	obstacle	the	fact	that	“the	forms	that	nationalism	takes	 have	 been	 kaleidoscopic”,	 and	 list	 variants	 such	 as	 religious,	 conservative,	liberal,	fascist,	communist,	diaspora,	and	pan	nationalism.				Crucially,	I	argue	that	a	further	key	complication	is	that	there	is	often	a	tendency	to	employ	concepts	without	paying	due	care	and	attention	to	the	meanings	we	assign	to	them.	The	study	of	nationalism	is	abounds	with	different	concepts	and	ideas	ranging	from	Nationalism/nationalism,	nation,	nationhood,	nationality,	nation-ness,	national	identity,	to	national	consciousness	and	nation-building	—	to	name	but	a	few.	Rustow,	for	example,	has	pointed	out	how	“nationalist	writers	have	done	little	to	clarify	what	they	mean	by	nation”	and,	therefore,	“have	generated	more	heat	than	light”	(quoted	in	Özkirimli,	2005:15).																																																											2	See	Anderson’s	(2016:133-163)	interesting	discussion	of	the	development	of	disciplines	and	interdisciplinarity.	
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Reading	through	the	literature,	it	quickly	becomes	clear	that	a	central	problem	within	the	field	is	confusion	regarding	the	ways	in	which	different	concepts	are	used,	what	their	 relationship	 is	 to	 one	 another,	 and	 how	 different	 nuances	 and	meanings	 are	attributed	 to	 various	 analytical	 categories.	 Thus,	 a	 central	 difficulty	 is	 finding	adequate	 and	 agreed	 definitions	 of	 key	 concepts	 (Hutchinson	 &	 Smith,	 1994:3-4).	However,	 this	 is,	 so	 to	 speak,	 a	 fertile	 difficulty	 in	 that	 it	 goes	 to	 highlight	 the	slipperiness	 and	malleability	 of	 the	 different	 concepts,	 and	 the	 conceptual	 debates	that	follow	offer	crucial	 insights	into	both	the	social	phenomena	under	scrutiny	and	the	study	of	those	social	phenomena	itself.	Importantly,	issues	of	definition	are	deeply	politically	 charged,	 “and	 any	 definition	 of	 the	 nation	 legitimates	 some	 claims	 and	delegitimates	others”	(Calhoun	in	Özkirimli,	2005:15).				Consequently,	we	risk	 taking	 for	granted	and	reifying	 the	very	social	 constructs	we	seek	to	critically	interrogate.	A	problem	related	to	this	within	nationalism	studies,	it	seems	to	me,	is	how	nationalism,	as	a	concept,	is	discussed.	There	is	a	tendency,	often	unwittingly,	 to	 reify	 the	 concept	 of	 nationalism	 and	 to	 refer	 to	 it	 in	ways	 in	which	seem	 to	 endow	 agency	 to	 nationalism;	 that	 is,	 that	 nationalism	 comes	 across	 as	 a	‘thing’	in	and	of	itself.		This,	of	course,	is	misguided:	nationalism	does	not	lead	a	life	of	its	 own	 which	 is	 somehow	 detached	 from	 people.	 Nationalism	 is	 a	 phenomenon	which	stems	from	and	is	created,	changed	and	reproduced	by	people	on	both	macro	and	micro	levels.	Just	as	we	‘do’	gender,	we	also	‘do’	nationalism,	actively	taking	part	in	 shaping	 and	experiencing	 it.	 Thus,	 I	would	urge	 the	 reader	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	when	I	refer	to	 ‘nationalism’	in	the	remainder	of	this	thesis:	I	use	it	as	a	short-hand	and	 my	 intention	 is	 not	 to	 ignore	 the	 active	 processes	 that	 make	 and	 re-make	nationalisms.				Taking	Rustow’s	critique	regarding	the	lack	of	definitions,	as	well	as	the	above	point	regarding	reification	into	account,	this	section	seeks	to,	on	the	one	hand,	engage	with	existing	definitions	of	key	concepts	such	as	nation,	national	identity	and	nationalism	found	 in	 nationalism	 studies	 literature.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 order	 to	 lay	 down	 a	solid	conceptual	basis	for	this	study,	I	will	explain	my	understandings	of	these	terms	and	how	they	are	employed	in	this	research.				
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2.3.1.	Nation	and	state	
	A	 central	 concern	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 understanding	 how	 the	 ‘Scottish	 nation’	 is	constructed	and	imagined;	how	this	‘nation’	is	experienced	by	ethnic	minorities;	and	how	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 ‘race’	 are	 linked	 to	 these	 processes.	 Thus,	 taking	 the	 question	‘what	 is	 a	 nation?’	 as	 a	 definitional	 starting	 point	 seems	 apt.	 Because	 ‘nation’	 and	‘state’	 are	 often,	 especially	 in	 everyday	 language,	 equated	 and	 seen	 to	 denote	 the	same	phenomena,	 it	 seems	 logical	 to	discuss	 the	 two	 in	 tandem.	While	 the	 two	are	closely	related,	they	are	not	the	same	thing	(Spencer	and	Wollman,	2002:2)	as	will	be	explained.	 Scotland	 is	 often	 termed	a	 ‘stateless	nation’	 or	 ‘a	 nation	without	 a	 state’	(something	 that	 political	 actors	 and	 activists	 	 —	 through	 the	 2014	 independence	referendum	—	 sought	 to	 address,	 and	 create	 a	 sovereign	 Scottish	 state).	 Thus,	 in	order	 to	 contextualise	 Scotland	 as	 a	 ‘nation’	 and	 a	 ‘state’,	 dwelling	 on	 these	 two	concepts	in	the	first	instance	seems	appropriate.					As	mentioned,	for	many	the	two	concepts	seem	synonymous.	Sutherland,	for	example,	notes	how	the	adjective	‘national’	is	“often	used	to	describe	matters	pertaining	to	the	state”	which	“is	because	the	nation	has	become	the	key	means	for	states	to	legitimate	their	 power	 over	 people	 and	 place,	 and	 exercise	 both	 domestically	 and	internationally	recognised	authority”	(2012:9).	However,	she	stresses	the	importance	of	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 two	 concepts:	 while	 nation	 “refers	 to	 the	 cognitive,	legitimating	 basis	 for	 authority	 (…),	 the	 state	 embodies	 the	 territorial	 and	institutional	dimensions	of	authority”	(2012:9-10).	The	conception	of	the	nation	is	a	way	 of	 justifying	 where	 borders	 are	 drawn;	 while	 “nation	 need	 not	 have	 a	 state”,	“states	need	some	kind	of	national	construct	to	legitimate	their	control”	(Sutherland,	2012:10).	Therefore,	out	of	the	two	concepts	 ‘nation’	emerges	as	more	powerful	 for	Sutherland	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 states	 rely	 on	 a	 ‘national	 construct’	 as	 a	 basis	 for	legitimacy.			Traditionally,	 different	 ways	 of	 defining	 ‘nation’	 have	 drawn	 on	 what	 have	 been	termed	objective	or	subjective	markers	of	nations	(Davidson,	2000;	Özkirimli,	2005;	Smith	2001).	Stalin,	for	example,	neatly	encapsulates	the	‘objective’	criteria	in	his	oft-quoted	essay	 ‘Marxism	and	the	National	Question’	 from	1913.	 In	 it	he	argues	that	a	
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nation	 is	 a	 historically	 constituted	 community	 of	 people,	 and	 the	 characteristic	features	 that	make	 up	 a	 nation	 are	 common	 language,	 territory,	 economic	 life	 and	psychological	make-up	(manifesting	itself	in	common	culture)	(1994:18-20).	None	of	these	 characteristics	 taken	 separately	make	up	a	nation;	 rather,	 they	all	need	 to	be	present	 simultaneously	 (Stalin,	 1994:20-21).	 Thus,	 Stalin’s	 formulation	 relies	 on	‘objective’	markers	such	as	common	history,	language	and	territory.				On	 the	other	hand,	an	example	of	 ‘subjective’	 criteria	 is	offered	 in	 the	definition	by	Zionist	 Ahad	Ha’am:	 “If	 I	 feel	 the	 spirit	 of	 Jewish	 nationality	 in	my	 heart	 so	 that	 it	stamps	all	my	inward	life	with	its	seal,	 then	the	spirit	of	 Jewish	nationality	exists	 in	me;	 and	 its	 existence	 is	 not	 at	 an	 end	 even	 if	 all	my	 Jewish	 contemporaries	 should	cease	to	feel	it	 in	their	hearts”	(quoted	in	Davidson,	2000:9).	For	Ha’am,	then,	being	part	of	a	nation,	or	his	nationality,	 is	defined	by	a	personal	and	inner	 feeling	that	 is	not	dependent	on	others’	views.	Thus,	commonly	cited	subjective	elements	defining	a	nation	 include	 self-awareness,	 solidarity,	 loyalty	 and	 common	 (or	 collective)	 will	(Özkirimli,	 2005:17-18).	 According	 to	 Hugh	 Seton-Watson	 (1977),	 “a	 nation	 exists	when	a	significant	number	of	people	in	a	community	consider	themselves	to	form	a	nation,	or	behave	as	if	they	form	one”	(quoted	in	Davidson,	2000:9).	For	Davidson,	a	nation	is	“a	human	community	that	has	acquired	national	consciousness”	(2000:11).	Further	 examples	 of	 ‘subjective’	 definitions	 are	 Renan’s	 view	 that	 the	 nation	 is	 “a	large-scale	solidarity,	constituted	by	the	feeling	of	the	sacrifices	that	one	has	made	in	the	past	and	of	those	that	one	is	prepared	to	make	in	the	future”	(quoted	in	Özkirimli,	2005:18).				Özkirimli	 draws	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 objective	 and	 subjective	elements	 in	 that	 objective	 markers	 do	 not	 themselves	 make	 nations,	 but	 “are	necessary	 to	generate	 the	 feeling	of	commonality	 that	gives	birth	 to	or	sustains	 the	nation”	 (2005:18).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 ‘objective’	 elements	 —	 language,	 territory,	culture	—	are	used	as	raw	stock	for	‘subjective’	forms	of	imagining	the	nation.	This	is	an	 important	 argument,	 and	 I	 will	 pick	 it	 up	 in	 Chapter	 5	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘national	values’	and	the	symbolic	resources	(Zimmer,	2003)	nationalist	narratives	draw	on	in	an	effort	to	forge	a	sense	of	the	nation’s	‘character’.			
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Turning	 to	 the	 concept	of	 ‘state’,	 there	 are	 certain	 features	which	different	 authors	see	 as	 central	 to	 it.	 These	 are,	 notably,	 shared	 territory,	 self-governance,	 and	legitimate	use	of	 violence.	Weber	 famously	 argued	 that	 the	 state	has	 the	monopoly	over	 the	 legitimate	 use	 of	 physical	 force	 in	 a	 given	 territory	 (Coakley,	 2012:7).	Similarly,	 Smith	explains	 that	 a	 state	 can	be	 taken	 to	 refer	 to	 “a	 set	of	 autonomous	institutions	 exercising	 a	monopoly	 of	 coercion	 and	 extraction	 in	 a	 given	 territory”	(2009:61-62).	 Coakley	 (2012:11),	 in	 turn,	 argues	 that	 the	 state	 is	 a	 self-governing	territorial	entity	with	a	central	decision	making	agency	which	possesses	a	monopoly	of	the	legitimate	use	of	force	in	ensuring	compliance	with	its	decisions	on	the	part	of	all	 persons	 within	 its	 borders.	 Finally,	 Giddens	 sees	 the	 state	 as	 formative	 to	 the	existence	 of	 nations	 as,	 for	 him,	 nation	 “only	 exists	 when	 a	 state	 has	 a	 unified	administrative	 reach	 over	 the	 territory	 over	 which	 its	 sovereignty	 is	 claimed”	(1994:34).	Thus,	 to	sum	up	his	viewpoint	of	 the	nation-state	as	a	bordered	 ‘power-container’,	 Giddens	 argues	 “the	 nation-state,	 which	 exists	 in	 a	 complex	 of	 other	nation-states,	 is	 a	 set	 of	 institutional	 forms	 of	 governance	 maintaining	 an	administrative	monopoly	over	a	territory	with	demarcated	boundaries	(borders),	its	rule	being	sanctioned	by	law	and	direct	control	of	the	means	of	internal	and	external	violence”	(1994:35).			In	terms	of	the	connections	between	the	two	concepts,	Weber	argues	that	nation	and	state	 are	 intimately	 linked:	 	 “a	 nation	 is	 a	 community	 of	 sentiment	 which	 would	adequately	manifest	itself	in	a	state	of	its	own;	hence,	a	nation	is	a	community	which	normally	tends	to	produce	a	state	of	its	own”	(2009:176).	Smith	(2009:61-62)	argues	broadly	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 as	Weber	 and	notes	 that	 “a	 free	 nation	 often	needs	 a	state	 of	 its	 own	 for	 protection	 and	 the	 nurture	 of	 its	 culture”	 but	 “this	 is	 not	 an	absolute	requirement”	as	has	been	evidenced	by	stateless	nations	such	as	Quebec	and	Catalonia.	 Connor	 sees	 the	 state	 as	 quite	 straightforwardly	 “the	 major	 political	subdivision	 of	 the	 globe”	 which	 is	 easily	 conceptualised	 in	 quantitative	 terms	 by	measuring	 the	number	of	 inhabitants,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 territory	 and	 the	 location,	 for	example	 (1994:36).	 By	 contrast,	 he	 finds	 ‘nation’	 difficult	 to	 define	 “because	 the	essence	of	a	nation	is	intangible”;	the	essence	being	a	“psychological	bond	that	joins	a	people	 and	differentiates	 it,	 in	 the	 subconscious	 conviction	of	 its	members,	 from	all	other	people	in	a	most	vital	way”	(1994:36;	added	emphasis).	The	nature	of	that	bond	is,	however,	shadowy	and	elusive	(Connor,	1994:36).		
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Importantly,	 like	Giddens,	we	often	 refer	 to	 ‘nation-states’,	 thus	 combining	 the	 two	concepts	into	one.	Sutherland,	 for	example,	argues	it	 is	unlikely	that	the	two	will	be	decoupled	in	contemporary	politics	as	citizenship	legislation,	 for	example,	builds	on	nation-based	 criteria	 (2012:127).	 Thus,	 the	 administrative,	 bureaucratic	 and	legislative	 domain	 of	 citizenship	 is	 intimately	 linked	 to	 ideas	 of	 the	 ‘nation’	 and	‘nationhood’.	Connor	notes	how	the	term	‘nation-state’	describes	a	territorial-political	unit	 (state)	 whose	 borders	 (nearly)	 coincide	 with	 the	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 a	national	group	(1994:39).	Greenfeld	argues	that	state	is	an	impersonal,	legal-rational	form	of	government	which	—	at	least	in	principle	—	has	a	representative	character,	while	 also	 being	 an	 implication	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 popular	 sovereignty	 (2004:39).	Greenfeld,	like	Sutherland,	links	state	and	nation	by	saying	that	the	authority	that	the	state	 exercises	 emanates	 from	 the	nation	 (2004:39).	Also	worth	noting	 is	 a	 further	concept	 linked	 to	 the	 state,	 namely	 nation-building	 which	 for	 Sutherland	 means	‘official,	state-led	nationalism’	(2012:7).				In	 terms	of	my	understanding	of	 the	definitional	debates	around	nation	and	state,	 I	would	argue	that	focusing	on	finding	‘objective’	criteria	to	pin	down	the	‘essence’	of	a	nation	 is	 a	 risky	 endeavour.	 Therefore,	 I	 agree	 with	 Bauman’s	 view	 regarding	 the	search	for	an	‘objective	definition’	of	‘nation’:				
The	 search	 for	 an	 ‘objective	 definition’	 obliquely	 legitimizes	 the	 nationalistic	
claims	that	it	is	the	sharing	of	certain	attributes	that	‘makes	a	nation’	(…)	rather	
than	exposing	the	fact	that	the	‘commonality’	 itself	(…)	is	always	an	artefact	of	
boundary-drawing	 activity:	 always	 contentious	 and	 contested,	 glossing	 over	
some	 (potentially	 disruptive)	 differentiations	 and	 representing	 some	 other	
(objectively	 minor)	 differences	 as	 powerful	 and	 decisive	 separating	 factors.	(1992	in	Özkirimli,	2005:17)		Indeed,	 it	 is	 telling	that	 the	concepts	of	nation	and	state	have	become	equated	with	one	another,	especially	 in	elite	political	discourse.	As	previously	mentioned,	Connor	(1994)	argues	that	states	are,	by	and	large,	more	easily	quantifiable	in	terms	of	their	borders	and	population	sizes,	 for	example.	Thus,	 they	 feel	more	real	 and	natural	or	
beyond	question.	They	seem	like	a	 fact	of	 life	—	merely	one	of	 the	different	ways	 in	which	our	social	world	is	organised.	By	equating	nations	with	states,	nations	come	to	feel	more	real	and	natural	as	well.			
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This	 study	 takes	 Benedict	 Anderson’s	 famous	 conceptualisation	 as	 a	 starting	 point	with	regard	to	sociologically	understanding	and	interrogating	the	concept	of	‘nation’.	He	argued	that	nations	are	‘imagined	communities’,	and	“imagined	as	both	inherently	limited	and	sovereign”	(2006:6).	Nation	 is	 imagined	“because	the	members	(…)	will	never	know	most	of	 their	 fellow-members,	meet	 them,	or	even	hear	of	 them,	yet	 in	the	minds	of	each	lives	the	image	of	their	communion”	(2006:6).	In	a	related	sense	to	Anderson’s	 formulation,	 Connor	 argues	 that	 an	 intuitive	 conviction	 of	 the	 nation’s	uniqueness	 gives	 nations	 a	 psychological	 dimension	 approximating	 that	 of	 the	extended	 family	 (1994:38).	 Importantly,	 as	 Spencer	 and	Wollman	 (2005a:5)	 point	out,	 for	 Anderson	 ‘imagined’	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 ‘invented’.	 Indeed,	 Anderson	highlights	 the	 drawback	 with	 Gellner’s	 formulation	 that	 “Nationalism	 is	 not	 the	awakening	 of	 nations	 to	 self-consciousness:	 it	 invents	 nations	 where	 they	 do	 not	exist”	(quoted	in	Anderson,	2006:6):	for	Anderson,	Gellner	“assimilates	‘invention’	to	‘fabrication’	 and	 ‘falsity’,	 rather	 than	 to	 ‘imagining’	 and	 ‘creation’.	 In	 this	 way	 he	implies	 that	 ‘true’	 communities	 exist	 which	 can	 be	 advantageously	 juxtaposed	 to	nations”	(2006:6).				As	outlined	above,	the	state	is	often	conflated	with	nation,	and	the	two	are	taken	to	be	synonyms.	 In	 the	 present	 study,	 the	 state	 is	 taken	 to	 mean	 that	 standardised	 and	formalised	 entity	 that	 has	 power	 over	 the	 legitimate	 use	 of	 violence	 as	 well	 as	political,	institutional,	administrative,	bureaucratic	and	legislative	processes	which	in	turn	 guide	 and	 structure	 life	 within	 the	 borders	 of	 a	 given	 polity.	 However,	 state	borders	do	often,	but	not	always,	contain	within	them	perceived	‘nations’;	that	is,	they	contain	an	‘imagined	community’,	most	of	the	members	of	which	hold	in	their	minds	different	 and	 overlapping	 imaginaries	 of	 a	 communion.	 Furthermore,	 beyond	 state	boundaries,	 there	 can	 also	 be	 ‘diasporas’	 (this	 concept	will	 be	 discussed	 further	 in	Chapter	 4	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Homecoming	 franchise)	 which,	 although	 not	 residing	within	the	confines	of	the	state,	are	nonetheless	seen	to	belong	to	the	‘nation’.	
	
	
	
2.3.2.	Nationalism		The	 concept	 of	 ‘nationalism’	 is	 at	 the	heart	 of	 this	 thesis,	 and	directly	 relates	 to	 all	
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four	central	research	questions.	 I	am	 interested	 in	how	nationalism	 is	narrated	and	experienced,	 and	what	 its	 relationship	 is	 to	 ‘race’	 and	 ‘ethnicity’	 and,	 by	 extension,	diversity,	 difference	 and	 belonging.	 Conventionally,	 a	 number	 of	 authors	 have	suggested	that	nationalism	involves	the	aim	of	creating	a	state	(Davidson,	2000:13).	Spencer	and	Wollman	(2002:2-3)	define	nationalism	as	“an	ideology	which	imagines	the	community	in	a	particular	way	(as	national),	asserts	the	primacy	of	this	collective	identity	over	others,	and	seeks	political	power	in	its	name,	ideally	(if	not	exclusively	or	 everywhere)	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 state	 for	 the	 nation	 (or	 a	 nation-state)”.	 Smith	—	similarly	 to	 Spencer	 and	 Wollman	 above	 —	 also	 highlights	 the	 ways	 in	 which	nationalism	 as	 an	 ideology	 seeks	 to	 create	 nations:	 nationalism	 is	 “an	 ideological	movement	 for	 attaining	 and	 maintaining	 the	 autonomy,	 unity	 and	 identity	 of	 an	existing	or	potential	 ‘nation’”,	and	“as	a	movement,	nationalism	often	antedates,	and	seeks	 to	 create,	 the	 nation,	 even	 if	 it	 often	 pretends	 that	 the	 nation	 already	 exists”	(1989:343).	He	emphasises	that	nationalists	cannot,	however,	create	nations	ex	nihilo.	In	order	for	them	to	reach	their	goals	of	autonomy,	unity	and	identity,	“there	need	to	be	 some	 core	 networks	 of	 association	 and	 culture,	 around	 which	 and	 on	 which	nations	can	be	‘built’”	(1989:343).				In	 an	 effort	 to	 sum	 up	 the	 key	 definitional	 paradigms,	 Smith	 (2001:5-6)	 lists	 the	following	meanings	that	are	usually	associated	with	the	concept	of	‘nationalism’:			 (1)	a	process	of	formation,	or	growth,	of	nations;	
	 (2)	a	sentiment	or	consciousness	of	belonging	to	the	nation;	
	 (3)	a	language	and	symbolism	of	the	nation;	
	 (4)	a	social	and	political	movement	on	behalf	of	the	nation;	
	 (5)	a	doctrine	and/or	ideology	of	the	nation,	both	general	and	particular.	
	Balibar,	 however,	 notes	 that	 defining	 nationalism	 is	 difficult	 because	 it	 never	functions	alone;	rather,	it	is	always	a	part	of	a	chain	(alongside	gender	and	‘race’,	for	example)	in	which	it	is	both	the	central	and	the	weak	link	(2005:164).	Hobsbawm,	on	the	other	hand,	points	to	the	vagueness	of	nationalism	and	its	lack	of	programmatic	content	(1996:357),	thus	allowing	it	 to	be	shaped	and	modified	to	fit	 the	needs	of	a	given	national	project.	It	is,	importantly,	these	characteristics	pointed	out	by	Balibar	and	Hobsbawm	—	that	 is,	nationalisms’	 ‘add-ons’	and	 its	vagueness	—	that	make	 it	
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such	a	potent	 force	 in	the	modern	world.	Nationalist	 ideas	are	highly	malleable	and	flexible,	as	well	as	often	contradictory	(as	will	be	seen	in	Chapters	4-7).	As	Bhabha	so	well	puts	it	(1990:292):	
It	is	the	mark	of	the	ambivalence	of	the	nation	as	a	narrative	strategy	—	and	an	
apparatus	of	power	—	that	it	produces	a	continual	slippage	into	analogous,	even	
metonymic,	 categories,	 like	 the	 people,	 minorities,	 or	 ‘cultural	 difference’	 that	
continually	overlap	in	the	act	of	writing	the	nation.	
	Investigating	these	slippages	into	difference,	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’	in	the	writing	of	the	nation	 is	 crucial	when	seeking	 to	understand	nationalist	narratives	 in	Scotland	and	beyond.			There	is	also	the	issue	of	patriotism	in	relation	to	nationalism.	Connor,	 for	example,	sharply	distinguishes	the	concepts	of	nation	and	nationalism	(or	ethnonationalism,	as	he	calls	it)	from	those	of	state	and	patriotism	(Smith,	2001:15).	Connor,	then,	“would	speak	of	a	Belgian	or	Spanish	‘patriotism’	—	that	is,	a	loyalty	to	the	larger	territorial	state	 and	 its	 institutions	 —	 and	 contrast	 it	 with	 a	 Flemish	 or	 Catalan	 ‘ethno-nationalism’”	 which	 he	 would	 define	 “as	 a	 psychological	 bond	 of	 ancestral	relatedness,	 stemming	 ultimately	 from	 kinship	 sentiment	 —	 even	 if	 the	 myth	 of	origins	 fails	 (as	 it	 so	 often	 does)	 to	 correspond	 to	 real,	 biological	 descent”	 (Smith,	2001:15-15).	Thus,	in	the	British	context,	Connor	sees	British	state	patriotism,	on	the	one	 hand,	 co-existing	 with	 English,	 Scots	 and	 Welsh	 ethno-nationalisms	 (Smith,	2001:16).	 Similarly,	 Kedourie	 (1994:49)	 distinguishes	 nationalism	 from	 patriotism	and	 xenophobia	 “with	 which	 it	 is	 often	 confused”.	 Kedourie	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	“patriotism,	affection	for	one’s	country,	or	one’s	group,	loyalty	to	its	institutions,	and	zeal	 for	 its	 defence,	 is	 a	 sentiment	 known	 among	 all	 kinds	 of	 men”	 (1994:49-50).	Smith,	 however,	 doubts	whether	 such	 a	 sharp	distinction	between	nationalism	 and	patriotism	 can	 be	maintained	 even	 if	 analytically	 useful.	He	 critiques	 the	 idea	with	regard	 to	 the	 example	 of	 British	 patriotism:	 “in	 practice,	 the	 English	 have	 always	found	it	impossible	to	distinguish	their	own	English	ethno-nationalism	from	a	British	patriotism,	 which	 they	 conceive	 of	 equally	 as	 their	 ‘own’”	 (2001:16).	 Thus,	 Smith	argues	 that	 separating	 ‘English	 ethno-nationalism’	 and	 ‘British	 patriotism’	 is	impossible	as	English	nationalism	strongly	relies	on	ideas	of	‘Britishness’.			While	I	agree	with	Smith’s	critique	of	Connor,	I	would,	further,	contest	the	concept	of	
	41		
patriotism	on	analytical	grounds.	Indeed,	it	seems	to	me,	patriotism	is	often	used	as	shorthand	 for	what	 is	 seen	 as	 a	more	 acceptable	 form	 of	 nationalism	 or	 as	wholly	different	 from	 nationalism	 and	 its	 perceived	 negative	 connotations.	 	 For	 example,	Billig	discusses	Northern	Ireland	and	notes	how	Northern	Irish	secessionists	seeking	to	alter	boundaries	are	automatically	seen	as	‘nationalists’	whilst	the	UK	state,	in	its	aim	to	maintain	boundaries,	escapes	such	a	label.	Therefore,	‘nationalist’	often	carries	with	 it	an	association	with	 ‘extreme’	 in	commonplace	semantics.	Thus,	 the	world	of	settled	 nations	 appears	 as	 the	 ‘point-zero	 of	 nationalism’	 as	 wars	 waged	 by	democratic	states	are	not	labelled	nationalist	while,	in	contrast,	those	waged	by	rebel	forces	 are	 (2005:193-195).	 	 In	 the	 Scottish	 context,	 as	 will	 be	 seen	 in	 Chapter	 7,	during	the	referendum	campaign,	those	on	the	Better	Together	side	often	highlighted	their	 acceptable	 ’patriotism’	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 perceived	 unacceptable	’nationalism’	 of	 the	 Yes	 side.	 Thus,	 the	 distinction	 between	 patriotism	 and	nationalism	 quickly	 becomes	 a	 political	 and	 normative	 one	 (as	 is	 the	 case	 with	distinctions	 between	 ‘ethnic’	 and	 ‘civic’	 nationalism	 as	will	 be	 shortly	 discussed	—	see	 Chapter	 4).	 Questions	 need	 to	 be	 asked	 about	 the	 analytical	 usefulness	 of	 the	concept	or,	certainly,	great	care	needs	to	be	taken	if	using	the	term,	and	its	political	connotations	need	to	be	accounted	for.				However,	while	 contemporary	nationalism	studies	usually	 focus	on	and	 foreground	ideas	 around	 ‘narrating	 the	 nation’	 (to	 use	 Bhabha’s	 term)	 and	 emphasise	 the	ambiguity	and	fluidness	of	the	‘nation’,	it	is	important	to	keep	the	state’s	structuring	forces	in	mind.	These	have	a	considerable	and	real	effect	on	people’s	lives.	Thus,	it	is	important	to	avoid	thinking	and	talking	about	nations	as	purely	‘imagined’	or	‘stored	entities’	 that	 are	 “created	 and	 manipulated	 by	 states	 and	 their	 elites”	 (Smith,	2009:14).	 Discussing	 nations	 as	 purely	 ‘imaginings’	 threatens	 to	 hide	 the	 very	 real	consequences	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 on	 people’s	 lives.	 Take	 citizenship	 rules,	 for	example:	 while	 the	 shape	 they	 take	 is	 affected	 by	 seemingly	 abstract	 ideas	 and	discourses	around	who	may	and	may	not	belong	to	a	given	state	and,	by	extension,	‘nation’,	 they	 have	material	 effects	 on	 people’s	 experience.	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 a	close	—	albeit	an	ambiguous	—	relationship	between	nationalism	and	ideas	around	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’.	This	relationship	is,	in	turn,	crucial	—	among	other	factors	—	to	the	 formation	of	national	anti-racism	and	 ‘race	equality’	policies	and	actions.	These	anti-racist	and	‘race	equality’	policies	and	actions,	then,	have	material	and	both	direct	
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and	 indirect	 effects	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 racialised	 ethnic	 minorities	 in	 the	 form	 of,	 for	example,	 policing,	 housing,	 or	 employment,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 potential	 efforts	 to	introduce	positive	action.	They	also	impact	public	attitudes	to	racism.			For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 preceding	 discussion,	analytically,	 I	understand	nationalism	as	two	interlacing	and	overlapping	processes.	On	 the	 one	 hand	 you	 have	 the	 political	 sphere	 where	 the	 world	 is	 seen	 as	 being	organised	in	accordance	with	putative	‘nations’,	and	there	is	an	operating	assumption	that	 these	national	entities	 (which	are	normatively	expected	 to	 fall	perfectly	within	the	 borders	 of	 the	 state)	 should	 be	 sovereign	 and	 independent	 (a	 goal	which	 is,	 of	course,	 limited	 by	 our	 globally	 interconnected	world).	On	 the	 other	 hand	 you	have	nationalism	as	a	narrative;	that	is,	as	a	conglomeration	of	idea(l)s	and	imaginings	of	what	 the	 ‘nation’s’	 ‘essence’	or	 ‘being’	 is.	Through	nationalist	narratives	nations	are	‘storied’	and	given	a	character,	uniqueness,	a	history,	myths,	and	values	among	other	things.	 Nations	 come	 to	 exist	 because	 people,	 through	 nationalist	 narratives,	construct	 them.	 Both	 understandings	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 current	 project:	 on	 the	 one	hand,	 in	 the	 independence	 referendum,	 a	 question	 was	 asked	 whether	 Scotland	should	 be	 a	 sovereign	 national	 entity	 or	 state.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 is	concerned	 with	 questions	 around	 nationalist	 narratives	 and	 the	 type	 of	 nation	Scotland	is	imagined	to	be	and	who	is	regarded	as	belonging	to	it.			Authors	such	as	Zimmer	(2003)	have	emphasised	the	importance	of	specific	symbolic	resources	—	 or	 raw	materials	 (such	 as	 culture	 and	 history,	 for	 example)	—	 social	actors	 use	 when	 constructing	 national	 boundaries.	 I	 also	 argue	 for	 the	 key	importance	of	understanding	the	mechanisms	(Zimmer,	2003)	through	which	nations	come	 to	 be	 imagined	 (Anderson,	 2006)	 —	 that	 is,	 which	 resources	 (e.g.	 values,	historical	myths)	 nationalist	 narratives	 draw	 on,	 and	 how	 they	 do	 this,	 in	 order	 to	conjure	up	an	image	of	a	nation.	This	is	of	great	interest	because	understanding	how	nations	come	to	be	constructed	especially	vis-a-vis	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’	holds	within	it	transformative	potential	from	an	anti-racist	viewpoint:	understanding	how	nations	are	 ‘made’	may	give	us	 clues	as	 to	how	 they	may	be	 re-imagined	or	deconstructed.	Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 once	more	 emphasise	 that	 nationalist	 narratives	 or	 ideas	structure	how	the	material	world	 is	organised,	and	thus	have	real	consequences	on	
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people’s	everyday	 lives.	As	will	be	seen	in	the	subsequent	chapters,	 the	malleability	and	ambiguity	of	nationalism	is	crucial	as	it	allows	nationalist	ideas	and	narratives	to	take	often	contradictory	forms.			
	
2.3.3.	 National	identity/National	consciousness		
		Studying	 and	 explaining	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘identity’	 is	 by	no	means	 a	 straightforward	matter,	and	the	usefulness	of	 ‘identity’	as	an	analytical	concept	has	been	challenged.	Brubaker	 and	 Cooper	 (2000)	 famously	 argued	 that	 social	 scientists	 need	 to	 move	‘beyond	 identity’.	 They	 argue	 that	 researchers	 should	 account	 for	 processes	 of	reification,	and	“avoid	unintentionally	reproducing	or	reinforcing	such	reification	by	uncritically	 adopting	 categories	 of	 practice	 as	 categories	 of	 analysis”	 (2000:5).	 By	categories	 of	 practice	 the	 pair	 refer	 to	 “something	 akin	 to	what	 others	 have	 called	‘native’	or	‘folk’	or	‘lay’	categories”	(2000:4).	Categories	of	analysis	are	those	concepts	we	use	 in	social	and	other	science	to	theorise	and	explain	the	world	around	us.	For	Brubaker	and	Cooper,	then,	‘identity’	as	a	concept	lacks	analytical	purchase,	it	is	too	ambiguous	and	too	torn	between	‘soft’	and	‘hard’	meanings,	essentialist	connotations	and	constructivist	qualifiers	(2000:1-2).				Similarly,	Anthias	(2002)	also	argues	for	the	limited	heuristic	value	of	‘identity’,	and	argues	for	the	use	of	concepts	of	’location’	and	(translocational)	’positionality’	instead	which,	for	her,	would	avoid	the	danger	of	essentialising	identities	via	social	analysis.		Following	Bakhtin,	Anthias	notes	that	her	participants’	notions	of	belonging	and	their	stories	about	the	social	categories	which	they	use	to	 locate	themselves	 in	particular	places	and	times	“are	not	given	or	static,	but	are	emergent,	produced	interactionally	and	 contain	 elements	 of	 contradiction	 and	 struggle,	 that	 is,	 they	 are	 not	 unitary”	(2002:500).	 This	 kind	 of	 understanding	 and	mode	 of	 studying	 identity	would	 then	emphasise	 the	 situated	 nature	 of	 claims	 and	 qualities,	 the	 creation	 of	 these	 in	different	 times	 and	 places,	 and	 recognition	 of	 the	 narration	 as	 an	 action	 or	performance.	However	—	and	this	is	an	important	limitation	—	which	identities	are	available	to	a	person	depends	on	their	social	position.	Thus,	the	capacity	to	mobilise	and	manipulate	certain	cultural	markers	is	dependent	on	the	amount	of	cultural	and	
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social	 power	 the	 said	 individual	 has,	 in	 order	 “to	 ‘pass’	 as	 something	 in	 the	 social	interactions	of	daily	life”	(McCrone,	2002:306).				‘National	 identity’,	 specifically,	 can	 be	 briefly	 understood	 as	 a	 political-cultural	identification	with	territory	(McCrone	&	Bechhofer,	2008:1245).	It	is	important	as	not	only	can	it	affect	life	chances	in	that	being	considered	‘one	of	us’	has	an	effect	on	an	individual’s	 social,	 political	 and	 cultural	 participation	 in	wider	 society	 (McCrone	 &	Bechhofer,	 2008:1246)	 but,	 in	 addition,	 being	 able	 to	 claim	 a	 national	 identity	 and	having	that	claim	accepted	by	others	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	an	individual’s	sense	 of	 inclusion,	 belonging	 or	 acceptance.	 A	 certain	 complication	 to	 the	 study	 of	identity	is	that	matters	of	 identity	seem	everywhere	and	yet	nowhere	because	most	people	do	not	have	to	think	about	or	negotiate	them	explicitly	very	often	(McCrone,	2002:317).	Indeed,	for	most,	national	identity	is	banal	(Billig,	1995)	in	that	it	is	“taken	for	granted,	everyday,	affirmed	by	the	iconography	of	daily	life”	(McCrone,	2002:317).	However,	 taking	 the	 perspective	 of	 those	 on	 the	 margins,	 whether	 in	 national	 or	ethnic	 terms,	 offers	 a	 way	 to	 gain	 an	 improved	 understanding	 of	 the	 negotiation	codes	used	as	people	attempt	to	navigate	their	way	through	processes	of	acceptance	and	affirmation	(McCrone,	2002:315).				This	 latter	point	 is	 important	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	 research	project.	 	On	 the	one	hand,	it	seeks	to	interrogate	the	processes	of	‘belonging’	(and,	consequently,	being	or	becoming	 ‘Scottish’)	 in	 terms	of	understanding	how	the	parameters	of	belonging	 to	the	nation	are	constructed	from	above	especially	vis-à-vis	‘those	on	the	margins’.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 it	 also	 seeks	 to	 understand	 how	 ‘those	 on	 the	margins’	—	 that	 is,	ethnic	minorities	whose	belonging	to	the	nation	may	be	challenged	—	negotiate	and	make	sense	of	‘Scottishness’	and	their	relationship	to	it.			As	we	have	seen,	‘nation’	is	a	contested	and	ambiguous	term	as	well,	and	when	paired	with	 identity	 (‘national	 identity’)	 it	 assumes	 a	 new	 layer	 of	 complexity.	 Davidson	(2000),	 for	 example,	 criticises	 the	 way	 in	 which	 many	 authors	 fail	 to	 distinguish	between	 nationalism	 and	 national	 consciousness	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 between	national	consciousness	and	national	identity	on	the	other.	He	quotes	Guibernau,	who	
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states	that:	
The	 fragmentary	 nature	 of	 current	 approaches	 to	 nationalism	originates	 from	
their	inability	to	merge	its	two	fundamental	attributes:	the	political	character	of	
nationalism	as	an	ideology	defending	the	notion	that	state	and	nation	should	be	
congruent;	and	its	capacity	to	be	a	provider	of	identity	to	individuals	conscious	
of	 forming	 a	 group	 based	 upon	 a	 common	 culture,	 project	 for	 the	 future	 and	
attachment	to	a	concrete	territory.	(1996:3)		Thus,	 Guibernau	 sees	 a	 disconnect	 between	 theories	 of	 nationalism	 and	 national	identity,	and	suggests	that	the	two	do	not	often	meet.	Davidson	also	emphasises	how	national	consciousness	is	different	from	national	identity.	For	him,	“identities	are	the	ensemble	of	all	the	external	signs	through	which	people	show	both	to	themselves	and	to	 other	 people	 that	 they	 have	 chosen	 to	 be	 identified	 in	 that	 particular	 way”	(2000:17).	Billig,	for	whom	“to	have	a	national	identity	is	to	possess	ways	of	talking	about	 nationhood”	 (2005:8),	 also	 notes	 that	 it	 should	 not	 be	 presumed	 that	 “an	identity	 is	 a	 hidden	 psychological	 state,	 as	 if	 there	 is	 a	 wordless,	 psychological	 or	neurological	 state	 of	 ‘having	 an	 identity”	 (1997,	 quoted	 in	 Davidson,	 2000:18).	Davidson	 argues	 that	 national	 consciousness	 is	 indeed	 that	 internal	 psychological	state	 which,	 in	 turn,	 seeks	 expression	 in	 the	 outward	 signs	 of	 identity	 (2000:18).	Smith,	similarly,	talks	about	‘national	sentiment’	finding	its	expression	through	myths	and	symbols	of	the	common	past	(1989:343).				Davidson’s	point	regarding	‘national	consciousness’	and	‘national	identity’	is	a	useful	one.	However,	on	a	practical	level,	it	is	often	difficult	to	neatly	differentiate	between	‘external	signs’	(national	identity)	and	‘psychological	states’	(national	consciousness)	as	 both	 interact	 and	 inform	 one	 another.	 Nonetheless,	 understanding	 that	 national	identity/consciousness	 operates	 and	 is	 constituted	 on	 different	 levels	 helps	 to	understand	 the	 process	 more	 fully.	 For	 simplicity’s	 sake,	 I	 will	 refer	 to	 ‘national	identity’	as	an	umbrella	term	which	includes	both	the	external	and	internal	ways	in	which	a	person’s	national	belonging	is	projected,	felt,	understood	and	experienced	by	that	 person.	 Importantly,	 beyond	 the	 individual,	 other	 people	 constantly	 make	assumptions	or	judgements	about	you	in	terms	of	who	you	are	and	whether	you	are,	for	example,	‘Scottish’	or	not.	In	turn,	those	assumptions	we	make	about	other	people	may	serve	to	consolidate	or	challenge	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	ourselves	in	national	terms.		
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Identities	 do	 not	 exist	 in	 a	 vacuum;	 they	 are	 deeply	 relational.	 Who	 we	 are	 also	depends	 on	 who	 or	 what	 we	 are	 not.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Anthias’s	 ‘translocational	positionality’	is	a	helpful	framework	for	thinking	through	the	ways	in	which	identities	may	 shift	 across	 social	 contexts	—	 that	 is,	 how	 you	 identify	 yourself	 may	 change	depending	on	where	and	with	whom	a	social	interaction	takes	place.	Anthias	argues	along	the	same	lines	with	Brubaker	and	Cooper	(2000)	and	notes	that	‘identity’	tends	to	 function	as	a	disabling	concept	 in	 that	 it	 “limits	 the	 focus	and	moves	 the	analyst	away	 from	 context,	 meaning	 and	 practice”	 (2002:493).	 Instead,	 she	 advocates	 for	understanding	 ‘identity’	 via	 narratives	 of	 location,	 and	 positionality.	 Here,	 location	refers	to	“an	account	that	tells	a	story	about	how	we	place	ourselves	in	terms	of	social	categories	such	as	those	of	gender,	‘ethnicity’	and	class	at	a	specific	point	in	time	and	space”	(Anthias,	2002:498	—	see	also	D.E.	Smith,	2005).	Positionality,	in	turn,	refers	to	“placement	within	a	set	of	relations	and	practices	that	implicate	identification	and	‘performativity’	or	action”	(Anthias,	2002:501).					
2.4.	Origins	of	nations	—	Classical	theories		After	attempting	to	clarify	some	of	the	conceptual	debates,	the	next	area	to	look	at	is	the	different	theories	of	nationalism.	I	will	focus	on	both	‘classical’	and	‘postclassical’	theories.	 While	 the	 former	 theories	 are	 more	 concerned	 with	 historical	 debates	regarding	when	and	why	nations	come	to	emerge,	the	latter	seek	to	move	beyond	the	origin	 debates	 and	 pose	 new	 types	 of	 questions	 about	 national	 phenomena.	 My	research	questions	speak	more	directly	 to	postclassical	 theories	and	are	 focused	on	the	“here	and	now”	(Fox	and	Miller-Idriss,	2008b)	(though	my	analysis	is	historically	informed)	and	I	do	not	seek	to	uncover	at	what	point,	historically,	the	‘Scottish	nation’	came	 to	 exist.	 Thus,	 the	 emphasis	will	 be	 on	 postclassical	 theories	 but	 in	 order	 to	understand	the	importance	and	value	of	them,	it	is	worth	situating	these	theories	in	a	broader	 context.	 This	 will	 help	make	 sense	 of	 why	 there	 has	 been	 a	 shift	 to	 post-classical	debates.				Within	the	classical	approach	to	nationalism	there	are	two	main	camps	—	modernists	and	 ethnicists/ethnosymbolists.	 While	 modernists	 insist	 that	 nations	 are	 recent	
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phenomena	—	taking	shape	 from	the	 late	18th	century	onwards	—	with	next	 to	no	connection	to	the	past,	ethnicists/ethnosymbolists	argue	that	the	roots	of	nations	lie	in	 the	early	medieval	 times	and	are	based	on	ethnie,	 to	use	Smith’s	 concept.	 Smith,	one	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	 ethnosymbolists,	 is	 interested	 in	 looking	 at	 how	“collective	 identities	 in	 pre-modern	 eras	 helped	 to	 shape	 modern	 nations”	(1989:341).	 Thus,	 Smith	 and	 fellow	 ethnicists/ethnosymbolists	 such	 as	 Connor,	Hutchinson	and	Armstrong	regard	“nations	as	specialised	developments	of	ethnic	ties	and	ethnicity”	and	claim	that	“we	cannot	hope	to	comprehend	the	powerful	appeal	of	the	 nation	 without	 addressing	 its	 relationship	 with	 ethnic	 ties	 and	 sentiments”	(Smith,	 2006:169)	 as	 well	 as	 with	 popular	 ethnic	 traditions	 (Smith,	 2005a:25-6).	Consequently,	 “nations	 are	 formed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 prior	 ethnic	 ties	 and	 networks,	which	 provide	 nationalists	 with	 cultural	 resources	 for	 their	 projects	 of	 ‘nation-building’”	—	 “without	 such	 resources,	 the	 task	 of	 forging	 new	 nations	 becomes	 an	uphill	struggle	against	disunity	and	fragmentation”	(Smith,	2006:169).				Smith	focuses	on	 ‘la	 longue	durée’	when	seeking	to	explain	and	understand	modern	nations	and	nationalisms	—	thus,	the	origins	and	formation	of	nations	must	be	traced	over	 long	 periods	 of	 time	 (2005a:23).	 Hastings	 argues	 that	 the	 origin	 of	 nations	should	be	identified	at	an	earlier	time	in	history	than	modernists	‘feel	safe	to	handle’;	that	is,	all	the	way	back	to	the	shaping	of	medieval	society	(2005a:37).	Smith	admits	that	in	antiquity	and	in	much	of	the	medieval	era,	nations	as	they	are	now	understood	—	following	his	own	definition	in	which	they	are	understood	as	named	communities	of	 history	 and	 culture,	 possessing	unified	 territories,	 economies,	 education	 systems	and	common	legal	rights	—	were	“rarely,	if	ever,	to	be	found”	(1989:344).				What	is	key	to	Smith’s	argument,	however,	is	the	existence	of	pre-modern	‘ethnies’	or	‘ethnic	 communities’	 as	 we	 now	 call	 them.	 Smith	 argues	 that	 different	 ethnies	manifest	 certain	 characteristics	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 degree,	 namely:	 a	 common	name	 for	 the	 unit	 of	 population	 included;	 a	 set	 of	 myths	 of	 common	 origins	 and	descent	for	that	population;	some	common	historical	memories	of	things	experienced	together;	a	common	‘historic	territory’	or	‘homeland’,	or	an	association	with	one;	and	one	or	more	elements	of	common	culture	(language,	customs	or	religion)	(1989:344-5).	While	some,	e.g.	“the	speakers	of,	say,	Slovakian	and	Ukrainian	dialects”	lacked	a	
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consciousness	of	their	membership	in	any	single	community,	there	were	nonetheless	a	 multitude	 of	 ethnies	 in	 the	 ancient	 and	 medieval	 worlds	 “which	 at	 first	 sight	resemble,	 but	 are	 not,	 nations”	 (1989:345).	 Therefore,	 Smith	 recognises	 the	modernity	 of	 nations	 as	 we	 now	 understand	 them	 but	 argues	 for	 their	 solid	rootedness	 in	previous	ethnies.	 These	ethnies,	 in	 turn,	 provide	 the	 raw	material	 for	nation-building	processes.	Thus,	there	is	a	parallel	here	to	Zimmer’s	(2003)	‘process-oriented	 approach’	 which	 agues	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 considering	 the	 symbolic	resources	nationalist	narratives	use	when	constructing	nations.			Gellner	 (who	was	 Smith’s	 supervisor),	Hobsbawm,	Anderson	 and	 other	modernists	do	 not	 see	 nations	 and	 nationalism	 as	 extending	 their	 roots	 beyond	 the	 period	associated	with	the	major	socio-economic	processes	of	modernity	(Day	&	Thomson,	2004:9).	Modernists	believe	that	Smith	et	al’s	approach	is	fundamentally	flawed:	they	argue	that	it	gives	too	much	weight	to	the	claims	of	nationalists	themselves,	and	that	‘nation’	—	 in	any	 sense	we	 recognise	 it	 today	—	does	not	have	deep	 roots	but	 is	 a	modern	phenomenon	which	emerged	at	a	particular	point	in	time	for	specific	reasons	(Spencer	 &	 Wollman,	 2005:5).	 For	 Gellner,	 “nationalism	 is	 not	 the	 awakening	 of	nations	to	self-consciousness:	it	invents	nations	where	they	do	not	exist”	(1964:168-9).	Hobsbawm	argues	along	the	same	lines	by	saying	that	“nations	do	not	make	states	and	nationalisms,	but	the	other	way	around”	and	that	nation	is	a	recent	phenomenon	and	“a	social	entity	only	in	so	far	as	it	relates	to	a	certain	kind	of	modern	territorial	state,	the	‘nation	state’	and	it	is	pointless	to	discuss	nation	and	nationality	except	in	so	 far	 as	 both	 relate	 to	 it”	 (1990:9-10).	 Gellner	 notes	 that	 a	 modernist	 theory	considers	nationalism	to	be	an	inherently	modern	phenomenon	but,	at	the	same	time,	it	 does	 not	 consider	 all	 social	 phenomena	 to	 be	 modern:	 culture	 and	 power	 are	perennial	but	they	come	to	be	related	to	each	other	in	a	new	way	in	the	modern	age	—	in	a	way	that	engenders	nationalism	(2005:42).	While	Gellner,	perhaps	somewhat	confusingly	 given	 his	 broader	 stance,	 agrees	 that	 some	 nations	 possess	 ‘genuine	ancient	 navels’,	 some	navels	 have	been	 invented	 and	 some	 are	navel-less	—	out	 of	these	categories	he	suspects	the	second	one	to	be	the	most	common	(2005:44).				According	 to	Gellner,	 transition	 from	one	kind	of	 society	 to	 another	—	 in	 this	 case	from	an	 agrarian	 society,	where	 literacy	was	 limited	 to	 elites,	 to	modern	 industrial	
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societies	which	require	extensive	communication	between	their	mobile	members	—	creates	 the	 need	 for	 nations	 due	 to	 the	 need	 for	 communication	 in	 a	 highly	differentiated	society	(Spencer	&	Wollman,	2005a:5).	Thus,	“nationalism	derives	from	the	requirement	of	industrial	economies	for	a	workforce	with	at	least	a	generalised,	basic	 education	 such	 as	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 centralising	 19th	 century	 state”	 (Day	 &	Thompson,	 2004:9).	 The	 new	 public	 culture	 that	 is	 created	 and	 reinforced	 by	 the	state	 becomes,	 then,	 the	national	 culture	 for	 the	majority	 of	 the	population	 (Day	&	Thompson,	 2004:9).	 Gellner	 argues	 that	 culture	 is	 produced	 by	 a	 centralised	education	 system	 and,	 consequently,	 ‘culture’	 becomes	 identity:	 therefore,	 national	identity	becomes	valued	in	modern	societies	not	because	of	any	desire	for	stability	or	belonging,	but	due	to	sociological	forces	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:9:10-11).				Anderson	 (2006)	 links	 the	 emergence	 of	 nationalism	 to	 capitalism,	 technological	developments	and	 to	 the	 spreading	of	 the	vernacular	and,	 in	 addition,	 especially	 to	the	American	War	of	Independence.	In	his	memoirs,	Anderson	(2016:128),	however,	concedes	 that	 there	 were	 issues	 with	 his	 approach,	 noting	 that	 using	 nations	 and	nation-states	 as	 basic	 units	 of	 analysis	 ignored	 how	 these	 units	were	 tied	 together	and	crosscut	by	global	political-intellectual	 currents	 such	as	 liberalism,	 fascism	and	socialism	 as	 well	 as	 by	 religious	 networks	 and	 economic	 and	 technological	 forces.	Thus,	he	points	out	how	very	few	people	are	‘solely’	nationalist.				For	 Breuilly,	 Gellner	 et	 al’s	 approaches	 seem	 too	 abstract,	 and	 he	 thus	 locates	nationalism	in	a	conception	of	modernity	in	which	politics	plays	a	more	central	role.	Here,	the	emergence	of	the	modern	state	is	key	because	the	prime	focus	of	nationalist	mobilisation	is	gaining	control	of	the	nation	state’s	power	and	resources.	Therefore,	nationalist	 ideas	 are	 not	 important	 for	 their	 own	 sake;	 rather,	 they	 are	 important	because	 they	 are	 used	 for	 identifiable	 projects	 and	 purposes	 (Spencer	 &	Wollman,	2005a:6).	 Most	 modernists	 —	 although	 Anderson	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 —	 have	 a	particularly	 Western	 focus	 as	 they	 locate	 the	 key	 features	 of	 modernity,	 such	 as	industrialisation,	mass	literacy	and	print	capitalism,	in	the	West	(Spencer	&	Wollman,	2005a:6).			Although	 classical	 theories	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 origins	 of	 nations	 help	 to	 situate	 the	
	50		
debate	on	nationalism	in	a	historical	context,	and	highlight	some	of	the	key	moments	in	 the	 forming	 of	 nations,	 critical	 questions	must	 be	 asked	 about	 the	 usefulness	 of	these	 debates	 —	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 nations	 and	 nationalisms	currently	 and	 because	 the	 debates	 tend	 to	 remain	 rather	 stagnant.	 In	 classical	debates,	 nations	 and	 nationalism	 are	 often	 seen	 as	 unproblematic	 and	straightforward	concepts:	although	opinions	vary	about	the	origin	and	modernity	of	nations	and	nationalism,	as	concepts,	they	avoid	further	scrutiny.				Historically,	 the	 classical	 debate	 has	 dominated	 the	 study	 of	 nationalism	 with	 its	grand	narratives.	In	the	process,	however,	classical	theory	often	misses	the	nuances	and	 ambiguities,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 pluralism	 of	 nations	 and	 nationalisms.	 The	intersections	 between	nationalism	 and	 ‘race’	 and	 ‘ethnicity’	 (a	 key	 concern	 for	 this	thesis),	gender,	sexuality	and	faith,	for	example,	go	unexplored.	In	addition,	they	also	concentrate	on	the	view	from	above	at	 the	expense	of	 the	view	from	below.	Thus,	 I	will	 now	 turn	 to	 post-classical	 debates	 which	 seek	 to	 address	 these	 issues.	 Before	doing	 so,	 however,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 I	will	 revisit	 the	 idea	 that	 contemporary	nationalisms	draw	on	historical	 raw	materials	—	as	 suggested	by	 Smith	 et	 al	—	 in	Chapter	 5	 specifically,	where	 I	 consider	 the	ways	 in	which	 Scotland	 is	 framed	 as	 a	‘value	community’.	Thus,	in	an	effort	to	uncover	how	the	‘Scottish	nation’	is	imagined	and	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 are	 mobilised	 contemporarily,	 Smith’s	 points	 in	relation	to	ethnies	are	of	use.					
2.5.	Post-classical	theories	of	nations	and	nationalism				Post-classical	 approaches,	which	 represent	an	alternative	 to	 classical	 theories,	have	become	more	prominent	since	the	1990s.	What	unites	these	theories	is	the	“belief	in	the	need	to	transcend	the	classical	debate	by	proposing	new	ways	of	thinking	about	national	 phenomena”	 (Özkirimli,	 2000:191)	 and	 there	 is	 an	 aspiration	 towards	redefining	the	terms	of	the	debate	while	posing	new	and	different	questions	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:13).			Day	&	Thompson	(2004)	offer	a	useful	four-fold	typology	of	the	main	features	of	post-
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classical	 theory.	 Firstly,	 post-classical	 theory	 is	 less	 involved	 and	 interested	 in	forming	general	historical-sociological	 theories	 regarding	 the	 rise	 and	development	of	nationalism.	Although	historical	sociology	is	not	abandoned	altogether,	there	is	less	focus	on	the	longue	durée	and	more	on	the	day-to-day	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:15).	Brubaker	 (1996:19),	 for	 example,	 is	 more	 concerned	 with	 the	 ‘eventful’	 than	 the	‘developmental’	nationalism	and	studies	“nationness	as	an	event,	(…)	as	a	contingent,	conjuncturally	fluctuating,	and	precarious	frame	of	vision	and	basis	for	individual	and	collective	action”.	He	challenges	 the	 treatment	of	nations	as	real	entities	and	shows	that	 they	 are,	 indeed,	 subject	 to	 continual	 renegotiation	 across	 time:	 rather	 than	reflecting	 reality,	 nationalism	 helps	 to	 organise	 people	 into	 groups.	 Post-classical	theory	 is,	 thus,	 influenced	by	a	turn	against	 ‘grand	narratives’	and	seeks	to	uncover	the	 temporality	 of	 nationalism.	 It	 also	 involves	 critical	 reflection	 on	 the	 practice	 of	social	 theory	 itself	 	 —	 especially	 on	 how	 social	 theorists	 reify	 the	 nation	 (Day	 &	Thompson,	2004:15).				Secondly,	post-classical	theory	is	post-foundational	in	that	it	rejects	the	idea	that	we	can	 point	 to	 distinct	 nations	 that	 are,	 for	 example,	 bounded	 by	 a	 common	 culture.	These	approaches	thus	concentrate	on	how	the	‘nation’	is	constituted	in	various	times	and	places,	often	through	competing	discourses	of	the	same	nation	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:16).				Thirdly,	post-classical	 theory	nonetheless	 takes	 into	account	 the	normative	value	of	the	idea	of	nation	as	a	real	community.	As	Miller	(1995)	notes,	even	if	nations	are	not	real	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 they	have	 an	 existence	 independent	of	people’s	 thoughts	 about	them,	it	is	still	possible	to	conceive	of	a	‘common	public	culture’	and	it	is	thus	possible	to	 speak	 of	 nations	 as	 substantive	 entities.	 Miller	 also	 points	 out	 that	 they	 can	 be	“created	 and	 sustained	 by	 active	 processes	 of	 thought	 and	 interchange	 among	 the	relevant	 body	 of	 people”	 (1995:6).	 Consequently,	 a	 nation	 is	 a	 form	 of	 community	whose	values	and	identity	are	subject	to	on-going	negotiation	and	reflection	(Day	&	Thompson,	2004:16).				Finally,	post-classical	theory	involves	“a	broad	emphasis	on	the	active	role	of	people	
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in	 interpreting	 and	making	 sense	 of	 nationalism	 and	 national	 identity”;	 thus,	 post-classical	 theories	 often	 conceptualise	 “nationalism	 as	 something	 that	 people	 create	together,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 over	 which	 they	 have	 no	 control”	 (Day	 &	Thompson,	2004:16).				Post-classical	approaches	draw	on	different	areas	of	social	theory.	For	example,	social	theory	 pertaining	 to	 gender,	 sexuality	 and	 feminism	 highlights	 the	 relationship	between	 nationalist	 discourses,	 symbolism	 and	 patriarchal	 practices	 and	 ideology	while	 looking	 at	 connections	 between	 nationalism	 and	 gendered	 discourses	 of	sexuality	 and	 sexual	 morality	 (Day	 &	 Thompson,	 2004:13).	 Yuval-Davis	 (1997:1)	notes	 how	 most	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 theorisations	 of	 nations	 and	 nationalism	 have	ignored	 gender	 relations	 as	 irrelevant.	While	 primordialists	 such	 as	 Geertz	 (1963),	Shils	 (1957)	 and	 van	den	Berghe	 (1979)	 regard	nations	 as	 an	 extension	 to	 kinship	relations,	 they	 forget	 women	 when	 discussing	 national	 ‘(re)production’,	 instead	relating	 it	 to	 state	 bureaucracies	 or	 intellectuals	 who	 are	 seen	 to	 establish	 and	 to	reproduce	national	and	ethnic	state	boundaries	and	ideologies	(Yuval-Davis,	1997:1-2).	Yuval-Davis	argues,	however,	that	it	is	“women	—	and	not	(just?)	the	bureaucracy	and	intelligentsia	—	who	reproduce	nations,	biologically,	culturally	and	symbolically”	(Yuval-Davis,	1997:2).	As	nationalism	is	more	often	than	not	discussed	with	regard	to	the	public	political	 sphere,	because	women	have	 long	been	 relegated	 to	 the	private	sphere,	women	usually	remain	excluded	from	the	political	arena	(Pateman,	1988;	see	also	Kandiyoti,	1991).				An	important	and	growing	field	within	post-classical	theories	of	nationalism	looks	at	everyday	 nationalism.	 Fox	 and	 Miller-Idriss	 (2008a:537)	 argue	 that	 mainstream	nationalism	studies	have	focused	on	the	political,	economic	and	cultural	determinants	of	popular	nationalism	somewhat	at	the	expense	of	the	people.	That	is,	the	popularity	of	nationalism	has	not	been	systematically	accounted	for,	and	people	are	“assumed	to	be	 attuned	 to	 the	 national	 content	 of	 their	 self-appointed	 nationalist	 messengers”	(Fox	 &	 Miller-Idriss,	 2008a:537).	 Fox	 and	 Miller-Idriss,	 however,	 argue	 that	 the	nation	“is	not	simply	the	product	of	macro-structural	forces;	it	is	simultaneously	the	practical	 accomplishment	 of	 ordinary	 people	 engaging	 in	 routine	 activities”	(2008a:537).		
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Billig’s	work	has	been	highly	influential	within	this	field,	especially	Banal	Nationalism	(1995).	With	 ‘banal	nationalism’,	Billig	refers	to	those	 ideological	habits	 that	enable	the	established	nations	of	 the	West	 to	be	reproduced.	 Importantly,	 these	habits	are	far	 from	 being	 removed	 from	 everyday	 life,	 as	 some	 have	 supposed.	 Here,	 Billig	criticises	 especially	 Giddens	 who	 maintains	 that	 nationalism	 is	 a	 “primarily	psychological”	phenomenon,	and	that	nationalist	sentiments	arise	when	the	“sense	of	ontological	 security	 is	 put	 in	 jeopardy	 by	 the	 disruption	 of	 routines”	 (1985:218),	making	nationalism	an	exception	rather	than	a	rule	because	nationalist	feelings	“are	not	 so	 much	 a	 part	 of	 regular	 day-to-day	 social	 life”	 (1985:215).	 	 For	 Billig,	nationalism	is	very	much	the	rule.	Indeed,	the	nation	is	indicated,	or	‘flagged’,	daily	in	the	lives	of	its	citizenry	which	means	that	nationalism,	“far	from	being	an	intermittent	mood	in	established	nations”,	is	rather	the	“endemic	condition”	(1995:7).	Nationhood	provides	a	 continual	background	 for	political	discourses	and	 cultural	products,	 and	the	 reminding	 is	 so	 familiar	 and	 continual	 that	 it	 often	 escapes	 our	 conscious	awareness.				Studying	 nationhood	 via	 studying	 the	 everyday	 is	 a	 fairly	 recent	 endeavour.	 As	mentioned,	 the	 1990s	 was	 characterised	 by	 a	 rejection	 of	 grand	 narratives	 in	nationalism	studies	(Smith,	2008:564),	and	‘everyday	nationhood’	studies	emerged	as	a	 rejection	of	what	was	 seen	 as	 elite-centred	 studies	 conducted	by	modernists	 and	their	 opponents	 —	 thus,	 the	 focus	 shifted	 to	 non-elites	 and	 ‘the	 people’	 (Smith,	2009:134).	Although	himself	a	‘grand	narrativist’,	Hobsbawm	notes	that	even	though	nationalism	 is	 mainly	 constructed	 from	 above,	 it	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 analysed	 from	below	—	that	is,	in	terms	of	the	“assumptions,	hopes,	needs,	longings	and	interests	of	ordinary	 people,	 which	 are	 not	 necessarily	 national	 and	 still	 less	 nationalist”	(1990:10).	For	Fox	and	Miller-Idriss,	then,	the	nation	is	a	discursive	construct	in	that	it	 is	 simultaneously	 produced	 by	 people	 on	 the	 ground,	 and	 through	 their	 daily	activities.	 Thus,	 following	 from	 Bourdieu,	 “these	 discursive	 acts	 are	 not	 simply	descriptive	 of	 social	 reality;	 they	 are	 simultaneously	 constitutive	 of	 that	 reality,	willing	 into	 existence	 that	 which	 they	 name”	 (1991:223	 in	 Fox	 and	 Miller-Idriss,	2008a:538).	 Therefore,	 nationalism	 operates	 and	 is	 discursively	 constructed	 both	from	above	as	well	as	from	below.		
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Everyday	 nationhood	 studies	 have,	 nonetheless,	 come	 under	 attack	 from	 Anthony	Smith,	 for	 example,	 who	 argues	 that	 ethno-symbolism	 straddles	 the	 gap	 between	historical	 grand	 narratives	 and	 cultural	 micro	 analyses	 of	 “ordinary	 people”	(2009:135).	According	 to	him,	ethno-symbolists	 share	a	 focus	on	non-elites’	beliefs,	activities	 and	 attitudes,	while	 those	 studying	 everyday	nationhood	 “pay	 little	 or	 no	regard”	to	history	(2009:134).	Furthermore,	he	states	that	ethno-symbolism,	which	is	rooted	in	the	understanding	of	history,	concerns	itself	with	“historic	nationhood”	as	well	as	everyday	nationhood	 in	 that	 it	considers	 the	ways	 in	which	various	cultural	legacies	and	traditions	of	previous	generations	provide	essential	frames	of	reference	for	subsequent	generations	whose	members	adapt	them	to	changing	conditions	and	new	 challenges	 (Smith,	 2009:134).	 Consequently,	 ethno-symbolism,	 according	 to	Smith,	 came	 to	 be	 due	 to	 the	 dissatisfaction	 with	 purely	 structural	 modernist	accounts	 of	 nationalism,	 which	 failed	 to	 pay	 attention	 to	 cultural	 and	 symbolic	elements	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 formation	 and	 shape	of	 nations	 and	nationalisms	(Smith,	2009:135).			
However,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 ethno-symbolism	 fails	 to	 uncover	 the	 ways	 in	 which	nationhood	and	nationalisms	play	out	in	people’s	everyday	lives	on	the	ground,	that	is,	 it	 —	 alongside	 other	 grand	 theories	 —	 fails	 to	 capture	 the	 experience	 of	nationalism.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 disregard	 grand	 narratives	 as	 both	 micro	 and	 macro	analyses	are	 important,	and	both	are	needed.	 If	we	want	 to	achieve	a	well-rounded	and	full	understanding	of	nationalism	at	work	in	the	contemporary	world,	we	need	to	study	 the	 “here	 and	now”,	 as	 Fox	 and	Miller-Idriss	put	 it	 (2008b),	while	 remaining	attuned	to	debates	with	regard	to	history.	Furthermore,	we	need	to	understand	how	nationalist	 narratives,	 many	 of	 which	 seek	 their	 legitimacy	 from	 history,	 operate	contemporarily.	Understanding	how	history,	among	other	elements,	 is	appropriated	in	 nationalist	 narratives	 helps	 us	 understand	 the	 context	 in	 which	 people,	 both	nationals	 and	non-nationals,	 experience	nationalist	 ideas	 in	 today’s	 society.	While	 I	do	agree	that	there	is	a	tendency	in	some	nationalism	studies	to	disregard	history	and	only	study	the	‘here	and	now’	without	acknowledgement	as	to	how	we	arrived	‘here’	in	 the	 first	 place,	 this	 kind	 of	 belittling	 of	 everyday	 nationhood	 studies	 seems	unwarranted.	I	am,	consciously,	trying	to	address	this	gap	between	micro	and	macro	theories,	as	well	as	contextualise	my	work,	which	looks	at	Scotland	contemporarily,	in	relation	to	the	history	of	Scotland.	
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As	 Fox	 and	 Miller-Idriss	 note	 in	 their	 reply	 to	 Smith	 (2008b:574),	 their	 primary	research	 focus	 is	not	historical;	 rather,	 they	are	 interested	 in	 the	 ‘here	and	now’	of	nationhood,	 i.e.	 “the	 everyday	 contexts	 in	which	 nationhood	 becomes	 (or	 is	made)	meaningful	 for	 (or	 by)	 ordinary	 people”.	 Furthermore,	 they	 note	 how	 historically	sensitive	 approaches,	 such	 as	 Smith’s,	 and	 their	more	 contemporary	 approach,	 are	not	 incompatible	 but	 are	 guided	 by	 different	 concerns.	While	 Smith	 focuses	 on	 the	moment	 of	 ethnogenesis,	 Fox	 and	Miller-Idriss	—	 and	 their	 colleagues	—	 focus	 on	“the	ways	 in	which	 ethnonational	 idioms	—	once	 in	 circulation	—	are	 enacted	 and	invoked	 by	 ordinary	 people	 in	 the	 routine	 contexts	 of	 their	 everyday	 lives”	(2008b:574).	 While	 Smith	 and	 his	 colleagues,	 whether	 modernists	 or	ethnosymbolists,	 have	 theorised	about	how	 “such	 idioms	have	 entered	 circulation”,	“the	 availability	 of	 such	 idioms	 (…)	 does	 not	 in	 itself	 explain	when,	where	 or	 how	those	idioms	actually	get	manipulated	by	their	end	users:	ordinary	people	in	the	‘here	and	now’	of	everyday	life”	(Fox	and	Miller-Idriss,	2008b:574).					Smith	does,	however,	 level	apt	criticism	against	everyday	nationalism	studies	when	he	asks:		
And	 what	 is	 the	 relevant	 frame	 of	 reference	 of	 the	 various	 immigrant	
communities	 in	western	states?	Here,	 the	 failure	 to	 separate	ethnic	community	
from	nationhood	conceals	as	much	as	it	reveals.	(Smith,	2008:567)	I	agree	with	this	criticism	to	some	degree	—	everyday	nationalism	studies	have	not	made	great	inroads	into	investigating	how	minorities	experience	nationalism	in	their	daily	 lives.	 Although	 looking	 at	 those	 whose	 “sense	 of	 belonging,	 and	 entitlement,	remains	 largely	 ‘beyond	question’”	 is	 of	 great	 interest,	 and,	 although	 it	means	 that,	consequently,	 “we	 may	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 explain	 why	 national	 forms	 of	identification	and	organisation	matter	and,	 just	as	 importantly,	why	such	 issues	are	being	debated	so	ferociously	at	the	current	time”	(Skey,	2011:2),	we	also	need	to	look	at	those	whose	national	membership	comes	under	scrutiny	and	is	problematised,	and	the	ways	in	which	the	nation	is	evoked	in	their	daily	lives.			As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	6,	in	sociological	writing	pertaining	to	everyday	nationalism,	the	everyday	is	often	taken	to	uncritically	mean	the	context	in	which	 things	happen,	while	 this	 context	 is	never	systematically	 scrutinised.	Passing	
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through	everyday	contexts	in	an	unreflective	and	unremarkable	way	is	not	an	option	for	 everyone	 (Smith,	 2016).	 Everyday	 nationalism	 studies	 have	 mainly	 focused	 on	those	whose	national	belonging	is	not	called	under	question,	and	whose	everyday	is	often	marked	by	unreflectiveness.	However,	looking	at	those	whose	belonging	comes	under	 scrutiny	 and	 challenge	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives	 reveals	 much	 about	 the	relationship	 between	 race	 and	 nation,	 for	 example,	 and	 this	 focus	 also	 begins	 to	disrupt	the	idea	of	the	everyday	as	mundane	and	unremarkable.	Indeed,	the	constant	challenges	to	the	right	to	occupy	the	space	that	you	do,	and	reminders	that	you	do	not	belong,	demonstrate	how	unreflectiveness	 in	relation	 to	 the	everyday	 is	a	privilege.	Black	 and	 brown	 Scots,	 especially,	 often	 face	 a	 continuous	 struggle	 to	 justify	 their	presence	and	voice	as	will	be	seen	in	Chapters	6	and	7.			
As	already	stated,	Billig	(1995)	is	 interested	in	 ‘banal	nationalism’,	and	especially	in	the	ways	in	which	national	identity	is	embedded	in	the	routines	of	everyday	life.	As	a	result	of	this,	the	nation’s	presence	is	forgotten	about.		Further,	he	highlights	how	the	‘flaggings’	or	reminders	of	the	nation	operate	mindlessly	rather	than	mindfully	in	the	form	of	 flags	 that	 go	 unsaluted	 and	 ignored,	 for	 example.	However,	 I	would	 like	 to	emphasise	that	these	flaggings	are	often	far	from	being	banal	to	those	not	belonging	to	 the	national	 community	or	who	have	 a	more	 complex	 relationship	with	 the	 said	imagined	 community.	 Billig	 does,	 however,	 note	 that	 banal	 does	 not	 signify	 benign	and	 the	 institutions	reproducing	nationalism	also	possess	vast	armaments	 (1995:7-8).	Further	to	this,	I	would	add,	banal	nationalism	is	also	reproducing	the	boundaries	of	 the	nation	via	 ‘ideological	armaments’,	 if	you	will,	demarcating	how	the	nation	 is	envisioned	to	be	in	terms	of	values,	culture	(see	Chapter	5)	—	or	bodies	(see	Chapter	6),	for	example.		
Thus,	 post-classical	 theory	 manages	 to	 capture	 those	 important	 micro	 level	experiences	 and	understandings	 of	 nationalism,	 and	 it	 deepens	 the	picture	 and	 the	analysis	 that	 is	 emerging	 with	 regard	 to	 contemporary	 understandings	 of	 what	nations,	 nationalisms	 and	 national	 consciousness	 are,	 how	 they	 change	 over	 time,	how	they	are	manipulated,	adapted	and	enacted,	and	how	they	may	look	 like	 in	the	future.	 While	 the	 classical	 debate	 seems	 to	 be	 going	 round	 in	 circles	 or	 remain	
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stagnant	 at	 times,	 post-classical	 theories	 open	 up	 new	 horizons	 and	 seek	 to	problematise	 familiar	 concepts.	 Chapters	6	 and	7	 specifically	 seek	 to	make	a	direct	contribution	to	this	field	of	study.			
2.6.	Dualistic	categories	of	nationalism			Spencer	and	Wollman	(2005b:197)	point	out	that	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	split	nationalism	 into	 two	 fundamentally	 different	 types,	 a	 tendency	 that	 goes	 back	 “at	least	 to	 the	 seminal	 work	 of	 Hans	 Kohn”.	 Thus,	 nationalism	 is	 often	 divided	 into	oppositional	 categories:	 civic/ethnic,	 political/cultural,	 Western/Eastern	 or,	 more	simplistically,	 as	 good/bad.	 Because	 there	 is	 such	 a	 strong	 conviction	 in	 both	academic	 and	 political	 circles	 that	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 represents	 the	 ‘civic’	 as	opposed	to	‘ethnic’	type	—	and	this	conviction	has	an	effect	on	the	ways	in	which	the	contours	of	the	nation	are	imagined	—	it	is	worth	considering	the	dualist	categories	in	detail	here,	as	this	discussion	will	provide	a	theoretical	foundation	for	Chapters	4	and	5	especially.				Historically,	 the	 distinction	 between	 ethnic	 and	 civic	 nationalism	 goes	 back	 to	 the	work	of	Meinecke	and	Kohn.	While	Meinecke	distinguished	between	‘Kulturnation’	—	a	 largely	 passive	 cultural	 community	 —	 and	 ‘Staatsnation’	 —	 an	 active,	 self-determining	 political	 nation	 —	 in	 1908	 (Smith,	 2005a:177),	 Kohn	 distinguished	between	 ‘Western’	and	 ‘Eastern’	nationalism	in	his	work	from	the	1940s	and	1950s	(Spencer	and	Wollman,	2005:200).	Kohn,	Plamenatz	and	Gellner	played	a	prominent	role	 in	 coining	 the	 East/West	 dichotomy.	 Rather	 than	 being	 a	merely	 geographical	divide,	 these	 two	 types	were	 attributed	 a	 particular	—	 and	 value-laden	—	 content	(Spencer	&	Wollman,	 2005b:199).	 According	 to	Kohn	 (1965),	 nationalism	was	 first	developed	 in	 the	West	 along	 singular	 lines	 as	 a	 product	 of	 the	 Enlightenment.	 He	depicts	Western	nationalism	as	an	essential	expression	of	the	confidence	of	rational	and	 bourgeois	 individuals	 who	 wish	 to	 pursue	 legitimate	 interests,	 which	 is	 in	opposition	 to	 Eastern	 nationalism	 which,	 in	 turn,	 developed	 in	 a	 different	environment	and	along	different	lines	as	a	reaction	to	the	success	and	confidence	of	the	West.	Thus,	Kohn	made	a	normative	distinction	between	the	two	opposing	types	of	 nationalism:	Western	 types	 of	 nationalism	—	 that	were	 essentially	 political	 and	
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voluntarist	—	 were	 seen	 as	 better	 than	 their	 ‘backward’	 counterparts	 in	 the	 East	(Mitchell	et	al,	2011:107).				Similarly,	 Plamenatz	 distinguished	 between	 Eastern	 (bad)	 and	 Western	 (good)	nationalism	 (1973).	 Plamenatz	 holds	 a	 highly	 controversial	 view	 about	 the	differences	between	East	and	West	with	regard	to	nationalism.	He	argues	that	in	the	West,	 nationalism	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 emerge	 among	 people	 who	 feel	 themselves	 at	 a	disadvantage	 but	 who	 are,	 nevertheless,	 “culturally	 equipped	 in	 ways	 that	 favour	success	 and	 excellence”	 (1976:33).	 The	 Eastern	 model,	 for	 him,	 represents	 “the	nationalism	of	peoples	recently	drawn	 into	a	civilisation	hitherto	alien	 to	 them	and	whose	 ancestral	 cultures	 are	 not	 adapted	 to	 success	 and	 excellence	 by	 these	cosmopolitan	and	 increasingly	dominant	standards”	(1976:33).	As	Nairn	writes,	 the	Western	 type	was	 perceived	 as	 “original,	 liberal	 and	 good”	while	 the	 Eastern	 type	“was	 reactive,	 envious,	 ethnic,	 racist	 and	 generally	 bad”	 (in	 Xenos	 1996:214).	 Leah	Greenfeld,	 a	 more	 recent	 author,	 also	 sees	Western	 Europe	 and	 North	 America	 as	places	where	civic	nationalism	is	rife	and	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	as	sites	where	ethnic	 nationalism	 can	 be	 observed	 (Xenos,	 1996:215).	 Some	 commentators	 have	noted	 the	 ‘neo-orientalist’	 flavour	 of	 such	 characterisations	 (Brubaker,	 2002:56).	Indeed,	 such	 value-laden	 assumptions	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 West	 and	 East	reflect	what	Stuart	Hall	has	termed	the	discourse	of	‘West	and	the	Rest’	(2005b:200-1),	 and	 these	 assumptions	highlight	 the	 ethnocentrism	of	 the	Western	writers	who	denounce	Eastern	nationalism	while	 remaining	blind	 to	 the	deficiencies	 (as	well	 as	the	irrationalism,	I	might	add)	of	the	Western	form.			The	 distinction	 between	 cultural	 and	 political	 nationalism	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 this	distinction	between	Eastern	and	Western	nationalism.	Kohn	(1965)	refers	to	Western	
political	 nationalism	 which	 is	 progressive,	 modern	 and	 a	 creation	 of	 the	 present	although	 orientated	 towards	 the	 future.	 Eastern	 cultural	 nationalism,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	is	a	reaction	to	political	nationalism	and	stands	in	opposition	to	its	core	values	and	is	driven	by	a	different	dynamic.	While	the	former	is	rational	and	is	related	to	the	liberal	 revolt	 against	 absolutism,	 the	 latter	 is	based	on	emotions,	 is	 inward-looking	and	 concentrates	 on	 the	 past.	 However,	 when	 looking	 at	 particular	 cases	 the	sharpness	of	the	distinction	between	the	two	types	is	often	hard	to	sustain	(Spencer	
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&	Wollman,	 2005b:202).	 For	 example,	 the	 political	 ideal	 type	 is	 often,	 in	 practice,	underpinned	by	 a	 logic	 of	 assimilation:	 in	 France	 “cultural	 assimilation	 is	 the	price	that	 must	 be	 paid	 (…)	 for	 integration	 into	 the	 political	 community”	 (Mitchell	 &	Russell,	 1996:67).	 Nations	 that	 are	 ostensibly	 models	 of	 the	 political	 form	 of	nationalism	seem	to	exhibit	pride	in	‘their’	culture	and,	simultaneously,	to	experience	anxieties	about	their	health,	security	and	visibility	(Spencer	&	Wollman,	2005b:202).				The	most	discussed	distinction	is	that	between	ethnic	and	civic	nationalism,	however.	This	 is	 also	 especially	 important	 for	 the	 Scottish	 case,	 as	 Scottish	 nationalism	 is	habitually	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 shining	 example	 of	 civic	 nationalism	 in	 action	 both	 by	academics	as	well	as	(mainly	SNP)	politicians.	The	civic/ethnic	dichotomy	can	be	seen	as	 an	 extension	 to,	 or	 as	 a	 reformulation	 of,	 the	 political/cultural	 distinction.	 For	Ignatieff,	 civic	 nationalism	 denotes	 a	 nation	 that	 is	 composed	 of	 all	 those	 who	subscribe	to	the	nation’s	political	creed	regardless	of	race,	colour,	ethnicity,	gender	or	language	 thus	 envisaging	 “a	 community	 of	 equal,	 right	 bearing	 citizens,	 united	 in	patriotic	attachment	to	a	shared	set	of	political	practices	and	values”	(1993:3-4).	Civic	nationalism	can,	then,	be	seen	to	follow	the	principle	of	ius	soli,	 leaving	membership	to	 at	 least	 some	 degree	 open.	 In	 contrast,	 an	 ethnic	 nation	 is	 “first	 and	 foremost	 a	community	of	common	descent”	(Smith,	1991:11)	and	such	nations	are	believed	to	be	“historically	determined	entities	based	on	ancestry”	(Jenkins	&	Sofos,	1996:15).	Here,	national	membership	is	not	a	choice	and	remains	closed	and	exclusive	following	from	the	principle	of	ius	sanguinis.				Although	drawing	a	similar	distinction	between	ethnic	and	civic	forms	of	nationalism,	Brown	 differentiates	 between	 civic	 and	 ethnocultural	 forms	 of	 nationalism	 (2000)	thus	using	slightly	different	terminology.	While	ethnocultural	nationalism	draws	on	a	sense	 of	 community	which	 focuses	 on	 a	 belief	 in	myths	 of	 common	 ancestry,	 civic	nationalism	manifests	itself	through	the	belief	that	residence	in	a	common	territorial	homeland	 and	 commitments	 to	 its	 state	 and	 civil	 society	 institutions	 generates	 a	distinctive	 national	 character	 and	 civic	 culture	 (2000:51-52).	 Thus,	 all	 citizens	 —	regardless	 of	 ancestry	 —	 “comprise	 a	 community	 in	 progress,	 with	 a	 common	destiny”	 (2000:	 52).	 Brown	 also	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 two	 in	 terms	 of	 their	outlook:	 civic	nationalism	 is	 forward-looking	 in	 that	 its	 vision	 is	of	 a	 community	 in	
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the	 process	 of	 formation,	 and	 ethnocultural	 nationalism	 is	 backward-looking	 in	 its	focus	on	the	myths	of	the	past	(2000:	52)3.			However,	 the	 dualistic	 way	 of	 opposing	 ethnic	 and	 civic	 nationalism	 is	 a	 highly	problematic	 framework	 both	 theoretically	 as	well	 as	 analytically	 as	will	 be	 argued	and	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 dichotomy	 relies	 on	Weberian	‘ideal	types’	and	it	thus	does	not	reflect	and,	indeed,	serves	to	conceal	the	messy	 reality	 of	 nationalisms.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 civic/ethnic	 paradigm	 often	involves	 (either	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly)	 a	 normative	 value	 judgement	 regarding		‘good’	and	‘bad’	nationalisms.			
	
	
2.7.	Nation	and	‘the	Other’		As	the	focus	of	this	thesis	is	on	the	ways	in	which	Scottish	nationalist	narratives	deal	with	difference	and	belonging	 from	above,	and	 the	ways	 in	which	ethnic	minorities	experience	 said	 narratives	 from	 below,	 considering	 theories	 that	 focus	 on	 the	relationship	between	nation,	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’	are	of	great	importance.	It	is	often	difficult	 to	draw	a	 clear-cut	 line	between	definitions	pertaining	 to	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 to	‘nation’	as	many	of	 the	 features	used	 to	 identify	one	are	 frequently	used	 to	 identify	the	other	as	well.				Spencer	and	Wollman,	for	example,	note	how	three	out	of	six	elements	identified	by	Anthony	 Smith	 as	 central	 to	 ethnic	 identity	 reappear	 in	 his	 definition	 of	 national	identity	 (2005a:11).	 They	 argue	 that	 although	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 and	 feasible	 to	maintain	an	analytical	distance	between	the	two	concepts,	more	often	than	not	such	formulations	 crumble	 in	 practice	 as	 in	 real	 life	 nation	 and	 ‘ethnicity’	 become	overlapping	and	interlaced	in	various	and	complex	ways.	By	extension,	the	ambiguity	between	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 ‘race’	 has	 also	 been	 pointed	 out	 (Eriksen,	 2010)	 which,	 in	turn,	 complicates	 matters	 further.	 What,	 then,	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 ‘race’,																																																									3	Although	Brown	does	clarify	that	the	difference	is	not	as	clear-cut	as	both	can	take	influences	from	the	
future	as	well	as	from	the	past	(2000:56).	
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‘ethnicity’	 and	 nationalism,	 and	 does	 this	 relationship	 help	 us	 understand	 how	 the	nation’s	‘Other’	is	constituted?				Benedict	Anderson	(2006:149)	famously	argued	that	“nationalism	thinks	in	terms	of	historical	destinies,	while	racism	dreams	of	eternal	contaminations,	transmitted	from	the	 origins	 of	 time	 through	 an	 endless	 sequence	 of	 loathsome	 copulations:	 outside	history”.	 Thus,	 for	 him,	 “the	 dreams	 of	 racism	 actually	 have	 their	 origins	 in	 the	ideologies	of	 class,	 rather	 than	 those	of	nation”,	 and	 “above	all	 in	 claims	 to	divinity	among	 rulers	 and	 to	 blue	 or	 white	 blood	 and	 breeding	 among	 aristocracies”	(2006:149).	Anderson	further	argues	that	because	racism	and	anti-Semitism	manifest	themselves	within	national	boundaries	but	not	across	them,	“they	justify	not	so	much	foreign	wars	as	domestic	repression	and	domination”	(2006:150).				Gilroy,	in	his	critical	take	on	Anderson,	argues	that	for	the	latter	“racism	is	essentially	antithetical	 to	 nationalism	because	nations	 are	made	possible	 in	 and	 through	print	languages	rather	than	notions	of	biological	difference	and	kinship”	and	“anyone	can	in	theory	learn	the	language”	and	become	a	citizen	through	naturalisation	(1992:44).	Gilroy,	I	feel,	is	being	slightly	unfair	to	Anderson.	Rather	than	saying	that	racism	and	nationalism	 are	 antithetical,	 Anderson	 argues	 	—	 contra	Nairn	—	 that	 racism	does	not	derive	from	nationalism	(2006:148).	Anderson’s	argument	is	thus	to	do	with	the	origins	 of	 racist	 ideologies	 which	 he	 links	 to	 class	 as	 opposed	 to	 nation.	 Further,	Anderson	seems	to	suggest	in	Imagined	Communities	that	biology	and	kinship	do	play	a	part	in	the	feeling	of	nation-ness:	
Something	of	the	nature	of	this	political	love	can	be	deciphered	from	the	ways	in	
which	 languages	 describe	 its	 object:	 either	 in	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 kinship	
(motherland,	Vaterland,	patria)	or	that	of	home	(heimat	or	tanah	air	(…)).	Both	
idioms	 denote	 something	 to	 which	 one	 is	 naturally	 tied.	 (…)	 [I]n	 everything	
‘natural’	 there	 is	 always	 something	 unchosen.	 In	 this	 way,	 nation-ness	 is	
assimilated	 to	 skin-colour,	 gender,	 parentage	and	birth-era	—	 all	 those	 things	
one	can	not	help.	And	in	these	‘natural	ties’	one	senses	what	one	might	call	‘the	
beauty	of	Gemeinschaft’.	To	put	 it	another	way,	precisely	because	such	 ties	are	
not	chosen,	they	have	about	them	a	halo	of	disinterestedness.	(2006:143)			Thus,	 Anderson’s	 argument	 seems	 to	 resonate	 with	 Geertz’s	 idea	 of	 ‘primordial	attachments’	which	Geertz	explains	as	(1994:31):	
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…one	that	stems	from	the	 ‘givens’	—	or,	more	precisely,	as	culture	 is	 inevitably	
involved	in	such	matters,	the	assumed	’givens’	—	of	social	existence:	immediate	
contiguity	and	kin	connection	mainly,	but	beyond	them	the	givenness	that	stems	
from	 being	 born	 into	 a	 particular	 religious	 community,	 speaking	 a	 particular	
language,	and	following	particular	social	practices.		Consequently,	Geertz	argues,	“these	congruities	of	blood,	speech,	custom	(…)	are	seen	to	have	an	ineffable,	and	at	times	overpowering,	coerciveness	in	and	of	themselves”	(1994:31).	 The	 tie	 itself	 is	 thus	 attributed	 great	 importance.	 As	 Smith	 notes,	primordialism	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 fixity,	 essentialism	 and	 naturalism,	 and	Geertz	has	often	been	misread	(2001:53).	Thus,	 the	 important	qualifying	phrases	of	‘assumed’	and	‘are	seen	to’	as	well	as	Geertz’s	reference	to	culture	(Smith,	2001:53)	signal	that	it	is	humans	who	see	these	ties	as	givens,	and	that	they	are	by	no	means	given	 in	a	sense	of	being	 ’natural’	or	 ‘of	nature’.	Anderson	 therefore	highlights	how	nation-ness	 comes	 to	be	assimilated	with	 seemingly	unchosen	 ‘natural	 ties’	 such	as	skin	 colour	 or	 parentage.	 Such	 attributes	 then	 derive	 their	 power	 from	 their	unassumingness:	 they	 are	 seen	 as	 beyond	 question,	 and	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	’national’	comes	to	be	associated	with	such	attributes.			Etienne	 Balibar,	 in	 turn,	 sees	 racism	 not	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 nationalism	 but	 as	 a	supplement	 internal	 to	 nationalism.	 	 Thus,	 racism	 —	 vis-à-vis	 nationalism	 —	 is	“always	in	excess	of	it,	but	always	indispensable	to	its	constitution	and	yet	always	still	insufficient	 to	 achieve	 its	 project”	 (1991:54).	 	 Similarly,	 nationalism	 on	 its	 own	 is	indispensable	and	insufficient	in	achieving	the	formation	of	the	nation	or	the	project	of	a	‘nationalisation’	of	a	society	(1991:54).	Racism	induces	an	excess	of	‘purism’	with	regard	to	the	nation;	 for	the	nation	to	be	itself,	 it	needs	to	be	racially	and	culturally	pure	 (Balibar,	 1991:59-60).	 For	 Balibar,	 ‘the	 Other’	 becomes	 crucial	 when	constructing	what	it	means	to	belong.	In	order	to	construct	race	as	a	supernationality,	a	 way	 to	 recognise	 ‘true’	 or	 ‘essential’	 nationals	 based	 on	 some	 sure	 criterion	 is	required.	 In	 practice,	 “the	 racial-cultural	 identity	 of	 the	 ‘true	 nationals’	 remains	invisible,	 but	 it	 is	 inferred	 from	 (and	 assured	 by)	 its	 opposite,	 the	 alleged,	 quasi-hallucinatory	visibility	of	the	‘false	nationals’”	(1991:	284-5).	As	a	result,	populations	and	social	groups	are	‘racialised’	and	their	collective	features	are	designated	stigmata	of	 exteriority	 and	 impurity.	When	 seeking	 to	 identify	 and	 circumscribe	 the	 shared	essence	of	nationals,	racism	aims	to	uncover	the	 ‘core’	of	unobtainable	authenticity,	shrinking	 the	 boundaries	 of	 nationality	 and	 destabilising	 the	 historical	 nation.	
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However,	as	Balibar	notes,	the	‘superior’	race	cannot,	by	definition,	coincide	with	the	totality	of	the	national	population	due	to	the	historical	and	social	heterogeneity	of	the	‘people’	(1991:285-6).				Billig	 (1995:78)	also	points	out	how	nationalism	 involves	stereotyping	 ‘them’;	 thus,	nationalism	is	not	just	about	‘us’	but	is	also	an	ideology	of	the	third	person	—	there	can	be	no	‘us’	without	‘them’,	and	defining	who	we	are	also	emphasises	who	we	are	not.	 (see	 also	 Triandafyllidou,	 1998).	 Billig	 (1995:79-85)	 highlights	 the	 fact	 that	nation	 is	 never	 completely	 inward-looking	 but	 that	 a	 community	 can	 only	 be	imagined	 by	 also	 imagining	 communities	 of	 foreigners	 (whereby	 ‘foreigner’	 is	 a	specific	category,	not	just	any	‘other’).	Nationalism	is,	thus,	an	international	ideology	as	 it	 constantly	 observes	 other	 nations	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 nation	 meets	universal	codes	of	nationhood	while	at	 the	same	time	gaining	access	to	stereotyped	judgements	about	 foreigners.	These	stereotypes	are	 then	used	 to	distinguish	 ‘them’	from	 ‘us’,	 and	 ‘we’	 assume	 ‘ourselves’	 as	 standard,	 the	unmarked	normality	 against	which	‘their’	deviations	appear	notable.				Paul	 Gilroy	 (1992:44)	 argues	 that	 politics	 of	 ‘race’	 in	 the	 UK	 are	 surrounded	 by	conceptions	 of	 national	 belonging	 and	 homogeneity	 which	 not	 only	 blur	 the	distinction	between	‘race’	and	nation	but	rely	on	the	ambiguity	for	their	effect.	Nation	is	 represented	 in	 biological	 and	 cultural	 terms	 and	 ‘new	 racism’	 is	 primarily	concerned	 with	 exclusion	 and	 inclusion	 in	 that	 it	 specifies	 who	 can	 legitimately	belong	 to	 a	 national	 community	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 advances	 reasons	 for	segregation	or	banishment	of	 those	whose	 ‘origin’,	 sentiment	or	 citizenship	assigns	them	 elsewhere	 (Gilroy,	 1992:45).	 	 Gilroy	 refers	 to	 the	 ‘camp	 mentality	 of	nationalists’,	and	defines	‘national	camps’	as	locations	in	which	“particular	versions	of	solidarity,	belonging,	kinship,	and	identity	have	been	devised,	practiced,	and	policed”	(2000:85).	The	camp,	specifically,	is	used	as	“a	metaphor	for	the	pathologies	of	‘race’	and	nation”	(2000:85	—	original	emphasis).				For	Hobsbawm	(1992),	nationalist	movements	seem	to	be	reactions	of	weakness	and	fear;	attempts	to	erect	barricades	to	keep	the	forces	of	the	modern	world	—	such	as	
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immigration	—	at	bay.	National	movements,	therefore,	fuel	defensive	reactions	in	the	face	 of	 a	 combination	 of	 international	 population	 movements	 and	 ultra-rapid,	fundamental	 and	 unprecedented	 socio-economic	 transformations.	 He	 notes	 that	“wherever	we	 live	 in	 an	 urbanized	 society,	we	 encounter	 strangers:	 uprooted	men	and	 women	 who	 remind	 us	 of	 the	 fragility,	 or	 the	 drying	 up	 of	 our	 own	 families’	roots”	(1992:173).	Gilroy,	in	similar	vein,	notes	that	“alien	cultures	come	to	embody	a	threat”	and	any	perceived	national	decline	and	weakness	is	blamed	on	the	arrival	of	non-nationals	 	 (1992:45-46).	 Worsthorne	 has	 said,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 UK,	 that	“though	Britain	is	a	multi-racial	society,	it	is	still	a	long	way	from	being	a	multi-racial	nation”:	 while	 formal	 membership	 is	 provided	 by	 laws,	 more	 substantive	membership	 derives	 from	 historic	 ties	 of	 language,	 custom	 and	 ‘race’	 (in	 Gilroy,	1992:59).	Gilroy	points	out	 that	nationhood	 is	not	 an	 empty	 receptacle	 that	 can	be	filled	 with	 alternative	 concepts	 according	 to	 the	 dictates	 of	 political	 pragmatism;	rather,	 although	 it	may	 be	malleable	 to	 some	 degree,	 its	 links	 to	 the	 discourses	 of	classes	and	‘races’	and	the	organisational	realities	of	these	groups	are	not	arbitrary.	Thus,	nationhood	is	confined	by	historical	and	political	factors	(Gilroy,	1992:59).				The	 authors	 cited	 above	 thus	 by	 and	 large	 agree	 that	 a	 close	 relationship	 exists	between	 ‘race’	 and	 nation,	 and	 that	 in	 order	 for	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘the	 nation’	 to	 have	purchase	an	‘Other’	needs	to	be	imagined	as	well.	Gilroy’s	insight	about	the	ambiguity	regarding	the	overlap	and	interconnections	between	‘race’	and	nation	is	a	crucial	and	revealing	one.	The	concept	of	the	nation	—	in	order	for	it	to	have	emotional	traction	—	needs	to	be	elusive	and	fuzzy	so	that	it	caters	for	a	heterogeneous	audience	who	may	all	have	very	different	understandings	of	what	a	given	nation	is	or	ought	to	be.	Beyond	 the	 elusiveness	 and	 fuzziness,	 however,	 different	 and	 often	 contradictory	understandings	of	who	belongs	to	the	nation	can	be	brought	to	view	through	careful	interrogation	and	investigation.				Thus,	this	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	these	debates	around	‘race’	and	nation,	but	it	is	 especially	 interested	 in	 the	 processes	 (Zimmer,	 2003)	 through	 which	understandings	of	’race’	and	‘ethnicity’	—	as	well	as	discourses	around	‘diversity’	and	‘difference’	—	are	drawn	upon	and	are	related	to	ideas	of	’the	nation’.	Understanding	these	 processes	 is	 important	 because	 it	 allows	 us	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 messy	 and	
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contradictory	ways	in	which	nations	are	made	and	negotiated.	Rather	than	labelling	nationalism	as	 ‘civic’	 and	 ‘inclusive’	 or	 ‘ethnic’	 and	 ‘exclusive’	 (and	 thus	potentially	racist),	the	focus	needs	to	be	on	the	ways	in	which	social	actors’	nationalist	narratives	draw	on	certain	ideas,	discourses	and	understandings	in	an	effort	to	demarcate	and	patrol	the	edges	of	the	nation.				
2.8.	Nationalism	studies	in	the	Scottish	context		Nationalism	 and	 national	 identity	 have	 attracted	much	 interest	 in	 academia	 in	 the	Scottish	context.	The	focus	has	been	both	on	Scotland	by	itself	(e.g.	Kiely	et	al,	2001;	Bond,	 2006;	 Virdee	 et	 al,	 2006;	 Hopkins	 2007)	 as	 well	 as	 on	 comparative	 studies	whereby	 Scottish	 nationalism	 has	 been	mainly	 looked	 at	 in	 comparison	 to	 Catalan	and	 Quebecois	 nationalisms	 (e.g.	 Keating,	 1996;	 Henderson,	 1999;	 Hepburn	 2011;	Guibernau	et	al,	2013).	Here,	for	the	sake	of	brevity,	the	focus	will	on	the	former.				Studies	 pertaining	 to	 Scottish	 nationalism	 have	 mainly	 taken	 place	 at	 two	 levels	(especially	 vis-a-vis	 ‘race’	 and	 ‘ethnicity’):	 from	 above	 and	 from	 below.	 That	 is,	studies	looking	at	Scottish	nationalism	from	above	have	focused	on	the	SNP’s	rhetoric	and	 narratives	 around	 Scotland,	 ‘Scottishness’	 and	 Scottish	 national	 identity	 in	particular.	 Leith	 (2008),	 for	 example,	 seeks	 to	 find	 out	 whether	 Scottishness	 is	projected	 as	 a	 political	 or	 territorial	 identity,	 and	 as	 an	 ethnic/exclusive	 or	 a	civic/inclusive-based	identity	(or	both	at	the	same	time)	by	studying	SNP	manifestos.	Leith	 concludes	 that	 the	 employment	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 Scottishness	within	 the	 SNP	manifestos	is	resolutely	civic	in	nature,	with	an	inclusive	vision	of	identity.	However,	he	 also	demonstrates	 that	 there	has	been	 a	 change	 from	 the	past	when	manifestos	provided	expressions	of	Scottishness	that	were	more	ethnic	in	focus	and	exclusive	in	nature.				Mycock	 (2012),	 however,	 contradicts	 Leith’s	 reading	 of	 the	 SNP’s	 understanding	 of	what	constitutes	a	 ‘Scottish	nation’.	He	argues	that	the	SNP	deploys	a	form	of	 ‘black	sheep	nationalism’	(see	Shin	et	al,	1999)	which	seeks	to	denigrate	rival	constructions	
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of	Scottish	national	 identity	whilst	overlooking	 limitations	 in	 their	own	account.	He	concludes	that	 the	SNP’s	nationalism	is	not,	as	claimed,	wholly	civic	and	that	ethnic	constructions	 of	 the	 Scottish	 nation	 and	 its	 people	 still	 resonate.	 Furthermore,	 he	argues	 that	 popular	 attitudes	 towards	 immigration	 allied	 to	 residual	 sentiments	 of	Anglophobia	and	 Islamophobia	 (see	also	Hussain	and	Miller,	2006)	suggest	 there	 is	potential	for	a	more	exclusionary	form	of	ethnicised	Scottish	nationalism	to	emerge.				Meer	(2015:1491),	on	the	other	hand,	through	conducting	qualitative	interviews	with	MSPs,	 looks	 at	 “how	 elite	 political	 actors	 are	 locating	minorities	within	 projects	 of	nation-building	 under	 conditions	 of	 multinationalism	 and	 multiculturalism”.	 Meer	seeks	to	illustrate	the	ways	in	which	political	elites	“can	play	a	vital	role	in	ensuring	that	 appeals	 to	 nationhood	 in	 Scotland	 can	 be	 meaningfully	 calibrated	 to	 include	minorities	 too”	 therefore	 arguing	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 rather	 ‘civic’	 vision	 of	 Scottish	nationhood	 among	 the	 political	 elite	—	 though	Meer	 acknowledges	 that	 Scotland’s	“historical	experience	self-evidently	casts	a	shadow	over	contemporary	expressions	of	 nationhood”	 thus	 referring	 to	 Scotland’s	 role	 within	 the	 violent	 history	 of	 the	British	Empire	(a	theme	I	will	return	to	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	4).				On	 the	 other	 hand,	 studies	 looking	 at	 nationalism	 from	 below	 have	 focused	 on	individuals’	 —	 both	 ‘indigenous’	 Scots’	 and	 ethnic	 minorities’	 —	 identities	 and	understandings	 of	 ‘Scottishness’;	 that	 is,	 who	 is	 ‘Scottish’,	 and	 what	 does	 ‘being	Scottish’	 entail?	 These	 studies	 have	 also	 sought	 to	 tease	 out	 the	 ways	 in	 which	nationalism	 and	 national	 identity	 interact	 and	 intertwine	 with	 issues	 of	 ‘race’	 and	‘ethnicity’,	 for	 example.	 In	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 scholars	 such	 as	 David	 McCrone,	Michael	Rosie,	Frank	Bechhofer,	Richard	Kiely	and	Ross	Bond	who	are,	or	have	been,	part	 of	 the	 Edinburgh	National	 Identity	 Group	 at	 the	University	 of	 Edinburgh	 have	been	building	a	more	comprehensive	picture	of	Scottish	nationalism	and	how	Scottish	national	 identity	 is	 constructed,	 reproduced	 and	 negotiated.	 McCrone	 argues	 that	they	 have	 gone	 “beyond	 the	 more	 commonly	 held	 view	 that	 national	 identity	 is	handed	down	in	the	form	of	a	relatively	fixed	repertoire	by	power	systems”,	and	have	focused	 on	 “how	 actors	 negotiate	 and	mobilise	 identities	which	 are	 open	 to	 them”	(2001:153).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Edinburgh	 School	 have	 been	 criticised	 —	 and	rightly	 so	 —	 for	 not	 taking	 sufficient	 account	 of	 the	 structures	 (including	 class	
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structures	—	see	Hopkins,	2007)	that	limit	or	enable	individual	choice	with	regard	to	identity.	On	 the	other	hand,	 they	have	also	been	 criticised	 for	 attributing	 too	much	agency	 to	 individuals	and	overstating	 their	ability	 to	negotiate	and	claim	(national)	identities	(Pryke,	2001).	Nonetheless,	while	I	agree	with	these	criticisms,	they	have	at	the	 same	 time	provided	 rich	data	—	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	—	regarding	the	changing	conceptual	boundaries	of	the	Scottish	nation.					Members	 of	 the	 Edinburgh	 group	 have	 come	 to	 term	 the	 key	 elements	 affecting	claiming,	 attributing	 and	 assessing	 claims	 to	 nationality	 as	 ‘identity	 markers’	 and	‘identity	 rules’.	 While	 identity	 markers	 are	 defined	 as	 “those	 social	 characteristics	presented	 to	 others	 to	 support	 a	 national	 identity	 claim	 and	 looked	 to	 in	 others,	either	to	attribute	national	identity,	or	receive	and	assess	any	claims	or	attributions	made”,	 ‘identity	 rules’	 are	 probabilistic	 rules	 of	 thumb	 which	 guide	 rather	 than	enforce	 judgements	 about	 who	 is	 (not)	 one	 of	 us	 (Kiely	 et	 al,	 2001:35-6).	 Thus,	because	markers	themselves	do	not	tell	you	how	people	use	them,	it	is	necessary	to	focus	 attention	 also	on	 the	 study	of	 rules	 in	 order	 to	uncover	 and	understand	how	markers	are	enacted.	Furthermore,	markers	and	rules	are	usually	implicit	and	taken-for-granted,	only	coming	to	 the	 fore	more	explicitly	when	something	 is	problematic	and	 contested	 about	 them	 (Kiely	 et	 al,	 2001:35-6).	Rules	do,	 however,	 change	over	time,	 and	 they	 are	 sustained	 in	 the	 everyday	 dialogues	 between	 people	 when	judgements	are	made	about	who	people	are	and	whether	or	not	they	belong	(Kiely	et	al,	2001:52).			
In	 addition	 to	 the	 study	 of	 identity	 ’markers’	 and	 ‘rules’,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 trend	towards	 researching	 people’s	 identifications	 with	 regard	 to	 prioritisation	 of	identities.	 Hopkins	 found	 that	 young	Muslim	men	 living	 in	 Scotland	 tended	 to	 give	priority	 to	 their	 Scottish	 identities,	 and	 that	 such	 findings	 can	 provide	 important	information	 about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 people	 choose	 to	 order	 their	 identities.	 He	nonetheless	 contends	 that	 “such	 a	 line	 of	 questioning	 forces	 people	 to	 choose	between	two	identity	markers	that	they	do	not	necessarily	need	to	choose	between”	(2007:65).	 Further,	 Hopkins	 notes	 how	 focusing	 on	 the	 prioritisation	 of	 identities	conceals	 their	variations	across	space	and	 time,	as	well	as	 their	 fluid	and	contested	nature.	While	 a	person	might	 cho
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meanings,	 understandings	 and	 interpretations	 of	 such	 an	 identity	 will	 vary	significantly	 between	 individuals,	 groups	 and	 places	 (2007:65).	 Here,	 considering	Anthias’s	ideas	regarding	positionality	discussed	before	are	of	use:	depending	on	our	“placement	within”	any	given	“social	relations”,	the	ways	in	which	we	act	or	identify	may	change.			This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 two	 focal	 points	 of	 existing	nationalism	research	—	that	is,	nationalist	elite	rhetoric	from	above	(notably	by	the	SNP)	 and	 ethnic	minorities’	 experiences	 and	 understandings	 from	 below.	 Studying	both	 elite	 constructions	 of	 the	 nation	 as	 well	 as	 ethnic	 minorities’	 experiences	 of	those	 constructions	 gives	 a	 more	 detailed	 and	 wholesome	 picture	 of	 the	 different	processes	 at	 play	 —	 especially	 as	 this	 was	 done	 within	 the	 temporal	 and	 social	context	 provided	 by	 the	 independence	 referendum.	 Research	 focusing	 on	 the	 SNP	has,	 almost	 exclusively,	 adopted	 the	 binary	 civic/ethnic	 theoretical	 framework	 and	thus,	from	an	analytical	point	of	view,	remained	rather	restricted.	Chapter	4	critiques	both	 the	 analytical	 usefulness	 of	 this	 dichotomy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 aptness	 of	 the	dominant	view	of	framing	the	SNP’s	nationalism	as	‘civic’.	Chapter	5	begins	sketching	out	new	ways	of	 analysing	nationalism	 in	Scotland	using	Zimmer’s	 (2003)	process-oriented	approach	in	relation	to	the	idea	of	‘Scottish	values’.	Literature	pertaining	to	Scottish	nationalism	and	both	ethnic	minorities	and	‘white	Scots’	has	mainly	focused	on	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘national	 identity’.	 What	 has	 been	 missing,	 however,	 is	 detailed	discussion	of	 how	nationalist	 ideas	 affect	 the	 everyday	 lives	 of	 ethnic	minorities	 in	Scotland	—	this,	 in	 turn,	will	be	 the	 focus	of	Chapters	6	and	7.	 Indeed,	as	has	been	argued,	studies	of	everyday	nationalism	more	broadly	have	failed	to	take	into	account	the	 experiences	 of	 those	 whose	 membership	 to	 a	 nation	 more	 often	 comes	 under	challenge	and	scrutiny.				
2.9.	Conclusion		This	 chapter	has	 sought	 to	outline,	 introduce	and	critically	discuss	 some	of	 the	key	debates	 to	 which	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 contribute.	 All	 the	 debates	 covered	 in	 this	
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chapter	 tie	 into	 the	 subsequent	 discussions,	 and	provide	 a	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	chapters	that	follow.	I	have	allocated	a	considerable	amount	of	space	to	definitional	issues	—	I	felt	that	this	was	necessary	as	authors	in	this	field	do	not	always	provide	clear	definitions	of	the	key	terms	and	concepts	they	use.				In	 terms	of	 the	 ‘origin	debates’,	 I	 find	myself	 taking	a	position	somewhere	between	modernist	 and	 ethnosymbolist	 arguments.	 I	 agree	 that	 ‘nations’	 are	 modern	phenomena	 and	 a	 modern	 way	 of	 imagining	 and	 conceptualising	 a	 community	 of	people,	 and	 that	 modern	 technological	 advancements	 and	 industrialisation,	 for	example,	played	a	part	 in	 the	 rise	of	nations	and	nationalism.	However,	 the	biggest	problem	 with	 modernist	 theories,	 in	 my	 view,	 is	 that	 they	 are	 offer	 a	 very	pragmatically	orientated	account	and	by	and	large	fail	to	account	for	the	passion	and	emotional	 attachment	 (see	 Chapter	 7)	 that	 feelings	 of	 belonging	 to	 a	 national	community	 evoke	 in	 people,	 and	 why	 that	 is.	 Here,	 I	 think,	 ethnosymbolism	 goes	some	way	in	filling	the	gap	by		
…analysing	 communities,	 ideologies	 and	 sense	 of	 identity	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
constituent	 symbolic	 resources,	 that	 is,	 the	 traditions,	memories,	 values,	myths	
and	 symbols	 that	 compose	 the	 accumulated	 rivage	 of	 cultural	 units	 of	
population.	(Smith,	2009:15-16).		Thus,	culture	is	privileged	over	the	material	and	political	domains	“only	inso	far	as	we	are	dealing	with	the	form,	contents	and	appeal”	of	nationalism	(Smith,	2009:16).			However,	 as	 argued,	 the	 post-classical	 debates	 have	 provided	 a	welcome	 and	 fresh	perspective	 to	 the	 study	 of	 nationalism	 by	 shifting	 the	 discussions	 beyond	 ‘the	chicken	and	the	egg’	debate	of	which	came	first,	nations	or	nationalism.	Post-classical	debates	have,	 instead,	 focused	our	attention	on	 the	 relationship	between	 ‘race’	 and	nation,	for	example,	as	well	as	between	nationalism	and	the	everyday.	What	has	been,	however,	missing	from	everyday	nationalism	studies	is	a	focus	on	those	people	whose	membership	 of	 the	 national	 community	 is	 not	 usually	 seen	 as	 beyond	 question	 in	everyday	interactions	(i.e.	those	who	are	ethnicised	or	racialised	through	both	formal	and	informal	means	—	see	section	3.3.1.1.	for	a	more	extended	discussion).		In	order	to	 uncover	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 contribute	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 experiences	 of	ethnic	minorities	(if	at	all)	 in	Scotland	and	beyond,	putting	ethnic	minorities’	at	 the	
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heart	of	studying	everyday	nationalism	is	crucial.				Finally,	 the	 civic	 versus	 ethnic	 dichotomy	 has	 dominated	 much	 of	 literature	 on	nationalism.	 This	 kind	 of	 theorising	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 nationalism	 studies	 as	“pervasive	 dualism”	 —	 as	 Calhoun	 puts	 it	 —	 is	 evident	 in	 Western	 thinking	 (in	Heaney,	 2013:244)	more	 generally.	Heaney	 (2013:244)	—	who	 takes	 an	 “expressly	anti-dualistic”	position	—	argues	that	“the	spectre	of	dualism	has	haunted	the	social	sciences	 for	 most	 of	 their	 history”.	 That	 is,	 binary	 oppositions	 have	 historically	included	“mind	vs	body,	order	vs	chaos,	men	vs	women,	being	vs	becoming,	agency	vs	structure,	 individual	 vs	 society”	 as	 well	 as	 reason	 versus	 emotion	 (Heaney,	2013:244).	I	will	discuss	the	civic/ethnic	dichotomy	in	more	detail	in	Chapters	4	and	5.	 	
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Chapter	3	Methods	and	Methodology:	Making	sense	of	nationalism	through	a	multimethod	approach				
3.1.	Introduction	
The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	explain	and	critically	discuss	what	the	rationale	for	this	thesis	is,	the	ways	in	which	this	research	was	conducted,	and	what	the	methods	used	to	gather	and	analyse	data	were.	I	used	a	combination	of	methods,	namely	interviews	(with	 practitioners,	 that	 is	 people	 working	 for	 ethnic	 minority	 third	 sector	organisations;	pro	and	anti-independence	campaigners;	and	with	lay	individuals	who	come	 from	 an	 ethnic	minority	 background),	 participant	 observation	 (at	 debates	 on	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	and	other	related	referendum	events),	as	well	as	 content	 analysis	 (of	 party	 political	 speeches	 and	 publications;	 interviews	 in	 the	media;	and	televised	and	radio	appearances	of	key	actors	 in	relation	to	the	Yes	and	No	 campaigns).	 I	 will	 also	 discuss	 and	 elaborate	 my	 decision	 to	 focus	 on	 the	independence	referendum	specifically.					
3.2.	Aims	and	objectives	
This	 research	 is	 motivated	 by	 an	 ambition	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relationship	between	how,	on	 the	one	hand,	nationalist	narratives	and	 rhetoric	 are	 constructed,	developed	and	expressed	in	Scotland	by	the	SNP	and,	on	the	other	hand,	how	ethnic	minorities	 in	 Scotland	 interpret,	make	 sense	 of	 and	 possibly	 challenge	 or	 embrace	nationalist	 narratives	 in	 their	 daily	 lives	 and	 experiences.	 Therefore,	 this	 research	considers	 both	 the	 structural	 and	 institutionalised	 forms	 of	 the	 nationalist	 project	‘from	 above’,	 that	 is,	 from	 political	 actors	 and	 institutions,	 as	 well	 as	 ethnic	minorities’	 understandings,	 interpretations,	 and	 contestations	 of	 the	 nationalist	narratives;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 their	 experiences	 ‘from	 below’.	 Thus,	 using	 the	
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independence	 referendum	 as	 a	 case	 study,	 yet	 situating	 the	 discussion	 in	 a	 wider	post-devolutionary	 framework,	 this	 research	 aims	 to,	 firstly,	 investigate	 the	 post-devolutionary	 relationship	 between	 nationalism	 and	 minority	 communities	 within	Scotland,	 considering	 both	 the	 public,	 discursive	 construction	 of	 nationalist	narratives	with	regard	to	 ‘ethnicity’,	and	the	interpretative	and	formative	responses	of	minority	communities	to	nationalism.	Secondly,	 this	research	aims	to	understand	and	 investigate	 the	 legislative,	 institutional	 and	 structural	 contexts	 for	 the	management	and	creation	of	‘the	Scottish	nation’	as	well	as	the	individual,	subjective	understandings	 and	 negotiations	 of	 this	 ‘nation’.	 Therefore,	 this	 research	 considers	how	the	structural	and	individual	contexts	interact,	and	possibly	inform,	overlap,	and	challenge	one	 another.	 In	 order	 to	meet	 these	 aims,	 I	 am	guided	by	 these	 research	questions:	
1. How	 have	 different	 projects	 and	 narratives	 of	 nationalism	 been	 imagined,	
mobilised	and	contested	in	the	context	of	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	
in	particular,	and	in	the	context	of	devolution	more	generally,	by	the	SNP?	What	
are	these	narratives’	essential	components?		
	
2. What	 are	 the	 particular	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 public	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 SNP’s	
nationalism	has	addressed	questions	of	 ‘diversity’,	 ‘ethnicity’	and	 ’belonging’	 in	
Scotland;	 how	 has	 it	 addressed	 and	 engaged	with	 ethnic	minorities	 post-1999	
and	in	the	context	of	the	independence	referendum	more	specifically?		
	
3. How,	 if	 at	 all,	 have	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 narratives	 intersected	 with	 the	
formation	 of	 policy	 with	 regard	 to	minority	 communities,	 anti-racism	 and	 so-
called	 ‘race	equality’,	and	with	approaches	to	the	treatment	of	recently	arrived	
migrants?	
	
4. How	 do	 nationalist	 narratives	 contribute	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	
ethnic	minorities,	 if	at	all?	How	do	minority	 communities	 respond	 to,	 interpret	
and	possibly	challenge	nationalist	ideas	and	narratives?			Questions	1	and	2	seek	to	uncover	the	ways	in	which	nationalism	is	discursively	and	publicly	constructed	 ‘from	above’	by	 the	SNP,	and	to	consider	how	these	narratives	potentially	account	for	difference	and	diversity	in	relation	to	 ‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’	 in	
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particular.	 Question	 2,	 further,	 aims	 at	 highlighting	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ethnic	minorities	 feature	 and	 are	 included	 in	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 project	 (if	 at	 all)	 and	question	4	considers	how	nationalist	messages	are	understood	and	made	sense	of	by	ethnic	minorities	on	the	ground.	Question	3	turns	the	focus	on	the	more	structured,	formalised	 and	 institutionalised	 ways	 in	 which	 ethnic	 and	 racial	 minorities	 are	addressed	 via	 ‘race	 equality	 strategies’	 and	 citizenship	 rules,	 for	 example.	 As	discussed	 in	 Chapters	 1	 and	 2,	 nationalist	 narratives	 are	 not	 merely	 discursive	formations,	 but	 have	 real	 effects	 on	 people’s	 lives	 through	 policy	 formation,	 for	example.				As	mentioned	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	when	discussing	nationalism	 in	Scotland	 the	dualistic	 prism	 of	 ethnic	 versus	 civic	 nationalism	 is	 often	 adopted.	 Within	 this	framework,	the	SNP’s	nationalism	in	particular	is	usually	argued	to	be	an	example	of	the	 latter	 ‘type’.	 In	 seeking	 to	 answer	 questions	 1-3,	 I	 will	 critically	 engage	 with	literature	pertaining	 to	 the	civic/ethnic	distinction,	and	 interrogate	 the	distinction’s	
analytical	 usefulness	 in	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5,	 especially.	 Furthermore,	 underlying	 my	research	 questions	 is	 an	 engagement	 with	 seeking	 to	 understand	 the	 relationship	between	 nationalism,	 ‘race’	 and	 ‘ethnicity’.	 Thus,	 I	 seek	 to	 make	 a	 contribution	 to	existing	 understandings,	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 pertaining	 to	 this	relationship.	 With	 regard	 to	 question	 4,	 I	 am	 especially	 looking	 to	 contribute	 to	debates	around	everyday	nationalism	studies	by	considering	ethnic	minority	voices	and	experiences	within	that	context.			
Although	 the	 discussion	 and	 analysis	 in	 this	 thesis	 will	 take	 the	 wider	 post-devolutionary	context	into	account,	I	have	made	a	conscious	decision	to	focus	on	the	period	 immediately	before,	during	and	after	 the	Scottish	 independence	 referendum	which	 took	 place	 on	 18	 September	 in	 2014.	 Firstly,	 the	 decision	 to	 have	 a	 specific	focus	helped	me	to	locate	define	the	parameters	of	this	study,	and	to	give	it	a	distinct	and	manageable	shape	and	scope.	It	is	incredibly	easy	to	have	one’s	research	project	expand	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	what	 is	 possible	 and	 feasible,	 and	 having	 such	 a	 clear	focal	 point	 aided	 me	 in	 keeping	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 research	 in	 check.	 More	importantly	 however,	 apart	 from	 the	 practical	 concerns,	 the	 main	 reasons	 for	
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choosing	 this	 approach	 had	 to	 do	 with	 theoretical,	 analytical	 and	 methodological	concerns.	My	research	focuses	on	issues	around	‘ethnicity’,	‘race’,	identity,	belonging,	and	 nationalism	 —	 themes	 which,	 notoriously,	 can	 be	 rather	 difficult	 to	 capture	precisely	because	of	 their	 ‘everydayness’	or	banality	 (Billig,	1995),	 at	 least	 to	 those	people	who	 feel	 themselves	 to	belong	unproblematically	 to	 the	national	community	and	consciousness.				Therefore,	 as	McCrone	 notes,	 “it	 is	 generally	 in	 contexts	where	 national	 identity	 is	seen	 either	 to	 be	 highly	 salient	 or	 regarded	 as	 problematic	 that	 the	 complex	processes	of	 identity	construction	become	most	clearly	apparent”	(2002:307).	Thus,	it	 seemed	 to	 me	 that	 the	 independence	 referendum	 offered	 such	 a	 context	 of	heightened	 visibility	 of	 issues	 highlighted	 above,	 namely	 ‘ethnicity’,	 ‘race’,	 identity,	belonging	 and	 nationalism.	 Similarly,	 Flyvbjerg	 notes,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 case	 study	method,	 that	 atypical	 and	 extreme	 cases	 often	 reveal	 more	 as	 they	 activate	 more	actors	(2006:229)	at	a	given	moment	in	time.	Further,	drawing	on	ethnomethology’s	‘breaching’	practice,	Fox	(2017:33)	urges	us	to	look	to	the	edges	of	the	nation		—	that	is,	 to	 those	 “places,	 times	and	contexts	where	 the	nation	 is	on	 the	periphery	—	the	edges	—	of	our	consciousness”.	Within	these	contexts	our	underlying	understandings	and	experiences	of	 the	nation	 can	be	 teased	out.	 I	will	 return	 to	 this	point	 in	more	detail	in	Chapter	7.	
	I	started	working	on	 this	 thesis	 in	September	2013	—	that	 is,	one	year	prior	 to	 the	vote.	The	official	referendum	campaigning	period	started	on	31	May	2014	and	lasted	for	 16	 weeks	 —	 thus,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 follow	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 campaigns	 when	conducting	my	research.	I	received	my	ethical	approval	on	20	May	2014,	so	I	was	able	to	 go	 into	 the	 field	 when	 the	 campaigns	 started.	 I	 conducted	my	 last	 interview	 in	September	2015,	and	this	marked	the	end	of	my	fieldwork	period.			
3.3.	Methods	and	data	analysis	As	 already	 outlined,	 I	 used	 a	 combination	 of	 methods	 to	 gather	 data,	 including	interviews,	participant	observation	and	content	analysis.	Further	to	these,	I	also	kept	
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a	 fieldwork	 diary	 where	 I	 would	 record	 my	 ideas,	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 as	 the	fieldwork	and	data	analysis	progressed.	In	this	section,	I	will	give	an	overview	of	the	methods	used,	my	rationale	for	choosing	them,	and	will	explain	what	I	was	trying	to	achieve	 through	 using	 these	methods.	 I	will	 also	 explain	 and	 discuss	 how	 the	 data	were	analysed.			
As	a	brief	reminder,	through	my	data	collection	and	analysis,	I	sought	to	answer	the	following	research	questions:		
1. How	 have	 different	 projects	 and	 narratives	 of	 nationalism	 been	 imagined,	
mobilised	and	contested	in	the	context	of	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	
in	particular,	and	in	the	context	of	devolution	more	generally,	by	the	SNP?	What	
are	these	narratives’	essential	components?		
	
2. What	 are	 the	 particular	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 public	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 SNP’s	
nationalism	has	addressed	questions	of	 ‘diversity’,	 ‘ethnicity’	and	 ’belonging’	 in	
Scotland;	 how	 has	 it	 addressed	 and	 engaged	with	 ethnic	minorities	 post-1999	
and	in	the	context	of	the	independence	referendum	more	specifically?		
	
3. How,	 if	 at	 all,	 have	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 narratives	 intersected	 with	 the	
formation	 of	 policy	 with	 regard	 to	minority	 communities,	 anti-racism	 and	 so-
called	 ‘race	equality’,	and	with	approaches	to	the	treatment	of	recently	arrived	
migrants?	
	
4. How	 do	 nationalist	 narratives	 contribute	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	
ethnic	minorities,	 if	at	all?	How	do	minority	 communities	 respond	 to,	 interpret	
and	possibly	challenge	nationalist	ideas	and	narratives?		
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3.3.1	Interviews	and	observation	
I	conducted	29	interviews	with	30	participants4,	nine	of	which	were	practitioner	and	campaigner	 interviews	 and	 20	 of	 which	 were	 interviews	 with	 ‘ordinary’	 people.	 I	have	provided	two	tables	offering	an	overview	of	the	participants	(see	Appendix	V).	While	 the	 interviews	 were	 semi-structured	 in	 that	 I	 had	 an	 interview	 schedule	 at	hand,	 I	 sought	 to	conduct	 the	 interviews	—	especially	with	 the	voters	—	 in	a	 fairly	informal	fashion	in	order	to	make	the	participants	feel	more	at	ease,	and	to	take	the	inherent	power	dynamics	of	the	interviewing	situation	into	account.			
I	 began	 my	 fieldwork	 by	 conducting	 interviews	 with	 practitioners,	 that	 is,	 with	representatives	 of	 third	 sector	 organisations	 working	 in	 the	 broad	 field	 of	 ethnic	minority	 representation	 and	 rights.	 Interestingly,	 the	 practitioners	 I	 interviewed	occupy	a	‘liminal’	position	in	that	although	their	organisations	are	mainly	funded	by	the	government	—	and	 that	 can	 therefore	be	 seen	as	being	 closely	 linked	with	and	implicated	 by	 dominant	 discourses	 —	 practitioners,	 nonetheless,	 are	 outwith	 the	institutional	 structures	of	 the	government	 and,	 indeed,	 often	directly	 challenge	and	contest	the	government’s	policies.	I	was	interested	in	talking	to	these	individuals	as	I	was	hoping	that,	due	to	their	vast	experience	and	expertise	in	the	field,	they	would	be	able	to	give	me	(critical)	insight	into	how	ruling	relations	and	discourses	might	affect	and	shape	ethnic	minorities’	position	and	experiences	in	Scottish	society	—	especially	in	terms	of	government	policies	and	structural	inequalities.	That	is,	the	practitioners	can	 recognise	 how	 these	 discourses	 perform	 mediating,	 positioning	 work.	Furthermore,	many	of	 the	organisations	 the	participants	worked	 for	also	organised	events	 and	debates	—	 some	of	which	 I	 personally	 attended	—	around	 the	 Scottish	independence	 referendum.	 Again,	 I	 felt	 that	 because	 of	 this,	 they	 were	 in	 a	 good	position	to	discuss	the	referendum	from	the	vantage	point	of	ethnic	minorities.					I	also	interviewed	people	who	were	involved	in	the	Yes	(pro-independence)	and	No	(anti-independence)	campaigns,	and	 therefore	had	a	profound	political	 interest	and																																																									4	There	were	two	participants	present	at	one	of	the	‘practitioner’	interviews;	otherwise	I	conducted	all	
interviews	on	a	one-to-one	basis.	
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conviction	in	relation	to	the	referendum.	While	I	initially	grouped	campaigners	with	practitioners	due	to	their	‘expert’	knowledge	and	approached	specific	individuals	due	to	their	role	in	the	campaigns,	many	of	the	campaigners	spoke	very	much	out	of	their	own	 experience,	 and	 drew	 on	 their	 personal	 circumstances	 in	 the	 interviews.	Furthermore,	apart	from	one,	all	campaigners	came	from	non-Scottish	backgrounds.	Therefore,	the	line	between	the	campaigners	and	the	‘ordinary’	people	I	interviewed	eventually	became	quite	fuzzy.	This	is	also	why	I	have	included	these	participants	in	the	‘voters’	table	(see	Appendix	V)	rather	than	along	with	the	practitioners.	The	Yes	campaigners	I	spoke	to	were	the	founders	and/or	active	members	of	ethnic	minority	Yes	 groups.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 during	 the	 referendum	 we	 saw	 the	proliferation	of	campaigning	groups	organising	along	ethnic	lines,	and	such	groups	as	‘Polish	 for	 Yes’,	 ‘English	 Scots	 for	 Yes’,	 ‘Africans	 for	 an	 Independent	 Scotland’	 and	‘Scots	Asians	 for	 Independence’	 featured	visibly	 in	 the	debates	and	on	social	media.	While	some	of	the	members	of	these	campaign	groups	had	an	affiliation	with	the	SNP,	others	did	not.	I	was	interested	in	speaking	to	political	actors	and	activists	especially	from	 these	 kinds	 of	 groups	 because	 I	 was	 keen	 to	 hear	 how	 they	 negotiated	 their	ethnic	minority	position	vis-à-vis	Scottish	nationalist	narratives,	and	how	they	made	sense	 of	 their	 national,	 ethnic,	 and	 other	 identities	 in	 relation	 to	 these	aforementioned	narratives.				Additionally,	 I	 spoke	 to	 two	 No	 campaigners;	 one	 of	 whom	 was	 what	 the	 census	would	term	‘White	Scottish’,	and	the	other	English	with	an	African	parent.	I	found	it	more	difficult	to	identify	No	campaigners	to	speak	to	because,	it	seemed	to	me,	most	of	the	No	campaign	operated	under	the	unified	banner	of	Better	Together	while	the	Yes	campaign	was	splintered	 into	smaller	groups	 (e.g.	 ‘NHS	 for	Yes’,	 ‘Academics	 for	Yes’,	 ‘Labour	 for	 Yes’,	 ‘Seniors	 for	 Yes’,	 ‘Yes	 LGBT’	—	 the	 list	 goes	 on).	 I	 recruited	experts	 by	 directly	 contacting	 them,	 and	 requesting	 an	 interview.	 Therefore,	 I	identified	 key	 organisations	 which	 had	 been	 vocal	 in	 relation	 to	 ethnic	 minority	representation	and	rights,	as	well	as	‘ethnicity’	based	referendum	campaign	groups.	I	then	 identified	 the	 key	 contacts	 in	 these	 organisations	 and	 groups,	 and	 asked	 to	conduct	an	interview	with	them.								
As	 mentioned	 above,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 practitioner	 and	 campaigner	 interviews,	 I	
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interviewed	 20	 ethnic	 minority	 voters.	 These	 interviews	 took	 place	 on	 university	campus,	in	cafes,	and	at	the	participants’	places	of	work,	and	lasted	between	half	an	hour	and	two	hours,	depending	on	time	constraints	and	how	much	the	participants	had	 to	 say	 on	 the	 topic.	 The	 participants	 were	 recruited	 via	 different	 avenues:	 I	placed	ads	on	both	Gumtree	and	Metro;	 recruited	participants	 through	 friends;	and	snowballed	interviews	through	other	participants.			
I	 decided	 to	 focus	 on	 people	 from	 specific	 ethnic	 minority	 backgrounds,	 namely	African,	 Caribbean,	 English,	 Indian,	 Pakistani,	 and	Polish.	While	 I	 am	 fully	 aware	 of	the	 criticisms	 made	 against	 such	 ‘groupism’	 (Brubaker,	 2002),	 I	 felt	 this	 decision	made	 the	 management	 of	 the	 recruitment	 process	 easier.	 Nonetheless,	 Brubaker	criticises	the	practice	of	taking	groups	for	granted	in	the	study	of	race,	‘ethnicity’,	and	nationhood	(2002:164).	This,	for	him,	is	‘groupism’,	i.e.	“the	tendency	to	take	discrete,	sharply	 differentiated,	 internally	 homogeneous	 and	 externally	 bounded	 groups	 as	basic	 constituents	 of	 social	 life	 (…)	 and	 fundamental	 units	 of	 social	 analysis”,	 the	tendency	to	reify	such	groups,	and	“the	tendency	to	represent	the	social	and	cultural	world	 as	 a	 multichrome	 mosaic	 of	 monochrome	 ethnic,	 racial	 or	 cultural	 blocs”	(2002:164).			
While	I	agree	with	Brubaker’s	criticism,	importantly,	in	addition	to	practical	reasons,	I	felt	there	was	a	solid	analytical	rationale	for	focusing	on	these	specific	‘groups’.	My	intention	is,	by	no	means,	to	reify	or	essentialise	these	putative	ethnic	groupings.	As	Baumann	(1996:9-36)	convincingly	argues	in	relation	to	the	concept	of	‘community’,	by	using	such	broad	and	wide-ranging	concepts,	we	end	up	concealing	more	than	we	reveal;	such	overarching	terms	as	community,	or	group	for	that	matter,	shape	ethnic	categories	into	communities	defined	by	a	reified	culture	(1996:16),	therefore	hiding	the	 heterogeneity	 within	 these	 purported	 ‘communities’	 or	 ‘groups’.	 However,	 in	addition	to	practical	concerns,	I	consciously	chose	these	‘ethnic	groups’,	which	I	will	now	consider	each	in	turn,	because	of	what	I	considered	to	be	their	analytical	value	for	the	research,	and	their	historical	and	contemporary	significance	to	Scotland.			
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During	 the	 referendum,	 the	veteran	BBC	presenter	 Jeremy	Paxman	argued	 that	 the	campaign	 for	 Scottish	 Independence	 was	 fuelled	 by	 ‘hatred’	 against	 the	 English	(Harrison,	2014).	Furthermore,	Alex	Salmond,	when	taking	part	in	the	phone-in	hour	on	BBC	Radio	Scotland	in	August	2014	(this	incident	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	4)	was	asked	a	question	regarding	what	the	listener	saw	as	the	growth	of	anti-English	hatred	in	Scotland.	More	generally,	Miles	and	Dunlop	(1986)	have	argued	that	historically,	with	 regard	 to	 ‘race	 relations’,	 Scotland	has	 looked	 to	 its	 southern	neighbour,	 and	 especially	 Westminster,	 as	 its	 ‘other’,	 rather	 than	 internally	 to	 its	ethnic	 minorities.	 Therefore,	 because	 of	 the	 prominent	 position	 of	 the	 English	 in	relation	to	Scotland’s	national	imagining,	I	felt	it	was	crucial	to	include	English	voices	in	the	research.			
I	 included	 the	African	minority	 (which,	 obviously,	 is	 extremely	 heterogeneous	 as	 it	comprises	people	from	an	entire	continent)	as	it	is	the	most	rapidly	growing	minority	group	 in	 Scotland	 —	 totalling	 5,000	 in	 the	 2001	 census,	 and	 30,000	 in	 the	 2011	census	 (thus	 seeing	 an	 overall	 growth	 of	 479	 per	 cent)	 (Simpson,	 2014).	 Poles,	 in	turn,	 are	 the	biggest	minority	 in	 Scotland	 at	 the	moment,	 numbering	61,000	 in	 the	previous	census	(Simpson,	2014).	Thus,	as	the	biggest	minority,	and	as	the	object	of	numerous	moral	panics	(Cohen,	2002)	 fuelled	by	the	right-wing	press	 in	relation	to	alarm	 over	 eastern	 European	 immigration	 in	 terms	 of	 numbers	 ‘swarming’	 in	 and	British	 people	 losing	 their	 jobs,	 this	 group	 seemed	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	 understanding	Scottish	 national	 consciousness.	 Finally,	 I	 included	 the	 Indian	 and	 Pakistani	minorities	 firstly	 due	 to	 their	 close	 connection	 with	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 its	colonial	 project.	 Secondly,	 Scotland	 has	 a	 long	 history	 of	 Indian,	 and	 especially	Pakistani,	migration	stemming	mainly	from	the	historical	imperial	link.	Finally,	taken	together,	 the	 two	 minorities	 total	 82,000	 people	 (33,000	 Indians	 and	 49,000	Pakistanis)	 in	 the	 2011	 Scottish	 census	 (Simpson,	 2014),	 thus	 making	 up	 a	 group	often	referred	to	as	‘Asian	Scots’	or	‘Scots	Asians’.			
Because	these	groups	are	already	politicised	categories	 in	social	 life,	and	have	been	subject	to	different	racialising	and	essentialising	discourses,	it	seemed	appropriate	to	recruit	participants	 from	these	backgrounds.	 	Gaining	 insight	 into	 their	experiences	
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would	then	allow	me	to	critically	interrogate	essentialised	views	of	ethnic	difference	by	exploring	how	that	perceived	difference	is	experienced,	negotiated	and	potentially	challenged	 by	 ethnic	minorities	 in	 relation	 to	 dominant	 ideas	 of	 ‘Scottishness’	 and	Scottish	 identity.	 Thus,	 these	 ‘groups’	 are	 not	 the	 object	 of	 my	 study	 in	 and	 of	themselves;	rather,	they	are	of	interest	due	to	their	political	positioning	in	relation	to	Scottish	 nationalist	 narratives.	 Understanding	 and	 studying	 their	 experiences	 will	help	shed	light	on	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	discourses	operate,	are	constructed	and	affect	people’s	lives	beyond	the	local	context.		
Furthermore,	it	is	worth	noting	that	these	groups	differ	in	terms	of	their	visibility	in	the	 literal	 sense	 of	 the	 word.	 	 While	 Englishness	 and	 Polishneness	 are,	 for	 the	majority	of	time,	imagined	as	white	(both	in	terms	of	how	people	define	themselves	in	the	census,	and	what	the	‘traditional’	understanding	of	these	identities	is	in	terms	of	 ‘race’),	 Africans,	 Indians,	 and	 Pakistanis	 are	 marked	 out	 as	 visibly	 different	 (as	Black,	 Brown	 or	 as	 ‘people	 of	 colour’)	 in	 the	 White	 majority	 Scotland.	 Therefore,	having	both	‘visible’	and	‘invisible’	minorities	offers	an	interesting	contrast,	and	it	is	this	comparison	that	proved	to	render	rich	data	which	will	be	discussed	in	due	course	in	the	following	chapters.		
In	 addition	 to	 interviews,	 I	 also	 observed	 events	—	 especially	 political	 debates	—	connected	to	the	referendum	in	the	run-up	to	the	vote	(10	in	total).	I	was	especially	interested	 to	 see	 how,	 in	 these	 events,	 nationalist	 narratives	 featured	 in	 the	discussions,	 and	 how	 issues	 around	 belonging,	 identity	 and	 ethnic	minorities	were	discussed	—	 if,	 indeed,	 at	 all.	 I	was	also	paying	attention	 to	how	ethnic	minorities5	themselves	interacted	and	spoke	at	these	events.	Furthermore,	these	events	gave	me	a	 chance	 to	 have	 informal	 conversations	 with	 fellow	 attendees,	 and	 get	 a	 better	understanding	of	how	the	debates	were	experienced	and	analysed	by	those	following	them.	I	kept	fieldnotes	where	I	recorded	the	themes	and	main	discussion	points	that	featured	 in	 the	debates,	 as	well	 as	 comments	 that	were	made	 from	 the	 floor.	 I	 also	sought	to	record	the	general	atmosphere	and	the	feeling	at	these	events.																																																										5	Speakers	would	often	profess	their	‘minority	status’.	
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3.3.1.1.	Defining	‘ethnic	minorities’	and	‘migrants’	
	Migration,	to	put	it	simply,	“is	the	relocation	of	individuals	to	some	distant	place,	i.e.,	at	 least	 beyond	 one’s	 own	 city	 or	 town”	 (Bartram	 et	 al,	 2014:4).	 	 While	 being	 a	geographic	phenomenon,	migration	 is	also	—	 importantly	 for	 this	 thesis	—	a	social	phenomenon	connected	with	such	“life	domains”	as	identity,	economics,	culture,	and	politics	 (Bartram	 et	 al,	 2014:4).	 The	 migrant	 is	 thus	 someone	 who	 has	 moved,	nationally	or	internationally,	individually,	with	their	family	or	other	people,	to	a	new	location	and	place	of	residence.	However,	migrants	often	retain	connections	to	their	countries	 of	 origin	 as	 “even	 in	 relatively	 settled	 communities,	 people	 can	communicate	 or	 travel	 between	 new	 country	 and	 home	 country,	 giving	 rise	 to	 the	
transnational	communities	and	transnational	transfers”	(Fenton,	2010:118).	Further,	due	 to	 the	growing	 trend	 towards	 “circular	migration”	 (Martin	and	Martin,	2006	 in	Fenton,	2010:6)	migration	may	often	be	quite	short-term.	In	this	thesis,	the	migrants	I	 discuss	 have	moved	 to	 Scotland	 from	within	 the	UK	 (England	 and	Guernsey)	 and	from	outside	the	UK	(e.g.	Poland,	Pakistan,	Zambia).			As	discussed	 in	Chapter	1,	 “ethnicity	refers	to	the	social	construction	of	descent	and	culture,	 the	 social	 mobilization	 of	 descent	 and	 culture	 and	 the	 meanings	 and	implications	of	classification	systems	built	around	them”	(Fenton,	2010:3	—	original	emphasis).	 Ethnicity	matters	 because	people	 attach	meaning	 to	 their	 own	ethnicity	and	to	that	of	others.	Importantly,	 ‘ethnicity’	is	also	given	meaning	and	has	material	effects	 through	 formal	 processes:	 “state	 institutions	 commonly	 use	 ethnicity	 as	 a	system	 of	 classification	 in	ways	 that	 can	 be	 highly	 consequential”	—	 “for	 example,	instruments	 like	 the	 census	 and	 the	 passport	 can	 make	 ethnic	 (and	 national)	classifications	seem	natural”	(Bartram	et	al,	2014:63).	 In	the	public	sphere,	“actions	of	 private	 sector	 organizations	 and	 the	 media	 can	 have	 similar	 impacts:	 these	institutions	 often	 present	 different	 ethnic	 groups	 as	 having	 distinct	 cultures	 and	consumption	 habits,	 making	 ethnic	 differences	 seem	 natural”	 (Bartram	 et	 al,	2014:63).			Ethnic	 minorities	 are	 therefore	 those	 who	 are	 marked	 through	 both	 formal	 (e.g.	institutional)	and	informal	(e.g.	everyday	interactions)	processes	of	classification	and	
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categorisation	 as	 ‘different’	 or	 ‘other’	 and	 are	 not	 regarded	 as	 being	 part	 of	 the	‘dominant’	or	‘majority	ethnicity’	(that	often	goes	unmarked	or	invisible	as	the	‘norm’	which	 others	 are	 different	 from).	 As	 Fenton	 notes,	 minorities	 may	 be	 native-born,	immigrants,	 or	 children	 of	 immigrants	 (2010:137).	 Indeed,	 “there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	ways	 in	which	minorities	become	 incorporated	 into	political	communities,	 from	the	conquest	 and	 colonization	 of	 previously	 self-governing	 societies	 to	 the	 voluntary	immigration	 of	 individuals	 and	 families”	 and	 “these	 differences	 in	 the	 mode	 of	incorporation	affect	the	nature	of	minority	groups,	and	the	sort	of	relationship	they	desire	with	the	larger	society”	(Kymlicka,	1996b:10).			The	 two	 concepts,	 ‘migrant’	 and	 ‘ethnic	minority’,	 are	 therefore	 closely	 related	 and	not	mutually	 exclusive.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 ethnic	minorities	 are	 those	who,	 by	 virtue	 of	 e.g.	 their	 origins,	 language,	 religion,	 dress	 (and	 a	 combination	 of	these)	 are	 marked	 out	 as	 different	 from	 the	 ‘ethnic	 majority’	 both	 in	 everyday	interactions	 as	 well	 as	 through	 more	 formal	 means	 (e.g.	 the	 census,	 equal	opportunities	 monitoring	 forms).	 Migrants,	 when	 arriving	 in	 a	 new	 country,	 often	become	 ‘ethnicised’	 (and	racialised)	and	are	seen	as	belonging	 to	particular	 “ethnic	groups”	 (Kymlicka,	 1996b).	 Perceived	 ethnic	minority	 groups	 are	 thus	made	 up	 of	more	settled	minority	groups	and	more	recent	migrants,	for	example.	Crucially,	these	minority	groups	are	not	homogenous	but	individuals	are	further	differentiated	based	on	class,	gender,	 sexuality,	and	disability,	 for	example.	 I	use	 the	 terms,	 i.e.	 ‘migrant’	and	‘ethnic	minority’,	to	emphasise	different	facets	of	experience.	When	referring	to	migrants	 in	 a	 given	 context,	 I	 seek	 to	 highlight	 the	 experience	 and	 attribution	 of	transience	 and	 a	 Simmelian	 sense	 of	 being	 a	 “stranger”.	 When	 referring	 to	 ethnic	minorities,	 I	 seek	 to	 foreground	different	processes	of	 racialisation	and	othering.	 In	real	 experience,	 of	 course,	 this	 conceptual	 differentiation	 is	much	 less	 fixed,	 and	 a	person’s	 experience	as	 a	migrant,	 and	 their	 experience	as	 a	member	of	 a	 racialised	minority,	will	 often	 overlap.	 Further,	 I	 also	 take	 into	 account	 the	 participants’	 own	terminology	whereby	 they	may	refer	 to	 themselves	alternatively	as	 ‘migrants’	or	as	being	part	of	an	‘ethnic	minority’	in	different	contexts.			Interestingly,	Kymlicka	draws	a	distinction	between	‘national	minorities’	and	‘ethnic	minorities’.	By	the	former,	he	refers	to	cultural	diversity	that,	
…arises	 from	 the	 incorporation	 of	 previously	 self-governing,	 territorially	
concentrated	 cultures	 into	a	 larger	 state.	 These	 incorporated	 cultures,	which	 I	
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call	 ‘national	 minorities’,	 typically	 wish	 to	 maintain	 themselves	 as	 distinct	
societies	alongside	the	majority	culture,	and	demand	various	forms	of	autonomy	
or	self-government	to	ensure	their	survival	as	distinct	societies.	(1996b:10)		In	contrast,		
In	 the	 second	 case,	 cultural	 diversity	 arises	 from	 individual	 and	 familial	
immigration.	Such	immigrants	often	coalesce	into	loose	associations	which	I	call	
‘ethnic	groups’.	They	typically	wish	to	integrate	into	the	larger	society,	and	to	be	
accepted	as	full	members	of	it.	While	they	often	seek	greater	recognition	of	their	
ethnic	identity,	their	aim	is	not	to	become	a	separate	and	self-governing	nation	
alongside	 the	 larger	 society,	 but	 to	 modify	 the	 institutions	 and	 laws	 of	 the	
mainstream	society	to	make	them	more	accommodating	of	cultural	differences.	(1996b:10-11)		The	latter	concept	is	useful	for	the	purposes	of	defining	‘ethnic	minorities’.	‘National	minority’,	 in	 turn,	 is	 interesting	 when	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Scotland	 itself.	While	 it	 could	 technically	 be	 argued	 that	 Scots	 are	 a	 ‘national	minority’	within	 the	wider	UK	 in	 the	sense	Kymlicka	discusses	 the	concept,	 I	 remain	dubious	of	such	an	assertion.	This	is	because	Scottish	elites	have	long	wielded	power	within	the	UK,	and	have	 been	 absolutely	 central	 to	 shaping	 and	 contributing	 to	 its	 political,	 economic	and	social	life	and	structures	(including	its	colonial	project	—	see	Chapter	4).	While	certain	 fractions	 of	 the	 Scottish	 society	 have	 sought	 independence,	 and	 have	therefore	 sought	 self-government,	 drawing	 a	 parallel	 between	 Scots	 and	oppressed	national	minorities	such	as	Native	Americans,	Maoris	or	Canadian	Aboriginals	seems	disingenuous.	 	Further,	 treating	Scots	as	a	 ‘national	minority’	 risks	 feeding	 into	and	propping	up	 the	 idea	of	 Scottish	 exceptionalism	 (see	Chapter	5)	whereby	Scots	 are	depicted	as	somehow	inherently	different	and	more	progressive	than	others	(notably	the	English).				It	 is,	 however,	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	belief	or	 feeling	 of	 being	 a	 ‘national	minority’	 does	 feed	 into	 certain	 expressions	 of	 nationalism	 in	 Scotland;	 that	 is,	whether	‘national	minority’	is	an	apt	conceptual	tool	within	the	Scottish	context	is	up	for	 debate,	 but	 the	 belief	 of	 some	 constituencies	 that	 Scots	are	 a	 national	minority	contributes	to	ways	in	which	the	nation	is	imagined	and	experienced	especially	vis-à-vis	its	‘significant	other’	(England).	It	could	also	be	argued	that	certain	sections	of	the	population	supporting	 independence	(notably	 those	 living	 in	Gaelic	speaking	areas)	could	 potentially	 be	 seen	 as	 genuine	 national	 minorities	 following	 Kymlicka’s	
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conceptualisation	—	though,	historically,	it	would	have	been	both	Scottish	and	British	elites	who	were	responsible	for	the	Gaelic	speakers’	‘incorporation’.				
3.3.2.	Content	analysis	Institutional	 ethnographers	 have	 helpfully	 pointed	 out	 that	 technologies	 of	 social	control	are	increasingly	and	pervasively	textual	and	discursive	(Smith,	1999	cited	in	DeVault,	2006:294).	That	is,	texts	matter	because	social	relations	are,	in	part,	realised	through	the	“textually-mediated	social	organisation”,	and	it	is	therefore	important	to	study	dominant	 “texts-in-use”	 (Longhofer	et	al,	2013:88)	which	coordinate	people’s	activities	(Smith,	2006:65).			
I,	too,	consider	texts	to	be	of	great	analytical	interest,	and	I	thus	conducted	a	content	analysis	 of	 party	 political	 speeches,	 manifestoes	 and	 publications.	 My	 focus	 was	specifically	on	the	SNP,	but	I	also	read	and	followed	publications	and	speeches	by	the	other	main	political	forces	behind	the	Yes	and	No	campaigns,	namely	those	released	by	 the	Labour	Party,	 the	Conservative	Party	 (both	part	of	Better	Together)	and	 the	Scottish	Green	Party	(campaigning	for	a	Yes	vote,	although	they	gave	individual	MSPs	the	freedom	to	express	differing	opinions).	I	was	interested	in	manifestos	because	“as	definitive	 statements	 of	 party	 positions,	 manifestos	 are	 especially	 significant	 and	enable	systematic	analysis	over	time”	(Leith,	2008:84).	While	much	of	the	analysis	of	material	of	this	kind	has	tended	to	be	quantitative	in	nature	(Budge	et	al,	2001;	and	Klingemann	et	al,	2006	cited	 in	Leith,	2008:84),	as	Smith	and	Smith	 (2000,	 cited	 in	Leith,	 2008:84)	 note,	manifestos	 are	 ”rhetorical	 constructions	 of	 political	 realities”,	and	therefore	their	 language	and	idioms	are	of	great	 interest.	Furthermore,	as	Leith	notes	 (2008:84),	while	 British	 party	 political	manifestoes	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	meticulous	analysis,	Scottish	political	manifestoes	have	been	less	so.			However,	as	Brack	(2000)	notes,	these	documents	may	not	be	widely	read.	Therefore,	speeches	and	other	public	engagements	by	key	figures	 from	both	the	pro-	and	anti-
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independence	 campaigns6 	were	 of	 crucial	 importance	 as,	 when	 conducting	 the	interviews,	a	majority	of	the	voters	spoke	about	at	least	one	of	these	politicians,	and	the	 majority	 had	 followed	 referendum	 debates	 on	 TV	 and	 through	 press	 and	therefore	 had	 an	 idea	 about	 what	 their	 key	 political	 messages	 might	 be.	 Thus,	speeches	 and	 other	 public	 performances	 are	 a	 central	 form	 of	 getting	 a	 party’s	political	 message	 and,	 importantly,	 their	 nationalist	 narrative	 across	 to	 the	 public,	and	are	key	media	through	which	ruling	relations	are	mediated.	
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 sample,	 the	 publications	 I	 focused	 on	 were	 the	SNP’s	 White	 Paper	 on	 independence	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	 2013),	 and	 the	preceding	publications	Your	Scotland	Your	Future	(The	SNP,	2011)	and	Choice	—	An	
historic	opportunity	for	our	nation	(The	SNP,	2012).	As	for	speeches,	the	sample	was	restricted	 based	 on	 temporal	 and	 person-based	 factors.	 I	 chose	 to	 focus	 on	 First	Minister	Alex	Salmond’s,	Deputy	First	Minister	Nicola	 Sturgeon’s,	Cabinet	 Secretary	for	 Culture,	 Tourism	 and	 External	 Affairs	 Fiona	 Hyslop’s	 and	Minister	 for	 External	Affairs	 and	 International	Development	Humza	Yousaf’s	 contributions.	 This	 decision	was	taken	due	to	these	three	politicians’	centrality	to	the	Yes	campaign	due	to	their	roles.	 Additionally,	 Yousaf	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	 politicians	 of	 colour	 in	Scotland	 —	 although	 born	 and	 raised	 in	 Glasgow,	 Yousaf’s	 parents	 migrated	 to	Scotland	in	the	1960s	(his	father	comes	from	Pakistan	and	his	mother	from	Kenya).	Furthermore,	I	chose	to	focus	on	speeches	delivered	well	in	advance	the	start	of	the	referendum	 campaign	 period	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 2014,	 and	 immediately	 after	 the	referendum	result.	Thus,	 the	 timeframe	 for	 the	speeches	under	scrutiny	 is	between	January	2012	and	September	2014.	This	allowed	me	to	trace	the	development	of	the	SNP’s	 narrative	 over	 a	 set	 period	 of	 time,	 beginning	with	 the	 preparations	 for	 the	future	 referendum	 and	 ending	 with	 the	 thoughts	 and	 reflections	 on	 the	 result.	Altogether,	 I	 analysed	 36	 SNP	 speeches	 (see	 Appendix	 VI	 for	 details).	 Through	content	 analysis,	 I	was	 trying	 to	 gain	 a	better	understanding,	 and	 to	present	 to	 the	reader	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	rhetoric	is	constructed,	vocalised	and	developed	by	 political	 actors	 and	 parties,	 and	 how	 it	 is	 communicated	 to	 the	 wider	 public.	Understanding	 and	 interpreting	 how	nationalist	 rhetoric	 is	 taken	 advantage	 of	 and																																																									6	Such	as	those	by	Alex	Salmond,	Nicola	Sturgeon	and	Humza	Yousaf	(SNP)	and	Patrick	Harvie	(Greens)	from	
the	Yes	side,	and	Alistair	Darling,	Douglas	Alexander,	Johann	Lamont,	Anas	Sarwar	(Labour),	David	Cameron	
and	Ruth	Davidson	(Conservatives)	from	the	No	side.	
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expressed	 from	 above	 provides	 the	 context	 in	 which	 ethnic	 minorities’	 everyday	experiences	 and	 understandings	 of	 belonging	 and	 identity,	 then,	 exist	 and	 are	possibly	shaped	by	these	public	articulations	of	nationalist	narratives.				
3.3.3.	Fieldwork	diary	
During	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 also	kept	 a	diary	where	 I	 recorded	my	 thoughts,	 reflections	and	feelings	with	regard	to	the	research	itself,	as	well	as	with	regard	to	the	issues	and	themes	 arising	 from	 the	 research	 in	 general	 and	 the	 fieldwork	more	 specifically.	 It	also	gave	me	a	chance	to	reflect	on	my	own	positioning	within	the	debate	which	I	was	very	intimately	connected	to.	I	moved	to	Scotland	in	2008,	and	at	the	time	of	writing	this,	have	lived	here	for	over	nine	years.	Many	of	the	questions	I	put	forward	to	my	participants	were	of	great	personal	 interest	 to	me,	and	they	were	questions	 I	had	a	personal	view	on	as	well.			This	thesis	seeks	to	uncover	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	narratives	are	constructed,	and	how	those	narratives	are	interpreted,	understood	and	potentially	challenged	by	ethnic	minorities	in	Scotland.	Being	white,	middle-class,	cis-gendered,	straight,	able-bodied,	and	coming	from	a	Nordic	country	in	Western	Europe	(indeed,	an	area	which	was	often	referred	to	as	a	model	for	progressive	politics	by	the	Yes	campaign),	I	fully	acknowledge	 that	 my	 experience	 and	 perception	 is	 very	 specifically	 situated.	However,	I	nonetheless	live	outside	my	country	of	birth,	and	listen	to	the	same	anti-migration	 right-wing	 rhetoric	 as	 my	 fellow	 migrants,	 and	 the	 descendants	 of	migrants.	I	understand	what	it	is	like	to	struggle	with	feelings	of	belonging:	to	be	in-between	nations.	While	 I	 cannot	 fully	understand	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	be	 the	 target	 of	racist	 violence,	whether	 physical	 or	 psychical,	 I	 can	 nonetheless	 seek	 to	 uncover	 it	and	write	about	it	as	an	ally,	and	therefore	be	committed	to	anti-racist	politics.			
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3.3.4.	Analysis	
All	data	—	interview	transcripts,	fieldnotes	and	the	data	for	content	analysis	—	were	coded	 and	 analysed	 thematically.	 The	 analysis	 process,	 I	 believe,	 begins	 with	 the	transcription	of	the	 interviews	and	the	reading	of	materials	 for	the	content	analysis	as	the	researcher	comes	to	know	the	data	intimately,	and	starts	to	notice	similarities	as	 well	 as	 differences	 across	 the	 data.	 Following	 this,	 I	 began	 with	 ‘open	 coding’	(Neuman,	 2007:330;	 Basely,	 2013:126)	whereby	 I	 started	 to	 group	 the	 data	 under	broad	‘emergent	themes’	such	as	‘nationalism’	and	‘Scottish	distinction’,	for	example.	I	also	started	to	think	about	more	 focused	 ‘subthemes’	under	these	broader	themes	(Bernard	 and	 Ryan,	 2010:54)	 such	 as	 ‘anti-Englishness’	 under	 ‘nationalism’,	 for	example.	At	this	stage	themes	are	tentative	and	open	to	challenge	and	revision.			Following	 this	 initial	 stage	 of	 identifying	 themes	which	 gave	me	 an	 overall	 picture	and	 sense	of	 the	data,	 I	 immersed	myself	 in	 the	data	again	 in	order	 to	undertake	a	more	meticulous	and	 focused	reading	of	 the	data	which	enabled	me	to	develop	and	tweak	my	 themes	 and	 subthemes	 arising	 from	 the	 interviews	 and	 content	 analysis	further.	In	addition	to	the	coding	process,	I	also	wrote	analytic	memos	with	regard	to	the	analysis.	As	Neuman	notes,	memos	forge	a	link	between	the	data	and	theoretical	thinking	 (2007:334).	 For	me,	 memos	 are	 a	 way	 of	 having	 a	 conversation	with	 the	data,	and	of	noting	down	analytical	ideas	and	thoughts	as	they	arise	in	relation	to	the	data.			
Rather	than	line-by-line	coding,	 I	chose	to	code	more	substantial	sections	of	text.	 In	my	view,	 this	 approach	 enables	 the	 researcher	 consider	 the	broader	 context	 of	 the	section	under	scrutiny,	detect	nuances	throughout	the	speech	and	text,	and	to	more	readily	notice	connections	between	the	data.	Indeed,	when	coding,	most	passages	fell	under	multiple	themes	and	subthemes	which	highlights	the	richness	and	complexity	of	the	data,	and	how	intimately	the	themes	are	interconnected.	Thus,	data	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	simple	and	monochromatic	interpretation.	On	a	practical	note,	following	a	recommendation	from	a	colleague,	I	used	a	storyboarding	software	called	Scrivener	to	code	and	organise	the	data	as,	simply,	I	found	Scrivener	the	most	intuitive,	easiest	and	most	straightforward	to	use.	
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3.4.	Limitations	of	the	study	
No	research	 is	perfect,	and	neither	can	 it	be.	While	 there	are	many	strengths	to	 the	present	 study,	 there	 are	 also	 limitations.	 Due	 to	 time	 constraints	 and	 unsuccessful	meeting	requests,	I	was	unfortunately	unable	to	recruit	Caribbean	participants.	I	was	keen	to	recruit	from	this	group	due	to	Scotland’s	intimate,	and	violent,	historical	link	with	 the	 West	 Indies	 as	 a	 result	 of	 slave	 trade	 and	 colonialism	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	Nonetheless,	 I	 did	 manage	 to	 recruit	 Indian	 participants	 who	 provided	 a	 link	 to	Scotland’s	historical	connection	to	the	British	Empire	and,	more	broadly,	 I	managed	to	recruit	participants	from	categories	that	are	politicised	contemporarily	(e.g.	Poles)	as	 well	 as	 contemporarily	 and	 historically	 (e.g.	 the	 English).	 Furthermore,	 the	Caribbean	and	Scotland’s	historical	 and	contemporary	 relationship	with	 it	will	be	a	central	concern	of	the	broader	analysis.					While	 I	 was	 able	 to	 gather	 and	 analyse	 data	 from	 multiple	 sources	 and	 by	 using	various	methods,	I	was	also	hoping	to	include	a	press	review	as	part	of	my	analysis.	Due	to	time	constraints,	however,	it	became	impossible	to	meticulously	analyse	these	data.	 It	 would	 have	 been	 interesting	 to,	 firstly,	 see	 how	 party	 political	 manifestos,	speeches,	and	other	publications	were	represented	in	the	media,	and	what	aspects	of	them	 were	 given	 a	 platform.	 Secondly,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 interesting	 to	 see	 the	extent	 to	 which	 newspapers	 discussed	 issues	 to	 do	 with	 ‘ethnicity’,	 identity	 and	belonging	in	relation	to	the	referendum	and,	if	they	did	indeed	refer	to	these	subject	matters,	how	and	in	what	manner	were	these	topics	covered.	This	was,	however,	not	doable	 within	 the	 timeframe	 of	 a	 PhD.	 Although	 media	 outlets	 were	 of	 crucial	importance	 in	 getting	 parties’	 and	 media	 corporations’	 views	 of	 the	 referendum	across	to	voters,	as	mentioned	previously,	speeches	and	televised	and	radio	debates	also	 fulfilled	 this	 role.	 Furthermore,	 in	 order	 to	 truly	 capture	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	narrative	 as	 they	 present	 it,	 second-hand	 accounts	 would	 have,	 perhaps,	 been	counterproductive	taken	the	aims	and	objects	of	the	present	study.					
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3.5.	Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 has	 outlined	 and	 critically	 discussed	 the	 central	 aims,	 objectives	 and	research	questions	 guiding,	 and	 giving	 shape,	 to	 this	 research.	 Crucially,	 this	 thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	understandings	of	nationalism	on	two	analytical	levels:	on	the	one	 hand,	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 SNP,	 it	 considers	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 elite	 nationalist	narratives	construct	ideas	and	imageries	of	a	‘nation’;	who	does	and	does	not	belong	to	 that	 nation;	 and	 how	 that	 belonging	 can	 be	 or	 is	 achieved.	 As	 outlined	 in	 the	Introduction,	focusing	on	the	SNP	is	interesting	due	to	its	status	as	a	nationalist	party,	and	due	to	the	power	the	SNP	has	held	especially	since	2007	when	they	became	the	governing	 party.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 also	 interrogates	 ethnic	 minority	individuals’	experiences	and	understandings	of,	and	responses	to,	nationalism	within	the	Scottish	context.			
I	have	outlined	that	while	I	focus	on	the	independence	referendum	as	a	case	study,	I	nonetheless	 seek	 to	 situate	 the	 discussion	 in	 a	 broader,	 post-devolutionary	framework.	 Besides	 making	 the	 project	 more	 manageable	 in	 pragmatic	 terms,	 it	makes	 analytical	 sense	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 referendum.	 Nationalism	 can	 be	 extremely	difficult	 to	 ‘pin	down’	 and	 thus	moments	when	 the	edges	of	 the	nation	 (Fox,	2017)	become	 more	 obviously	 visible	 are	 of	 important	 analytical	 value.	 The	 referendum	provided	such	a	context:	as	Scotland’s	future	was	up	for	debate,	people	reflected	on	the	 nation	 in	ways	 that	were	 revealing	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 how	 the	 content	and	contours	of	the	nation	were	made	sense	of	and	imagined.			
In	terms	of	how	the	research	was	conducted,	 I	opted	for	a	multimethod	approach.	 I	therefore	used	interviews,	content	analysis	and	observation.	These	methods	enabled	me	 to	 collect	meaningful	 and	holistic	data	 that	would	help	me	answer	my	 research	questions.	In	terms	of	the	fieldwork	process	(which	often	tends	to	be	rather	messy!),	keeping	 a	 fieldwork	 diary	 to	 organise	 and	 record	 my	 thoughts	 and	 ideas	 as	 they	developed	was	especially	useful.	The	diary	also	provided	space	for	reflection	during	the	thematic	data	analysis	process.		
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Having	 provided	 a	 theoretical	 and	 methodological	 basis	 for	 my	 thesis,	 I	 will	 now	move	on	to	discuss	the	key	findings	of	this	research	in	Chapters	4-7.		 	
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Chapter	4	Civic	vs.	Ethnic	Forms	of	Nationalism:	Interrogating	the	dichotomy	in	Scotland	and	beyond			
4.1.	Introduction	Traditionally,	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 through	 the	 binary	distinction	of	civic	versus	ethnic	nationalism,	with	various	academics,	politicians	and	political	commentators	arguing	for	the	‘civic’	quality	of	the	SNP’s	nationalism.	Based	on	 a	 close	 analysis	 of	 SNP	 speeches	 and	 referendum	 publications,	 as	 well	 as	interviews	with	 practitioners	 and	 Yes	 and	 No	 campaigners	 especially,	 this	 chapter	problematises	 this	 view	 by	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 erroneous	 to	 consider	 the	 SNP’s	nationalism	 as	 being	 wholly	 civic	 in	 its	 expression.	 Indeed,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	conceptualisation	of	nationalism	more	generally	in	terms	of	a	civic/ethnic	dichotomy	is	analytically	constraining	and	problematic.			
Thus,	this	chapter	will	advance	two	interrelated	arguments.	Firstly,	it	will	argue	that	understanding	 and	 considering	 the	 SNP	 to	 demonstrate	 nationalism	of	 the	 civic,	 as	opposed	to	ethnic,	variety	is	misguided	when	taking	into	account	the	ways	in	which	the	nation	is	constructed	in	public	political	discourse.	Secondly	and	importantly,	this	chapter	will	also	argue	 that	analysing	and	making	sense	of	nationalism	through	the	civic/ethnic	lens	restricts	and	limits	our	analytical	process	by	drawing	rigid	analytical	lines	 where	 they	 should	 not	 exist.	 Instead,	 nationalism	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	complex	 and	 multilayered	 construction	 that	 must	 not	 be	 reified	 as	 a	 ‘thing’.	Nonetheless,	 it	 seems	difficult	 to	 completely	abandon	 ideas	around	civic	and	ethnic	nationalism,	as	these	have	become	an	everyday	way	of	making	sense	of	nationalism	in	the	Scottish	context	and	beyond	and,	as	such,	are	of	interest	as	objects	of	analysis	(as	opposed	to	tools	of	analysis)	(Brubaker,	2013:6)	—	thus,	how	we	engage	with	ideas	of	civic	and	ethnic	nationalism	is	of	utmost	importance.		
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In	 order	 to	 make	 these	 arguments,	 this	 chapter	 will,	 first	 of	 all,	 build	 on	 issues	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2	 and	 further	 consider	 the	 theoretical	 discussion	 around	 the	civic/ethnic	distinction.	Secondly,	it	will	then	move	on	to	look	at	the	different	explicit	and	implicit	ways	in	which	Scottish	nationalism	—	as	exemplified	by	the	SNP	—	has	been	 framed	 as	 civic	 both	 by	 the	 SNP	 as	well	 as	 by	 academics.	 Following	 this,	 the	notion	of	‘Scottish	civicness’	will	be	challenged	on	two	grounds,	namely	in	relation	to	culture	and	heritage	on	the	one	hand,	and	history	on	the	other.	Finally,	 this	chapter	will	begin	to	move	beyond	the	Scottish	context	and	take	a	more	detailed	look	at	the	analytical	shortcomings	of	the	civic/ethnic	dichotomy.			
This	 chapter	 will,	 thus,	 address	 issues	 regarding	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 were	mobilised	during	the	referendum	(and	beyond),	and	especially	consider	the	ways	in	which	 questions	 around	 ‘diversity’,	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 ‘belonging’	 have	 featured	 in	political	 discourse.	 In	 relation	 to	 this,	 I	will	 also	 discuss	 how	nationalist	 narratives	affect	and	intersect	with	approaches	to	‘race	equality’	in	devolutionary	Scotland.				
4.2.	Setting	the	theoretical	scene:	Civic	vs.	ethnic	nationalism		
As	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 nationalism	 is	 often	 understood	 and	 conceptualised	 in	terms	 of	 dualistic	 categorisations	 in	 academic	 literature;	 be	 it	 cultural	 or	 political,	Eastern	 or	 Western	 or,	 importantly	 for	 this	 chapter,	 ethnic	 or	 civic.	 Furthermore,	these	dualisms	are	closely	interlinked	—	while	civic	nationalism	is	often	depicted	as	political	 and	Western	 in	 origin,	 ethnic	 nationalism	 is	 seen	 as	 cultural	 and	 Eastern.	These	 simple	 dichotomous	 distinctions	 are	 then	 expected	 to	 do	 normative,	descriptive	 as	 well	 as	 analytical	 work	 (Brubaker,	 2004;	 Yack,	 1996).	 Ethnic	nationalism	 is	 seen	 as	 veering	 towards	 authoritarianism	 as	 it	 “presupposes	 an	inherited	commonality	that	must	be	imposed	when	it	 is	not	otherwise	forthcoming”	(Xenos,	 1996:215)	 and	 is	 characterised	 as	 “illiberal,	 ascriptive,	 particularist	 and	exclusive”	 (Brubaker,	 2004:56).	 Conversely,	 civic	 nationalism	 is	 characterised	 as	“liberal,	 voluntarist,	 universalist	 and	 inclusive”	 (Brubaker,	 2004:56).	 Civic	nationalism	is	thus	seen	as	being	ahistorical	and	acultural;	a	voluntary	association	of	
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culturally	unmarked	individuals	for	whom	nation-membership	is	a	chosen	and	not	a	given.	 This	 is,	 then,	 in	 contrast	 to	 ethnic	 nationalism	 whereby	 membership	 is	understood	to	be	based	on	‘ethnicity’	(Brubaker,	2004:59-61).	As	Hearn	has	noted,	“it	has	 been	 common	 to	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 ‘ethnic’	 and	 ‘civic’	 forms	 of	nationalism,	the	former	involving	beliefs	in	biological	and	cultural	essentialisms,	and	the	latter	involving	commitments	to	ideas	of	citizenship	and	the	rule	of	law”	(2000:7	in	Kiely	et	al,	2005:150).				However	—	and	as	will	be	discussed	 in	more	detail	 later	—	 it	 is	difficult	 to	draw	a	clear-cut	 line	 between	 ethnic	 and	 civic	 types	 of	 nationalism.	 Keating	 (1996:5-6	 in	Brubaker,	 2004:61-62),	 for	 example,	 characterises	 civic	 nationalism	 as	 “rooted	 in	individual	 assent	 rather	 than	 ascriptive	 identity”	 and	 says	 it	 is	 based	 on	 “common	values	and	institutions”	as	well	as	“patterns	of	social	interaction”.	Thus,	the	“bearers	of	national	identity	are	institutions,	customs,	historical	memories	and	rational	secular	values”	 and	 “anyone	 can	 join	 the	nation”	 regardless	of	 their	 ethnic	origins,	 “though	the	 cost	 of	 adaptation	 varies”.	 While	 “there	 is	 no	 myth	 of	 common	 ancestry”	 and	nationhood	is	based	on	territorially	defined	community,	he	nonetheless	contends	that	“there	 need	 to	 be	 a	 structured	 set	 of	 political	 and	 social	 interactions	 guided	 by	common	values	and	a	sense	of	common	identity”.				Brubaker	(2004:62),	however,	 importantly	points	out	that	while	Keating	retains	the	universalist	 and	 rationalist	 emphasis	 on	 choice	 in	 his	 ‘thin’	 understanding	 of	 civic	nationalism,	 his	 “more	 sociologically	 realistic	 understanding	 pushes	 him	 to	acknowledge	the	importance	of	‘common	values’,	‘customs’,	‘historical	memories’	and	‘a	 sense	of	 common	 identity’”.	But,	 these	are	particularist,	 ‘thick’	and	 ‘given’	 factors	which	 more	 broad,	 culturalist	 understandings	 of	 ‘ethnicity’	 usually	 highlight	(Brubaker,	 2004:62).	 Therefore,	 even	 such	 sophisticated	 definitions	 of	 civic	nationalism	 as	 Keating’s	 often	 include	 elements	 that	 are	 traditionally	 attributed	 to	ethnic	 nationalism.	 Consequently,	 the	 line	 between	 ethnic	 and	 civic	 nationalism	remains	blurred	and	this,	in	turn,	calls	into	question	the	analytical	usefulness	of	such	rigid	typologies	which	do	not	seem	to	bear	the	definitional	weight	that	is	ascribed	to	them.		
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Similarly,	 when	 discussing	 the	 differences	 between	 civic	 and	 ethnic	 nationalism,	Smith	 (2005b)	 seems	 to	 blur	 the	 line	 between	 the	 two	 types	 as	 well.	 While	 he	attributes	laws	and	institutions	as	well	as	legal	and	political	rights	to	the	Western	or	‘civic’	model	of	 the	nation,	he	also	sees	a	measure	of	common	values	and	traditions	among	 the	 population	—	 or	 “at	 any	 rate	 its	 ‘core’	 community”	 (2005b:	 178)	—	 as	important.	 Furthermore,	 he	 also	 argues	 that	 civic	 nationalism	 is	 a	 predominantly	spatial	or	 territorial	 conception.	However,	 this	does	not	apply	 to	 just	any	stretch	of	land:	“It	is,	and	must	be,	the	‘historic’	land,	the	‘homeland’,	the	‘cradle’	of	our	people,	even	where,	as	with	the	Turks,	it	is	not	the	land	of	ultimate	origin”	(2005b:	178).	As	a	result,	 the	 “homeland	 becomes	 a	 repository	 of	 historic	memories	 and	 associations,	the	 place	 where	 ‘our’	 sages,	 saints	 and	 heroes	 lived,	 worked,	 prayed	 and	 fought”	(2005b:	178).	Thus,	“in	the	Western	model	of	national	identity	nations	were	seen	as	culture	 communities,	 whose	 members	 were	 united,	 if	 not	 made	 homogenous,	 by	common	 historical	 memories,	 myths,	 symbols	 and	 traditions”	 (2005b:	 178).	 With	reference	 to	ethnic	nations,	Smith	mentions	stress	on	(presumed)	descent,	a	 strong	popular	or	demotic	element	and	vernacular	culture	—	furthermore,	membership	 in	such	 a	nation	 is	 a	 given:	 in	 a	 sense	 that	whether	 you	 stay	or	 emigrate,	 you	 remain	organically	a	member	of	the	community	of	your	birth	(2005b:180).				As	with	Keating’s	 definition,	 Smith’s	model	 attributes	 elements	 to	 civic	 nationalism	which	 would,	 in	 Brubaker’s	 terms,	 fall	 under	 the	 ‘thick’	 understandings	 of	 ethnic	nationalism.	Not	only	does	Smith	evoke	the	idea	of	common	values	and	traditions,	he	also	 makes	 reference	 to	 a	 ‘historic’	 homeland	 which	 serves	 as	 a	 site	 of	 historical	memories	and	associations.	It	is	not	clear	how	this,	then,	translates	into	an	inclusive	sense	of	nationalism:	whose	culture,	values	and	traditions	get	to	be	included	or	get	to	be	at	the	‘core’?	Whose	and	which	historical	memories	get	to	be	remembered?	Which	myths	 and	 symbols	 come	 to	 prevail?	 Such	 a	 model	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	indeed	a	specific	ethnic	group	around	which	such	a	nation	comes	to	be,	and	continues	to	be,	built.			
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4.3.Civic	SNP	nationalism:	Explicit	framings		
Therefore,	 as	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 problem	 which	 emerges	 from	 the	literature	 is	 the	 apparent	 instability	 of	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘ethnic’	 and	 ‘civic’	nationalism.	As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 data	 analysis	 process	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 the	 SNP’s	nationalism	 is	both	explicitly	and	 implicitly	portrayed	as	being	of	 the	 ‘civic’	kind.	 	 I	will	begin	by	discussing	the	explicit	framings.			
	
4.3.1.	Academic	perspectives	
The	SNP’s	nationalism	has	been	portrayed	as	demonstrating	civic	characteristics	not	just	 by	 the	 party	 and	 its	 key	 figures	 themselves,	 but	 by	 various	 academics	 and	political	 commentators	 alike.	 As	 Kearton	 notes,	 the	 civic	 conception	 of	 Scottish	nationalism	is	widely	accepted	in	academia	(2005:26).	She	goes	on	to	highlight	Tom	Nairn’s	comment	that	the	“national	movement	[is]	conducted	exclusively	in	political	terms	—	political,	and	indeed	quite	self-consciously	civic	and	pacific	terms”	(Nairn	in	Kearton,	 2005:27).	 T.	 C.	 Smout	 (in	 Kearton,	 2005:27),	 in	 turn,	 argues:	 “Modern	Scottish	 identity	 is	much	more	 firmly	 allied	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 place	 than	 to	 a	 sense	 of	tribe.”	Similarly,	for	McCrone	“Scottishness	falls	at	the	‘‘civic’’	rather	than	the	‘‘ethnic’’	end	 of	 nation-ness”	 (in	 Kearton,	 2005:27).	 Thus,	 as	 Hamilton	 notes	 (in	 Leith,	2008:83),	there	emerges	a	consensus	in	much	academic	writing	which	sees	Scottish	nationalism	as	civic	and	inclusive,	and	the	SNP	as	“resolutely	civic	in	[its]	orientation”,	supporting	a	Scotland	 “where	membership	 is	 a	 legal	 concept	and	not	one	based	on	ethnic	exclusion”.		
Leith	(2008)	has	provided	perhaps	the	most	meticulous	and	detailed	analysis	of	what	he	sees	as	 the	civicness	espoused	by	 the	SNP;	 indeed,	he	starts	by	saying	 that	 “this	article	 confirms	 the	 consensus	 that	 the	 contemporary	 employment	 of	 Scottishness	within	 the	 SNP	 manifestoes	 is	 very	 resolutely	 civic,	 with	 a	 clearly	 inclusive-based	vision	of	 identity”	 (2008:84;	 emphasis	 added).	He	does,	however,	demonstrate	 that	the	 current	 state	 of	 affairs	 has	 not	 always	 been	 the	 case:	 analysing	 the	 SNP’s	manifestoes	 from	 the	 1970s,	 he	 contends	 there	 has	 been	 “a	 change	 from	 the	 past	
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when	manifestos	provided	expressions	of	Scottishness	which	were	much	more	ethnic	in	 focus	 and	 exclusive	 in	 nature”	 (2008:84).	 Leith,	 thus,	 argues	 that	 on	 an	“exclusive/inclusive	nationalism	spectrum”,	 the	 SNP	has	become	 “more	 inclusive	 in	tone	and	direction”	(2008:85).	Therefore,	for	Leith,	“the	SNP	has	clearly	become	less	nationalist	within	the	manifestoes	in	the	manner	in	which	a	sense	of	national	identity	is	presented”	(2008:85).			
What	 is,	 however,	 curious	 is	 Leith’s	 contention	 that	 the	 SNP	 is	 becoming	 ‘less	nationalist’.	 While	 he	 argues	 that	 the	 SNP	 demonstrate	 civic	 nationalist	characteristics,	 he	 notes	 how	 they	 have	 become	 ‘less	 nationalist’	 —	 therefore	equating	nationalism	in	general	with	its	ethnic	variant.	So	for	Leith,	moving	from	one	end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 (ethnic	 nationalism)	 to	 the	 other	 (civic	 nationalism)	 seems	 to	signal	 a	 decrease	 in	 nationalism	 as	 such,	 and	 becoming	 civic	 means	 you	 are	 ‘less	nationalist’.	This	is	—	as	will	shortly	be	discussed	in	more	detail	—	a	problem	within	nationalism	studies.	As	long	as	the	 ‘good’	type	of	nationalism	is	manifested,	 it	 is	not	viewed	as	 ‘truly’	nationalistic,	whereas	 ‘bad’	 forms	of	nationalism	are.	Thus,	a	 clear	normative	 distinction	 is	made	 between	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 nationalism.	 This,	 in	turn,	 leads	 to	a	 simplistic	 ‘civic-good,	ethnic-bad’	dichotomy	which,	 to	me,	does	not	seem	 like	 a	 sound	 analytical	 tool.	 Crucially,	 as	 Brubaker	 notes,	 “understandings	 of	nationhood	as	based	on	citizenship	or	political	creed	(…)	are	not	more	inclusive,	but	differently	inclusive	—	and	exclusive	—	than	understandings	of	nationhood	as	based	on	cultural	community	or	common	descent”	(2004:65).			
Interestingly,	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	 some	 of	 the	 participants	 demonstrated	 similar	conclusions	 to	 those	 drawn	 by	 Leith	 (2008).	 John	—	 a	 31-year-old	 SNP	 councillor	originally	from	England		—	argued	that	‘Scottish	nationalism’	has	been	on	a	journey	from	an	ethnic	form	to	now	being	civic	in	form:	
Scottish	nationalism	has	been	on	a	 long	 journey	 from	 its	 ethnic	national	 roots	
right	 through	 to	 the	 very,	 very	 civic	 nationalist	 system	which	 you	 see	 in	 place	
now.	 (…)	 There	 was	 definitely	 an	 aspect	 of	 ethnic	 nationalism	 in	 Scotland	—	
Scottish,	it	being	a	thing	of	ethnicity,	given	the	times	in	the	1930s	was	only	to	be	
understood.	 But,	 since	 then,	 it	 has	 been	 on	 a	 very	 long	 journey	 from	 ethnic	
nationalism	right	to	the	very	core	of	civic	nationalism...and	I	think	that	you	said	
that	 academia’s	 long	 espoused	 Scottish	 nationalism	 as	 an	 example	 of	 civic	
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nationalism	and	it’s	very	true.	Therefore,	he	acknowledges	how,	historically,	 the	nationalist	 ideas	espoused	by	 the	SNP	have	drawn	on	Scottishness	as	an	ethnic	 identity.	This	 is,	however,	understood	by	 the	 participant	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 historical	 circumstances	 of	 the	 1930s.	 Another	participant	—	 Eilidh,	 a	 54-year-old	 social	worker	 originally	 from	 Guernsey	—	was	highly	 critical	 of	 the	 SNP’s	 policies	 and	 their	 nationalist	 agenda	 in	 general,	 and	similarly	 noted	 how	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 has	 not	 always	 been	 “so…inclusive	 or	so...cuddly”,	and	that	she	 is	not	sure	“how	 long	 that	will	 last	and	 it	certainly	 is	very	new”.				
4.3.2. Political	perspectives		
Aside	from	academics,	the	SNP	have	also	been	very	vocal	regarding	the	purportedly	civic	quality	of	their	nationalism	in	the	post-devolutionary	period.	Directly	referring	to	nationalism	in	Scotland,	in	2007	Salmond	argued	that	it	is	a	“democratic,	liberating	movement	that	everybody	can	buy	into”	which	is	“based	on	a	peaceful,	inclusive,	civic	nationalism,	one	born	of	tolerance	and	respect	for	all	 faiths,	colours	and	creeds	and	one	which	will	continue	to	inspire	constitutional	evolution	based	on	a	positive	vision	of	what	our	nation	can	be”	(Mycock,	2012:54).	He	has	also	highlighted	the	inclusivity	of	Scottishness	and	its	compatibility	with	different	identities	and	ethnicities	by	saying	that:	“No-one	should	be	asked	to	sacrifice	their	identity	to	be	part	of	Scottish	society.	(…)	We	see	diversity	as	a	strength	not	a	weakness	of	Scotland”	 (Kearton,	2005:27).	Such	 rhetoric	 lead	 Mitchell	 et	 al	 to	 point	 out	 how	 the	 civic-ethnic	 distinction	 has	become	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 political	 discourse	 in	 Scotland	 and	while	 this	might	“not	have	had	an	 impact	on	 the	public	at	 large”,	politicians	 from	the	SNP	habitually	describe	themselves	as	civic	nationalists	(2011:109).			During	the	independence	referendum	campaign,	the	SNP	continued	to	emphasise	this	discourse	 and	 explicitly	 remarked	 and	made	 reference	 to	 the	 ‘civicness’	 of	 Scottish	nationalism.	Alex	Salmond,	in	his	speech	at	the	Glasgow	Caledonian	University’s	New	York	 Campus	 on	 7	 April	 2014,	 argued	 for	 Scotland’s	 key	 role	 in	 international	
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diplomacy,	 citing	 the	 Northern	 Irish	 peace	 process	 and	 the	 2006	 St	 Andrews	Agreement	 as	 examples.	 This	 then	 led	 him	 to	 argue	 that	 more	 could	 be	 done	 to	support	such	initiatives	if	Scotland	were	to	be	a	sovereign	state,	and	that	“our	current	democratic	journey	provides	a	helpful	context	—	as	we	decide	our	future	in	a	context	based	entirely	on	consensual,	civic,	non-ethnic	and	peaceful	principles”.			
A	few	weeks	later,	on	28	April	2014,	Salmond	gave	a	speech	at	the	College	of	Europe	in	 Bruges,	 Belgium,	 and	 made	 a	 similar	 point	 by	 arguing	 that	 “ours	 is	 a	 peaceful,	inclusive,	 civic	 —	 and	 above	 all	 a	 democratic	 and	 constitutional	 independence	movement”.	Further,	he	went	on	to	say	that:	
And	our	vision	for	our	nation	includes	and	welcomes	all	those	who	want	to	call	
Scotland	 their	 home.	 Of	 course,	 this	 inclusiveness	 extends	 to	 our	 elections.	
Scotland	is	one	of	the	few	places	in	the	EU	to	allow	other	EU	nationals	to	vote	in	
our	national	Parliament’s	elections.	They	will	also	have	a	vote	in	the	referendum	
on	Scottish	independence	on	18	September.	All	160,000	of	them.	That	tradition	is	
long-standing	in	our	politics.	Before	the	European	Union	was	founded,	citizens	of	
the	 Irish	 republic	 were	 allowed	 to	 vote,	 as	 indeed	 they	 and	 citizens	 of	 other	
Commonwealth	 countries	 still	 are.	 Our	 civic	 nationalism	 promotes	
internationalism;	 our	 independence	 movement	 embraces	 interdependence.	We	
seek	sovereignty,	knowing	that	we	will	then	choose	to	share	that	sovereignty.		Here	he	draws	our	attention	to	the	voting	rights	granted	to	non-nationals	as	a	sign	of	inclusion,	 and	makes	 reference	 to	 Irish	 and	 Commonwealth	 citizens	 as	 a	 historical	example	and	testimony	of	this	inclusiveness.	Rather	than	inward	looking	and	closed	off,	 for	 Salmond,	 Scottish	 civic	 nationalism	 promotes	 internationalism	 and	 global	connections.	 Thus,	 he	 seeks	 to	 convey	 civic	 nationalism	 as	 a	 positive	 force,	 as	 an	outlook	that	is	open	to	the	world	—	a	view	that	is	implicitly	contrasted	to	‘traditional’	understandings	of	nationalism	as	aggressive,	inward-looking	and	exclusive.			
4.3.3. Practitioners’	and	campaigners’	perspectives		Apart	 from	academics’	and	the	SNP’s	 framing	of	 ‘Scottish	nationalism’	as	civic,	what	was	telling	about	many	of	my	‘expert’	interviews	was	the	extent	to	which	this	account	of	 ‘civic’	 SNP	 nationalism	 was	 reiterated	 amongst	 my	 respondents.	 Thus,	 it	 is	interesting	to	consider	the	ways	in	which	the	participants	—	especially	the	ones	more	
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directly	involved	in	politics	or	activism	and	the	race	equality	sector	—	made	sense	of	the	 SNP	 and	 characterised	 its	 nationalist	 narratives.	 Their	 views	 are	 of	 interest	because	these	actors	are	 likely	to	be	more	actively	aware	of,	or	engaged	with,	SNP’s	visions	of	the	‘Scottish	nation’,	or	where	the	SNP	may	imagine	the	parameters	of	that	nation	 to	 lie.	Therefore,	 taking	 their	 ‘expert’	understanding	of	 the	SNP	and	 its	 ideas	and	policies	 into	account,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	see	 to	what	extent	 they	agree	with	 the	‘civic’	characterisation.			For	example,	a	CEO	of	an	ethnic	minority	third	sector	organisation	—	albeit	perhaps	with	slight	hesitation	—	put	it	this	way:	
	 Practitioner	 1:	 But	 I	 mean,	 that’s…so…I	 think	 we	 know	 from	 the	 SNP’s	
nationalism	it’s	not	identity	and	it’s	not…everything	they’ve	said	about	everyone	
will	be	a	citizen.	But	it’s	their	view,	we	don’t	know	but,	you	know.	And	later:	Practitioner	 1:	 Okay,	 the	 SNP	 nationalism	 has	 been	 very	 civic,	 inclusive	
nationalism	—	not	a	problem	 for	anybody	—	and	 they’ve	 said	 the	 right	 things	
inside	but…what	you	don’t	know	is	what	will	happen	or	who	will	be	in	power.		The	participant,	thus,	highlights	three	points	in	relation	to	the	SNP’s	presentation	of	the	party’s	nationalism:	he	argues	that	it	is	not	about	identity	and	that	it	is	inclusive	—	it	is	“not	a	problem”.	Secondly,	there	is	—	as	already	suggested	—	slight	hesitation	to	his	account:	for	example,	 in	relation	to	citizenship	he	qualifies	his	statement	with	“we	don’t	know	but,	you	know”.	Thirdly,	in	relation	to	this,	as	he	points	out,	the	SNP	promised	citizenship	for	everyone	living	in	Scotland	at	the	point	of	independence.				Indeed,	 in	order	to	demonstrate	their	discourse	of	openness	and	inclusivity	 in	more	practical	 terms,	 the	 SNP	 argued	 for	 a	 liberal	 take	 on	 citizenship	 during	 the	referendum	campaign.	Thus,	the	White	Paper	outlines	that	
At	 the	 point	 of	 independence,	 this	 Government	 proposes	 an	 inclusive	model	 of	
citizenship	 for	 people	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 define	 themselves	 as	 primarily	 or	
exclusively	 as	 Scottish	 or	wish	 to	 become	 a	 Scottish	 passport	 holder.	 People	 in	
Scotland	are	accustomed	to	multiple	identities,	be	they	national,	regional,	ethnic,	
linguistic	 or	 religious,	 and	 a	 commitment	 to	 a	 multi-cultural	 Scotland	 will	 be	
cornerstone	 of	 the	 nation	 on	 independence.	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	2013:271)	
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Alex	Salmond	reiterated	this	view	in	a	phone-in	hosted	by	BBC	Radio	Scotland:	
Well,	 Morris	 [the	 caller]	 —	 again,	 the	 White	 Paper	 outlines	 the	 citizenship	
qualifications	 which	 are	 extremely	 thorough	 and	 open.	 I	 mean,	 everybody	 in	
Scotland,	 regardless	 of	 background,	 where	 they	 came	 from,	 everybody	 born	 in	
Scotland	 —	 a	 range	 of	 other	 categories	 can	 apply	 for	 citizenship	 in	 an	
independent	 Scotland.	We	 couldn’t	 be	 more	 explicit,	 and	 we	 couldn’t	 be	 more	
generous	in	terms	of	what’s	been	offered.	(…)	there’s	nothing	in	that	which	could	
possibly	 be	 described	 as	 in	 any	 way	 inward-looking	 or	mean-minded;	 just	 the	
opposite.		(Morning	Call,	29.8.2014)			Of	 course,	 granting	 citizenship	 cannot	 be	 taken	 as	 conclusive	 evidence	 of	 an	unproblematic	 demonstration	 of	 full	 inclusiveness	 and	 civic	 nationalism	—	and	 the	participant	is	not	suggesting	it	should.	Although	citizenship	grants	an	official	status	of	belonging	to	a	polity	legally,	we	must	not	uncritically	treat	it	as	the	ultimate	form	of	belonging	 (although	we	should	also	be	careful	not	 to	downplay	 the	 type	of	 security	and	 status	 a	 passport	 can	 impart).	While	 it	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 SNP’s	rather	inclusive	vision	of	citizenship,	it	is	important	to	look	beyond	passports.		
Similarly	to	the	CEO	quoted	above,	Pietr,	a	31-year-old	health	care	worker	originally	from	Poland,	 and	 an	 active	 Yes	 campaigner,	mentions	 how	 the	 SNP’s	nationalism	 is	‘civic’	and	‘left-wing’	nationalism.	I	asked	him	to	explain	what	civic	nationalism	means	to	him:	
It	 doesn’t	matter	who	 you	 are	 or	 from	where	 you	 come	 from,	 if	 you	 are	 living	
here,	you	are	taking	responsibilities	for	this	country	and	you	got	tried	to	do	your	
own	country,	yeah.	That’s	how	I	see	 it.	And	 it’s	 totally	 in	the	contrast	of	British	
nationalism	—	ol-	-	well,	this	campaign	was	a	clash	of	two	different	nationalisms.	
A	British	one,	which	 is	defined	 in	 the	conservative	way,	 like…Britain	 for	British	
people	 [unintelligible].	 Look	 how	 often	 they	 were	 saying	 ‘I’m	 patriotic,	 I’m	
British,	 proud,	 army,	 queen’,	 yeah.	 That’s	 what	 they	 were	 saying	 during	 the	
campaign	 and	 on,	 on	 the	 contrast	 you	 have	 the	 Yes	 movement,	 yeah,	 civic	
nationalism.	 Umm,	 [unintelligible]	 nationalist	 because	 it	 was	 saying	 about	
democracy,	equality,	umm,	diversity,	human	rights.	[Pause]	That’s	the	difference.	
	Pietr	 starts	 his	 definition	 by	 highlighting	 things	 that,	 for	 him,	 are	 key	 to	 civic	nationalism.	What	matters	 is	 that	 you	 live	 in	 Scotland	 (residency)	 and	 that	 you	 are	taking	responsibility	for	the	country	(making	a	contribution)	as	you	would	do	in	your	
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‘own	 country’.	 As	 will	 be	 discussed,	 these	 tropes	 of	 residency	 and	 contribution	became	central	to	the	SNP’s	understanding	of	who	make	up	the	‘people	of	Scotland’;	those	who	live	and	work	here.		Further,	Pietr	also	explains	what	civic	nationalism	(as	embodied	 by	 the	 Yes	movement)	 is	 through	 a	 comparison	with	British	 nationalism	which,	for	him,	conveys	a	conservative	‘Britain	for	British	people’	attitude.	Pietr	goes	on	to	argue	that	British	nationalism	relies	on	such	institutions	as	the	military	and	the	monarchy	as	receptacles	of	pride	and	patriotism.	While	Scotland,	of	course,	shares	the	Queen	as	the	head	of	state	and	contributes	to	the	army,	these,	for	Pietr,	are	not	central	to	Scottish	civic	nationalist	understandings	or	constructions	of	the	nation.		
In	a	similar	vein,	the	Yes	campaign	was	framed	as	an	example	of	civic	nationalism	by	John,	the	SNP	councilor	who	I	interviewed,	and	by	one	of	the	practitioners	who	works	as	a	policy	officer	in	the	third	sector.	Here	John,	in	a	similar	vein	to	Pietr,	expresses	the	importance	of	residency	and	contribution	as	a	foundation	for	national	belonging.	John:	Whereas	 civic	 nationalism,	which	 I’m	 really	 glad	 the	Yes	 campaign	 is	 all	
about,	civic	nationalism	is	the	idea	that	if	you	live	and	work	in	a	country,	and	you	
work	 for	 its	 betterment,	 and	 you	work	 to	 better	 the	 lives	 of	 all	 people	 in	 that	
country,	 regardless	 of	 where	 they’re	 from,	 regardless	 of	 where	 they’re	 born,	
regardless	 of	 their	 religious	 creed,	 their	 gender,	 their	 ethnicity,	 their...sexual	
orientation,	 their,	 their	age	or	 their,	 you	know,	 the	colour	of	 their	hair	 for	 that	
matter	—	it	doesn’t	matter,	you	live	and	work	here,	then	we’re	for	you.		Practitioner	 5:	 (…)	 the	 rise	 of	 rightwing	 extremism	 in	 Europe,	 ehm,	 which	 is	
mirrored	 in	 some	 way	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 UKIP	 in,	 ehm,	 Britain	 and	 that	 the	 Yes	
campaign	was	 somehow	 the…equivalent	 rise	of	nationalism	within	Scotland	as	
we	 had	 some	 in	 another	 areas	 of	 Europe,	 was	 ehm…disingenuous	 I	 believe,	
because	 it’s	 not	 a	 ch-chance	 -	 -	 no	 snowball’s	 chance	 in	 hell	 that	 groups	 (…)	
within	the	race	equality	sector	would	stay	quiet	for	one	second	if	they	had	a	sniff	
of	ethnic	nationalism	within	the	con-	-	context	of	the	independence	referendum.	
Ehm,	you	touched	upon	different	ethnic	minority	communities	have	set	up	their	
own	specific,	ehm,	campaigning	groups	and	I	think	that	is	testament	to	the	fact	
that	it’s	a	civic	nationalism	as	opposed	to	an	ethnic	nationalism.	(Policy	officer,	Ethnic	minority	third	sector	organisation)			Interestingly,	 the	 latter	 quote	 from	 the	policy	 officer	 highlights	 how	 the	participant	sees	 the	 proliferation	 of	 Yes	 groups	 based	 on	 ‘ethnicity’	 —	 such	 as	 ‘Africans	 for	Independent	 Scotland’,	 ‘Scottish	 Asians	 for	 Independence’,	 ‘English	 Scots	 for	 Yes’,	
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‘Polish	for	Yes’	—	as	an	indication	of	how	‘civic’	nationalism	in	Scotland	is.	A	similar	point	 was	 made	 by	 Odogwu,	 a	 Nigerian	 36-year-old	 student	 and	 active	 Yes	campaigner	who	talked	about	the	Yes	campaign	as	being	a	grassroots	and	community-driven	campaign	which	people	from	‘all	over	the	world’	took	part	in:		(…)	 communities	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 you	 have	 groups	 of	 people,	 people	
from..different	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 who	 have	 decided	 to	 make	 this	 place	 their	
home,	 or	 call	 this	 place	 home,	 so	 you	 know,	 you	 have	 different	 groups.	 So	 this	
wasn’t	 about	 nationalism	 per	 se,	 because	 you	 had	 Nigerians,	 you	 had	 Polish	
campaigning	 for	 independence,	 I	 met	 Canadians,	 I	 met,	 you	 know,	 different	
people	from	different	pa..all	over	the	world	campaigning	for	this.	Here	Odogwu,	interestingly,	also	raises	the	issue	of	the	independence	referendum	not	being	 “about	 nationalism	per	se”	—	a	 theme	 that,	 as	we	 shall	 see	 in	 due	 course	—	featured	 strongly	 in	 SNP’s	 imagining	 and	 interpretation	 of	 the	 motives	 for	 the	referendum.		
Crucially,	however,	the	cropping-up	of	such	ethnic	minority	Yes	groups	did	highlight	a	certain	paradox.	Here,	John,	the	SNP	councillor,	was	speaking	about	how	some	people	might	 fall	 into	 the	 trap	of	 thinking	 that	 the	vote	was	about	 ‘ethnicity’	 if	 they	mainly	hear	English	voices	on	the	No	side,	and	Scottish	voices	on	the	Yes	side.	Therefore:	John:	 (…)	 I	 think	someone	needs	to	be	English	and	speak	up	 for	 the	Yes	side	as	
well,	because	I	can	tell	someone	it’s	not	about	anti-Englishness	at	all,	it’s	not	an	
anti-English	message,	 it’s	 not	 about	 Scots	 versus	 England,	 it’s	 about	where	we	
should	be	governed	from,	and	they’ll	listen	to	me	because	I’m	English.		Minna:	Yeah.	John:	‘Cause	they..they’ll..it	is	about	nationality.	So	ironically,	while	it’s	not	about	
nationality,	 I	 founded	 a	 group	 that’s	 about	 nationality	 [laughs],	 so	 it’s	 kind	 of	
a..an	 interesting,	 umm,	what	 the	word,	 umm,	 it’s	 kind	of	 a…almost	an	 illogical	
fallacy,	I’m..		 Minna:	Yeah,	like	a	paradox.	Such	an	insight	into	the	way	in	which	‘ethnicity’	and	nationalism	interact	is	extremely	valuable.	Here,	a	 far	more	complicated	picture	begins	to	emerge	—	 indeed,	one	that	begins	 to	 challenge	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 of	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 as	straightforwardly	 civic	 and	not	 concerned	with	 ‘ethnicity’.	 There	 are	 ‘paradoxes’	 at	play,	 and	 it	 is	 exactly	 these	 inconsistencies	 that	 are	 most	 revealing	 about	 the	ambiguity	 of	 dominant	 conceptions	 of	 nationalism	 (a	 point	 which	 I	 also	 raised	 in	
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Chapter	2).			
Thus,	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 above,	 the	 civicness	 of	 nationalism	 in	 Scotland	 —	especially	in	terms	of	the	SNP’s	nationalism	—	is	often	mentioned	in	explicit	terms	by	academics	 and	 political	 actors,	 and	 this	 view	 was	 echoed	 by	 practitioners	 and	campaigners	as	well.	During	the	referendum	campaign	there	was	also	a	more	implicit	tendency	 to	 highlight	 the	 ostensible	 openness	 and	 inclusiveness	 of	 Scottish	nationalism.	This	was	mainly	reflected	in	the	way	in	which	the	referendum	itself	was	framed	—	as	Odogwu	put	it,	it	was	not	about	‘nationalism	per	se’.	Through	arguments	pertaining	to	democracy,	social	justice	and	fairness,	diversity,	and	rationality,	the	SNP	argued	that	independence	was	necessary	to	affect	wider	societal	change	with	regard	to	inequalities,	for	example.	In	addition,	the	SNP	also	take	a	neoliberal	and	utilitarian	approach	 to	 immigration,	 which	 implicitly	 contributes	 to	 the	 framing	 of	 Scottish	nationalism	as	civic.			
4.4.	‘Civic’	SNP	nationalism:	Implicit	framings	
In	addition	 to	explicit	 framings,	 the	SNP	 implicitly	 framed	 their	nationalism	as	civic	during	 the	 referendum.	 Here,	 the	 arguments	 related	 to	 ‘democratic	 deficit’,	 ‘social	justice’,	 ‘diversity’,	 ‘independence	as	the	rational	choice’,	and	the	 ‘economic	utility’	of	migration.			
4.4.1.	‘Democracy’	arguments	
Let	us	begin	with	the	SNP’s	argument	that	a	key	justification	for	independence	was	a	perceived	 democratic	 deficit	 with	 regard	 to	 Scottish	 affairs.	 In	 his	 foreword	 to	
Scotland’s	Future	 (The	Scottish	Government,	2013)	—	i.e.	 the	SNP’s	White	Paper	on	independence	—	Alex	Salmond	makes	the	argument	which	was	frequently	reiterated	during	the	referendum	campaign:	namely,	that	voting	for	independence	
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of	democracy,	that	it	was	about	“the	power	to	choose	who	we	should	be	governed	by	and	 the	 power	 to	 build	 a	 country	 that	 reflects	 our	 priorities	 as	 a	 society	 and	 our	values	as	a	people”	 (p.viii).	 Indeed,	 in	 the	36	SNP	speeches	analysed	 for	 this	 thesis,	this	democratic	argument	featured	in	26.	In	his	spring	conference	address	(23	March	2013),	Salmond	notes	 that	 “on	18	September	2014	we	will	have	 the	opportunity	 to	ensure	 that	decisions	about	Scotland	are	 taken	by	 the	people	who	care	most	 about	Scotland	–	the	people	who	live	and	work	here”	—	thus,	for	him,	this	is	“the	essence	of	self-determination	for	the	nation”	(speech	at	Mareel	Arts	Centre,	25	July	2013).			
Fiona	 Hyslop	 —	 Cabinet	 Secretary	 for	 Culture,	 Tourism	 and	 External	 Affairs	 —extends	this	notion	by	saying	that		
…it	is	the	fundamental	belief	that	it	will	be	better	for	us	all,	if	decisions	about	the	
future	 of	 Scotland	 are	 taken	 by	 those	 who	 care	 most	 about	 Scotland	—	 the	
people	who	live	here.	(…)	It	will	mean	supporting	the	view	that	people	who	live	
here,	 rather	 than	 in	 Westminster,	 will	 do	 a	 better	 job	 of	 running	 Scotland	(speech	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh,	5	June	2014).		For	 Salmond	 independence	would	 end	 “our	 democratic	 deficit”	 and	 “the	 people	 of	Scotland	will	finally	get	the	governments	we	vote	for”	(speech	in	Arbroath,	18	August	2014).	Thus,	“UK	governments	that	we	don’t	vote	for	should	have	none	of	the	say”	—	rather,	 “the	people	of	 Scotland	 should	have	all	 the	 say”	 (DFM	Nicola	 Sturgeon,	 SNP	Spring	 Conference,	 23	March	 2013).	 Salmond	 argues	 that	 the	 democratic	 deficit	 is	“not	 a	 passing	 inconvenience,	 but	 a	 debilitating	 disconnect	 at	 the	 very	 heart	 of	politics”.	He	goes	on	to	reflect	on	Westminster	governments:		
I’m	59	years	old.	For	more	than	half	of	my	life,	Scotland	has	been	ruled	by	parties	
with	 no	 majority.	 At	 the	 last	 four	 UK	 elections,	 the	 Conservatives	 in	 Scotland	
have	 won	 0,	 1,	 1,	 and	 1	 seat	 respectively.	 (New	 Statesman	 Lecture,	 4	 March	2014)			
Therefore,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 argument	 that	 independence	 would	 fix	 the	 issues	 of	democratic	deficit,	some	key	points	become	evident.	Firstly,	an	idea	that	runs	through	the	 SNP	 speeches	 and	 written	 Yes	 materials	 such	 as	 the	 White	 Paper	 on	independence	(The	Scottish	Government,	2013),	is	that	the	people	who	live	and	work	in	Scotland	are	best	placed	to	take	decisions	about	Scotland	and	its	future.	Thus,	there	is	 a	 sense	of	 framing	belonging	 to	 the	 ‘Scottish	nation’	 through	 residency	—	 ‘living	
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here’	—	and	economic	contribution	—	‘working	here’.	Secondly,	 linked	to	this	is	the	notion	that	Westminster	does	not	have	Scotland’s	best	interests	at	heart;	that	people	who	live	and	work	in	Scotland	are	the	ones	that	care	most	about	Scotland.			
Finally,	repeated	references	are	made	to	the	extent	to	which	Scotland	“is	still	affected	by	decisions	on	welfare,	 employment,	 taxation	and	business	 regulation	—	made	by	UK	 governments	 which,	 more	 often	 than	 not,	 we	 didn’t	 vote	 for”	 (Alex	 Salmond,	International	 Festival	 for	 Business,	 Liverpool,	 17	 July	 2014).	 This	 point	 is	 usually	made	with	reference	to	Conservatives:		
With	independence	Scotland	will	get	the	governments	it	votes	for.	In	contrast,	we	
are	now	governed	from	Westminster	by	a	Conservative	led	administration.	In	the	
last	four	UK	General	Elections,	the	Conservatives	have	won	—	 in	order	—	zero,	
one,	one	and	one	Westminster	seats	in	Scotland7.	Yet	they	make	the	big	decisions	
on	 our	 economy,	 welfare	 and	 tax	 systems,	 and	 on	 whether	 nuclear	 weapons	
should	continue	to	be	based	in	this	country.	That	might	sound	like	an	anti-Tory	
point.	But	it	is	more	fundamentally	a	pro-democracy	one.	(DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon,	Keynote	speech	to	the	David	Hume	Institute,	Edinburgh,	15	January	2014)	Here,	 Sturgeon	 is	 keen	 to	 point	 out	 that	 she	 is	 not	 making	 ‘an	 anti-Tory	 point’	 in	relation	 to	 the	 democratic	 argument;	 that	 is,	 should	 having	 a	 Conservative	government	 be	 the	 will	 of	 the	 people	 in	 an	 independent	 Scotland,	 that	 would	 be	democracy	at	work	—	unlike	now.	However,	as	will	be	demonstrated	in	Chapter	5,	a	strand	of	‘anti-Toryism’	is	evoked	when	imagining	Scotland	and	Scottishness	through	the	notion	of	shared	values	and	ideals.			
4.4.2.	‘Social	justice’	arguments	
In	addition	to	the	democracy	arguments,	the	referendum	was	also	framed	through	the	ideas	of	social	 justice	and	fairness	(see	also	Mooney	&	Scott,	2015).	Again,	 in	the	36	SNP	speeches	analysed,	the	themes	of	’fairness’	and	‘social	justice’	were	referred	to	in	27.	 Nicola	 Sturgeon,	 for	 example,	 said	 in	 her	 spring	 conference	 address	 (23	March	2013)	that	“if	we	are	to	build	a	better,	more	democratic,	just	and	prosperous	country																																																									7	In	the	2017	General	Election,	the	SNP	lost	21	seats	while	Scottish	Conservatives	gained	12	seats.	As	a	result,	the	two	parties	now	have	35	and	13	MSPs	respectively.		
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for	our	children	to	inherit,	then	let	me	tell	you	this	—	Independence	is	not	optional.	Independence	is	essential”.			
Further,	 she	also	noted	how	 the	UK	government’s	welfare	 cuts	 “are	a	dagger	 to	 the	heart	of	the	fairness	and	social	justice	that	we	hold	so	dear”.	Sturgeon	also	connected	the	social	justice	argument	to	the	democratic	deficit	argument	by	saying	that	the	cuts	“are	a	disgrace	 to	democracy	too”	since	“four	out	of	 five	—	80%	—	of	Scottish	MPs	voted	against	the	benefit	cap”	and	“90%	voted	against	the	bedroom	tax”.	She	goes	on	to	say,	“And	Westminster’s	reaction?	They	shrug	their	shoulders	and	impose	the	cuts	anyway.	 It	 is	a	democratic	outrage	and	 its	 time	 is	up”.	Alex	Salmond	noted	how	the	Yes	 ‘movement’	 was	 “dedicated	 to	 a	 common	 goal”,	 namely	 “to	 build	 a	 better	Scotland”	and	“to	create	a	fairer	society”	(SNP	conference	address,	12	April	2014).			
Therefore,	both	Salmond	and	Sturgeon	sought	to	steer	away	from	identity	politics	by	suggesting	 that	 the	 fundamental	 issues	 at	 stake	 in	 the	 referendum	 —	 and	 the	fundamental	 reason	 for	 voting	 yes	 on	 independence	—	were	 to	 do	with	 advancing	social	justice	(i.e.	building	a	more	equal	and	socially	just	society)	and	democracy	(i.e.	taking	political	decisions	locally).	As	Sturgeon	summed	it	up	in	her	spring	conference	speech	(23	March	2013):	
Our	case	for	independence	is	about	the	kind	of	country	we	want	Scotland	to	be.	It	
can	 be	 summed	 up	 in	 three	 words	—	 fairness,	 prosperity,	 democracy.	 Three	
pillars	of	any	decent	society.		
(…)	
And,	 make	 no	 mistake,	 each	 and	 every	 one	 of	 them	 is	 being	 undermined	 and	
eroded	 by	 out	 of	 touch	 Westminster	 governments.	 And	 Scotland	 needs	
independence	to	put	a	stop	to	it.	
	
	
	
4.4.3.	Referendum	and	diversity		
Furthermore,	 during	 the	 referendum,	 there	 was	 also	 a	 strong	 suggestion	 that	
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regardless	of	where	you	 come	 from,	you	 should	be	able	 to	 take	part	 in	making	 this	decision.	Again,	 the	 supposed	 inclusivity	was	used	 as	 a	way	 to	 frame	 the	debate	 as	civic.	This	 tendency	was	highlighted	by	Alex	 Salmond	 in	 an	 interview	with	 a	Polish	expatriate	magazine:	”There	is,	I	believe,	a	universal	law,	which	is	that	the	people	who	live	and	work	in	a	country	are	the	best	ones	to	decide	its	future.	It’s	nothing	to	do	with	background	or	origin”	 (MacGuire	and	Bator-Skórkiewicz,	2014:27).	Similarly,	Nicola	Sturgeon	emphasised	the	role	that	all	 ‘people	of	Scotland’	have	 in	taking	part	 in	the	process	of	building	Scotland’s	new	chapter:		
My	case	for	independence	is	based	on	confidence,	it’s	based	on	belief,	it’s	based	on	
hope	and	it’s	based	on	an	unshakable	knowledge	that	we	in	Scotland	—	all	of	us,	
regardless	of	where	we	come	from	—	if	we	work	together,	we	can	build	a	better	
country.	(Sikh	Channel,	Independence	referendum	special	6.9.2014)			Indeed,	Scotland’s	diverse	communities	were	referred	to	on	several	occasions	during	the	referendum	campaign.	Nicola	Sturgeon,	taking	part	in	a	referendum	debate	with	Labour’s	 Anas	 Sarwar	 at	 a	 Gurdwara	 in	 Glasgow,	 said	 that	 being	 there	 gave	 her	 a	chance	to	say,	
…from	my	heart,	 that	 I	believe	the	diversity	of	Scotland,	 the	wonderful	cultural	
diversity	 of	 our	 country,	 is	 one	 of	 our	 great	 strengths.	 You	 don’t	 have	 to	 have	
been	born	in	Scotland	to	vote	yes	in	the	referendum.	Anyone	who	has	chosen	to	
make	Scotland	their	home,	anyone	who	has	done	us	the	great	honour	of	making	
Scotland	 their	 home,	 is	 part	 of	 Scotland.	 You	 belong	 to	 Scotland	 and	 Scotland	
belongs	to	you,	as	much	as	that	is	the	case	for	me.	(Sikh	Channel	Independence	referendum	special,	6.9.2014).		In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Salmond	 praises	 the	 diversity	 and	 vibrancy	 of	 Scotland	 on	 the	opening	 pages	 of	 the	White	 Paper	 (2013:viii).	 As	 a	 result,	 Scottishness	 is	 routinely	framed	as	an	open	and	all-encompassing	identity:		
And	all	 this	 nonsense	about	 repatriating	English	—	we	value,	 absolutely	 value	
English	 people	 in	 Scotland,	 they’re	 part	 of	 the	 community	 and	 it’s	 perfectly	
satisfactory	 for	 people	 to	 be	 English	 and	 Scottish,	 Irish	 and	 Scottish,	 Pakistani	
and	Scottish	—	it’s	one	of	the	great	things	about	Scottishness:	it’s	a	nonexclusive	
identity.	And	 every	 single	 person	who’s	 part	 of	 our	 community	will	 have	 equal	
status	as	a	citizen,	and	equal	rights	and	deserves	equal	respect.	(Alex	Salmond,	Morning	Call,	BBC	Radio	Scotland,	29.8.2014)				
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Humza	Yousaf,	an	SNP	Minister	for	Europe	and	International	Development	and,	as	he	describes	himself,	 “a	son	of	Pakistani	 immigrants”,	went	on	to	argue	in	an	 interview	on	Channel	4	News	that	“there	has	always	been	an	identity	of	Scottishness”,	and	that	ethnic	minorities	are	more	likely	to	call	themselves	Scottish	as	shown	by	studies.	He	then	goes	on	to	say	that,	
Actually	—	in	Scotland	—	and	talking	as	an	ethnic	minority	in	here,	we’ve	never	
been	asked,	‘look,	are	you	Scottish	or	are	you	Pakistani,	are	you	Scottish	or	Asian,	
are	you	Scottish	or	English’.	Actually,	 people	accept	 you	 for	being	Scottish;	 you	
complain	 about	 the	 bad	weather,	 the	 sometimes	 dodgy	 football	 team	and	 that	
makes	you	Scottish	(Channel	4	News,	1.5.2014).				Thus,	 across	 these	 statements,	 diversity	 is	 praised	 as	 a	 strength.	 Interestingly,	Sturgeon	 argues	 that	 you	 do	 not	 need	 to	 be	 born	 in	 Scotland	 in	 order	 to	 vote	 yes.	Consequently,	she	highlights	and	contests	the	 implicit	and	underlying	sense	of	a	yes	vote	potentially	being	seen	as	nationalist	or	patriotic.	Salmond	and	Yousaf	 raise	 the	issues	of	identity,	and	argue	that	Scottishness	is	a	‘nonexclusive	identity’	that	does	not	require	 the	denouncement	of	other	 identities	—	rather,	Scottishness	 is	portrayed	as	happily	 existing	 alongside	 other	 identities,	 and	 as	 deriving	 from	 such	 mundane,	everyday	 activities	 as	 complaining	 about	 the	 weather	 and	 supporting	 a	 ‘dodgy	football	team’.	However,	although	these	visions	of	the	‘Scottish	nation’	seem	inclusive	and	democratic	on	the	face	of	 it,	understandings	of	the	 ‘Scottish	nation’	nonetheless	remain	underpinned	by	essentialised	notions	of	racial	difference.	There	is	an	implicit	assumption	that	there	exists	a	type	of	‘Scottishness’	from	which	some	are	different	but	despite	 their	 difference	 —	 because	 of	 the	 non-exclusionary	 nature	 of	 ‘Scottish	identity’	—	they	can	nonetheless	belong.				
	 4.4.4.	Independence	as	the	‘rational’	choice	What	transpires,	on	the	surface	at	 least,	 then,	 is	a	sense	of	utilitarianism	as	regards	the	SNP’s	 independence	endeavour	—	through	 independence	Scotland	would	be	an	even	 better	 global	 citizen;	 independence	 would	 enable	 democracy	 propre;	 and	 it	would	 enable	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 fairer	 and	 more	 prosperous	 nation.	 Indeed,	 Nicola	
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Sturgeon,	 in	her	 speech	at	 the	Edinburgh	Centre	 for	Constitutional	Law	on	16	 June	2014,	 draws	 upon	 a	 distinction	 between	 ‘existential’	 and	 ‘utilitarian’	 nationalists	made	by	Sir	Neil	MacCormick.	She	counts	herself	 in	 the	 latter	category,	as	someone	who	 supports	 independence	 “as	 the	 best	 way	 of	 achieving	 the	 sort	 of	 society	 we	want”	while	‘existential	nationalists’	“support	independence	for	its	own	sake”.	While	she	 contends	 that	 “this	 being	 Scotland,	 of	 course,	 both	 strands	 of	 nationalisms	comfortably	 co-exist	 within	 the	 country,	 the	 Yes	 Campaign,	 the	 SNP,	 and	 probably	within	most	 individual	nationalists”,	 for	her	 the	 current	debate	on	 independence	 is	nonetheless	 predominantly	 “about	 the	 opportunities	 that	 independence	 will	 bring	Scotland	—	opportunities	for	economic	growth,	for	a	fairer	society,	and	for	Scotland's	place	in	the	world”.	Thus,	for	Sturgeon,	“the	terms	of	the	debate	are	very	much	those	of	the	utilitarian	nationalism”.	Not	only	is	nationalism	on	the	Yes	side	thus	presented	as	being	civic	in	form,	but	it	is	also	utilitarian	in	its	purpose,	rather	than	instinctual	or	‘natural’.			
Therefore,	 “at	 its	 heart,	 ours	 is	 not	 an	 emotional	 argument”,	 Sturgeon	 maintains.	Rather,			
It	 is	 rational,	 reasonable	and	 responsible.	 It	 is	 about	 the	best	way	 forward	 for	
our	country	—	the	best	way	to	build	the	fair,	prosperous,	democratic	nation	we	
want	 to	 be.	We	 know	 that	 no-one	 is	more	 passionate	 about	 the	 future	 of	 our	
nation	than	the	people	of	Scotland.	No-one	else	cares	as	much.	So	it	should	be	the	
Scottish	people	who	take	the	decisions	that	will	shape	the	lives	of	this	and	future	
generations.	It	is	that	simple.	(23	March,	2013)	Similarly,	 SNP	 councillor	 John	 argues	 that	 the	 Yes	 campaign	 made	 use	 of	 rational	arguments	 —	 perhaps	 contrary	 to	 what	 some	 people	 might	 have	 expected	 at	 the	outset	—	 and	 that	 it	 was	 actually	 the	 No	 campaign	 that	 was	making	 a	 nationalist,	emotive	argument	based	on	a	notion	of	Britishness.	
I	think	the	real	defining	thing	about	the	debate,	the	interesting	thing	is,	10	years	
ago	if	you	told	people	there’ll	be	a	referendum	in	2014,	describe	what	the	various	
campaigns	 will	 be	 saying,	 I	 think	 the	 opposites	 of	 what’s	 actually	 happened	
would	be	the	case.	People	would	be	saying	that	the	Yes	campaign	would	be	full	of	
emotive	 language	and	 tugging	at	 the	heart	 strings	 stuff,	 talking	about	history,	
racial	history,	ethnicity	and	really	trying	to	appeal	to	the	‘your	Scottish,	therefore	
you	should	vote	yes’.	Whereas	I	think…and	the	No	campaign	(…)	would	be	talking	
about	 the	 mind:	 they	 would	 be	 talking	 about	 the	 economics	 of	 independence	
being	 bad,	 they	 would	 be	 talking	 about	 the	 money	 versus	 the..the	 arguments	
about	statehood	and	democracy	et	cetera.	They	wouldn’t	be	trying	to	appeal	to	
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your	emotional	aspects.	And	I	think	in	actuality	the	opposite	has	happened.	(…)	
So,	 we’ve..we’ve	 not	 really	 talked	 about	 nationality	 at	 all	 in	 this	 debate,	 it’s	 a	
debate	 for	 us	 about	 democracy,	 the	 economics	 of	 making	 Scotland	 a	 fairer,	 a	
more	 equitable	 society.	 Whereas	 the	 No	 campaign,	 their	 entire	 campaign	 has	
been	 focused	 on	 this	 notion	 of	 Britishness,	 this	 notion	 of	 being	 better	 together	
because	think	of	all	the	things	that	Britain	has	done	as	a	nation	state	(…).	
	
		
4.4.5.	Neoliberalism	and	migration		
Finally,	 in	 the	 broader	 post-devolutionary	 context,	 the	 SNP	 implicitly	 frame	 their	nationalism	as	‘civic’	with	reference	to	the	party’s	approach	to	immigration	and	‘race	equality’.	 Further,	 this	 approach	 needs	 to	 be	 contextualised	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 SNP’s	neoliberal	and	utilitarian	vision	of	immigration.	Although	migrants	are	not	excluded	within	this	framing,	aligning	migrants’	value	so	closely	with	economic	considerations	raises	some	important	questions	regarding	the	nation	and	belonging.		
During	the	referendum	campaign,	the	SNP’s	White	Paper	was	very	vocal	of	what	they	saw	 as	 Westminster’s	 “aggressive	 approach	 to	 immigration,	 asylum	 seekers	 and	refugees”	which	culminated	in	people	being	told	“to	leave	the	UK	and	‘go	home’”	(The	Scottish	 Government,	 2013:267)8.	 Further,	 the	 then	 Deputy	 First	 Minister	 Nicola	Sturgeon	 argued	 that	 she	 is	 confident	 that	 an	 independent	 Scotland,	 regardless	 of	which	party	was	in	power,		
…would	take	a	much	more	positive	attitude	towards	immigration	than	is	taken	
by	 Westminster.	 I	 very,	 very	 much	 loath	 the	 attitude	 that	 we	 hear	 from	
Westminster,	 that	 tries	 to	 tell	 us	 that	 immigrants	 are	 a	 drain	 in	 our	 society.	 I	
don’t	 like	 that,	 but	 I	 also	 don’t	 agree	 with	 it	 because	 I	 know	 from	 my	 own	
experience	it’s	not	true.	(Sikh	Channel	Independence	Special,	6.9.2014)		
Similarly,	Humza	Yousaf,	an	SNP	Minister	for	Europe	and	International	Development,	agreed	on	the	positive	impact	of	immigration.	Speaking	on	BBC2’s	(2014)	Generation																																																									8 	‘Go	 Home’	 is	 in	 reference	 to	 ‘Operation	 Vaken’.	 As	 part	 of	 this	 operation	 targeting	 ‘illegal	immigration’,	 vans	 with	 a	 text	 “In	 the	 UK	 illegally?	 Go	 home	 or	 face	 arrest”	 written	 on	 them	were	driven	around	UK	cities.	See	Jones	et	al	(2017).	
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2014	programme	Minister	Yousaf	argued	that	Scotland	needs	immigration	due	to	its	ageing	population,	but	also	 that	 the	 current	UK	 immigration	policy,	 as	he	 sees	 it,	 is	driven	by	UKIP.	He	points	out	how	he	“was	disgusted	to	see	just	a	mile	down	the	road	from	here	posters	that	said	‘go	home’”.	For	him,	“Go	Home	is	one	of	the	worst	racist	insults	 I’ve	ever	had	 thrown	at	me”	because	 “this	 is	my	home,	 I	don’t	have	another	home”.	 To	 have	 such	 a	 campaign	 adopted	 by	 the	 UK	 government	 was,	 for	 Humza	Yousaf,	‘disgusting’	(Generation	2014,	BBC	2,	22.3.2014).		
Although	the	SNP’s	rhetoric	surrounding	 immigration	has	been	and	continues	 to	be	positive	 —	 and	 this	 is	 especially	 commendable	 considering	 the	 broader	 climate	surrounding	 migration	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 refugee	 crisis	 and	 spikes	 in	 post-Brexit	racist	hate	crime,	for	example	—	this	rhetoric	must	be	placed	within	a	broader	neoliberal	 context.	 The	 SNP	 espouse	 a	 discourse	 favourable	 to	 migrants	 and	migration,	 thus	 aligning	 themselves	 with	 a	 ‘civic’	 conception	 of	 ‘inclusive’	Scottishness,	 and	 the	 issue	of	 immigration	 is	 usually	presented	 in	 conjunction	with	concerns	 pertaining	 to	 Scotland’s	 demography	 and	 skills	 gaps	 and,	 by	 extension,	Scotland’s	 economic	performance	 and	 growth.	As	de	Lima	notes,	 population	 trends	and	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 economy	 have	 provided	 a	 “backdrop	 for	 discourses	 on	migration	in	Scotland	and	have	implications	for	the	existing	and	new	minority	ethnic	groups	in	Scotland”	(2012:97).	While	Scotland’s	declining	population	has	been	a	long-term	concern	for	Scottish	policy-makers,	 the	 issue	has	become	a	more	central	 focus	since	devolution	and	in	particular	since	2007	when	the	SNP	took	office	(de	Lima	and	Wright,	 2009:392).	 This	 concern	 with	 demographic	 and	 skills	 shortages	 is	 neatly	captured	in	this	quote	from	the	SNP’s	Yes	pamphlet	Your	Scotland,	Your	Future:	
As	a	small	country	with	an	ageing	population,	Scotland	needs	a	certain	number	
of	migrants.	We	recognise	that	new	Scots	can	help	to	address	skills	shortages	in	
our	labour	market.	EU	nationals	have	the	same	right	to	live	and	work	here	as	we	
have	in	their	countries.	Since	independence	will	give	us	responsibility	for	our	own	
borders,	we	will	be	able	 to	 tailor	our	 immigration	policy	 to	 suit	Scottish	needs	
and	to	help	address	the	economic	challenges	of	demographic	change.	(2011:19)		
Thus,	arguments	pertaining	to	Scottish	migration	and	race	equality	policy	need	to	be	placed	 within	 a	 neoliberal	 context.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 it	 is	 useful	 to,	 first	 of	 all,	consider	what	neoliberalism	means	and	entails.	As	David	Harvey	puts	it,		
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Neoliberalism	is	in	the	first	instance	a	theory	of	political	economic	practices	that	
proposes	 that	 human	well-being	 can	best	 be	 advanced	by	 liberating	 individual	
entrepreneurial	 freedoms	 and	 skills	 within	 an	 institutional	 framework	
characterized	by	strong	private	property	rights,	free	markets,	and	free	trade.	The	
role	of	the	state	is	to	create	and	preserve	an	institutional	framework	appropriate	
to	such	practices.	(2005:11)	Thus,	neoliberalism	is	“the	project	of	economic	and	social	 transformation	under	the	sign	 of	 the	 free	 market”	 and	 it	 has	 been	 successful	 in	 creating	 markets	 for	 things	whose	commodification	was	once	almost	unimaginable	(Connell	et	al,	2009:331).	The	most	 dramatic	 form	 of	 commodification	 has	 been	 the	 privatisation	 of	 public	 assets	and	institutions	(Connell	et	al,	2009:331).	At	the	heart	of	neoliberalism	is	a	sustained	effort	 “to	 promote	 competition,	 choice,	 entrepreneurship	 and	 individualism”	 and	these	themes	of	this	“new	dominant	social	ideology	(…)	implicitly	justif[y]	the	social	inequality	that	allows	proper	rewards	for	‘winning’”	(Connell	et	al,	2009:333).	Harvey	argues	that	neoliberalism	has	become	“hegemonic	as	a	mode	of	discourse”	(2005:12)	and,	as	such,	it	has	a	significant	impact	“on	ways	of	thought	to	the	point	where	it	has	become	 incorporated	 into	 the	 common-sense	way	many	of	us	 interpret,	 live	 in,	 and	understand	the	world”	(2005:12).			
Therefore,	neoliberalism	becomes	a	condition	and	a	structuring	factor	(among	many	other	 factors)	of	 the	world	 in	which	we	 live.	As	Connell	et	al	put	 it,	neoliberalism	is	not	just	an	economic	policy	agenda,	that	is,	a	re-arrangement	of	the	relations	between	capital	and	the	state,	but	also	an	agenda	for	cultural	and	institutional	change	which,	potentially,	 extends	 across	 every	 arena	 of	 social	 life	 (2009:333).	 Importantly,	 this	‘reform’	agenda,	as	it	often	tends	to	be	called,	is	not	necessarily	popular	and	has	faced	crises	 of	 legitimacy	 (Connell	 et	 al,	 2009:333).	 Recently,	 we	 have	 witnessed	 this	 in	relation	to	the	strong	opposition	to	the	‘bedroom	tax’	as	well	as	public	spending	cuts	in	the	UK.	In	Scotland,	while	the	rail	system	was	privatised	under	John	Major	and	the	Conservatives	 in	 the	 1990s,	 recently	 the	 awarding	 of	 the	 ScotRail	 franchise	 to	 the	Dutch	state-owned	company	Abellio	was	met	with	 loud	objections	as	 it	was	seen	to	have	“dashed	hopes	of	taking	Scotland's	railways	back	into	public	hands”	(Gardham,	2014).		
Neoliberal	ideas	also	place	great	emphasis	on	globalisation,	and	international	markets	
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are	seen	as	a	positive	(Harvey,	2005:13).	In	their	2007	economic	strategy	the	SNP	put	forward	 a	 vision	 of	 globalisation	 as	 an	 opportunity	 which,	 if	 seized,	 could	 deliver	“accelerated	 rates	 of	 growth	 through	 developing,	 attracting,	 and	 retaining	 mobile	capital	 and	 labour”	 (in	 Cuthbert	 and	 Cuthbert,	 2009:107).	While,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	immigrants	may	 be	 represented	 as	 irritants	 and	 threats,	 and	 these	 representations	are	then	“discursively	linked	to	their	role	as	subordinate	and	exploitable	labor”,	on	the	other	hand,	“immigration	can	be	represented	as	a	source	to	replenish	the	nation	with	new	 citizens,	 fresh	 labor,	 innovation	 and	 creativity”	 (Bauder,	 2008:57-8).	Consequently,	 “these	 representations	 of	 immigration	 as	 threat	 and/or	 opportunity	can	 facilitate	 and	 legitimate	 neoliberal	 regulatory	 transformation”	 (Bauder	 2006	 in	Bauder,	2008:58).			As	 in	 Scotland,	 the	 representation	 of	 immigration	 as	 an	 economic	 tool	 has	 been	central	 to	 German	 immigration	 discourses	 as	 well	 (Bauder,	 2008:58);	 that	 is,	immigrants’	 ‘economic	 utility’	 (wirtschaflicher	 Nutzen)	 (Wengele	 2003	 in	 Bauder	2008:58)	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 these	 narratives.	When	 this	 economic	 utility	 approach	 is	applied	in	favour	of	immigration,	Bauder	argues,	“the	central	theme	is	that	the	skills	of	 immigrant	 workers	 are	 a	 necessity	 for	 the	 well-being	 of	 key	 industrial	 sectors”	(2008:63).	The	SNP’s	stance	on	immigration	has	been	heavily	influenced	by	a	vision	which	sees	immigration	as	an	opportunity	for	economic	growth.	In	their	White	Paper	for	independence,	the	SNP	note	how,	
An	 independent	 Scotland	 will	 also	 be	 responsible	 for	 immigration	 and	
citizenship,	with	the	opportunity	to	develop	an	immigration	policy	that	sensibly	
meets	 Scotland’s	 population	 and	 economic	 needs,	 while	 enriching	 our	 society.	(The	Scottish	Government,	2013:257)		Thus,	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 this	 extract,	 population	 and	 economic	 needs	 are	foregrounded,	with	societal	enrichment	being	somewhat	of	an	‘add-on’.		Furthermore,	the	SNP	note	that,	
Migrants	have	played	an	important	part	throughout	Scottish	history	in	enriching	
and	 renewing	 our	 culture	 and	 boosting	 the	 economy	 of	 the	 country.	 We	 will	
welcome	people	who	want	to	come	to	work	and	live	in	Scotland.	(SNP,	2013:269)		Again,	while	migrants’	cultural	contributions	are	acknowledged,	their	role	in	boosting	the	economy	and	willingness	to	work	in	Scotland	seems	to	be	the	framing	idea.			
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Harvey	also	explains	how,	 for	proponents	of	neoliberalism,	 the	shorter	 the	 terms	of	market	contracts	are,	 the	better	(2005:13).	He	notes	how	Lyotard	has	 identified	the	postmodern	condition	as	one	in	which	‘the	temporary	contract’	supplants	“permanent	institutions	 in	 the	 professional,	 emotional,	 sexual,	 cultural,	 family	 and	 international	domains,	as	well	as	in	political	affairs”	(in	2005:13).	This,	in	turn,	resonates	with	the	experiences	 of	 many	 migrants;	 that	 is,	 with	 the	 impermanency	 and	 precarity	 that	many	 (non-European)	 migrants	 experience	 vis-à-vis	 visas	 and	 the	 UK	 Border	Agency’s	 immigration	 controls.	 Those	 coming	 to	 the	 UK	 (and	 Scotland)	 need	 to	provide	ample	evidence	of	their	favourable	financial	situation,	present	and	future,	in	order	to	gain	entry	to	(and	the	ability	to	remain)	in	the	country.	Thus,	foreign	bodies	become	marked	and	 categorised	by	 their	 ability	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	neoliberal	 and	capitalist	 mode	 of	 production	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 UK’s	 national	 policies	 on	immigration.			
The	SNP,	 on	 their	 part,	envisaged	 a	points-based	 system	 for	 skilled	migration	 in	 an	independent	 Scotland	 (SNP,	 2013:254).	 Bauder	 notes	 that	 many	 recent	 studies	suggest	 that	 migration	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 neoliberal	 restructuring	 (Basok	2002;	 Bauder	 2006;	 and	 Herod,	 2000	 in	 Bauder,	 2008:55).	 In	 1987,	 Robin	 Cohen	argued	 that	 migration	 is	 “a	 structural	 necessity”	 for	 industrialised	 countries’	economies	 (Bauder,	 2008:57).	 Thus,	 “immigration	 law	 serves	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	existing	population”	(and,	might	I	add,	the	neoliberal	order)	by	“using	migrants	as	a	utility	 —	 similar	 to	 the	 items	 in	 a	 toolbox	—	 that	 can	 be	 selected	 to	 fix	 various	problems,	 including	 filling	 labour	 shortages	 and	 attracting	 investment	 capital	 (Ley,	2003	and	Piore,	1979	in	Bauder,	2008:57).			
As	noted	by	Davidson,	we	have	witnessed	a	significant	failing	of	academics	based	in	Scotland	—	 some	 of	 whom	 act	 as	 public	 intellectuals	—	 to	 analyse	 the	 effects	 of	neoliberalism	 locally	 (2010:i).	 He	 finds	 this	 surprising	 given	 the	 extent	 to	 which	Scotland	 has	 integrated	 into	 the	 capitalist	 world	 economy,	 and	 how	 “one	 of	 the	flagship	 policies	 of	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 British	 neoliberalism,	 the	 Private	 Finance	Initiative	 (PFI),	 was	 launched	 in	 Scotland	 from	 1995	 with	 the	 construction	 and	commercial	operation	of	the	Skye	Road	Bridge”	(Davidson,	2010:i).	Since	taking	office	
	115		
in	 2007,	 the	 SNP	 have	 continued	 on	 the	 path	 of	 neoliberal	 economics	 and	 politics	(Cuthbert	and	Cuthbert,	2009).	The	economy	has	had,	and	continues	to	have,	a	central	priority	 for	 the	 SNP:	 in	 their	 2007	 economic	 strategy,	 the	 SNP	 proclaimed	 that	“sustainable	 economic	 growth	 is	 the	 one	 central	 purpose	 to	 which	 all	 else	 in	government	 is	 directed	 and	 contributes”	 (in	 Cuthbert	 and	 Cuthbert,	 2009:107).	Importantly,	 this	 resonates	with	 the	ways	 in	which	 race	 equality	 is	 framed	 through	demographic	 considerations	 in	 the	 Scottish	 context.	 Concerns	 regarding	 the	population,	in	turn,	are	closely	linked	to	the	underlying	economic	considerations.			
During	the	referendum,	immigration	continued	to	be	talked	about	largely	in	terms	of	demographic	 and	 economic	 concerns.	When	debating	 Jim	Murphy	on	BBC2,	Humza	Yousaf,	 the	 then	Minister	 for	External	Affairs	 and	 International	Development,	noted	that	Scotland	needed	immigration	due	to	an	ageing	population	and	said	that	“we	need	our	 own	 control	 over	 the	 immigration	 system	so	where	we	have	 skills	 gaps	—	 like	engineering	 (…)	 we	 can	 use	 the	 immigration	 policy	 levers	 to	 attract	 more	 highly	skilled	 immigrants”	(BBC2,	2014).	Thus,	as	can	clearly	be	seen	 from	both	the	White	Paper	as	well	as	Humza	Yousaf’s	statement,	the	SNP’s	main	concerns	with	regard	to	immigration	 continued	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 demographic	 trends	 and	 economic	considerations	 during	 the	 referendum.	 As	 Meer	 notes,	 “because	 of	 a	 history	 of	population	 decline	 there	 has	 been	 a	 clear	 recognition	 that	 a	 successful	 Scottish	
economy	needs	to	attract	and	retain	migrants”	(2015:4;	emphasis	added)	in	order	to	address	 labour	 market	 gaps	 and	 rural	 depopulation,	 for	 example	 (de	 Lima	 and	Wright,	2009:392).			
Since	their	ascendance	to	power,	the	SNP	have	brought	immigration	to	the	very	core	of	 their	 economic	 strategy.	 The	 Government	 policy	 has	 been	 founded	 on	 the	assumption	 that	an	 increasing	population	 is	 “a	key	contributor	 to,	and	consequence	of,	a	more	vibrant	society	and	a	more	dynamic	economy”	(The	Scottish	Government	2007	 in	de	Lima,	2012:98)	and	 that	 immigration	 can	 contribute	 to	 this	process	 (de	Lima,	2012:98).	An	illuminating	example	of	how	economic	concerns	are	at	the	heart	of	the	SNP’s	policies	is	the	Scottish	Government’s	Race	Equality	Statement	2008-2011	which	preceded	the	current	Race	Equality	Framework	2016-2030.	The	document	was	
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explicitly	 framed	 around	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 economy:	 the	 Race	 Equality	 Statement	clearly	stated	that	it	“is	informed	by,	and	will	contribute	to,	the	delivery	of	the	Scottish	Government’s	economic	strategy	and	 its	national	objectives	and	outcomes”	(2008a:1	—	added	emphasis).	Further,	it	went	on	to	make	the	following	points:	[The	 Race	 Equality	 Statement]	 is	 placed	 within	 the	 context	 of	 fast	 changing	
demographics,	 the	current	economic	and	global	challenges	 facing	Scotland	and	
its	communities,	and	 the	shifts	 in	 the	equality	 landscape.	 It	 is	 informed	by,	and	
will	 contribute	 to,	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 Scottish	 Government’s	 economic	 strategy	
and	its	national	objectives	and	outcomes.	(Scottish	Government,	2008a:1)	
At	this	time	it	is	important	that	we	properly	draw	on	the	talents	and	skills	of	all	
our	 workforce	 and	 that	 we	 remove	 the	 barriers	 which	 preclude	 some	 in	 our	
minority	 ethnic	 communities	 from	 achieving	 their	 full	 potential	 in	 education,	
skills,	training	and	employment.	(Scottish	Government	,	2008a:3)	
Scottish	 Government	 has	 identified	 a	 suite	 of	 national	 economic	 targets	 and	
outcomes,	a	number	of	which	have	particular	relevance	to	race	equality:	to	have	
tackled	 the	 significant	 inequalities	 in	 our	 society;	 we	 live	 our	 lives	 safe	 from	
crime,	 disorder	 and	 danger’	 and	 ‘we	 take	 pride	 in	 a	 strong,	 fair	 and	 inclusive	
Scottish	identity’.		(Scottish	Government	,	2008a:4)	
The	Scottish	Government’s	stated	purpose	is	to	focus	the	Government	and	public	
services	 on	 creating	 a	 more	 successful	 country,	 with	 opportunities	 for	 all	 of	
Scotland	to	flourish,	through	increasing	sustainable	economic	growth.	(Scottish	Government	,	2008a:9)			Consequently,	 the	 issues	 of	 migration	 as	 well	 as	 race	 equality	 become	 framed	 as	issues	which	matter	in	terms	of	demographic	change	and	economic	challenges.	As	the	Race	Equality	Statement	puts	it	above,	the	Statement	is	informed	by,	and	contributes	to,	the	delivery	of	the	Government’s	economic	strategy.	Thus,	the	economy	lies	at	the	heart	 of	 the	 Statement	 with	 race	 equality	 revolving	 around	 it.	 Race	 equality	 then	comes	 to	be	seen	as	a	building	block	 in	 the	project	of	achieving	a	more	prosperous	nation	 in	 this	 instrumentalist	 vision.	 Though	 the	 economic	 vision	 is	 ‘civic’	 in	 that	one’s	belonging	is	measured	through	economic	contribution,	one	is	left	wondering	if	immigrants	 and	 ethnic	 minorities	 are	 recognised	 as	 anything	 more	 than	 economic	agents	 carrying	 the	potential	 to	 bolster	 Scotland’s	 finances.	As	 de	 Lima	 and	Wright	note	(2009:394),	migrants’	“migrant	labour	identity	is	privileged	over	all	other	forms	of	 identity	with	 little	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 their	 personal,	 social	and	cultural	background	may	be	mobilised	and	shape	their	experiences	in	particular	
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circumstances”.	 Thus,	 this	 in	 turn	has	 an	 implication	 for	 the	 extent	 to	which	 ethnic	minorities	 can	 feel	 and	 develop	 an	 affinity	 with	 the	 ‘Scottish	 nation’	 when	 their	existence	is	so	strongly	framed	through	their	economic	utility.		
Thus,	as	we	have	seen	so	far,	there	is	a	variety	of	ways	in	which	the	SNP’s	nationalism	has	 been	 portrayed	 and	 understood	 as	 civic	 by	 politicians,	 academics,	 campaigners	and	practitioners,	as	well	as	a	variety	of	ways	 in	which	the	referendum	was	steered	away	 from	 nationalist	 identity	 politics.	 I	 will	 now	 move	 on	 to	 critically	 consider	whether	this	pervasive	view	of	the	SNP’s	nationalism	as	‘civic’	—	which	has	strongly	emerged	from	my	findings	so	far	—	is	a	fair	or	accurate	representation.			
4.5.	Interrogating	the	civicness	of		the	SNP’s	vision	of	the		nation	
It	 is	 nothing	 new	 that	 political	 elites	 make	 use	 of	 historical	 myths	 or	 common	ancestry	 to	 forge	 a	 feeling	 of	 commonality	 (Kearton,	 2005)	 or	 an	 ‘imagined	community’	 (Anderson,	2006).	When	nationalist	narratives	 turn	 to	historical	myths	or	 ancestry	 as	 resources	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 construct	 a	 shared	 ‘nationness’,	 the	myths	these	narratives	make	use	of	usually	directly	 relate	 to	a	specific	group	of	people	or	‘nationals’	—	or	ethnie	as	Anthony	Smith	would	put	it	(see	Chapter	2).	As	a	result,	the	nation	 comes	 to	 be	 constructed	 according	 to	 and	 around	 the	 culture,	 history,	 and	heritage	of	these	specific	people.	This,	then,	means	that	the	contemporary	nationalist	narratives	 appropriating	 historical	 myths	 or	 ancestry	 tend	 to	 border	 on	 so-called	‘ethnic	nationalism’.	Within	this	imagining	of	the	nation	a	bounded,	specific	group	of	people	is	placed	at	the	core	of	the	nation.		
The	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 —	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 above	 —	 is	 routinely	 referred	 to	 and	understood	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 civic	 nationalism.	 As	 such,	 if	 it	 is	 ‘truly	 civic’	 and	anyone	can	be	Scottish,	nationalist	narratives	should	not	construct	the	nation	in	ways	that	 may	 serve	 to	 exclude	 certain	 people	 from	 ‘the	 nation’.	 Kearton,	 although	 still	embracing	 the	 civic/ethnic	 analytical	 distinction,	 has	 challenged	 this	 predominant	
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understanding	of	 ‘Scottish	nationalism’	by	saying	that	“while	Scottish	nationalism	is	clearly	further	towards	the	civic	end	of	an	ethnic-civic	spectrum,	the	understanding	of	Scotland	as	a	civic	nation	is	not	unproblematic”	(2005:30)	and	“while	the	Scots’	civic	identity	 is	 inclusive	in	that	(in	theory)	anyone	can	join,	some	of	 its	recurring	tropes	have	 particular	 ethnic	 and	 cultural	 origins”	 (2005:39).	 Thus,	 she	 argues	 that	while	Scotland	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 predominantly	 civic	 nation	 formed	 in	 modernity,	 it	nonetheless	draws	on	symbols	from	its	ethnic	past	in	order	to	gain	legitimacy.			
Thus,	 among	 the	 dominant	 ‘Scottish	 nationalism	 is	 civic’	 academic	 views,	 more	critical	standpoints	exist.	Based	on	a	careful	analysis	of	my	data,	it	became	apparent	to	me	 that	 there	 are	 indeed	 grounds	 for	 contesting	 the	dominant	 ‘civic’	 trope.	 This	section	will	 consider	 the	 civicness	 of	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 narratives	 in	 relation	 to	two	broad	themes	that	arose	from	the	data	and	which	are	closely	linked	to	processes	of	constructing	the	‘Scottish	nation’	—	namely	culture	and	heritage,	on	the	one	hand,	and	history	on	the	other.			
4.5.1.	Highland	culture	and	Gaelic	as	symbols	of	Scottishness	
In	the	Introduction	to	this	thesis,	I	advanced	a	twofold	argument	especially	in	relation	to	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5.	 I	 argued	 that	 when	 nationalist	 narratives	 draw	 on	 history	(irrespective	of	the	‘truthfulness’	of	this	history),	those	narratives	seek	to,	on	the	one	hand,	demarcate	the	contours	of	the	nation	—	that	is,	they	serve	to	define	who	does	(or	 does	 not)	 belong.	 What	 history	 is	 remembered	 (or	 forgotten),	 and	 how	 that	history	is	remembered	(or	forgotten),	is	important	as	this	affects	where	the	contours	of	 the	 nation	 fall	 at	 a	 given	 time.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 once	 history	 has	 served	 its	purpose	in	terms	of	demarcating	the	tangible	and	intangible	borders	of	the	nation	—	that	 is	where	 ‘we’	end	and	 ‘you’	begin	—	that	national	community	then	requires	 its	‘content’	or,	using	Renanian	(1990)	terminology,	its	‘soul’	and	‘spiritual	principle’.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	political	elites	draw	on	‘heritage’	and	‘tradition’	(which	are,	of	course,	highly	contested	concepts).			
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Heritage	 refers	 to	 “the	 whole	 complex	 of	 organisations,	 institutions	 and	 practices	devoted	 to	 the	 preservation	 and	 presentation	 of	 culture	 and	 arts”,	 and	 heritage	“becomes	 the	 material	 embodiment	 of	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 nation,	 a	 collective	representation	of	(…)	tradition”	(Hall,	2007:88).	For	McDowell,	heritage	signifies	the	selective	use	of	the	past	for	contemporary	purposes,	and	heritage	can	be	seen	as	an	aggregation	 of	myths,	 values,	 inheritances	 that	 are	 determined	 and	 defined	 by	 the	needs	 of	 societies	 in	 the	 present	 (2008:37).	 McCrone	 et	 al	 argue	 that	 “we	 have	constructed	 heritage	 because	 we	 have	 a	 cultural	 need	 to	 do	 so	 in	 modern	 age”	(1995:1).	What	 is	more,	 heritage	 also	 serves	 the	needs	of	nationalist	narratives.	As	such,	 heritage	 only	 has	 “a	 tenuous	 connection	 to	 actual	 events”	 (McCrone	 et	 al,	1995:1).	Heritage	aims	not	only	to	preserve	for	posterity	things	of	value	(whether	in	aesthetic	 or	 historical	 terms),	 but	 to	 also	 exercise	 power:	 heritage	 carries	 with	 it	symbolic	power	to	order	knowledge,	to	rank,	classify	and	arrange,	and	consequently	to	give	meaning	to	objects	and	things	through	the	imposing	of	interpretive	schemas,	scholarship	and	what	Hall	terms	the	‘authority	of	connoisseurship’	(Hall,	2007:88).			
Thus,	 this	 section	will	 explore	 and	present	 some	of	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	SNP	has	sought	 to	 construct	 the	 Scottish	 nation	 by	 utilising	 remembering	 and	 forgetting,	history,	heritage,	and	tradition,	and	how	these	endeavours,	in	turn,	can	be	argued	to	run	against	the	grain	of	what	is	normally	understood	to	constitute	’civic’	nationalism.	Thus,	based	on	an	analysis	of	data	from	interviews	as	well	as	political	speeches	and	publications,	 this	 chapter	 has	 —	 so	 far	 —	 demonstrated	 that	 Scottish	 nationalist	narratives	were	 frequently	 understood	 and	 framed	 as	 ‘civic’	 by	 the	 SNP	during	 the	referendum.	 The	 extended	 content	 analysis	 in	 this	 section	 will	 reveal	 what	 the	political	rhetoric	seems	to	deny	or	ignore	with	regard	to	its	construction	of	national	identity.			
For	Hall,	we	should	think	of	heritage	as	a	discursive	practice:	“it	is	one	of	the	ways	in	which	 the	 nation	 slowly	 constructs	 for	 itself	 a	 sort	 of	 collective	 social	 memory”	(2007:89).	By	storying	their	turning	points	into	a	single,	coherent	narrative,	nations	construct	 identities	 by	 selectively	 binding	 their	 chosen	high	 points	 and	memorable	achievements	 into	 an	 unfolding	 ‘national	 story’.	 This	 story,	 then,	 serves	 as	 the	
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nation’s	 ‘tradition’	(Hall,	2007:89).	Building	on	Raymond	Williams’	 idea	of	 ‘selective	tradition’,	Hall	argues	that	(2007:90):	
Like	personal	memory,	 social	memory	 is	 also	highly	 selective,	 it	 highlights	and	
foregrounds,	 imposes	 beginnings,	 middles	 and	 ends	 on	 the	 random	 and	
contingent.	Equally,	 it	 foreshortens,	 silences,	disavows,	 forgets	and	elides	many	
episodes	which	—	 from	another	perspective	—	could	be	the	start	of	a	different	
narrative.	 This	 process	 of	 selective	 ‘canonisation’	 confers	 authority	 and	 a	
material	 and	 institutional	 facticity	 on	 the	 selective	 traditions,	 making	 it	
extremely	difficult	to	shift	or	revise.	The	institutions	responsible	for	making	the	
’selective	tradition’	work	develop	a	deep	investment	in	their	own	‘truth’.			
Drawing	on	Benedict	Anderson,	Hall	argues	that	“even	so-called	‘civic’	states	(…)	are	deeply	 embedded	 in	 specific	 ‘ethnic’	 or	 cultural	 meanings	 which	 give	 the	 abstract	idea	 of	 the	 nation	 its	 lived	 ‘content’”	 (2007:88-89;	 emphasis	 added).	 Consequently,	national	 heritage	 is	 a	 powerful	 source	 of	 such	meanings	 and	 “it	 follows	 that	 those	who	 cannot	 see	 themselves	 reflected	 in	 its	 mirror	 cannot	 properly	 ‘belong’”	(2007:89).	 Thus,	 heritage	 —	 or	 what	 is	 constructed	 as	 heritage	 —	 serves	 as	 a	powerful	 link	 between	 history,	 nationalism	 and	 belonging.	 Hall’s	 use	 of	 the	 word	‘mirror’	is	very	significant	here.	Through	the	(often	political)	construction	of	heritage,	people	 acquire	 a	 tangible	 vision	 of	 themselves:	 of	 their	 roots,	 of	 continuity,	 of	belonging	that	transcends	the	present,	and	of	who	they	are.	Of	course,	not	everyone	signs	up	to	this	vision	and,	importantly,	not	everyone	fits	into	this	vision.			During	 the	 referendum,	 the	 SNP	 placed	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 culture	 in	 their	 Yes	publications.	 Scotland’s	 “strong	 and	 vibrant	 culture”	 was	 argued	 to	 be	 “one	 of	 our	most	 enduring	 and	 powerful	 national	 assets”	 while	 Scotland’s	 “rich	 heritage	 gives	[Scotland	a]	sense	of	place	and	underpins	our	understandings	of	our	past,	our	present	and	 our	 future”	 (Scotland’s	 Future,	 2013:309).	 Furthermore,	 “culture	 and	 heritage	can	enrich	and	empower	our	communities,	transforming	places	and	lives”	(Scotland’s	Future,	2013:314).	Indeed,	culture	and	heritage	are	not	measured	in	worth	solely	in	monetary	 terms	 —	 as	 the	 SNP	 argue	 that	 Westminster	 does	 (Scotland’s	 Future,	2013:19)	—	but	“we	value	[them]	precisely	because	they	embody	our	heart	and	soul,	and	 our	essence”	 (Scotland’s	 Future,	 2013:314;	 emphasis	 added).	 Thus,	 culture	 and	heritage	are	framed	as	bearers	of	what	it	means	to	be	Scottish;	they	embody	the	very	being	 of	 what	 this	 identity	 is	 about.	 Consequently,	 what	 Scotland’s	 culture	 and	
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heritage	 is	 understood	 to	 comprise	 of	 becomes	 extremely	 important.	 How	 Scottish	culture	 and	 heritage	 are	 imagined	 to	 be	 gives	 us	 clues	 as	 to	 how	 the	 nation	 is	imagined	to	be.		
Scotland’s	cultural	life	and	heritage	are	portrayed	as	taking	“many	different	forms,	as	diverse	as	the	land,	peoples	and	places	of	our	country”	(Scotland’s	Future,	2013:316)	—	or,	 as	 the	 then	Culture	Secretary	Fiona	Hyslop	put	 it,	 “there	 is	no	one	 thing	 that	defines	 us”	 (5	 June	 2013,	 Edinburgh	 University)	 —	 thus	 signalling	 a	 broad	understanding	of	these	things.	However,	some	cultural	elements	are	given	precedence	over	 others:	 as	 Fiona	 Hyslop	 goes	 on	 to	 say,	 “there	 are,	 of	 course,	 iconic	 images,	poems,	 films,	 artists,	 writers,	 performers,	 compositions,	 buildings	 and	 landscapes	that	 evoke	 our	 sense	 of	 ‘Scotland’”.	 	 Scotland’s	 historic	 languages,	 and	 specifically	Gaelic,	 are	 promised	 to	 be	 given	 “a	 secure	 future”	 in	 Scotland	 “by	 increasing	 the	numbers	learning,	speaking	and	using	Gaelic”	(Scotland’s	Future,	2013:314).	The	SNP	assert	that		
The	 inspiration	 and	 significance	 we	 draw	 from	 our	 culture	 and	 heritage,	
including	Gaelic	and	Scots,	are	fundamental	to	shaping	our	communities	and	the	
places	 in	which	we	 live.	Culture	and	heritage	make	our	communities	attractive	
places	to	live,	work,	invest	and	visit.		(…)	Through	their	contribution	to	our	social	
fabric,	 community	 cohesion	 and	 economic	 wellbeing,	 culture	 and	 the	 arts	
support	 better	 outcomes	 for	 healthier,	 safer	 and	 more	 resilient	 communities.	(Scotland’s	Future,	2013:312)	Gaelic	is	recognised	as	“a	continuing	element	in	Scottish	heritage,	identity	and	history	for	many	centuries”	and	the	Scots	 language,	which	was	 included	in	the	2011	census	for	 the	 first	 time,	 is	 flagged	up	as	something	the	government	wants	 to	promote	and	support	in	policy	developments	(Scotland’s	Future,	2013:449).			
Mycock	notes	 the	SNP’s	 continued	 emphasis	 on	 the	historic	 languages	 of	 Scots	 and	Gaelic	 as	 parts	 of	 Scotland’s	 identity	 and	 heritage	 in	 the	 party’s	 publications	(2012:56).	 According	 to	 Mycock,	 “these	 ‘indigenous’	 languages	 underlie	 romantic	nationalist	 conceptions	 of	 Scottish	 identity	 and	mark	 linguistic	 distinctiveness	with	England”	 (2012:56).	Consequently,	Mycock	points	out	how	such	promotion	of	 Scots	and	Gaelic	potentially	ethnicises	the	Scottish	nation	as	the	national	community	seems	to	 be	 defined	 by	 two	 historical	 and	 distinct,	 yet	 somewhat	 dying,	 languages	 rather	
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than	 the	 SNP	 making	 any	 formal	 attempts	 to	 recognise	 other	 minority	 languages	spoken	 by	 (newer	 and	 bigger)	 communities	 (2012:56).	 Further,	 as	 Phipps	 and	Fassetta	(2015:10)	highlight,	while	the	SNP’s	White	Paper	on	independence	reiterates	Scotland’s	welcoming	attitude	to	migrants,	it	“makes	no	mention	of	the	languages	and	cultures	 that	 migrants	 bring	 with	 them”.	 Thus,	 expressed	 support	 for	 Scotland’s	‘historic	languages’	“offers	a	fascinating	insight	into	the	place	[sic]	 languages	play	in	the	development	 of	 national	 policy	 and	 identity	 in	 a	 country	 recently	devolved	 and	seeking	further	powers”	(Phipps	and	Fassetta,	2015:10).	Consequently,	there	is	scope	to	argue	 that	 the	way	 in	which	 the	SNP	approaches	culture	and	heritage	via	official	policy	compromises	the	dominant	discourse	of	civic	nationalism.		
In	order	to	make	sense	of	Gaelic’s	current	standing	in	Scotland,	as	well	as	its	broader	significance	in	relation	to	 ‘Highlandism’,	 it	 is	useful	to	briefly	consider	the	history	of	Gaelic	in	Scotland.	A	small	kingdom,	Dalriada,	used	to	exist	in	south-west	Argyll.	The	Scots	of	Dalriada	began	migrating	there	from	modern-day	Antrim	in	Northern	Ireland	sometime	before	their	king,	Fergus	Mór,	arrived	c.500	(Lynch,	1998:17).	Gradually,	a	Celticisation	of	parts	of	Pictland	 in	 the	Highlands	as	well	 as	 intermarriage	between	Gaelic	speakers	and	Picts	began	happening,	and	eventually	the	two	kingdoms	merged	in	the	early	9th	century	(Lynch,	1998:23-25).	Gaelic,	thus,	came	to	be	part	of	‘Highland	culture’.	 ‘Highlandism’	became	the	dominant	force	in	Scottish	cultural	life	in	the	first	half	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 thanks	 to	 Sir	 Walter	 Scott’s	 influence.	 In	 his	 novels,	 Scott	imagined	 a	 romantic	 and	 fictitious	 picture	 of	 the	 Scottish	 past	 which,	 in	 turn,	encouraged	 19th	 century	 Scottish	 historians	 to	 recover	 and	 study	 historical	documents	as	well	as	records,	and	recreate	similar	pictures	of	the	past	(McCrone	et	al,	1995:4).	Scott’s	‘historical	revolution’	created	a	new	way	of	considering	the	past,	and	introduced	the	idea	of	past	and	present	being	two	very	different	entities	(McCrone	et	al,	1995:4).	Consequently,		
This	new	past	gradually	came	to	be	cherished	as	a	heritage	that	validated	and	
exalted	 the	 present.	 And	 the	 new	 role	 heightened	 concern	 to	 save	 relics	 and	
restore	monuments	as	emblems	of	communal	identity,	continuity	and	aspiration.	(Lowenthal,	1985:xvi	cited	in	McCrone	et	al,	1995:4)		
Thus,	 material	 and	 imagined	 aspects	 of	 Highland	 life	 and	 regional	 identity	 (e.g.	
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heather,	 thistles,	 bagpipes,	 and	 tartan)	 have	 come	 to	 be	 central	 to	 popular	constructions	 of	 ‘Scottishness’	 (Knox	 &	 Houston,	 2001:xviii-xix).	 ‘Highland	 culture’	therefore	features	heavily	in	the	SNP’s	imagining	of	Scottish	culture	and	heritage	not	only	in	the	form	of	Gaelic,	but	in	terms	of	tartan	as	well.	During	the	referendum,	Alex	Salmond	 described	 Scotland	 as	 a	 tartan	 on	 multiple	 occasions.	 Talking	 to	 a	 Polish	expat	magazine,	he	said:		
(…)	a	tartan	has	many	shades	in	it,	and	each	tartan	has	different	shades	woven	
into	the	cloth	and	they	together	make	up	an	absolute	distinctive	pattern.	I	like	to	
look	 upon	 Scotland	 as	 a	 tartan	 and	 the	 Polish	 communities	 are	 part	 of	 the	
thread,	a	strand	of	that	tartan.	(MacGuire	and	Bator-Skórkiewicz,	2014:27).	Additionally,	during	a	speech	at	the	College	of	Europe	in	Bruges,	he	also	noted	that,	
Tartan	 is	 the	 distinctive	 national	 cloth	 of	 Scotland.	 It’s	 made	 up	 of	 patterned	
threads	of	different	colours.	I	like	to	think	that	Scottish	identity	is	like	the	tartan.	
There	are	many	 colours,	many	 threads,	many	 strands	 to	 the	 Scottish	 tartan	of	
identity.	(28	April	2014)		
Utilising	 the	 imagery	of	 tartan	 in	 this	way	 is	 interesting	on	 two	counts.	On	 the	one	hand,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 through	 statements	 like	 this,	 the	 cultural	 nationalist	appropriation	of	Highland	culture	can	be	seen	as	reconceptualising	these	motifs	in	an	inclusive	manner.	On	the	other	hand,	the	statements	could	also	be	seen	as	providing	evidence	 of	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 claims	 about	 civic	 and	 inclusive	 nationalism	 in	Scotland	 are	 still	 closely	 attached	 to,	 and	 aligned	 with,	 the	 imaginaries	 of	 cultural	nationalism.	The	value	attached	to	Gaelic	by	consecutive	SNP	governments,	therefore,	is	telling	in	terms	of	what	history	is	deemed	important	for	the	construction	of	Scottish	‘heritage’.	 Gaelic,	 its	 present	 status	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 is	 appropriated	 in	nationalist	narratives	and	policy	debates	cannot	be	separated	 from	Scott’s	 legacy	of	‘Highlandism’	and	’tartanry’.				
4.5.2.	Empire,	Homecoming	and	the	‘Scottish	diaspora’	As	we	have	 seen,	 a	 very	 specific	history	 is	drawn	upon	 in	 an	effort	 to	 construct	 an	idea	 of	 ‘Scotland’	 and	 ‘Scottish	 culture	 and	 heritage’.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 more	sinister	 chapters	 are	 forgotten	 or	 remain	 behind	 a	 curtain	 of	 silence.	 Thus,	 a	 very	
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particular	 understanding	 of	 history	 is	 employed,	 and	 as	 such	 it	 works	 towards	excluding	some	voices	and	experiences	 from	Scotland’s	 ‘national	 story’.	This	partial	historiography	 was	 especially	 evident	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 recent	 ‘Homecoming’	franchise	 in	Scotland	which	 took	place	 in	2014	 (the	 same	year	as	 the	 referendum),	and	sought	to	entice	the	‘Scottish	diaspora’	to	‘come	home’.			So	far	I	have	shown	how	public	rhetoric	around	Scottish	culture	and	heritage	has	an	effect	 on	 the	 contours	 and	 content	 of	 what	 the	 ‘Scottish	 nation’	 is	 imagined	 and	understood	to	be.	Further,	I	would	argue	that	those	parts	of	Scottish	history	that	are	remembered	 or	 not	 remembered	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 ideas	 regarding	 the	 ‘Scottish	diaspora’,	especially	in	relation	to	the	Homecoming	franchise.			
Kearton	 (2005)	 has	 previously	 argued	 that	 when	 drawing	 on	 Scotland’s	 ‘ethnic	history’,	the	SNP	use	history	in	a	way	such	that	the	“ethnic	core	is	used	to	project	an	inclusive,	 forward-looking	vision	of	the	nation”	(Kearton,	2005:39).	Thus,	 the	multi-ethnic	roots	of	medieval	Scotland	—	consisting	of	Picts,	Britons,	Scots,	Anglo-Saxons	and	Norse	—	are	drawn	upon	as	a	rhetorical	device	 to	 legitimise	the	contemporary	claim	 that	 Scottishness	 is	 an	 open	 and	 inclusive	 identity,	 and	 Scotland	 being	 an	ethnically	 diverse	 nation	 (Kearton,	 2005.:27-28).	 	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	referendum,	 Salmond	 referred	 to	 two	 of	 the	 most	 talked	 about	 Scottish	 historical	figures,	Robert	the	Bruce	and	William	Wallace,	and	uses	their	ethnic	origins	to	argue	for	an	inclusive	vote	in	September:		
The	 two	 greatest	 heroes	 in	 Scottish	 history	 are	 Robert	 the	 Bruce	 and	William	
Wallace.	Firstly,	Robert	de	Brus,	his	family	were	of	Norman	extraction.	William	
Wallace,	William	le	Waleys,	means	William	the	Welshman.	His	family	came	from	
Wales.	So	this	is	nothing	to	do	with	where	you	are	from,	this	is	about	where	you	
are.	 That	 is	 the	 argument,	 which	 will	 carry	 the	 YES	 vote	 in	 September.	(MacGuire	and	Bator-Skórkiewicz,	2014:27)		
Indeed,	people	such	as	Bruce	and	Wallace	are	important	building	blocks	in	nationalist	narratives.	 Similarly,	 Robert	 Burns	 and	 his	 poetry	 have	 become	 to	 denote	quintessential	Scottishness.	However,	while	Salmond	contends	that	he’s	“happy	to	be	the	representative	of	a	country	whose	most	celebrated	figure,	Robert	Burns	—	with	
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the	third	most	statues	of	any	secular	figure	across	the	planet	—	is	not	a	soldier,	but	a	poet”	 (speech	 at	 Glasgow	 Caledonian	 University	 New	 York	 campus,	 7.4.2014)	 he	conveniently	chooses	not	to	mention	that	Burns	came	very	close	to	moving	to	Jamaica	in	 order	 to	 take	 on	 a	 job	 at	 a	 plantation.	 	 Thus,	mixed	 origins	 of	 Scottish	 national	heroes	 and	 people	 are	 appropriated	 as	 evidence	 of	 civic	 nationalism	 and	 of	 the	‘mongrel	nation’	that	Scotland	supposedly	is.		
However,	 a	 specific	 section	 of	 population	 is	 often	 forgotten	 and,	 consequently,	Scotland’s	 ‘historical	diversity’	 is	used	in	a	way	to	occlude	Scotland’s	 leading	role	in	the	empire	and	the	violence	perpetrated	under	the	banner	of	‘Great	Britain’.	As	Tom	Devine	 puts	 it,	 Scotland	 has	 long	 suffered	 from	 ‘national	 amnesia’	 in	 the	 public	domain	in	relation	to	its	colonial	past.	The	ways	in	which	Scotland’s	past	is	entangled	with	slave	trade	and	slavery	has	been	shrouded	with	—	in	Mullen’s	terms	—	a	“myth	of	 denial”	 and	 a	 casual	 acceptance	 that	 “it	 wisnae	 us”	 (2009b:5).	 Rather,	 popular	history	 is	more	often	 seen	 to	be	one	of	 subjection;	 “of	 a	 Scotland	economically	 and	politically	subservient	to	the	will	of	its	larger	neighbour9”	(Mullen,	2009b:5).			
Scots	played	a	central	role	—	as	doctors,	plantation	owners,	slave	traders,	merchants	and	 appointed	 imperial	 officers	 and	 governors	 —	 with	 regard	 to	 managing	 and	running	the	empire;	indeed,	they	were	disproportionately	represented	in	the	imperial	endeavour	when	considering	the	size	of	the	population	(Hamilton,	2012;	Mackenzie,	1993).	Scots	flocked	especially	to	the	Caribbean	sugar	colonies	(e.g.	Jamaica,	Grenada,	Dominica,	St	Vincent	and	Tobago)	in	their	thousands	(Hamilton,	2012:429)	and	were	thus	a	 significant	presence	 in	 these	 societies.	Although	 relatively	 few	slave	voyages	originated	 from	 Scottish	 ports10,	 there	 was	 nonetheless	 money	 to	 be	 made	 in	 the	slave	 trade,	 and	 Scottish	 investors,	 captains,	 surgeons,	 merchants	 and	 crew	 all	worked	to	make	the	slave	trade	profitable	(Hamilton,	2012:430).		
The	Caribbean	islands	were	‘slave	societies’	in	that	they	depended	on	un-free,	forced																																																									9	Indeed,	 as	we	 shall	 see	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 the	 participants	 often	 reiterated	 and	 supported	 the	 narrative	 of	
‘Scottish	victimhood’	although	the	minority	also	challenged	it	as	well.	10	Ships	carrying	slaves	mainly	originated	from	Liverpool,	Bristol	and	London.	
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labour	 as	 without	 the	 slaves	 it	 would	 have	 been	 impossible	 to	 run	 the	 sugar	economies,	 and	by	1850	about	85	per	 cent	 the	British	West	 Indies’	population	was	comprised	of	black	Africans	(Devine,	2003:224).	Devine	notes	how	the	Caribbean	was	“known	as	 the	graveyard	of	 the	slaves”	as	 the	suffering	of	 the	slaves	was	especially	horrendous	 (2003:224).	 As	 mentioned	 previously,	 Scots	 came	 to	 the	 Caribbean	 in	great	 numbers,	 and	 they	 were	 highly	 visible	 due	 to	 their	 positions	 in	 the	 white	communities	 as	 plantation	 owners,	 merchants	 and	 their	 employees,	 clerks,	bookkeepers	and	overseers	(Hamilton,	2012:429).	Scots	also	served	as	attorneys,	i.e.	as	those	managing	the	estates	for	absentee	landowners,	thus	occupying	positions	of	responsibility	 since	 they	 wielded	 enormous	 power	 over	 the	 enslaved	 Africans	(Hamilton,	2012:429).			
Scots’	 intimate	relationship	with	the	slave	economy	carried	more	than	just	 financial	consequences:	children	of	Scots	migrants	and	enslaved	and	‘free	coloured’	women	is	a	notable	legacy	of	Scotland	and	slavery	(Devine,	2015:8).	As	Robert	Wedderburn	(a	radical	anti-slavery	advocate	and	a	son	of	a	 Jacobite	Scot	 in	Jamaica)	explains	 in	his	writings	with	regard	to	his	father	James	Wedderburn,	Esq.	of	Inveresk	(a	proprietor	of	sugar	estates	in	Jamaica)	and	his	mother	Rosanna	(a	slave	to	Lady	Douglas):	
From	him	[James	Wedderburn]	 I	have	received	no	benefit	 in	 the	world.	By	him	
my	mother	 was	made	 the	 object	 of	 his	 brutal	 lust,	 then	 insulted,	 abused,	 and	
abandoned	 (…).	 (…)	 It	 is	 a	 common	 practice,	 as	 has	 been	 stated	 by	 Mr.	
Wilberforce	 in	parliament,	 for	 the	planters	 to	have	 lewd	 intercourse	with	 their	
female	slaves;	and	so	inhuman	are	many	of	these	said	planters,	that	many	well-
authenticated	 instances	are	known,	of	 their	selling	their	slaves	while	pregnant,	
and	making	that	a	pretence	to	enhance	their	value.	(1991:45-46)		
Therefore,	 to	 this	 day,	 there	 is	 a	 large	 Caribbean	 population	 with	 a	 direct	 link	 to	Scotland.	Indeed,	many	carry	Scottish	surnames,	such	as	Campbell,	Lamont	and	Grant,	which	 were	 forced	 upon	 their	 enslaved	 ancestors	 by	 their	 Scottish	 slave	 masters.	There	 were	 also	 black	 people	 of	 Scottish	 descent	 living	 in	 Scotland	 which	 leads	Hamilton	 to	 note	 how	 notions	 of	 a	 historically	 ‘white	 country’	 are	 misplaced	(2012:437).	 Furthermore,	 many	 ordinary	 people	 of	 African,	 Indian	 and	 Scottish	descent	 lived	 and	 worked	 and	 were	 educated	 across	 the	 country,	 the	 presence	 of	whom	“challenges	historians	to	think	carefully	about	who	they	regard	‘Scottish’	in	the	
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late	eighteenth-century	Scotland”	(Hamilton,	2012:437).			
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Scotland’s	 political	 elite	 continues	 to	 perpetuate	 the	 discourse	 of	social	 justice,	 which,	 as	 will	 be	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 is	 anchored	 on	 the	 idea	 of	‘Scottish	values’	and	Scottish	exceptionalism.	On	the	other	hand,	its	political	discourse	also	draws	on	the	view	of	Scotland	being	a	‘mongrel	nation’.	This	‘historical	diversity’	or	 mixedness,	 then,	 accommodates	 civic	 nationalist	 ideas	 of	 openness	 and	inclusiveness:	because	Scotland	has	been	historically	made	up	of	diverse	peoples	and	tribes,	it	is	an	oxymoron	to	suggest	that	Scottish	nationalist	narratives	would	be	of	the	’ethnic’	 instead	of	 the	 ’civic’	 type.	However,	 this	understanding	of	a	 ‘mongrel	nation’	—	or	 ‘mixed	origins’	—	does	not	extend	 to	 those	 in	 the	Caribbean	with	a	historical	connection	to	Scotland.		
A	case	 in	point	regarding	the	way	 in	which	Scottish	history	and	 ‘heritage’	 is	used	 in	nation-building,	 and	how	Scotland’s	 violent	history	 is	 occluded,	 is	 the	Homecoming	franchise.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 one	 of	 the	 Scottish	 Government’s	 national	outcomes	is	‘inclusive	national	identity’.	According	to	the	government,	“the	awareness	and	 advocacy	 for	 Scotland	 by	 the	 Scots	 diaspora”	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 contributing	 to	successfully	 achieving	 ‘inclusive	 national	 identity’	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	‘national	 identity:	 n.p.).	 This	 national	 outcome	 is,	 thus,	 closely	 connected	 to	 the	Homecoming	franchise	which	seeks	to	entice	‘diasporic	Scots’	to	‘come	home’.		
The	first	Homecoming	Scotland	event	—	which	lasted	an	entire	year	—	took	place	in	2009	 with	 the	 second	 Homecoming	 taking	 place	 in	 2014	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	referendum.	While	the	2014	event	website	notes	that	“contemporary	Scotland	blends	a	 rich	 array	 of	 cultures	 from	 around	 the	world”,	 it	 nonetheless	 singles	 out	 “several	icons	 considered	 uniquely	 and	 recognisably	 Scottish”	 (VisitScotland,	 2014).	Unsurprisingly,	and	in	line	with	Sir	Walter	Scott’s	 ‘Highlandism’,	these	turn	out	to	be	kilts,	bagpipes,	 tartan,	Highland	games,	Gaelic,	and	 the	Saltire.	As	Mycock	notes,	 the	main	 focus	 of	 the	 SNP-led	 government	 initiatives,	 such	 as	 the	 2009	 Homecoming,	have	been	to	encourage	(affluent)	Scottish	self-identifier	diasporic	communities	from	
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countries	 such	 as	 the	 US,	 Canada,	 New	 Zealand	 and	 Australia	 to	 come	 visit	 ‘their	home’	(2012:63).	While	the	term	‘Blood	Scots’	was	originally	used,	there	was	a	swift	shift	 to	 ‘ancestral	 Scots’.	 Thus,	 Mycock	 argues	 that	 SNP’s	 focus	 with	 regard	 to	Homecoming	is	“instructive	in	determining	how	Scottish	nationality	is	understood	by	the	SNP”	 (2012:63).	While	 the	marketing	of	Homecoming	2009	was	 firmly	directed	towards	Canada,	 the	US	 and	NZ	 and	Australia	 (Mullen,	 2009a:9),	 other	parts	 of	 the	Commonwealth	which	are	intimately	linked	with	Scotland	and	its	historical	legacy	—		notably	the	Caribbean	—	were	 forgotten	about.	 Indeed,	Sir	Geoffrey	Palmer	pointed	out	 that	no	 Jamaicans	were	officially	 invited	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	events	 even	 though	many	 Jamaicans	 consider	 themselves	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 Scottish	 diaspora	 (Mullen,	2009a:9).	 Thus,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 engagement	 with	 those	 diasporic	communities	 that	 are	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	 violent	 legacy	 of	 Scottish	 colonialism	(Mycock,	2012:63).			
Following	 Homecoming	 2009	 the	 event	 was,	 however,	 framed	 in	 a	 more	 all-encompassing	 way	 with	 Alex	 Salmond	 arguing	 that	 the	 events	 “captured	 the	imagination	of	people	around	 the	world	who	have	 links	 to	and	 ties	 to	Scotland	and	more	widely	 people	who	 simply	 love	 our	 country”	 (Homecoming	 Scotland	2010:2).		While	 Homecoming	 is	 directly	 linked	with	 Scotland’s	 imperial	 past	 in	 that	 it	 urges	Scots	 from	 the	 Commonwealth	 to	 ’come	 home’,	 the	 more	 oppressive	 chapter	 of	Scotland’s	 history	 connected	 with	 slave	 trade	 and	 plantations	 has	 been,	 to	 a	 large	part,	 absent	 from	 public	 rhetoric	 related	 to	 the	 event.	 The	 SNP	 has	 not	 actively	engaged	with	Scotland’s	 imperial	 legacy	 in	 its	constructions	of	Scottish	nationalism,	and	there	is	“scant	acknowledgement	of	[the	colonial	legacy’s]	potential	contribution	in	 shaping	 contemporary	 Scottish	 national	 values	 or	 identity”	 (Mycock,	 2012:62).	Thus,	via	Homecoming,	 the	SNP	are	demonstrating	what	Brubaker	terms	 ‘homeland	nationalism’	by	which	he	means	nationalism	which	is	
…directed	 ‘outward’	across	the	boundaries	of	territory	and	citizenship,	towards	
members	 of	 their	 own	 ethnic	 nationality,	 that	 is	 towards	 persons	who	 ‘belong‘	
(or	 can	 be	 claimed	 to	 belong)	 to	 the	 external	 national	 homeland	 by	
ethnonational	 affinity,	 although	 they	 reside	 in	 and	 are	 (ordinarily)	 citizens	 of	
other	states.	(1996:111)	Such	 constructions	 of	 the	 nation	 bring	 the	 civic	 nationalism	 that	 the	 SNP	 claim	 to	propagate	into	question.	What	becomes	evident	through	events	such	as	Homecoming	
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is	that	Scottishness	is	not	solely	an	identity	based	on	residency	or	on	one’s	choice	to	live	and	work	in	Scotland	but	that	ancestry	—	but	not	all	ancestry	—	plays	a	key	part	in	constituting	Scottishness	as	well.		
It	must,	however,	be	acknowledged	that	during	Homecoming	2014	steps	were	taken	in	 remembering	 Scotland’s	 slavery	 past11.	 The	 Commonwealth	 Games,	 which	 were	held	 in	 Glasgow	 in	 summer	 2014,	 provided	 a	 convenient	 arena	 for	 thinking	 and	discussing	Scotland’s	role	in	the	empire	in	public	fora.	Over	the	period	of	about	two	weeks,	people	from	all	over	the	Commonwealth	gathered	together	in	the	‘second	city	of	the	empire’.	Before	the	games	started,	Humza	Yousaf	—	an	SNP	MSP	and	the	then	Minister	 for	External	Affairs	—	noted	 that	 there	are	many	 reminders	 in	Glasgow	of	“Scotland’s	role	in	the	UK’s	dark	past	throughout	the	city”	(2014:11).	Furthermore,	he	went	on	to	say	that:	
I	see	the	2014	Commonwealth	Games	as	a	chance	for	us	to	learn	lessons	for	our	
past,	 and	 look	 forward	 to	 a	 new	 relationship	 with	 the	 Commonwealth,	 which	
includes	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 African	 and	 Caribbean	 countries.	 This	 new	
relationship	 will	 be	 built	 on	 partnership	 and	 collaboration,	 rather	 than	 a	
relationship	where	one	country	is	superior	to	the	others.	(2014:11)	He	concluded	by	saying	that	he	hoped	that	by	acknowledging	this	particular	part	of	Scottish	history,	 “Glasgow’s	Commonwealth	Games	will	 allow	us	 to	move	 towards	a	more	 positive	 future	 and	 a	 relationship	 with	 Commonwealth	 countries	 which	 is	 a	partnership	of	equals”	(2014:11).			
Similarly,	the	issue	of	Scotland’s	role	in	the	empire	came	up	twice	at	an	independence	debate	in	Edinburgh.	In	this	context,	again,	Yousaf	argued	that	we	should	not	look	at	Scotland’s	past	through	rose	tinted	glasses,	especially	as	Glasgow	was	the	second	city	of	 the	Empire	 (fieldnotes,	 30.4.2014).	There	was	 also	 a	question	 from	 the	 audience	with	regard	to	the	former	overseas	colonies	and	the	injustices	the	people	from	those	countries	have	suffered.	The	speaker	wondered	what	would	happen	 to	UK	overseas	territories	 in	 case	of	 a	 yes	 vote.	 In	his	 reply,	Humza	Yousaf	 said	 that	 it	was	not	 the																																																									11	Also,	especially	in	2017,	there	have	been	numerous	high-profile	newspaper	articles	about	Scotland	and	 slavery	 (Campsie,	 2017;	 Garavelli,	 2017;	McLaren, 2017) and	 the	 programme	 for	 Black	 History	Month	2017	coordinated	by	 the	Coalition	 for	Racial	Equality	and	Rights	once	again	 included	various	events	focusing	on	Scotland’s	connection	to	the	slavery.		
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SNP’s	intention	to	absolve	Scotland	from	difficult	parts	of	its	past,	and	that	the	issue	of	territories	would	be	a	question	of	negotiation	with	regard	to	assets.	He	finished	by	noting	 that	he	was	 “a	 son	of	 immigrants”	and	 for	him	 independence	was	not	 about	politics	or	geography	—	if	it	was,	then	“I’m	not	a	nationalist”	(fieldnotes,	30.4.2014).	
	
Yousaf	 (2014)	also	mentions	Empire	Café	as	an	example	of	 the	 cultural	programme	that	took	place	during	the	games	and	which	was	aimed	at	examining	Scotland’s	links	with	the	slave	trade	“over	tea	and	cake”	(Duffy,	2014b).	The	Empire	Café	was	an	idea	of	author	Louise	Welsh	and	architect	Jude	Barber,	and	it	was	open	for	a	week	during	the	 Commonwealth	 Games.	 The	 café,	which	was	 based	 in	 the	 Briggait	 in	 Glasgow’s	Merchant	 City	 hosted	 readings,	 films,	 art	 installations	 and	 discussions	 around	 the	theme	of	Scotland	and	slavery	(Duffy,	2014b).	In	addition	to	the	café,	a	street-theatre	play	entitled	Emancipation	Acts	also	took	place	during	the	games.	This	series	of	plays	explored	 Glasgow’s	 role	 in	 Caribbean	 slavery,	 its	 abolition	 and	 current	 calls	 for	reparations	(What’s	On	Glasgow).	Graham	Campbell,	who	curated	Emancipation	Acts	and	 is	 now	an	 SNP	 councillor	 in	Glasgow,	noted	 that	 “it	 is	 important	 for	Afro-Scots	now,	 as	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 are	 relatively	 new	 to	 this	 city,	 and	 knowing	 their	 ancestors	played	 a	 big	 part	 in	 building	 the	 city	 from	 a	 long	 time	 ago,	 and	 that	 they	 really	 do	belong,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 thing	 to	 tell	 them”	 (Duffy,	 2014a).	 There	 was	 also	 an	exhibition	 in	 Glasgow’s	 Kelvingrove	 Art	 Gallery	 and	Museum	 entitled	How	Glasgow	
Flourished,	 1714-1837.	 Although	 the	 exhibition	 focused	 on	 Scotland’s	 thriving	economy,	 it	nonetheless	 featured	 items	relating	 to	 slavery,	 and	 the	Glassford	Family	Portrait,	which	famously	includes	a	(now	hidden)	black	boy	in	the	background	—	thus	hinting	at	Scotland’s	role	in	the	Atlantic	slave	trade	—	was	prominently	displayed,	for	example.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 opening	 ceremony	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	 Games,	Pumeza	Matshikiza,	 a	 South-African	 soprano,	 sang	 ‘Freedom	 Come	 All	 Ye’,	 an	 anti-imperialist	song	sung	in	Scots	and	written	by	Hamish	Henderson	in	1960.12			Thus,	 in	 sum,	 while	 the	 SNP	 use	 Scotland’s	 ‘mixed	 ethnic	 history’	 to	 argue	 for	 the	civicness	and	openness	of	Scottish	identity	and	nation,	this	line	of	argument	does	not	extend	 to	 those	 people	 connected	 to	 the	 violent	 parts	 of	 Scottish	 history.	 The																																																									12	You	can	find	the	lyrics	here:	http://www.scottishpoetrylibrary.org.uk/poetry/poems/freedom-come-all-ye	[Last	accessed	25/1/2018]	
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Homecoming	 franchise,	 which	 took	 shape	 under	 the	 SNP	 government	 and	 which	seeks	 to	 entice	 the	 ‘Scottish	 diaspora’	 to	 ‘come	 home’,	 challenges	 the	 view	 of	Scottishness	as	being	based	on	residency	and	contribution	(‘those	who	live	and	work	here’).	Rather,	a	more	ethnic	conception	of	Scottishness	whereby	one	is	linked	to	the	country	 by	 blood	 takes	 shape.	 Further,	 the	 franchise	 has	 completely	 ignored	 the	Scottish	diaspora	in	the	Caribbean	and,	therefore,	the	SNP	are	demonstrating	a	highly	selective	 understanding	 and	 remembering	 of	 history.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 has	 an	 effect	 on	where	the	contours	of	the	nation	are	imagined	to	be.						
4.6.	Analytical	issues	with	the	dichotomy		
	After	outlining	some	of	the	ways	in	which	the	claims	about	Scottish	civic	nationalism	can	be	challenged,	 I	will	 take	a	more	detailed	 look	at	 the	analytical	shortcomings	 in	relation	to	dichotomous	understandings	and	portrayals	of	nationalism.	As	Mitchell	et	al	note,	 the	theoretical	 literature	on	ethnic	and	civic	nationalism	is	 largely	based	on	historical	analysis	or	focuses	on	political	philosophical	concerns.	“There	is	little	that	explores	nationalist	movements	but	rather	the	focus	is	on	(perceptions	of)	nations	or	even	states.	The	dichotomy	is	rarely	tested	empirically	in	the	literature”	(Mitchell	et	al,	2011:107).	Thus,	this	chapter	seeks	to	do	just	this:	to	offer	an	empirically	informed	discussion	(and	critique)	of	the	dichotomy.	What	follows	is	a	threefold	argument:	1)	the	 labels	 of	 civic/ethnic	 nationalism	 are	 used	 normatively	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	lack	analytical	creditability;	2)	the	dichotomy	is	not	refined	and	sophisticated	enough	to	do	precise	and	rigorous	analytical	work;	3)	nonetheless,	it	is	important	to	account	for	 and	 deconstruct	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 civic	 and	 ethnic	 nationalism	 are	 used	 as	categories	 of	 practice	 (Brubaker	 and	 Cooper,	 2000)	 in	 both	 public	 and	 everyday	understandings.				Within	academia,	 this	analytical	distinction	has	both	 its	proponents	and	opponents.	While	Mitchell	et	al	argue	that	the	“distinction	is	unhelpful	in	understanding	modern	Scottish	politics	given	the	breadth	of	identification	with	the	Scottish	nation”	(Mitchell	et	 al,	 2011:107),	 some,	 such	 as	 Kearton	 (2005:25),	 continue	 to	 maintain	 the	dichotomy’s	analytic	utility	as	a	tool	which	can	be	used	to	examine	existing	types	of	
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nations	and	nationalisms.	Others,	 such	as	McCrone,	 are	 slightly	more	doubtful	with	regard	to	the	usefulness	of	the	two	concepts:			
While	 the	 analytical	 value	 of	 the	 civic/ethnic	 distinction	 has	 been	 put	 to	 good	
use…it	does	lend	itself	to	ethnocentric	caricature	—	why	can’t	they	be	more	like	
us?	It	is	also	a	distinction	which	can	be	criticised	on	analytical	grounds.	Is	it,	for	
example,	possible	 to	maintain	such	a	distinction	 in	practice?	(in	Mitchell	 et	 al,	2011:107-8)		Here,	 McCrone	 highlights	 two	 key	 issues:	 normativity	 and	 analytical	 soundness,	which	will	be	discussed	each	in	turn.				The	 first	shortcoming,	as	alluded	to	by	McCrone,	 is	 that	characterising	nationalisms	as	civic	or	ethnic	tends	to	imply	a	value-judgement	regarding	the	merits	of	a	specific	state	or	nation.	Thus,	when	Alex	Salmond,	for	example,	goes	on	to	explicitly	announce	and	underline	how	 the	SNP	 represent	 civic	nationalist	 views,	he	 implicitly	 suggests	the	 SNP	 occupy	 the	 moral	 high	 ground	 of	 ‘good’,	 inclusive	 civic	 nationalism	 as	opposed	to	‘bad’,	exclusive	ethnic	nationalism.	Therefore,	the	SNP	are	making	a	value	judgement	 by	 explicitly	 aligning	 themselves	 with	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 nationalism	 as	opposed	to	another	one;	that	is,	our	type	of	nationalism	is	acceptable.	The	analytical	issue	here	is	not	the	SNP	portraying	themselves	as	exemplifying	civic	nationalism	—	a	claim	which,	as	discussed	previously	 in	this	chapter,	can	be	challenged.	The	 issue	 is	that	a	concept	which	is	used	normatively	in	public	political	narratives,	and	therefore	carries	 heavy	 analytical	 baggage,	 is	 not	 a	 sound	 analytical	 tool.	 As	 Brubaker	(2004:57)	 notes,	 the	 dichotomy	 is	 normative	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 used	 to	 make	distinctions	 between	 states	 in	 an	 ideological	way	—	 i.e.	 that	while	 one’s	 own	 civic	nationalism	is	seen	as	good	and	legitimate,	others’	ethnic	nationalism	is	seen	as	bad	and	 illegitimate.	 It	 is,	 thus,	used	politically	 to	 legitimate	or	discredit	particular	state	policies	 or	 movements.	 In	 the	 SNP’s	 case,	 it	 is	 also	 worth	 keeping	 in	 mind	 that	because	of	their	economic	agenda,	it	is	in	the	SNP’s	best	(strategic)	interest	to	frame	themselves	as	proponents	of	civic	nationalism.				When	concepts	such	as	civic	and	ethnic	nationalism	are	uncritically	incorporated	into	academic	language	and	analysis,	we	risk	migrating	those	value	connotations	—	either	implicitly	 or	 explicitly	 —	 into	 our	 scholarly	 practice.	 Politicisation	 is	 not	 beyond	
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academia:	as	Brubaker	goes	on	to	argue,	scholarly	accounting	belongs	to	the	realm	of	nationalist	politics	in	that	it	awards	the	label	of	civicness	to	some	while	denying	it	to	others	(2004:58).	Therefore,		
…the	 work	 done	 by	 the	 notion	 ‘civic’,	 with	 its	 normative	 prestige,	 in	 such	
accounts	 may	 be	 more	 political	 than	 analytical:	 it	 may	 speak	 more	 to	 the	
putative	international	respectability	and	legitimacy	of	the	state	or	movement	in	
question	than	to	its	empirical	characteristics.	(Brubaker,	2004:58)	Consequently,	 ethnic	 nationalism	 is	 invariably	 ‘a	 term	 of	 abuse’	 while	 civic	nationalism	is	‘a	term	of	praise’	(Brubaker,	2004:64).			
As	a	result,	Brubaker	observes	how	many	scholars		—	myself	included	—	have	grown	uncomfortable	 with	 such	 sorting	 (2004:58).	 Indeed,	 the	 distinction	 itself	 reflects	ethnocentrism	in	that	the	dichotomy	should	set	off	alarm	because	these	two	types	of	nationalism	 are	 so	 often	 juxtaposed	 in	 terms	 of	 being	 “Western/Eastern,	 but	rational/emotive,	 voluntary/inherited,	 good/bad,	 ours/theirs”	 (Yack,	 1996:195-6).	Furthermore,	 Brubaker	 makes	 an	 important	 point	 by	 highlighting	 that	 all	understandings	 of	 nationhood	 and	 all	 forms	 of	 nationalism	 are	 inclusive	 and	exclusive	 at	 the	 same	 time	 —	 “what	 varies	 is	 not	 the	 fact	 or	 even	 the	 degree	 of	inclusiveness	 or	 exclusiveness,	 but	 the	bases	 or	 criteria	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion”	(2004:64).			Secondly,	 the	 dichotomy	 lacks	 serious	 analytical	 purchase.	 Although	 Brubaker	himself	 used	 the	 ethnic-civic	 distinction	 in	 his	 comparative	 study	 of	 nationalism	 in	France	 and	Germany	 (1992),	 he	 has	 since	 offered	 a	 convincing	 critique	 of	why	 the	civic/ethnic	 dichotomy	 lacks	 analytical	 rigour.	 Brubaker	 argues	 that	 the	 two	 terms	are	deeply	ambiguous	(2004:59).	Firstly,	‘ethnicity’,	as	Weber	has	famously	argued,	is	extremely	difficult	to	pin	down.	It	can	be	understood	in	a	narrow	sense,	i.e.	based	on	descent	and	biology;	however,	such	an	understanding	constricts	the	domain	of	ethnic	nationalism	greatly.	Brubaker	argues	that	if	we	are	to	view	‘ethnicity’	narrowly,	when	common	culture	is	emphasised	in	nationalist	rhetoric	—	but	not	common	descent	—	this	needs	 to	be	coded	as	a	kind	of	 civic	nationalism	(2004:60).	Consequently,	 civic	nationalism	becomes	too	broad	and	heterogeneous	a	category	while	the	category	of	ethnic	nationalism	looks	rather	vacant.	Conversely,	if	ethnicity	is	understood	broadly	as	ethnocultural,	then	virtually	all	nationalisms	have	to	be	seen	as	ethnic	(2004:61).		
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		There	is	a	risk,	conversely,	that	we	define	civic	nationalism	out	of	existence	when	it	is	understood	as	“a	voluntary	association	of	culturally	unmarked	individuals”	as	“even	the	cases	most	often	cited	as	paradigmatic	of	civic	nationalism	—	France	and	America	—	involve	crucial	cultural	components”	(2004:61).	Consequently,		
If	 one	 combines	 a	 strict	 understanding	 of	 civic	 and	 a	 strict	 understanding	 of	
ethnic	nationalism,	then	one	is	left	with	few	instances	of	either	one	and	a	large	
middle	ground	that	counts	as	neither,	and	one	can	no	longer	think	of	the	civic-
ethnic	distinction	as	an	exhaustive	way	of	classifying	types	of	manifestations	of	
nationalism.	(Brubaker,	2004:62)			If	you,	however,	choose	to	use	a	broad	understanding	of	both,	you	will,	again,	be	left	with	 a	 large	middle	 ground	 that	 could	 be	 coded	 as	 either	 civic	 or	 ethnic.	 Thus,	 the	distinction	cannot	be	seen	as	mutually	exclusive.	Those	advocating	for	the	continued	use	of	 this	typology	argue	that	the	middle	ground	demonstrates	cases	that	combine	elements	of	both	ethnic	and	civic	nationalism.	However,	Brubaker	points	out	that	the	problem	is	the	deep	ambiguity	of	the	two	concepts,	and	the	uncertain	place	of	culture	within	 this	 scheme	 (2004:62).	 	 Both	 Yack	 (1996)	 and	 Brubaker	 (2004)	 note	 how	France	and	America	(which	are	usually	seen	as	prime	examples	of	civic	nationalism)	make	use	of	 cultural	 components	 in	 their	 constructions	of	national	 identities.	Thus,	for	 Brubaker,	 civic	 nationalism	 only	 exists	 as	 an	 ideal	 type	 and	 even	 then	 it	 is	problematic	(2004:61).			As	has	been	discussed	in	great	detail,	the	SNP’s	and	its	key	politicians’	rhetoric	makes	substantial	use	of	a	conception	of	Scottish	history.	Consequently,	they	anchor	a	sense	of	 Scotland	 and	 Scottishness	 to	 certain	 ideas	 of	 heritage,	 culture	 and	 tradition;	 to	Gaelic	 and	 ’Highland	 culture’	 especially.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Homecoming	 franchise,	though	 originally	 Scottish	 Labour’s	 idea	 (Hay	 and	Morrison,	 2012:1),	was	 properly	implemented	 under	 the	 first	 SNP	minority	 government	 in	 2009,	 and	 again	 in	 2014	when	the	referendum	also	took	place.	Homecoming	has	been	promoting	and	enticing	diasporic	Scots	 ‘to	 come	home’	 and	celebrate	Scottish	 (Highland)	 culture.	However,	Scottish	 diaspora	 has	 been	 narrowly	 defined,	 and	 the	 event	 has	 failed	 to	 extend	 a	welcome	to	Scotland’s	Caribbean	diaspora.	Indeed,	the	SNP’s	nationalist	imaginings	of	
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history	 and	 heritage	 have	 by	 and	 large	 failed	 to	 account	 for	 Scotland’s	 role	 in	 the	Empire,	 slavery	 and	 colonialism.	 Thus,	 taking	 Brubaker’s	 critique	 regarding	 the	ambiguity	 of	 the	 analytical	 categories	 of	 civic/ethnic	 nationalism	 into	 account,	Scottish	nationalist	narratives	would	occupy	 the	middle	ground.	 If	we	 take	a	broad	understanding	of	‘ethnicity’	as	ethnocultural,	the	SNP’s	nationalism	would	fall	under	this	 label.	 If	we	take	a	narrow	view	of	 ‘ethnicity’	based	on	biology	and	ancestry,	 the	SNP’s	nationalism	could	still	be	argued	to	 fall	under	ethnic	nationalism	since,	as	we	have	 seen,	 during	 the	 first	Homecoming	 ‘blood	 Scots’	were	 initially	 asked	 to	 ‘come	home’.	At	 the	same	time,	 there	are	 instances	—	such	as	 the	 fairly	 inclusive	plans	of	awarding	citizenship	at	the	point	of	independence	—	which	would	suggest	the	SNP’s	nationalism	 being	 civic.	 However,	 I	 fear	 this	 kind	 of	 sorting	 and	 labelling	 process	leaves	 us	 with	 more	 questions	 than	 answers.	 As	 has	 transpired	 in	 this	 chapter,	nationalist	 narratives	 come	 with,	 and	 indeed	 often	 rely	 on,	 contradictions.	Consequently,	 analysing	 such	 multi-layered	 and	 composite	 nationalist	 narratives	through	dichotomous	understandings	risks	obscuring	more	than	it	reveals.				
Thirdly,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 civic/ethnic	 dichotomy	continues	to	be	important	as	a	category	of	practice	—	i.e.	as	something	that	is	akin	to	‘native’,	 ‘folk’	 or	 ‘lay’	 categories	 (Brubaker	 &	 Cooper,	 2000:4).	 These	 categories	 of	everyday	social	experience	are	developed	and	deployed	by	ordinary	social	actors	and	are	 distinguished	 from	 the	 “experience-distant	 categories	 used	 by	 social	 analysts”	(Brubaker	 &	 Cooper,	 2000:4).	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 important	ontological	work	‘civic	nationalism’	can	do	as	a	category	of	practice.	As	we	have	seen,	practitioners	working	for	ethnic	minority	rights	organisations	tended	to	highlight	the	civicness	of	the	SNP’s	nationalism:	“the	SNP	nationalism	has	been	very	civic,	inclusive	nationalism	—	not	a	problem	for	anybody”	(Practitioner	1).			
It	also	seemed	that	branding	the	SNP’s	nationalism	as	civic	also	gave	the	practitioners	the	 tools	 with	 which	 they	 could	 hold	 the	 government	 accountable.	 As	 argued	 by	Practitioner	5,	there	was		
…no	snowball’s	chance	in	hell	that	groups	like	[our	organisation]	or	the	Scottish	
Refugee	Council	or	you	know	others	within	the	race	equality	sector	would	stay	
quiet	 for	 one	 second	 if	 they	 had	 a	 sniff	 of	 ethnic	 nationalism	 within	 the	
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con…context	of	the	independence	referendum.	Thus,	 holding	 on	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalism	 as	 civic	—	however	false	 or	 compromised	 this	 conceptualisation	 may	 be	 —	 gave	 the	 practitioners	leverage	 to	 challenge	 problematic	 or	 unwanted	 nationalist	 narratives.	 Further,	 as	categories	 of	 practice,	 civic	 and	 ethnic	 nationalism	 carry	 real	 political	 differences.	That	 is,	 those	 political	 parties,	 such	 as	 the	 SNP,	 who	 identify	 themselves	 as	 civic	nationalists,	 are	 likely	 to	have	more	open	and	 inclusive	policies	 around	nationality,	for	 example.	 Conversely,	 parties	 identifying	 themselves	 with	 more	 ethnic	 ideas	 of	nationalism	are	likely	to	favour	policies	where	nationality	is	legally	rooted	in	familial	descent.		It	is,	therefore,	important	to	account	for	the	ways	in	which,	and	to	what	end,	civic	 and	 ethnic	 nationalism	 are	 used	 as	 categories	 of	 practice	 by	 political	 actors,	practitioners	 and	 the	 public	 alike	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 and	 interrogate	 the	 ways	 in	which	people	make	sense	of	their	social	world.		
Nonetheless,	while	something	is	salient	as	a	category	of	practice	does	not	mean	that	it	should	 uncritically	 be	 used	 as	 a	 category	 of	 analysis	 (Brubaker	 and	Cooper,	 2000).	While	the	SNP	and	others	may	continue	to	employ	the	concept	of	‘civic	nationalism’,	this	does	not	mean	that	social	scientists	should	do	the	same.	As	Brubaker	and	Cooper	note	with	 regard	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘nation’,	 “one	 does	 not	 have	 to	 take	 a	 category	inherent	in	the	practice	of	nationalism	—	the	realist,	reifying	conception	of	nations	as	real	 communities	—	 and	 make	 this	 category	 central	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 nationalism”	(2000:4).	 Analysts	 should	 be	 accounting	 for	 the	 process	 of	 reification	 rather	 than	contributing	 to	 it.	 By	 uncritically	 adopting	 categories	 of	 practice	 as	 categories	 of	analysis,	 we	 are	 unintentionally	 reproducing	 or	 reinforcing	 such	 reification	(Brubaker	&	Cooper,	2000:4).			
Something	being	a	category	of	practice	does	not	automatically	exclude	it	from	being	used	as	a	category	of	analysis,	however	—	the	problem	lies	within	the	ways	in	which	a	certain	category	 is	used	(Brubaker	&	Cooper,	2000:4).	Thus,	 it	 is	our	 job	as	social	scientists	 to	critically	study	and	make	sense	of	 the	ways	 in	certain	nationalisms	are	framed	 as	 civic	 without	 reifying	 the	 concept.	 Branding	 something	 as	straightforwardly	 civic	 or	 ethnic	 makes	 us	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	 processes;	 of	 how	
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nationalist	rhetoric	and	ideas	are	formed,	how	they	operate	and	how	they	change	and	shift.	It	flattens	the	nuances	and	the	complexities,	and	reifies	nationalism	as	a	‘thing’,	as	 something	 that	 ‘is’	 without	 treating	 it	 as	 something	 that	 we	 ‘do’.	 This	 play	 of	either/or	 —	 or	 a	 bit	 of	 both	 —	 seems	 to	 overlook	 the	 fuzziness	 and	 inherent	inconsistencies	and	paradoxes	that	are	present	in	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	ideas	are	 used.	 As	 Brubaker	 argues	 with	 regard	 the	 category	 of	 ’Muslims’	 (2013:6),	similarly,	rather	than	a	tool	of	analysis,	civic/ethnic	nationalism	should	be	treated	as	an	object	of	analysis.			
4.7.	Conclusion		Focusing	 on	 the	 civicness	 of	 some	 nationalisms	 and	 the	 ethnic	 elements	 of	 others	seems	to,	in	my	view,	lead	to	a	form	of	complacency	whereby	some	nationalisms	and	corresponding	states	are	seen	as	unproblematic.	Thus,	critical	voices	—	such	as	those	of	Mycock,	Palmer	and	Kearton	—	are	relegated	to	the	back	stage	while	the	dominant	rhetoric,	both	within	and	beyond	academia,	describes	the	innate	civicness	of	‘Scottish	nationalism’	(especially	in	relation	to	the	SNP).				In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 sought	 to	 make	 a	 twofold	 argument.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	chapter	has	sought	to	demonstrate	how	the	SNP’s	nationalism	is	habitually	described	and	defined	as	civic	by	 the	party	 itself,	academics	and	practitioners	within	 the	race	equality	 sector.	 I	 have	 also	 questioned	 this	 dominant	 discourse	by	drawing	on	 two	themes	 that	 emerged	 from	my	 data	—	 namely	 understandings	 around	 culture	 and	heritage	 as	well	 as	history	—	which	challenge	 how	 the	 SNP’s	nationalism	 is	widely	understood.				On	the	other	hand,	this	chapter	has	also	argued	that	conceptualising	nationalism	via	simplistic	binary	categorisations	lacks	analytical	purchase,	and	that	we	need	to	make	sense	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 without	 falling	 into	 the	 trap	 of	 normative	categorisations	 that	 obscure	 the	 complexities	 of	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 are	constructed.	 However,	 I	 have	 also	 conceded	 the	 importance	 of	 analysing	 ‘civic	nationalism’	 as	 a	 category	 of	 practice	 (Brubaker	 and	 Cooper,	 2000).	 Scholars	 of	
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nationalism	must	 therefore	 unpack	 and	 deconstruct	 nationalist	 narratives	 without	uncritically	 reifying	 them	 in	 the	process	—	 that	 is,	 civic	 and	ethnic	nationalism	are	too	 value-laden,	 ambiguous	 and	 analytically	 poor	 to	 use	 as	 categories	 or	 tools	 of	analysis.	 Our	 task,	 I	 believe,	 is	 to	 identify	 and	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	civic/ethnic	distinction,	among	other	discursive	tools	and	practices,	is	used	to	occupy	a	terrain	of	legitimacy.	That	is,	how	the	idea	of	 ‘civicness’	is	used	by	different	(often	political)	 actors	as	 a	normative	 tool	 to	 take	 the	moral	high	ground	and	how,	 in	 the	process,	cracks	begin	to	emerge	and	nationalist	narratives	come	to	rely	on	paradoxes.				Finding	 more	 nuanced	 ways	 to	 understand	 and	 explore	 nationalism	 is	 especially	important	 in	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 nationalism	 vis-à-vis	 ethnic	 minorities’	experiences	 of	 belonging,	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 rather	 than	reifying	nationalism	as	a	‘thing’,	as	something	that	‘is’	civic	or	ethnic,	we	need	to	focus	on	nationalism	as	a	process,	as	something	that	is	 ‘done’	and	actively	interpreted.	To	this	end,	I	will	draw	on	Zimmer’s	(2003)	theoretical	framework	in	the	next	chapter.	The	 following	chapters	will	continue	the	work	begun	here	by,	 firstly,	unpacking	the	SNP’s	constructions	of	Scotland	and	Scottishness,	 followed	by	a	discussion	of	ethnic	minorities’	 understandings	 and	 experiences	 of	 nationalism	 in	 Scotland	 within	 the	context	 of	 the	 independence	 referendum	 and	 beyond.
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	 Chapter	5	‘Scottish	Values’,	National	Community,	and	its	Boundaries		
	
5.1.	Introduction	The	 previous	 chapter	 challenged	 the	 analytical	 usefulness	 and	 rigorousness	 of	 the	predominant	civic/ethnic	distinction,	and	contested	the	widely	held	views	—	both	in	academia	and	beyond	—	which	represent	the	SNP’s	nationalism	in	particular	as	‘civic’	in	form.	This	chapter	will	build	on	this	critique	by	beginning	to	sketch	out	the	ways	in	which	 nationalist	 narratives	 can	 be	 analysed	 and	 understood	 beyond	 the	 binary	distinction.	 As	 noted	 by	 Mooney	 and	 Scott	 (2016:248),	 “the	 myth	 of	 Scottish	progressiveness,	 egalitarianism	 and	 collectiveness	 comes	 to	 occupy	 an	 even	 more	privileged	position	within	politics	and	across	public	discourse	in	Scotland”.	Indeed,	it	is	these	‘values’	of	progressiveness,	egalitarianism	and	collectiveness	amongst	others	—	 and	 the	 framing	 of	 these	 principles	 as	 ‘Scottish	 values’	 —	 	 that	 emerged	 as	 a	dominant	 theme	 throughout	 the	 different	 types	 of	 data	 that	 were	 gathered	 and	analysed	 for	 this	 thesis	 (namely	content	analysis	of	SNP	speeches	and	publications,	observational	 data	 from	 referendum	 events,	 and	 interviews	 with	 ‘experts’,	campaigners	and	individuals	from	different	ethnic	minority	backgrounds).			
As	noted	in	Chapter	2,	Benedict	Anderson,	who	relates	the	emergence	of	nationalism	to	 capitalism,	 technological	 developments	 and	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 vernacular	(Spencer	 and	 Wollman,	 2005:5),	 famously	 argued	 that	 nations	 are	 ‘imagined	communities’	 (2006).	 Importantly	 for	 this	 chapter,	 Anderson	 also	 notes	 how	“communities	 are	 to	 be	 distinguished	 (…)	 by	 the	 style	 in	which	 they	 are	 imagined”	(2006:6	 —	 added	 emphasis).	 Although	 understanding	 the	 roots	 of	 nationalism	 is	important	(see	the	classical	debates	in	Chapter	2),	it	is	equally	as	important	to	focus	on	contemporary	forms	of	nationalism	and	on	the	construction	of	imaginary	national	communities	(see	post-classical	approaches	in	Chapter	2).			
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Importantly,	 it	 is	crucial	to	understand	how	and	why	we	draw	boundaries	between,	and	within,	different	nations	in	order	to	shed	light	on,	as	Brubaker	puts	it,	nationness	as	 an	 event:	 “as	 a	 contingent,	 conjuncturally	 fluctuating,	 and	 precarious	 frame	 of	vision”	 (1996:19).	Here,	Brubaker	draws	our	attention	 to	nations	 in	 flux;	 that	 is,	 to	the	 observation	 that	 the	 way	 in	 which	 nations	 are	 imagined	 and	 constructed	 (the	shape	and	form	that	a	nation	takes)	shifts	and	changes	over	time.	Importantly,	and	as	will	be	discussed	further	 in	the	subsequent	chapters,	 the	ways	 in	which	nations	are	imagined	have	material	and	psychic	consequences	for	the	 lives	of	 those	who	do	not	‘unproblematically’	belong	to	the	nation.			
Thus,	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 uncover,	 in	 Anderson’s	 terms,	 the	 style	 in	 which	 the	Scottish	nation	 is	 imagined,	and	the	ways	 in	which	boundary	mechanisms	(Zimmer,	2003)	play	a	key	role	 in	negotiating	 the	contours	of	 the	nation	(i.e.	who	 ‘we’	are).	 I	therefore	address	questions	regarding	how	nationalist	narratives	and	projects	have	been	mobilised	 and	 contested	 in	 Scotland	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 referendum	and	 in	 the	devolutionary	context,	and	what	the	components	of	these	nationalist	narratives	are.	Drawing	on	Brubaker’s	argument	above,	Zimmer	(2003)	suggests	we	take	a	‘process-oriented	 approach’	 to	 national	 identity	—	 that	 is,	 that	we	 account	 for	 the	 changes,	paradoxes	 and	 complexities	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 without	 simply	 labelling	 one	form	of	nationalism	as	‘civic’	or	‘ethnic’.	Rather,	the	focus	should	be	on	understanding	nationalist	narratives	as	a	“precarious	frame	of	vision”	(Brubaker,	1996:19).	In	order	to	 do	 this,	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter,	 as	 alluded	 to	 above,	 will	 be	 on	 the	 notion	 of	’national	(Scottish)	values’	as	a	way	of	imagining	the	national	community.				
The	chapter	will	firstly	start	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	concept	of	’values’.	On	the	one	hand,	I	will	explore	its	centrality	to	sociological	concerns	and,	on	the	other	hand,	its	somewhat	uneasy	relationship	with	nationalism	studies.	Secondly,	after	discussing	values	 I	 will	 return	 to	 Zimmer’s	 framework	 and	 introduce	 it	 in	 more	 detail.	 This	chapter	will	then	move	on	to	consider	how	Scotland	is	framed	as	a	‘value	community’	both	 from	 above	 (by	 the	 SNP)	 and	 from	 below	 (by	 participants).	 This	 chapter	will	consider	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 history	—	 and	 especially	 Enlightenment	 history	—	 is	appropriated	 in	 the	 SNP’s	 narrative	 of	 the	 nation	 and,	 importantly,	 how	 the	 party	
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constructs	‘Scottish	values’	as	rooted	in	history	and	in	the	Scottish	psyche.	Thus,	this	chapter	contributes	to	the	argument	advanced	in	the	Introduction	and	in	the	previous	chapter	 that	 nationalist	 narratives	 draw	 on	 history	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 the	 nation	with	its	putative	‘content’	or	‘spirit’.	Finally,	before	further	discussing	and	concluding	the	 arguments	 raised	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 discussion	 will	 explore	 how	 ideas	 of	‘Scottish	 values’	 and	 ‘Scottish	 distinctiveness’	 are	 constructed	 in	 juxtaposition	 to	Westminster	and	in	opposition	to	values	which	are	seen	to	emanate	from	south	of	the	border.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 be	 on	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 narratives	 from	above	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 on	 interviewees’	 understandings	 and	 experiences	 of	those	narratives	on	the	other.			
5.2.	Nationalist	narratives	and	values		Values,	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter,	 have	 long	 been	 a	 central	 concern	 for	 sociologists.	Thus,	it	is	useful	to	briefly	outline	and	explore	what	the	concept	of	value	means	and	entails.	A	value	can,	in	‘lay	talk’,	be	seen	as	what	is	deemed	good,	and	ideals	that	guide	one’s	 actions	 (Tappolet	 &	 Rossi,	 2015:3).	 Rokeach	 defines	 value	 as	 “an	 enduring	belief	that	guides	actions	across	specific	contexts”	(1969:160,	cited	in	Henderson	and	McEwen,	2005:174).	Simmel	(2004	[1900]),	of	course,	 famously	developed	a	theory	regarding	 value	 in	 The	 Philosophy	 of	 Money.	 In	 it	 he	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 two	fundamental	forms	of	understanding	the	world,	namely	value	and	being	(Cantó	Milà,	2005:146).	For	Simmel,	“values	introduce	nuances	and	qualitative	differences	to	the	homogenous	picture	 that	 is	 achieved	 through	 the	 lens	of	being”	—	 furthermore,	he	does	 not	 differentiate	 too	 closely	 between	 economic,	 moral	 and	 aesthetic	 values;	rather,	these	are	special	instances	of	the	same	concept	(Cantó	Milà,	2005:146).	Values	are	thus	fundamental	to	“the	very	possibility	of	social	experience”	and	to	society,	and	people	 “cannot	 perceive	 anything	 at	 all	 without	 colouring	 it	 with	 value	 nuances”	(Cantó	Milà,	2005:146).	What	 is	key	 to	Simmel’s	understanding	 is	 that	 there	are	no	transcendental	 values	 but,	 rather,	 desiring	 subjects	 construct	 —	 in	 reciprocal	relations	with	each	other	—	the	only	lenses	of	value	there	are.	Thus,	the	lens	of	value	is	 subjective	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 our	 valuations	 never	 simply	 reflect	 or	 emerge	 from	intrinsic	qualities	of	objects	(Cantó	Milà,	2005:147).			
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The	 importance	 of	 values	 has	 also	 been	 noted	 in	 the	 field	 of	 nationalism	 studies	specifically	(e.g.	Zimmer	2003;	Lægaard	2007;	Wallace	Goodman	2010).	Focusing	on	political	discourse	in	Canada	and	the	UK,	Henderson	and	McEwen	note	how	“shared	values	 nurtured	within	 political	 discourse	 serve	 three	 different	 purposes”,	 namely,	“the	pursuit	of	ideological	or	policy	goals;	the	mobilisation	of	the	population;	and	the	promotion	of	 inter-regional	solidarity	and	 identity”	 (2005:174).	For	Henderson	and	McEwen,	it	is	this	final	function	that	is	of	interest;	that	is,	how	values	are	“drawn	upon	in	political	discourse	to	serve	a	nation-building	purpose	within	multinational	states”	(2005:174).	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	 framework,	 which	 will	 be	 explained	 in	 more	 detail	shortly,	 focuses	 on	 boundary	 mechanisms	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 (that	 is,	 on	 the	mechanisms	 social	 actors	 use	 to	 reconstruct	 national	 identity)	 and	 on	 symbolic	resources,	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 (that	 is,	 on	 the	 raw	 materials	 that	 social	 actors	appropriate	when	 drawing	 the	 boundaries	 of	 national	 identity).	 For	 Zimmer,	 these	resources	 are	 political	 values/institutions,	 culture,	 history	 and	 geography.	 Thus,	Zimmer	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 values	 as	 a	 symbolic	 resource	 in	 the	construction	of	national	boundaries.			However,	 there	 has	 been	 hesitation	 in	 nationalism	 studies	 to	 acknowledge	 that	“appeals	 to	 ‘national	 values’	 may	 themselves	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 nationalism”	—	 that	 is,	different	authors	have	been	hesitant	 to	view	nationalists’	appeals	 to	political	values	or	 principles	 as	 constitutive	 of	 nationalism	 (Lægaard,	 2007:38).	 Authors	 such	 as	Kymlicka	 (1996a)	 and	 Norman	 (1995),	 as	 noted	 by	 Henderson	 and	McEwen,	 have	argued	 that	 “shared	 values	 are	 entirely	distinct	 from	national	 identity”	 (Henderson	and	 McEwen,	 2005:177).	 Specifically,	 Norman	 (1995)	 has	 argued	 that	 “shared	identity	drives	national	cohesion	rather	than	shared	values”	(Henderson	&	McEwen,	2005:177).	 Further,	 because	 the	 values	under	 scrutiny	 are	 often	deemed	 “standard	liberal	 ideas	 and	 principles	 such	 as	 individual	 freedom,	 equality,	 tolerance	 and	democracy”	—	values	which	chime	with	 the	SNP’s	 rhetoric	as	will	be	seen	—	these	values	 are	 “understood	 as	 claiming	 universal	 validity	 and	 even	 as	 being	 in	 conflict	with	 nationalism”	 (Lægaard,	 2007:38).	 Because	 liberal	 values	 “are	 ordinarily	presented	 as	 based	 on	 a	 conception	 of	 all	 humans	 being	 free	 and	 equal”,	 “the	 very	idea	 of	 presenting	 liberal	 values	 as	 national	 values	 seems	 at	 best	 peculiar	 and	 at	worst	incoherent	(e.g.	Joppke	2005:56f.),	particularly	if	national	values	are	supposed	to	 provide	 a	 differentiation	 between	 members	 of	 the	 nation	 and	 non-members”	
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(Lægaard,	2007:46).				However,	as	Zimmer	(2003)	urges,	we	need	to	think	about	the	process	of	nationalism;	that	is,	the	ways	in	which	boundary	mechanisms	operate,	and	concentrate	less	on	the	
what,	 i.e.	on	 the	cultural	 content	which	 those	boundaries	supposedly	enclose.	Thus,	even	if	the	values	cited	as	‘national’	could	be	seen	to	be	‘universal’,	the	focus	should	be	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 (or	 the	 processes	 by	 which)	 these	 ‘universal	 values’	 are	framed	 as	 ‘national’.	 As	 Henderson	 and	 McEwen	 argue,	 and	 I	 agree	 with	 their	position,	 “a	 discourse	 of	 shared	 values	may	play	 a	 role	 in	maintaining	 and	 shaping	national	identity”	(2005:177).	Thus,	rather	than	treating	values	as	a	separate	sphere	from	 national	 identity,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 values	 contribute	 to	 collective	 national	consciousness	and	that	they	are	used	as	building	blocks	—	much	like	Zimmer	(2003)	suggests	—	 in	nationalist	narratives.	As	Henderson	and	McEwen	put	 it	 (2005:189),	“the	discourse	of	shared	values	serves	as	a	tool	in	the	politics	of	nation-building”,	and	the	idea	of	shared	values	can	be	appropriated	to	create	a	sense	of	commonality	and	distinctiveness	 from	 others	 (which,	 in	 Scotland’s	 case	 specifically,	 is	 often	Westminster).	While	values	framed	as	‘national’	are	often	universal	values,	“the	belief	that	 values	 are	 distinctly	 national	 may	 be	 more	 important	 than	 any	 objective	evidence	to	the	contrary”	(Henderson	and	McEwen,	2005:177).				
		
5.3.		Zimmer’s	process	oriented	approach	to	nationalism			In	his	insightful	article,	Zimmer	suggests	a	move	beyond	the	civic/ethnic	dichotomy	which	 is	 “too	 thematic	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 social	 and	political	 processes”	 (2003:173).	 As	 Zimmer	 rightly	 points	 out,	 “nationalism	 is	 by	necessity	 a	 complex	 blend	 of	 these	 two	 visions	 —	 the	 voluntaristic	 and	 the	deterministic”	 —	 or,	 as	 they	 are	 often	 called,	 civic	 and	 ethnic.	 Yet,	 there	 is	 a	temptation	to	classify	“entire	cases	rather	than	examining	national	identities	in	terms	of	 dynamic	 process”	 (2003:177).	 While	 the	 insight	 that	 ‘nations’	 are	 socially	constructed	is	useful	and	a	crucial	starting	point,	it	is	important	to	shed	light	on	the	
ways	 in	 which	 they	 are	 constructed.	 Having	 this	 insight	 allows	 us	 to	 better	understand	 the	 processes	 of	 nation	 building	 (rather	 than	 the	 ‘end	 product’	 of	
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labelling	something	as	‘civic’	or	‘ethnic’),	and	to	more	flexibly	interrogate,	deconstruct	and	 trace	 the	messy	and	often	 contradictory	ways	 in	which	national	belonging	and	‘nation-ness’	 are	 being	 negotiated,	made,	 and	 re-made.	 Importantly,	 understanding	the	ways	in	which	nations	are	made	and	imagined	helps	us	understand	the	very	real	consequences	 these	 processes	 have	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 people	 (including	 the	 lives	 of	racialised	minorities).	This	is	a	point	I	return	to	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	6.				Further,	 while	 Zimmer	 concedes	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 civic	 and	 ethnic	nationalism	“has	helped	to	shed	light	on	the	complex	genesis	of	nationalism,	not	least	by	 enabling	 comparisons	 between	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 different	 cases	 and	 historical	periods”,	 he	nonetheless	points	out	how	a	 rather	different	 framework	 is	needed	 “if	our	 concern	 relates	 to	 the	 discontinuously	 occurring	 public	 redefinitions	 of	nationhood	 rather	 than	 to	 long-term	 developments”	 (2003:177).	 Thus,	 “the	 classic	model	 has	 turned	 out	 particularly	 inadequate	when	 it	 comes	 to	 analysing	 national	identity	as	a	public	discourse	as	represented	in	newspapers,	public	speeches	and	the	like”	(2003:177).				Zimmer	 begins	 to	 develop	 a	 ‘process-oriented	 approach’	 to	 understanding	 national	identity.	This	approach	focuses,	on	the	one	hand,	on	the	mechanisms	social	actors	use	to	reconstruct	“the	boundaries	of	national	identity	at	a	particular	point	in	time”	and,	on	the	other	hand,	on	symbolic	resources	social	actors	draw	on	when	reconstructing	these	 boundaries	 (2003:178).	 For	 Zimmer,	 symbolic	 resources	 are	 political	values/institutions,	culture,	history	and	geography,	and	these	“resources	provide	the	symbolic	 raw	 material	 (…)	 which	 social	 actors	 use	 to	 define	 national	 identities	 in	public	discourse”	(2003:179-80).				In	addition	to	symbolic	resources,	boundary	mechanisms	are	important	to	Zimmer’s	understanding	 of	 national	 identity	 construction.	 Following	 Renan,	 Zimmer	 divides	boundary	mechanisms	into	two	types:	voluntarist	and	organic.	Firstly,	the	voluntarist	boundary	mechanism	“rests	on	a	voluntarist	conception	of	nationhood”	(2003:178).	Secondly,	 he	 proposes	 an	 organic	 boundary	 mechanism.	 Zimmer	 argues	 for	 the	usefulness	of	the	concept	of	 ‘organic’	over	 ‘ethnic’	by	noting	that	it,	 firstly,	stands	in	
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direct	opposition	to	‘voluntarist’	by	denoting	a	particular,	deterministic	mechanism	of	constructing	 national	 identity.	 Further,	 “the	 term	 ‘ethnic’	 refers	 to	 a	 specific	
understanding	 of	 national	 identity	 —	 one	 in	 which	 ethnic	 descent	 appears	 as	 the	prime	 factor”	 (Zimmer,	 2003:178;	 original	 emphasis).	 Rather	 than	 ‘civic’,	 Zimmer	proposes	the	use	of	‘voluntarist’	because	the	former	“conflates	a	particular	symbolic	resource	 (political	 values	 and	 institutions)	 and	 a	 specific	 mechanism	 of	 identity	construction	 (voluntarism)	 into	 a	 single	 concept”	 (2003:178-9).	 While	 voluntarist	mechanisms	 emphasise	 the	 constructed	 character	 of	 national	 communities,	references	 to	 the	nation’s	 “alleged	organic	 rootedness	serve	 to	establish	a	 link	with	the	invariant	in	a	world	of	recurrent	change”	(2003:179;	added	emphasis).	Thus	the	two	mechanisms	work	 in	 conjunction:	 organic	mechanisms	 emphasise	 the	 nation’s	“integrity	 as	 a	 distinctive	 community”	 whilst	 voluntarist	 mechanisms,	 while	“portraying	 the	 nation	 as	 virtuous	 and	unique”,	 also	 bring	 out	 “its	 constructed	 and	contingent	nature,	thus	exposing	its	potential	fragility”	(2003:189).				In	 his	 critique	 of	 the	 civic/ethnic	 distinction,	 Jensen	 points	 out	 how	 it	makes	 little	sense	to	label	certain	cultural	 idioms	or	content,	such	as	 ‘liberal	values’	(2014:564),	‘ethnic’	or	‘civic’	—	as	is	often	done	—	because	“the	open-ended	nature	of	any	cultural	idiom	or	resource	makes	it	receptive	to	both	inclusive	and	exclusive	interpretations”	(2014:567).	 Indeed,	 ‘shared	 values’	 are	 often	 understood	 as	 a	 key	 content	 of	 ‘civic	nationalism’	 (see	 Ignatieff	 1993:3-4	 and	 Brubaker,	 2004:61-62).	 However,	supposedly	 ‘civic’	 elements	 —	 such	 as	 ‘liberal	 values’	 —	 may	 well	 be	 framed	 in	exclusionary	terms	especially	by	the	radical	right	(Jensen,	2014:569).	Halikiopoulou	et	 al	 (2013)	demonstrate	 the	ways	 in	which	European	 radical	 right	 parties	 seek	 to	appropriate	‘liberal	values’	such	as	tolerance,	diversity	and	equality	in	order	to	define	boundaries	 between	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’.	 Thus,	 because	 of	 the	 present	 	 ‘civic	 zeitgeist’,	“instead	 of	 utilising	 a	 rhetoric	 focused	 on	 ethnic	 and/or	 primordial	 elements	 of	national	 identity	such	as	race,	creed,	blood	and	kinship,	 these	parties	have	annexed	civic	values	in	their	discursive	toolkit,	including	the	notions	of	democracy,	citizenship	and	 respect	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law”	 (Halikiopoulou,	 2013:108).	 Exclusion,	 no	 longer	justified	 in	 purely	 ethnic	 terms,	 is	 then	 “targeted	 at	 those	 who	 do	 not	 share	 ‘our’	liberal	 values	 such	 as	 democracy,	 multiculturalism	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law”	(Halikiopoulou	et	al,	2013:112;	see	also	Fozdar	and	Low,	2015).			
	146		
Importantly,	this	has	consequences	for	any	conception	of	a	civic/ethnic	dichotomy	as	well:	while	‘progressive	values’	supposedly	embodied	in	civic	nationalism	are	seen	as	the	 polar	 opposite	 to	 the	 ‘regressive	 values’	 of	 ethnic	 nationalism,	what	 often	 goes	under-analysed	are	the	ways	in	which	seemingly	civic	discourses	are	appropriated	to	exclusionary	ends.	Thus,	the	“dichotomy	does	not	capture	the	inherent	contradictions	within	liberalism	and	the	delicate	balance	between	tolerance,	inclusion	and	exclusion	that	these	entail”	(Halikiopoulou	et	al,	2013:113).	Such	discourses	are,	in	turn,	closely	related	to	the	rise	of	‘cultural’	or	‘neo’	racism	(see	Barker	1990	[1981];	Balibar,	1991)	whereby	cultures	are	depicted	as	a	 fixed	property	of	social	groups	and	cultures	are	presented	 as	 being	 arranged	 along	 ethnically	 absolute	 lines	 —	 thus,	 as	 culture	 is	brought	into	contact	with	‘race’,	it	is	transformed	into	a	pseudo-biological	property	of	communal	life	(Gilroy,	1990:266).				Having	outlined	both	the	centrality	of	values	to	nationalist	ideas	and	understandings	and	Zimmer’s	‘process	oriented	approach’	which	will	guide	the	discussion,	I	will	now	turn	 to	 the	 data.	 I	will	 discuss	 the	ways	 in	which	 Scotland	was	 framed	 as	 a	 ‘value	community’	during	 the	 independence	referendum	by	 the	SNP,	and	how	history	was	used	 and	 understood	 both	 by	 political	 actors	 and	 my	 participants	 with	 regard	 to	values.	 I	 will	 then	 consider	 the	 ‘view	 from	 below’	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	participants	 experienced	 and	 framed	 Scotland	 and	 ideas	 of	 Scottishness.	 Before	concluding,	I	will	focus	on	the	idea	of	‘Scottish	exceptionalism’.			 	
	
5.4.	Framing	Scotland	as	a	value	community		As	argued	in	Chapter	4,	and	as	also	pointed	out	by	Mooney	and	Scott	(2015;	2016),	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	was	to	a	large	degree	framed	around	issues	of	social	 welfare	 and	 social	 justice.	 The	 SNP	 explicitly	 stated	 that	 they	 represented	 a	nationalism	that	is	‘civic’	in	form,	and	thus	open	and	inclusive.	Further,	and	linked	to	this,	 this	 argument	 about	 the	 SNP’s	 ‘civic’	 outlook	 was	 compounded	 by	 how	 the	broader	Yes	campaign	was	framed	in	relation	to	issues	around	democratic	deficit	and	social	justice.	Importantly,	these	arguments	around	social	justice	and	welfare,	as	well	as	 democratic	 deficit,	 were	 explained	 and	 understood	 with	 reference	 to	 ‘values’.	
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Consequently,	during	the	referendum	debates,	values	became	an	important	reference	point	 through	 which	 ‘Scottishness’	 and	 Scottish	 national	 identity	 came	 to	 be	constructed	 and	 understood.	 Henderson	 and	McEwen	 (2005)	 have	 also	 previously	highlighted	the	importance	of	claims	regarding	specific	values	to	mainstream	Scottish	political	 discourse	 (especially	 by	 the	 SNP	 but	 also	 by	 Scottish	 Labour),	 and	 to	 the	construction	 of	 Scottish	 national	 identity.	 Similarly	 to	 my	 findings,	 they	 note	 how	“mainstream	political	discourse	emphasises	the	values	of	enterprise,	social	justice	and	support	 for	 egalitarianism	 as	 the	 distinguishing	 traits	 of	 Scottish	 national	 identity”	(2005:183;	added	emphasis).					 5.4.1.	‘Scottish	values’	and	the	view	from	above		
As	 will	 be	 explained	 below,	 speeches	 by	 SNP	 figures	 and	 the	 party’s	 referendum	publications	made	use	of	very	specific	values	(also	referred	to	as	 ‘principles’	by	 the	party)	and	 framed	these	as	 ‘Scottish	values’	or	 ‘our	values’.	 Indeed,	 the	SNP,	during	the	Yes	campaign,	argued	that	“democracy,	prosperity	and	fairness	are	the	principles	at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 case	 for	 independence”	 (Scotland’s	 Future,	 2013:40).	Consequently,	“if	we	transfer	decision-making	powers	from	Westminster	to	Scotland	we	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 see	 policies	 that	 are	 in	 tune	 with	 the	 values	 of	 people	 of	Scotland”	 (Scotland’s	 Future,	 2013:40).	 Thus,	 independence	 was	 framed	 as	 an	opportunity	to	begin	to	fulfil	these	values:	“independence	would	enable	us	to	build	a	new	Scotland	—	a	Scotland	that	is	fairer,	better,	wealthier,	more	confident	and	more	outward	looking	than	ever	before”	(Your	Scotland,	Your	Future,	2011:3).	The	ways	in	which	 the	 SNP	 appropriated	 values	 (as	 symbolic	 resources)	 in	 its	 active	process	 of	constructing	 a	 specific	 vision	 of	 the	 ‘Scottish	 nation’	 can	 helpfully	 be	 understood	through	Zimmer’s	(2003)	approach	outlined	above.		
The	 particular	 values	 that	 were	 highlighted	 during	 the	 campaign	 were:	 fairness;	democracy	 and	 social	 democracy;	 equality	 and	 egalitarianism;	 entrepreneurship,	prosperity	and	wealth;	and	internationalism.	The	frequency	with	which	these	themes	were	 mentioned	 in	 the	 36	 SNP	 speeches	 analysed	 provides	 an	 indication	 of	 the	centrality	 of	 ‘values’	 to	 the	 case	 for	 independence:	 fairness	 was	 mentioned	 in	 21	
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speeches;	 democracy	 was	 mentioned	 in	 24	 speeches;	 social	 democracy	 was	mentioned	in	4	speeches;	equality	and	egalitarianism	were	mentioned	in	10	speeches	(inequality	 was	 mentioned	 in	 16);	 entrepreneurship,	 prosperity	 and	 wealth	 were	mentioned	 in	 26	 speeches;	 and	 internationalism	 was	 mentioned	 in	 20	 speeches.	Claims	about	‘values’,	thus	became	central	to	the	SNP’s	nationalist	narratives.			
While	it	was	acknowledged	that	values	such	as	fairness,	equality	and	democracy	are,	on	 the	 one	 hand,	 ‘universal’,	 they	were,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 also	 framed	 as	 ‘Scottish	values’	 by	 the	 SNP.	 Speaking	 at	 a	 conference	 focusing	 on	 the	 2014	 Glasgow	Commonwealth	 Games	 and	 their	 legacy,	 Humza	 Yousaf	 (Beyond	 the	 Games	conference,	 Glasgow	 Caledonian	 University,	 21	 July	 2014)	noted	 that	 “The	 Scottish	Government	is	committed	to	creating	an	equal	and	fair	society	for	everyone,	built	on	the	 fundamental	 values	 of	 a	 nation	 free	 from	 prejudice,	 discrimination	 and	victimisation,	and	tackling	injustice	and	exclusion	in	all	forms”.	He	went	on	to	say	that	“the	 Commonwealth	 Games	 values	 of	 humanity,	 equality	 and	 destiny	 are	 universal	and	cherished	in	Scotland”	(added	emphasis).			
Similarly,	 but	 focusing	 on	 the	 national	 (British)	 context,	 FM	 Salmond	 suggests	 that	previous	 social	 reforms,	 although	 UK	wide,	 have	 a	 stronger	 legacy	 in	 Scotland.	 He	begins	by	noting	that,	
For	much	of	the	postwar	period,	people	in	Scotland	largely	embraced	the	great	
social	 reforms	 which	 were	 implemented	 by	 Clement	 Atlee’s	 government	 and	
sustained	through	much	of	the	1950s,	60s	and	70s.	National	insurance,	housing	
for	 all	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 national	 health	 service	 commanded	 a	
consensus	 which	 spanned	 political	 boundaries	 and	 national	 borders.	 (Speech,	‘Scotland’s	Place	in	the	World’,	Hugo	Young	Lecture,	London,	January	2012)	However,	 he	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	 “it	 probably	 is	 the	 case	 that	 Scotland	 subscribed	particularly	strongly	to	the	values	of	the	post-war	consensus”.	Thus,	there	is	—	on	the	one	 hand	—	 recognition	 of	 the	 universality	 of	 values	 such	 as	 equality	 and	 fairness	but,	 even	 then,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 suggestion	 that	 there	 is	 greater	appetite	 for	what	are	 framed	as	 “our	shared	progressive	values”	 (FM	Salmond,	SNP	spring	conference	address,	23	March	2013)	in	Scotland.			
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Thus,	 certain	 values	 are	 framed	as	being	Scottish	 or	Scotland’s	values,	 and	as	being	‘our	 values’.	 The	 White	 Paper	 on	 independence,	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	independence	will	provide	an	opportunity	to	“set	out	a	vision	for	the	type	of	economy	and	 society	 that	 captures	 Scotland’s	 distinct	 values	 and	 build	 distinct	 economic,	industrial	 and	 social	 policies	 which	 reflect	 these	 aims”	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	2013:94;	 added	emphasis).	 Similarly,	DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon	asked	whether	Scotland	should	 “have	 the	 status	 of	 a	 region,	 lobbying	Westminster	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 the	UK	Government	will	 protect	our	 interests	 and	promote	our	values”	 (keynote	 speech	 to	the	David	Hume	Institute,	Edinburgh,	15	January	2014)	and	FM	Alex	Salmond	argued	that	 “nobody	will	 do	 a	 better	 job	 than	we	 can,	 of	 reflecting	 our	 own	 priorities	 and	values,	of	creating	the	sort	of	country	we	wish	to	see”	(Speech	at	the	Royal	Highland	Show,	 Ingliston,	 19	 June	 2014).	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 sense	 of	 taking	 national	ownership	of	certain	‘progressive’	values,	and	a	tendency	to	frame	these	as	peculiarly	
Scottish.				
These	Scottish	values	would,	according	to	 the	SNP’s	proposition,	be	 ‘enshrined’	 in	a	Scottish	 constitution.	 As	 outlined	 in	 the	White	 Paper,	 they	 envisaged	 independent	Scotland	as	having	a	written	constitution	“which	expresses	Scotland’s	values”	while	embedding	 the	 rights	 of	 citizens	 and	 setting	 out	 the	 relationships	 of	 different	 state	institutions	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	 2013:560).	 As	 a	 result,	 “Scotland’s	 written	constitution	should	reflect	our	identity	as	a	nation	and	what	is	important	to	us”	(The	Scottish	 Government,	 2013:560-561).	 The	 process	 of	 drafting	 a	 constitution	 was	presented	 as	 open	 and	 all	 individuals	 and	 parties	would	 be	 encouraged	 to	 partake	and	contribute.	Thus,	 “the	process	of	drawing	up	a	constitution	 (…)	will	provide	us	with	a	chance	to	reflect	on	the	democracy	and	society	we	want	to	live	in,	the	values	that	we	most	cherish”	(Salmond,	 ‘Social	Union	and	the	Union	of	the	Crowns’	speech,	Campbeltown	Summer	Cabinet	Public	Discussion,	28	August	2013).				
As	 summarised	 by	Lægaard,	 “one	 of	 the	 elements	 or	 components	 in	 the	 traditional	notion	of	civic	nation”	—	which	I	would	argue,	as	has	been	noted,	is	a	problematic	and	unhelpful	category	of	analysis	—	“is	precisely	the	idea	that	what	unites	the	members	of	 such	a	nation	 is	 their	 shared	allegiance	 to	 certain	political	principles	 and	values,	
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perhaps	as	set	out	in	a	constitution,	as	in	Habermas’	idea	of	constitutional	patriotism”	(2007:43).	 Thus,	 the	 SNP	 put	 forward	 an	 idea	 of	 a	 ‘civic’	 Scottish	 nation	 based	 on	values	 such	 as	 fairness	 and	 social	 democracy	 which	 should	 be	 enshrined	 in	 a	constitution.			As	 a	 result,	 values	 become	 central	 and	 crucial	 building	 blocks	—	 or,	 in	 Zimmer’s	(2003)	words,	symbolic	resources	—	which	are	used	to	construct	the	boundaries	of	the	 ‘Scottish	 nation’.	 Further,	 as	 will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 subsequent	 section,	 due	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	symbolic	 resources	of	values	and	history	are	used,	 the	boundary	mechanisms	take	a	more	organic	form.			
5.4.2.	History	and	Enlightenment		
FAIRNESS	 runs	 through	 Scotland	 like	 a	 vein.	 We	 have	 a	 strong	 tradition,	
maintained	 over	 centuries,	 of	 seeking	 to	 create	 an	 inclusive	 society	 which	
encourages	 hard	 work	 and	 excellence	 but	 also	 supports	 those	 most	 in	 need.	
That’s	 one	 reason	 why	 we	 are	 so	 concerned	 about	 the	 way	 the	 Tories	 in	
Westminster	are	trying	to	change	things.	(Your	Scotland,	Your	Future,	2011:16)		Importantly,	 there	 was	 another	 layer	 to	 how	 symbolic	 resources	 were	 used	 in	 an	effort	to	construct	a	vision	of	Scotland	as	a	value	community	in	these	elite	discourses.	During	the	referendum	campaign,	Scotland	was	portrayed	as	uninterruptedly	aspiring	to	 equality	 and	 fairness	 throughout	 history.	 In	 order	 to	 bolster	 this	 claim,	 key	 SNP	actors	 repeatedly	 drew	 on	 historical	 events	 and	 people	 —	 especially	 the	Enlightenment	 and	 Adam	 Smith	 —	 to	 argue	 that	 fairness,	 egalitarianism	 and	democracy	 are	 indeed	 ‘Scottish	 values’	 that	 “[run]	 through	 Scotland	 like	 a	 vein”.	Framing	 such	 values	 as	 inherently	 national	makes	 political	 sense.	 As	 Jensen	 notes,	“the	 maximally	 universal	 construction	 of	 civic	 nationalism	 makes	 poor	 sense	 of	particularism	 because	 ahistorical,	 universal	 political	 values	 cannot	 differentiate	between	 national	 groups.	 Universal	 values	 are	 per	 definition	 unable	 to	 direct	 the	loyalty	 of	 individuals	 towards	 particular	 communities”	 (2014:565).	 Thus,	 the	 SNP	anchors	 these	 values	 in	 a	 specific	 historiography	 and	 a	 claim	 to	 Scottish	
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distinctiveness.			
As	mentioned	before,	Henderson	and	McEwen	(2005)	have	previously	written	about	the	 importance	 of	 values	 to	mainstream	 Scottish	 political	 discourse.	 Their	 analysis,	however,	overlooks	historiography	as	a	central	building	block	—	or	symbolic	resource	—	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 ‘national	 values’.	 Thus,	 they	 do	 not	 consider	 the	 ways	 in	which	historical	events	and	people	are	selectively	appropriated	in	an	effort	to	narrate	the	nation.	Mooney	and	Scott	(2016:239),	on	the	other	hand,	importantly	argue	that	“legacies	 of	 eighteenth-century	 Scottish	 Enlightenment	 continue	 to	 influence	 and	shape	Scottish	political	debate	 in	 the	early	 twenty-first	 century,	even	 if	 rarely	made	explicit”.	While	this	is	a	key	observation	which	is	very	much	in	line	with	my	findings,	and	I	agree	that	the	perceived	Enlightenment	legacies	do	influence	and	shape	public	debates,	I	would	argue	contra	Mooney	and	Scott	that	these	legacies	are	indeed	made	very	explicit	by	the	SNP,	as	will	be	shown	in	due	course.		
Nationalist	 narratives	—	 as	 established	 previously	—	 rely	 heavily	 on	 the	 selective	remembering	of	history.	Kearton	(2005)	has	previously	highlighted	how	the	SNP	has	appropriated	 history	 in	 order	 to	 bolster	 certain	 contemporary	 political	 aims.	 She	draws	 on	 different	 examples	 such	 as	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘popular	sovereignty’	 in	 the	SNP’s	 speeches,	 and	argues	 that	 the	 SNP	often	 refer	back	 to	 the	Declaration	 of	 Arbroath	 (1320)	 as	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 tradition	 of	 Scottish	constitutional	 thought	 and	 of	 seeing	 power	 as	 essentially	 limited	 and	 contractual	(2005:30-31).	 This	 is	 certainly	 a	 theme	 that	 continued	 during	 the	 referendum	campaign	 —	 in	 the	 36	 SNP	 speeches	 analysed,	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Arbroath	 was	mentioned	in	six	(by	Salmond,	Sturgeon	and	Hyslop).	FM	Alex	Salmond,	for	example,	noted	that:	
If	you	think	for	a	moment	about	Scotland’s	past,	the	reason	I’m	here	in	the	USA	
at	 this	 particular	 time	 is	 because	 of	 ideals	 of	 liberty	 and	 elective	 governance	
which	 were	 distilled	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Arbroath	 almost	 700	 years	 ago.	(Speech	at	the	Glasgow	Caledonian	University	New	York	campus,	7.4.2014)		
Interestingly,	 however,	 another	 strand	 of	 history	—	 as	 referred	 to	 by	 Mooney	 and	
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Scott	(2016)	—	was	drawn	upon	by	leading	SNP	figures	in	order	to	justify	and	provide	momentum	for	the	case	for	independence	during	the	referendum	campaign.	Scotland	and	its	thinkers’	role	in	the	Enlightenment	was	evoked	on	multiple	occasions	during	the	 Yes	 campaign,	 and	 it	was	 argued	 that	 there	 exist	 certain	 Scottish	 values	which	have	 been	 apparent	 throughout	 Scotland’s	 history	 —	 namely	 fairness	 and	entrepreneurship.	Furthermore,	these	values	are	positioned	as	important	today.	Alex	Salmond	 spoke	 about	 Adam	 Smith’s	 ‘Theory	 of	Moral	 Sentiments’	 during	 the	 same	speech	in	New	York	quoted	above:	
(…)	I	want	to	look	today	at	the	contribution	an	independent	Scotland	will	make	
to	 the	 world.	 I’ll	 outline	 our	 intention	 to	 be	 a	 good	 global	 citizen,	 working	 in	
partnership	 with	 countries	 across	 the	 planet.	 I’m	 going	 to	 argue	 that	 our	
international	policy	—	like	our	domestic	policy	—	should	be	governed	by	another	
enlightened	Scottish	idea	—	the	one	Adam	Smith	pursued	in	the	“Theory	of	Moral	
Sentiments”	 —	 of	 enlightened	 self-interest.	 By	 helping	 others,	 we	 will	 help	
ourselves.	 (Speech	 at	 the	 Glasgow	 Caledonian	 University	 New	 York	 campus,	7.4.2014)			What	 is	 key	 here	 is	 the	 reference	 to	 ‘enlightened	 self-interest’	which	 became	 a	 key	concept	 used	 by	 Salmond	 when	 referring	 to	 Adam	 Smith	 or	 the	 Enlightenment.	Salmond	continually	positioned	Scotland	as	a	‘progressive	beacon’	which	could	set	‘a	positive	 example’	 —	 and	 this	 example	 is	 set	 through	 combining	 fairness	 and	prosperity.	 Speaking	 at	 the	 Tsinghua	 University	 in	 Beijing,	 China	 on	 5	 November	2013,	Salmond	again	made	reference	to	the	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments	as	well	as	The	
Wealth	of	Nations.	Salmond	contends	that	while	it	has	been	argued	that	Smith’s	ideas	in	these	two	books	contradict	each	other,	for	him,	taken	together,	they	“balance	each	other”	 —	 “the	 moral	 philosophy	 of	 the	 first,	 and	 the	 science	 of	 economics	 of	 the	second,	supply	many	of	 the	 insights	we	need	to	confront	 the	challenges	of	 today.	 In	particular,	 enlightened	 self-interest	 helps	 us	 to	 reconcile	 individual	 desires	 and	collective	needs”.	Thus,	for	him	—	and	for	the	SNP’s	political	stance	more	broadly	—	it	is	important	to	join	up	the	values	of	wealth	and	entrepreneurship	on	the	one	hand,	and	social	fairness	on	the	other.	This	is	achieved	through	the	idea	of	‘enlightened	self-interest’.		
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The	following	rather	 lengthy	quote	from	an	interview	with	Salmond	neatly	sums	up	this	point.	Here	we	can	see	how	the	past	is	appropriated	in	order	to	make	claims	with	regard	 to	 supposedly	 intrinsic	 Scottish	 values,	 which	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 driving	 force	behind	the	independence	endeavour:	
"In	 Scotland,	 nationhood	 comes	 out	 of	 1,000	 years	 of	 history	 forged	 in	 a	 long	
millennium	 of	 time,"	 Salmond	 says	 (…).	 "Our	 values,	 though,	 I	 think	 largely	
emerged	during	 the	 enlightenment,	 both	 in	 terms	of	 the	 rational	 thinking	 that	
came	 forward,	 that	sprung	out	of	Scotland	and	Edinburgh,	and	also	 the	poetry	
which	was	memorably	encapsulated	 in	 the	work	of	Robert	Burns."	So	what	are	
these	values?	Well,	they're	values	which	say,	look,	people	have	to	work	hard.	We	
founded	 entrepreneurship,	 we	 founded	 the	 modern	 world.	 But	 the	 reason	 for	
doing	that	is	so	that	you	can	have	a	fairer	society."	Here,	the	interviewer	interjects:	
The	reason	many	'Yes'	voters	want	independence,	I	put	it	to	him	gently,	is	a	little	
more	 prosaic:	 that	 they	 can	 'end	 Tory	 rule	 forever',	 as	 one	 pro-independence	
placard	 puts	 it.	 These	 same	 values	 are	 ultimately	 leftist;	 they	 could	 be	 found	
anywhere	 in	 the	 north	 of	 England,	 just	 as	 fed	 up	 with	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	
London-centric	elites	of	Britain.		Salmond	replies:	
"They're	 not	 leftist	 sentiments,	 they're	 Scottish	 sentiments,"	 Salmond	 insists.	
"They're	 based	 on	 the	 precepts	 of	 Adam	 Smith	 and	 the	 Enlightenment.	 That's	
what	 I	 think	 people	 in	 London	 struggle	 to	 see.”	 [Salmond]	 quotes	 Andrew	
Carnegie,	 the	 "most	 successful	 entrepreneur	 in	history",	who	 said	 that	 "he	who	
dies	 rich	 dies	 shamed".	 (…)	 As	 Adam	 Smith	 taught	 us,	 he	 continues,	 "the	
prosperity	 of	 a	 nation	 is	 tied	 up	 in	 the	 welfare	 of	 its	 citizens".	 What	 welfare	
means	here,	he	 says,	 is	 "the	promotion	of	prosperity,	but	also	 the	promotion	of	
fairness".	(Stevenson,	2014)	
	In	this	interview,	Salmond	highlights	the	values	of	entrepreneurship	and	fairness	and,	crucially,	denies	that	the	values	he	is	talking	about	are	universal	and	‘leftist’	—	rather,	they	 are	 specifically	 Scottish.	 Importantly,	 Salmond	 makes	 an	 explicit	 reference	 to	London,	 and	 the	ways	 in	 which	 elites	 there	 “struggle	 to	 see”	 that	 these	 values	 are	‘Scottish	sentiments’,	and	thus	avowedly	particular	to	the	Scottish	context.	I	will	pick	up	the	issue	of	London,	Westminster	and	England	later	on	in	this	chapter	(see	section	5.5.).	
	
The	 focus	 on	 the	 Enlightenment	 is	 also	 interesting	 in	 light	 of	 Scotland’s	 historical	
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involvement	with	slavery	already	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	Since	the	discourses	around	‘progressive’	values	and	‘principles’	is	key	to	the	SNP’s	idea	of	the	Scottish	nation	and	its	 character,	 there	 is	 a	 notable	 focus	 on	 specific	 Enlightenment	 history	 (e.g.	Hume,	Smith)	and	a	deafening	silence	on	other	aspects	of	Scottish	history	(colonialism	and	slavery)	which	influence	understandings	of	the	contemporary	Scottish	nation	to	this	day	(e.g.	who	counts	as	part	of	the	‘Scottish	diaspora’	during	Homecoming).	Since	the	Enlightenment	period	and	Scotland’s	 involvement	in	colonialism	and	the	slave	trade	overlap	 it	 is	 telling	 that	 the	 SNP	 have	 focused	more	 on	 the	 former.	 Stephen	 Howe	notes	 how	 “until	 very	 recently,	 ‘imperial	 and	 colonial	 history	 existed	 in	 an	 almost	entirely	 separate	 sphere	 from	 the	writing	 of	 “domestic”	British	history’”	 (quoted	 in	Geppert	and	Müller,	2015:2).	This	seems	to	speak	to	the	Scottish	experience	as	well.	Slavery	past	does	not	exist	as	part	of	the	national	story	but	is	outside	it;	that	is,	 it	is	not	 portrayed	 as	 something	 that	 represents	 the	 nation	 and	 its	 values	 (indeed,	 it	stands	in	direct	opposition	to	the	celebrated	values	that	are	portrayed	as	making	up	a	major	part	of	Scottish	national	identity).			
This	 occluded	 history	 has	 been	 acknowledged	 more	 recently:	 for	 example,	 at	 a	referendum	 debate	 in	 Edinburgh,	 “in	 his	 brief	 opening	 statement,	 Humza	 Yousaf	argued	 that	 we	 should	 not	 look	 at	 Scotland’s	 past	 through	 rose	 tinted	 glasses,	 as	Scotland	was	the	second	city	of	the	Empire”	(fieldnotes,	30.4.2014).	He	then	went	on	to	 argue	 “that	 Scotland	 could	 contribute	 to	 the	 world	 as	 a	 nation”	 and	 “said	 how	Scotland	 has	 a	 duty	 to	 help	 those	 who	 flee	 horrors	 of	 their	 countries,	 and	 he	condemns	 dawn	 raids,	 destitution,	 and	 says	 how	 food	 coupons	 distributed	 to	 the	asylum	 seekers	 are	 ‘dehumanising’”	 (fieldnotes,	 30.4.2014).	 Thus,	 while	 there	 is	fleeting	recognition	of	Scotland’s	violent	past,	the	tradition	of	humanity	(which	ties	in	with	this	presentation	of	‘Scottish	values’)	is	foregrounded.			
Thus,	 in	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	 terms,	 drawing	 on	 the	 symbolic	 resource	 of	 (universal)	values	 theoretically	 works	 as	 a	 voluntarist	 boundary	 mechanism	 as	 anyone	 can,	technically,	 sign	 up	 to	 these	 values.	 However,	 because	 values	 are	 appropriated	 in	conjunction	with	the	symbolic	resource	of	history,	the	values	are,	in	turn,	anchored	in	historical	‘Scottishness’.	Thus,	the	boundary	mechanism	takes	on	a	more	organic	form.	
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This	is	where	the	strength	of	Zimmer’s	framework	lies:	it	uncovers	and	makes	visible	the	complex	and	contradictory	ways	in	which	symbolic	resources	are	drawn	on,	and	how	putatively	‘civic’	resources	(such	as	values)	can	be	used	in	exclusionary	ways.			
5.4.3.	The	view	from	below:	Class	and	community	The	 focus	 has	 so	 far	 been	 on	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 SNP	has	 framed	 Scotland	 as	 a	‘value	 community’	 and	 how	 this	 has	 been	 done	 by	 appropriating	 certain	 symbolic	resources.	Interestingly,	in	the	interviews,	many	of	the	participants	vocalised	similar	views	to	those	of	the	SNP	—	that	is,	that	Scotland	is	fairer,	which	was	usually	framed	in	 terms	of	Scotland	being	more	 leftist,	 and	 that	 there	 is	a	 stronger	commitment	 to	‘community’.	This	extract	from	Noor	illustrates	this	tendency:	
I	 think	Scotland	has	always	kind	of	 shown	 itself	as	be-	 -	wanting	to	be	a	much	
fairer,	sort	of,	society	anyway,	we’ve	a-	-	because	we,	we	are	much	more	leftist.	
And	I	think	that’s	where	the	arguments	about	the	finance	kind	of	came	in	which	
was	that	if	we	were	able	to,	ehm,	have	control	over	how	we	spend	our	budgets,	
then,	 you	know,	we	wouldn’t	have	 this	kind	of,	 this,	 this	 -	 -	well,	we	would	 still	
have,	ehm,	problems	with	poverty	but	at	 least	we	could	address,	you	know,	the	
more	serious	issues.	So	I	think,	ehm,	yeah	[sighs]	—	I	mean	I	am	-	-	that,	that’s	—	
that	is,	I	am	fundamentally	a	socialist.	(Noor,	Scottish-Indian,	teacher,	45	years	old,	voted	yes.)	Importantly,	she	understands	Scotland’s	left-wing-ness	as	being	a	longstanding	trend	(“always…shown	 itself”)	 which	 is	 shared	 across	 the	 people	 (“we	 are	 much	 more	leftist”).		Noor	of	course	also	identifies	as	a	socialist	herself,	so	her	political	identity	is	intimately	connected	to	the	values	which	she	sees	as	characteristically	Scottish.			
Lukasz	—	a	Polish	21-year-old	college	student	and	part-time	cleaner	who	voted	yes	—	 although	 explaining	 that	 he	 is	 “not	 really	 a	 socialist”,	 nonetheless	 enjoys	 “the	socialism	 spirit	 here	 ‘cause	 it’s	 quite	 different	 that	 my	 people	 know	 it”.	 For	 him,	socialism	in	Scotland,	as	he	sees	it,	is	vastly	different	from	the	“dark	side	of	socialism	and	communism”	that	“we	[Poles]	know”.	Consequently,	his	friends	in	Poland	call	him	“a	 bloody	 socialist”	—	 “you’re	 red	 army	 and	 shit”	—	 but	 for	 Lukasz	 “it’s	 not	 that	socialism,	no	it’s	not	the	best	but	well,	umm,	still	it’s	completely,	completely	different	view	for	the,	for	the	politics”.		
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Both	Noor’s	 and	 Lukasz’s	 understanding,	 therefore,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	more	 evident	mainstream	political	current	of	socialism	in	Scotland.	Lukasz’s	understanding	of	it	is	situated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 his	 post-Soviet	 and	 post-communist	 understanding	 of	socialism.	While	for	his	 friends	socialism	is	a	 ‘dirty	word’,	Lukasz	saw	there	being	a	different	 type	 of	 socialism	 at	 work	 in	 Scotland	 which	 is	 different	 from	 what	 was	experienced	in	Poland	(Lukasz	himself	identified	as	being	to	the	right	of	the	political	spectrum).		
In	 addition	 to	many	 of	 the	 participants	 viewing	 Scotland	 as	 being	 fairer	 and	more	leftist	 in	general,	many	also	saw	 the	 referendum	debate	as	being	about	—	or	being	framed	as	—	a	question	of	class.	When	interviewing	Odogwu,	a	36-year-old	university	student	from	Nigeria	who	actively	campaigned	for	a	yes	vote,	we	seemed	to	be,	for	a	while,	 implicitly	 discussing	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 referendum	 and	 class	without	specifically	naming	‘class’.	Eventually,	I	brought	up	a	newspaper	article	I	had	read	 in	 which	 Jonathon	 Shafi	 (2014)	 —	 one	 of	 the	 key	 figures	 in	 the	 Radical	Independence	Campaign	—	argued	 that	 class	was	 at	 the	heart	of	 the	vote.	Odogwu	said	 he	 agreed	 with	 Shafi’s	 stance,	 and	 that	 it	 came	 down	 to	 how	 “they	 want	 to	maintain	the	status	quo”	(added	emphasis)	and	that	the	referendum	was	“about	class	because	 you	 have	 people	 fighting	 from	 below,	 the	 people	 who	 are	 completely	disenfranchised”	 and	who	 “have	 been	 silenced”	 until	 now.	 He	went	 on	 to	 say	 that,	under	 Conservative	 rule,	 these	 people	 have	 witnessed	 the	 negative	 effects	 on	 the	NHS,	 for	 example,	 and	 they	are	 standing	up	 to	 “fight	 it”.	 	Thus,	Odogwu	 frames	 the	referendum	as	being	about	class	and	the	no	vote	as	maintaining	the	status	quo.	More	specifically,	he	frames	the	referendum	as	being	a	moment	when	the	disenfranchised	were	 rising	 up	 and	 fighting	 back	 against	 the	 Tory	 government	 and	 their	 austerity	policies.	While	it	did	not	become	clear	who	“they”	were	exactly,	it	seemed	likely	that	he	was	referring	to	the	Conservative	political	elite	in	Westminster.			
Others	 also	 raised	 the	 issue	 of	 those	 benefiting	 from	 the	 status	 quo	 as	 being	more	likely	 to	vote	no,	and	 therefore	seeing	 the	vote	 in	class	 terms.	George	explained	his	views:		
Umm..yeah,	 I	 think	 people	 were	 frightened	 and..there’s	 also	 the	 possibility	 of	
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there	 being	 a	 class	 divide,	 umm,	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 comfortable	 middle	 classes..fear	
losing	 that	 comfortable	 status.	Whereas	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 working	 class	 people	 are	
keen	 on	 a	 chance	 to	 improve	 their	 lives,	 so	 they	 wanna	 vote	 yes.	 It	 didn’t	
obviously	 just	 break	 down	 at	 class	 divide	 but	 I	 think	 there	 was..something	 to	
that.	 (…)	 Umm..I’m	 not	 sure	 what	 decided	 it	 [the	 outcome	 of	 the	 vote].	 I	
think…yeah,	I	think	it	comes	down	to	the	fear	of	change,	I	think	that	was	the	big	
thing	with	 it,	 umm,	and	 fear	of…people	 losing..somewhat	 comfortable	 lifestyles	
that	they	have.	Umm,	so	you	look	at	the	really	deprived	areas,	they	voted	quite	
heavily	yes.	Umm,	and	 then	 the	more	affluent,	 they	voted	really	 firmly	no,	 so	 it	
seems	to	be	that..I’m	doing	well,	fuck	everyone	else.	(English,	28	years	old,	stock	room	worker,	voted	yes.)	Similarly,	Lukasz	spoke	about	an	ESOL	teacher	who	came	from	a	wealthy	background	and	 how	 she	 “obviously”	 voted	 no.	 Lukasz	 went	 on	 to	 explain	 how	 the	 teacher	persuaded	some	of	the	students	to	vote	no	“just	because	of	[her]	own	advantage”.	As	George	put	it,	the	referendum	was	not	only	about	class	but	“there	was	something	to	that”.	George	and	Lukasz	thus	understand	the	vote	as	being,	at	least	to	some	extent,	about	 class	 in	 a	 way	 that	 the	 working	 class	 was	 likelier	 to	 vote	 yes	 while	 middle	classes	and	above	would	vote	no.			
This,	 however,	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 that	 those	 voting	 no	 can	 be	 framed	 as	 un-Scottish	or	as	being	against	values	such	as	 fairness	and	equality	 (see	section	4.2.1.)	Eilidh,	 who	 identified	 as	 being	 politically	 on	 the	 left,	 challenged	 the	 idea	 of	 the	referendum	 being	 about	 class.	 For	 her,	 it	 became	 a	 “disingenuously	 framed	 class	issue”	 because	 those	 voting	 yes	 could	not	 comprehend	 someone	who	 is	 not	 a	Tory	voting	 no	 and,	 consequently,	 no	 voters	 became	 portrayed	 as	 having	 “all	 the	 land”,	wearing	 tweed	 and	 not	 caring	 about	 foodbanks,	 poor	 people	 and	 social	 problems.	Thus,		
…it’s	a	class	issue	in	that	I’ve-	-	it’s	almost,	it’s	almost	umm..it	reminds	me	a	little	
of..th-	-	th-	-	the	portrayal	of	capitalists	around	the	time	of	the	Russian	revolution	
and	so	on.	 (…)	You	know,	 top	hats	and	nasty	person	hitting	 the,	hitting	people	
who	were	less	well-off.		In	 Eilidh’s	 view,	 then,	 those	 voting	 no	 came	 to	 personify	 and	 embody	 an	 almost	caricatured	understanding	of	privilege	and	a	lack	of	social	consciousness.			Following	on	 from	this,	 it	 is	useful	 to	briefly	step	back	and	consider	 to	what	extent	perceptions	of	Scotland’s	supposed	left-winged-ness	are	accurate.	According	to	data	
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from	YouGov,	people	surveyed	in	Scotland	do	indeed	stand	slightly	more	to	the	left	on	a	 number	 of	 issues	 such	 as	 immigration,	 multiculturalism,	 healthcare,	 the	 benefits	system	and	redistribution	of	wealth	compared	to	others	in	the	rest	of	the	UK	(Jordan,	2015).	 However,	 as	 Rachel	 Ormston	 (co-director	 of	 the	 Scottish	 Social	 Attitudes	Survey)	 cautions,	 “we	 often	 paint	 ourselves	 as	much	more	 socially	 democratic	 and	left-wing	 than	 the	 data	 shows	 that	 we	 are”	 (Brooks,	 2015).	 Curtice	 and	 Ormston	conclude,	based	on	data	 from	the	Scottish	and	British	Social	Attitudes	Surveys,	 that	“although	Scotland	is	more	social	democratic	in	outlook	than	England,	the	differences	are	modest	at	best”	and	that,	indeed,	“like	England,	Scotland	has	become	less	—	not	more	—	social	democratic	since	the	start	of	devolution”	(2011:1).	Here,	the	authors	define	a	 ‘social	democrat’	“as	someone	who	is	concerned	about	economic	inequality	and	 believes	 that	 the	 state	 should	 take	 action	 to	 reduce	 it”	 (2011:2).	 Curtice’s	 and	Ormston’s	 report	 focuses	 on	 the	 key	 issues	 of	 inequality;	 redistribution;	 tax	 and	spend;	and	distinctive	policies	(2011).			Take	inequality,	for	example.	People	in	Scotland	and	England	were	asked	whether	the	gap	between	 those	on	 low	and	high	 incomes	was	 too	 large.	 In	2010,	78	per	cent	of	Scottish	 respondents	 and	 74	 per	 cent	 of	 English	 respondents	 agreed.	 Apart	 from	2009,	Scottish	respondents	“have	consistently	been	a	little	more	likely	than	those	in	England	 to	 express	 this	 view”	 (2011:2).	 However,	 this	 difference	 has	 declined:	 in	1999	84	per	cent	of	Scots	said	the	income	gap	was	too	large	compared	to	78	per	cent	in	2010.	England	has	also	seen	a	similar	shift,	and	the	two	countries	have	thus	moved	in	parallel	(2011:2).	Interestingly,	while	78	per	cent	of	people	in	Scotland	agree	that	the	gap	in	income	inequality	is	too	large,	“only	43	per	cent	agree	that	the	government	should	redistribute	income	from	the	better-off	to	the	less	well-off”	—	“much	the	same	pattern	 is	 found	 in	 England”	 (2011:2-3).	 The	 difference	 between	 the	 countries	 is	modest	(43	per	cent	in	Scotland	agreeing	with	income	redistribution	compared	to	34	per	cent	in	England	in	2010),	and	the	gap	has	not	widened	over	the	last	decade:	thus,	Scotland	“simply	remains	a	little	to	the	left	of	England	on	this	issue”	(2011:3).			
There	 is,	however,	 evidence	of	Scots	being	more	 favourable	about	higher	 taxes	and	spending,	 though	 an	 overall	 downward	 trend	 has	 been	 apparent	 in	 Scotland	 since	1999.	In	2010,	while	30	per	cent	of	English	respondents	supported	an	increase	in	‘tax	
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and	 spend’	 policies,	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 Scots	 thought	 this	 should	 be	 on	 the	 agenda.	Although	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 tax	 issue	 is	 now	bigger	than	ever	before	since	the	first	survey	in	1999,	Scotland	has	not	shifted	more	to	 the	 left	 on	 the	 issue.	 That	 is,	 over	 the	 years	 Scots	 have	 become	 less	 keen	 on	increased	taxes	and	spending	thus	“mirroring	the	trend	in	public	opinion	in	England”	(2011:3).	 There	 is,	 nonetheless,	 more	 support	 for	 higher	 taxes	 in	 Scotland	 than	 in	England	 even	 if	 there	 has	 been	 a	 decrease	 in	 popularity	 for	 these	 policies	 in	 both	countries.			
While	 the	 figures	 cited	 above	 are	 from	 2010,	 Craig	 McAngus	 from	 the	 Centre	 on	Constitutional	Change	poses	 the	question	of	whether	 “the	 legacy	of	 the	 referendum	led	to	a	shift	to	the	Scottish	public	becoming	more	left-wing	than	their	neighbours	to	the	 south”	 (2015).	 Using	 data	 from	 the	 British	 Election	 Study	 carried	 out	 after	 the	General	Election	in	May	2015,	McAngus	found	that	on	a	left-right	spectrum,	14.5	per	cent	of	the	Scottish	public	“are	on	the	most	left-wing	point	of	scale”	in	comparison	to	9.8	per	cent	of	people	in	England.	Thus	there	seems	to	be	a	slight	difference	in	terms	of	having	a	greater	proportion	of	Scots	sitting	at	the	‘radical	left’	end	of	the	spectrum.	A	lack	of	previous	data,	however,	makes	it	difficult	to	attribute	the	figure	to	specific	events	and,	therefore,	it	is	unclear	whether	there	has	been	an	increase	before	or	after	the	referendum.		
Therefore,	 while	 slight	 differences	 do	 exist	 which	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 voters	 in	Scotland	 seem	 to	 fall	 slightly	 to	 the	 left	 of	 their	 English	 (and	 indeed	 Welsh)	counterparts,	 the	differences	often	become	somewhat	 inflated	 in	political	discourse.	As	pointed	out,	the	difference	is	only	modest,	Scotland	has	become	less	—	not	more	—	social	democratic	 in	outlook	since	devolution,	and	public	opinion	in	Scotland	has	moved	in	parallel	with	that	in	England	so	the	overall	gap	between	the	two	countries	has	not	widened	(Curtice	and	Ormston,	2011:4).	Of	course,	it	must	be	pointed	out	that	what	is	understood	as	left-wing,	or	what	kind	of	policies	are	seen	as	leftist,	is	highly	contested,	 but	 the	 figures	 do,	 nonetheless,	 give	 some	 indication	 regarding	 the	differences	 of	 opinion	 between	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 UK.	 However,	 whether	 the	people	of	Scotland	truly	are	more	left-wing	or	have	a	‘different’	social	consciousness	
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is	not	so	much	at	issue	here;	what	is	important	is	that	there	exists	a	belief	that	Scots	share	 certain	 values	 and	 are	 somehow	 culturally	 different,	 especially	 —	 and	importantly	—	with	reference	to	England.	This,	in	turn,	offers	interesting	insights	into	the	workings	of	nationalism,	nation	building	and	nation-ness.				
After	 this	 brief	 detour,	 let	 us	 return	 to	 the	 interviews.	 In	 addition	 to	 ideas	 around	fairness	 and	 class,	 the	 concept	 of	 community	 also	 surfaced.	 This	 excerpt	 from	 an	interview	with	 Rachel	 offers	 a	 good	 example	 of	 how	 the	 concept	 is	 explained	 and	understood:	Rachel:	[…]	Umm..	But	then	the	longer	I	live	here,	the	more	I	appreciate	that..that	
there	is	just	a	different	outlook	on	life,	generally	—	it’s,	it’s	horrible	because	you	
can’t	talk	about	this	without	using	sweeping	generalisations.	Minna:	Yeah,	yeah.	Rachel:	 Umm,	 but	 —	 generally..I	 think	 there’s	 a	 bigger	 commitment	 to	
community,	I	think	generally	there	is	a	more	left	of	centre,	umm,	kind	of	political	
affiliation.	 Umm…yeah.	 And,	 and	 that	 is	 stuff	 that	 you..you	 don’t	 get	 to	
understand	 by	 visiting	 —	 you	 only	 get	 to	 understand	 by	 living	 here	 and	
then..having	a	kind	of	drip-feed	to	you.	(English,	development	officer,	33	years	old,	voted	yes.)	Again,	 Rachel	 portrays	 Scotland	 as	more	 left-wing	 and	 fairer,	 and	 Rachel	 does	 this	especially	 in	comparison	with	England	(a	 theme	 I	will	pick	up	 in	more	detail	 in	 the	next	section).	Whilst	she	acknowledges	that	she	 is	using	“sweeping	generalisations”,	she	 nonetheless	 perceives	 that	 there	 is	 a	 different	 political	 outlook	 in	 Scotland	compared	to	its	southern	neighbour.	In	addition	to	this,	what	is	of	interest	is	the	focus	on	 ‘community’	and	the	commitment	to	 it.	Later	on	Rachel	goes	on	to	say	there	 is	a	bigger	 “desire	 for	 community”	 in	 Scotland	 and	 that	 policies	 “that	 kind	 of	 feed	 that	desire	in	a	way	that	the	Westminster	parties	don’t”	are	formulated.	According	to	her,	this	is	“because	they’re	still	very	much,	you	know,	in	the	kind	of	Thatcherite	‘there	is	no	society	—	individuals’”	frame	of	mind.			
Similarly,	Rahul	—	who	 is	 a	28-year-old	 student	 from	a	Scottish-Indian	background	and	voted	no	—	noted	 that	a	 lot	 of	 people	 in	 Scotland	hold	 socialist	 views.	When	 I	asked	what	makes	Scotland	more	socialist	 in	his	opinion,	he	explained	that	“a	 lot	of	people’s	 opinions	 are	 (…)	 based	 around	helping	 the	wider	 community	 and	not	 just	
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you,	yourself”.	Thus,	as	with	Rachel,	Rahul	connects	 the	perceived	stronger	socialist	outlook	with	a	commitment	to	‘community’.	Community	was	also	a	key	focus	for	SNP’s	Yes	 campaign	—	 in	 the	 White	 Paper	 they	 argued	 that	 “with	 independence	 we	 can	
create	a	social	nation:	a	country	that	acts	and	feels	like	a	community,	a	vibrant	society	
where	we	know	the	benefits	of	looking	out	for	each	other”	 (The	Scottish	Government,	2013:44	 —	 italics	 in	 original).	 Importantly,	 in	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	 terms,	 here	‘community’	 becomes	 a	 symbolic	 resource	 (and	 proxy	 for	 left-of-centre	 ‘values’)	Rachel	and	Rahul	draw	on	when	constructing	the	boundaries	of	the	‘Scottish	nation’.		Community	 is	 itself,	 of	 course,	 an	 interesting	 and	 complex	 concept	 sociologically	speaking.	Zygmunt	Bauman	(2001:1)	notes	how	words	have	meanings	but	that	some	words	have	a	feel.	For	him,	community	is	such	a	word:	it	feels	good,	and	it	is	a	warm,	cosy	and	comfortable	place.	Furthermore,	an	understanding	seems	to	be	shared	with	all	 members	 of	 the	 community	 and	 it	 seems	 ‘natural’	 —	 however,	 this	 shared	understanding	which	makes	 community	 escapes	 notice	 (or,	 as	 Tönnies	 puts	 it,	 it	 is	tacit)	(Bauman,	2001:10-11).	According	to	Bauman,	then,	the	impact	that	community	has	 on	 people	 relies	 on	 its	 everydayness,	 on	 its	 naturalness;	 it	 is	 not	 questioned.	Gilroy,	for	example,	notes	that	“community’	‘signifies	(…)	a	particular	set	of	values	and	norms	 in	 everyday	 life:	 mutuality,	 co-operation,	 identification	 and	 symbiosis”	(1987:234	 in	 Baumann,	 1996:15).	 Cohen	 remarks	 how	 community	 is	 that	 entity	 to	which	 one	 belongs	 —	 it	 is	 greater	 than	 kinship	 but	 more	 immediate	 than	 the	abstraction	we	call	‘society’	(1985:15).			
Rachel	 and	 Rahul	 both	 describe	 something	 similar	 to	 Gilroy’s	 conceptualisation	 as	they	note	how	community	has	to	do	with	something	bigger	than	the	individual	and	a	close-knit,	 more	 personal	 collectivity	 of	 people	 where	 they	 look	 after	 one	 another.	More	 specifically,	 Rachel	 argues	 Scotland	 has	 a	desire	 for	 community-ness	which	 is	something	 that	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	desires	of	Westminster	parties	 that	 continue	 to	exhibit	a	Thatcherite,	individualistic	outlook.	Three	things	are	of	interest	here.	Firstly,	both	Rahul	and	Rachel	connect	this	desire	or	commitment	to	community	with	Scots’	ostensibly	left-leaning	political	conviction.	Secondly,	Rachel’s	use	of	the	term	‘desire’	is	 an	 interesting	 one:	 it	 suggests	 that	 community	 is	 something	 that	 needs	 to	 be	achieved,	 something	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 worked	 for.	 Consequently,	 rather	 than	 an	
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unnoticed	or	natural	concept	—	as	Bauman	puts	it	—	community	becomes	something	more	reflexive.	As	argued	by	Back	(2009:203-204;	original	emphasis),	“community	is	not	simply	an	organic	fact	or	a	straightforward	state	of	affairs”	—	rather,	“there	might	be	some	merit	in	thinking	of	community	as	narrative	achievement,	a	way	of	thinking	and	 telling	 life’s	 story”.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 opens	 up	 interesting	 questions	 regarding	membership	 of	 that	 (national)	 community.	 What	 are	 the	 rules	 and	 processes	 that	govern	who	can	or	gets	to	belong?			
However	—	 thirdly,	 and	 finally,	 desire	 also	 has	 close	 connotations	 with	 deep	 felt	feelings	and	emotions:	 it	speaks	of	 longing.	The	narrative	of	Scotland	as	being	more	left-of-centre	or	a	more	caring	community	is	achieved	through	a	juxtaposition	with	an	‘other’	—	England	 or	Westminster.	 Consequently,	 the	 issue	 of	 community	 becomes	closely	tied	with	nationalism,	with	the	boundary	between	‘us’	and	‘them’.	Nationalism,	rather	than	being	made	up	of	merely	rational	ideas	and	theories	as	to	how	the	world	should	 be	 understood	 or	 organised,	 taps	 into	 our	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 and	 to	 our	
very	sense	of	 self.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 offers	 an	 interesting	–	and	potentially	 dangerous	—	problematic	 in	 terms	 of	 community.	 While	 ‘desire’	 highlights	 the	 potential	 for	reflexivity	regarding	 the	content	and	contours	of	 the	community,	emotions	could	be	argued,	at	least	to	some	degree,	to	disrupt	this	reflexive	process	—	as	argued	by	Hill	Collins	 (2010:10-11),	 “community	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 cognitive	 construct;	 it	 is	 infused	with	emotions	and	value-laden	meanings”.		
Thus,	what	I	take	from	Rachel’s	comment	regarding	the	‘desire’	for	community	is	the	lingering	 invidious	 quality	 of	 national	 identity	 and	 its	 conceptions.	 Many	 of	 the	participants,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 made	 the	 broader	 point	 about	 Scotland	 being	 a	different	kind	of	 ‘value	 community’	—	 i.e.	more	 leftist	or	 socialist	 as	opposed	 to	 its	‘other’,	 England	 or	 Westminster.	 Therefore,	 when	 Scotland	 is	 portrayed	 as	 a	‘progressive’	 community,	 this	 is	 achieved	 through	 constructing	 an	 essentialised,	emotionally	charged	understanding	of	Scotland	(and	Scottishness)	as	different	 from	its	southern	neighbour.			
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Before	moving	on	 to	discuss	 ‘the	other’	 and	 the	borders	of	 the	 community	 in	more	detail,	it	is	—	finally	—	important	to	point	out	that	many	participants	challenged	the	‘Scotland	as	more	equal’	trope.	While	some	participants,	as	we	have	seen,	argued	that	Scotland	 is	 fairer	 and	more	 left-wing,	 such	 characterisations	 of	 Scotland	were	 also	called	 into	 question.	 For	 example,	 this	 CEO	 of	 an	 ethnic	 minority	 third	 sector	organisation	 challenges	 the	 reputed	 egalitarianism	 of	 Scotland,	 and	 does	 this	especially	in	relation	to	racism:	Practitioner	 3:	There	 is,	 there	 is	 a	 bit	 of	 a	myth	 that	 Scotland	 is	 a	 very	 equal	
place,	there’s	no	racism,	no	—	you	know,	I	think.	I	think	there	is,	you	know,	you	
were	talking	about	the	poster	One	Scotland,	and	to	me,	 if	on	those	posters	they	
put	 the	 proper	 stats	 of,	 you	 know,	 the	 employment	 rate	 for	 BME	 people	 in	
Scotland	is	this,	what	are	you	gonna	do	about	it?	You	know,	that	—	I	think	that	
would	be	more	meaningful	than	shaking	hands.	Eilidh	raises	a	similar	point:	
Umm	—	 I	 interview	 people	 all	 the	 time	 who,	 you	 know,	 routinely	 use	 racist	
terminology,	 routinely,	 umm..consider	 themselves	 more	 entitled	 than..other	
people	from	other	ethnicities.	(…)		I	-	-	I	don’t	think..I	think..I	think	there’s	quite	a	
bit	 of	 mythmaking,	 umm,	 or..or,	 umm..co-opting	 of	 myths,	 umm,	 which	 were	
existing	 and	 are	 quite	 handy	 for	 ‘oh	 yeah,	 we’re	 all	 for	 social	 justice	 because	
that’s	the	way	we	roll	any	way’.	 	 (From	Guernsey,	 social	worker,	 54	years	old,	voted	no)			Thus,	for	the	CEO	and	Eilidh,	there	is	an	existing	myth	of	’no	problem	here’	(Donald	et	al,	1995)	and,	importantly,	there	is	an	ongoing	active	process	of	mythmaking,	as	Eilidh	puts	it,	in	operation.	The	CEO	and	Eilidh	raise	further	two	points	which	are	of	interest.	Firstly,	Eilidh	points	out	how	the	‘co-opting	of	myths’	helps	to	uphold	the	imagery	of	Scotland	as	more	socially	 just,	and	she	makes	this	point	especially	with	reference	to	racism.	Secondly,	and	relatedly,	 the	CEO	points	out	how	anti-racism	campaigns	such	as	One	Scotland	are	 lacking	 in	a	sense	 that	 they	do	not	address	 institutional	 racism	and	deep-seated	racist	structures	in	the	employment	market,	for	example.		
These	points	raised	by	the	two	participants	chime	with	the	(rather	limited)	academic	literature	that	exists	on	Scotland	and	‘race’.	It	was	not	until	the	late	1990s	that	a	series	
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of	disturbing	events	—	the	two	murders	of	Imran	Khan	and	Surjit	Singh	Chhokar13	in	1998	 —	 encouraged	 a	 shift	 in	 attitudes	 and	 approaches	 to	 racism	 in	 Scotland	(Penrose	 and	 Howard,	 2008:97)14 .	 Even	 so,	 Williams	 and	 de	 Lima	 (2006:499)	highlight	 how	 a	 longstanding	 ‘no	 problem	 here’	 attitude	 towards	 racism	 has	 led	 to	‘laissez-fair	politics’	regarding	race	equality	in	Scotland.	Further,	Penrose	and	Howard	note	(2008:95)	how	Scotland	has	been	imagined	as	devoid	of	racism	by	‘white’	Scots	and,	Scotland	being	a	predominantly	white	country,	consequently	this	has	lead	to	an	idea	that	conceptions	of	racism	having	neither	purchase	nor	relevance	in	the	Scottish	context.			
The	 authors,	 rightly,	 challenge	 such	 views	 and	note	how	 they	 stem	 from	 two	 faulty	assumptions:	 namely,	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 visible	 minorities	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 to	racism,	and	that	the	degree	of	racism	is	directly	proportional	to	the	size	of	non-white	population	 (2008:95).	 Thus,	 a	 degree	 of	 complacency	 has	 been	 evident	 in	 Scottish	politics	 and	 policies	 vis-à-vis	 ‘race’	 and	 racism	 since	 the	 devolution.	 Because	 the	discourse	 around	 fairness	 and	 equality	 is	 so	 constant	 and	 dominant,	 it	 becomes	almost	 commonsensical,	 and	 it	 becomes	 a	 trope	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	 challenge.	Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 real	 danger	 of	 overlooking	 the	 racism	 experienced	 by	racialised	 Scots,	 and	 of	 responding	 to	 racist	 incidents	 on	 an	 individual	 basis	 rather	than	focusing	on	and	seeking	to	dismantle	structures	that	enable	all	forms	of	racism.		
Similarly	to	the	CEO	and	Eilidh,	Jim,	a	48-year-old	trade	unionist	who	campaigned	for	a	no	vote,	directly	challenged	the	idea	of	 ‘Scottish	values’.	He	noted	that	there	was	a	sense	in	the	SNP’s	rhetoric	that	“if	it’s	Scottish	it’s	better,	and	we	do	things	better	in	Scotland	 because	we	 are	 better	 people	 because	 the	 Scottish	 character	 and	 Scottish	society	is…more	left-wing”	while	at	the	same	time	also	being	“more	entrepreneurial”.	The	 referendum	 process	 was	 “accompanied	 by	 quite	 deliberate	 myth-making”	 and																																																									13	The	Chhokar	case	was	recently	back	in	court.	As	a	result,	Ronnie	Coulter	was	convicted	of	Chhokar’s	murder	in	October	2016. 	14	The	timing	of	these	events	is	of	course	of	great	significance	as	Stephen	Lawrence,	a	black	youngster,	was	 brutally	 murdered	 by	 a	 group	 of	 white	 men	 in	 South	 London	 in	 April	 1993.	 The	 Macpherson	Report,	which	looked	into	the	appalling	management	and	handling	of	the	Lawrence	investigation	and	case,	was	 published	 in	 February	1999;	 it	was	 found	 that	 the	Metropolitan	police	was	 institutionally	racist.	Thus,	 it	 is	widely	argued	that	it	took	the	Stephen	Lawrence	inquiry	to	truly	bring	‘race’	on	the	agenda	(William	and	de	Lima,	2006:499)	in	Scotland.	
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“became	a	sort	of	self-perpetuating	thing	that	‘well,	if	we	do	things	on	a	Scottish	basis,	they	will	 automatically	be	better	 than	doing	 them	on	a	UK	basis’”.	Consequently,	he	argued,	 the	 campaign	 ”came	 down	 to	 certain	 myths	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 Scotland,	which	I	think	ignore	vast	amounts	of	actually	existing	Scotland”.			
In	 particular,	 Jim	 picked	 up	 on	 and	 referred	 back	 to	 Nicola	 Sturgeon’s	 speech	 on	having	a	Scottish	constitution	and	the	values	she	wanted	to	see	embedded	in	it:	
And	 she	 talked	 about	—	 she	 wanted	 national	 values	 firmly	 embedded	 in	 the	
constitution	and	things	 like	that.	 I	got	quite	worried	about	that	—	who	defines	
national	values	and,	you	know,	umm..[…]	You	know,	the,	the,	umm…there	are	—	
it’s	 not	 as	 if	 you	 only	 have	 two	 settings	 on	 the	 nationalist	 dial	 of	 kind	 of	 civic	
minded	pragmatist	—	so	we	only	want	independence	for	Scotland	because,	well,	
Westminster	inefficient,	we’d	do	it	better	here.	Or,	you	know..march	along	singing	
the	McHorst	Wessel	Song	—	you	know,	I	mean	it	would	be	foolish,	you	know,	to	
say	that’s	the	only	two	things	you	can	have.	But	there’s	a,	you	know	—	there	are	
gonna	be	a	range	of	things	in	between	that,	and	the	more	things	go	on,	the	more	
you	 talk	about	 embodying	national	 values.	 You	know,	 the	more	 you	 talk	about	
that	 Scotland’s	a	 state	of	mind..but	 it’s	 a	 state	of	mind	 that	 you	need	 to	 share,	
otherwise	you’re	not	properly	Scottish.	The	less	comfortable	I	became	with	it	all.	Here	 Jim	 raises	 some	 intriguing	 issues	 regarding	what	 he	 seems	 to	 describe	 as	 the	spectrum	of	nationalism.	Rather	than	having	two	polar	opposites	—	a	civic,	pragmatic	nationalism	and	ethnic	nationalism	and	 fascism	—	 Jim	argues	 there	are	 “a	 range	of	things	between	that”	or	a	continuum	of	ways	in	which	nationalist	ideas	are	expressed.	This	 links	 to	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	 arguments	 which	 advise	 against	 simply	 labelling	nationalist	narratives	as	‘civic’	or	‘ethnic’.			
Importantly,	what	made	 Jim	uncomfortable	was	 the	portrayal	 of	 Scotland	as	having	certain	national	values,	and	that	in	order	to	truly	belong,	one	would	need	to	sign	up	to	these	 Scottish	 values.	 Jim	 quite	 neatly	 captures	 a	 key	 point	 with	 his	 reference	 to	“Scotland’s	 state	 of	mind”.	 During	 the	 campaign,	 Scotland	 came	 to	 be	 reified	 as	 an	almost	 person-like	 entity	 with	 a	 distinct	 character	 and	 identity	 of	 its	 own	 —	spearheaded	 by	 the	 SNP’s	 vision	 and	 understanding	 of	 what	 Scotland	 is	—	 rather	than	being	seen	as	a	conglomeration	of	heterogeneous	individuals.				
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5.5.	‘Scottish	exceptionalism’,	Westminster,	and	the	English	This	chapter	has	focused	on	the	more	positive	ideas	around	Scottishness:	that	is,	the	claim	that	there	are	certain	“Scottish	values	that	define	us”,	and	that	“these	values	are	part	of	an	uninterrupted	national	story	evident	since	the	Enlightenment”.	However,	in	order	to	construct	a	national	imaginary,	it	is	not	enough	to	argue	who	we	are,	but	also	who,	or	what,	we	are	not	—	this	idea	of	the	‘national	other’	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.			
In	 the	 Scottish	 case,	 for	 SNP	 politicians	 Westminster	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	representing	 opposing	 values.	 The	 SNP	 have	 been	 careful	 to	 make	 reference	 to	‘Westminster	 values’	 (though	 see	 quote	 from	 Salmond	 on	 p.153),	 and	 to	 avoid	 any	essentialised	 notions	 of	 Englishness	 or	 ‘English	 values’.	 	 However,	 in	 the	 English	participants’	 experience	—	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives	 and	 encounters	—	 and	 in	 their	understandings	 of	 the	 political	 messages,	 they	 felt	 that	 they	 came	 to	 embody	‘Westminster	politics’	and	the	opposing,	‘un-Scottish	values’	(I	will	revisit	this	theme	in	Chapter	7).	Thus,	the	English	participants	came	to	interpret	conceptualisations	of	‘Westminster’	as	coded	references	to	English	identity.			
As	Henderson	and	McEwen	note,	(2005:183),	“the	 idea	that	Scots	hold	dear	a	set	of	values	 that	 distinguishes	 them	 from	 their	 English	 neighbours	 was	 especially	prominent	during	the	Thatcher	years,	and	informed	the	movement	for	Scottish	self-government”.	Thus,	as	the	authors	argue:		
The	1980s	witnessed	 three	 trends	 in	 Scottish	politics:	 the	 steady	decline	 in	 the	
Conservative	 vote;	 the	 strengthening	 of	 Scottish	 national	 identity;	 and	 the	
increased	 demand	 for	 Scottish	 home	 rule.	 These	 trends	were	 interrelated.	 The	
decline	 in	 the	 Conservative	 vote	 in	 Scotland,	 coupled	 with	 the	 continued	
dominance	 of	 that	 party	 in	 Westminster,	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 view	 that	 Scottish	
values	 and	 policy	 priorities	 were	 increasingly	 different	 from	 those	 held	 in	
England.	(2005:183-4)	During	 this	 time,	opposition	parties	—	especially	Labour	and	 the	SNP	—	“nurtured	and	 articulated	 collectivist	 values	 as	 ‘Scottish’	 values	 and	 a	 symbolic	 reflection	 of	Scottish	national	 identity.	Being	Scottish	was	 considered	 to	 reflect	 a	belief	 in	 social	justice	and	egalitarianism”	(Henderson	and	McEwen,	2005:184).	More	recently,	since	
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around	the	time	of	the	Scottish	devolution,	there	has	been	a	continuous	trajectory	of	juxtaposing	 ‘Scotland’s	 values’	 against	 those	 seen	 to	 emanate	 from	Westminster.	 In	1998,	Salmond	argued	that	“the	twin	values	of	compassion	and	enterprise”	underpin	“our	 culture	 and	 identity”	 and	 that	 they	 are	 anathema	 to	 the	 “social	 and	 economic	conservatism	 of	 Blair”	 (in	 Henderson	 and	 McEwen,	 2004:185).	 This	 juxtaposition	between	‘Scottish	values’	and	‘Westminster	values’	became	very	evident	and	a	central	tenet	of	the	referendum	debates.		
The	existence	of	an	Other	is	important	when	considering	values,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	concept	of	(national)	community,	on	the	other.	Let	us	focus	on	values	first	of	all.	Simmel	 emphasises	 the	 relationality	 of	 values,	 and	 notes	 that	 the	 creation	 and	consolidation	 of	 values	 does	 not	 stop	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 of	 desire	 (Cantó	Milà,	2005:156).	Thus,	“Simmel	argues	that	the	processes	that	make	individual	valuations	objective	 values	 are	 of	 social	 and	 relational	 character”.	 ”"[I]nitially	 subjective	valuations	 reach	 out	 beyond	 their	 subjective	 origins,	 and	 are	 crystallised	 into	objectified	values	which	become	independent	of	the	desiring	subjects,	facing	them	as	objective	realities”	(Cantó	Milà,	2005:156).	What	makes	any	valuation	possible	is	its	comparative	quality,	the	weighing	of	the	valuation	of	one	thing	against	another.	This	comparison,	 then,	 eventually	 crystallises	 “into	 a	 scale	 of	 values	which	 is	 bestowed	upon	each	object”	(Cantó	Milà,	2005:157).	In	order	to	illustrate	his	point,	Simmel	uses	the	analogy	of	length.	He	goes	on	to	say	that,		
…a	line	gains	the	quality	of	length	only	by	comparison	with	others.	For	its	length	
is	determined	not	by	itself	—	since	it	 is	not	simply	 ‘long’	—	but	by	another	line	
against	which	it	is	measured	(…).	If	we	were	to	assume	that	there	is	only	a	single	
line	 in	the	whole	world,	 it	would	not	have	any	specific	 length	since	 it	 lacks	any	
relation	to	others.	It	is	impossible	to	measure	the	world	as	a	whole,	because	there	
is	 nothing	outside	 the	worlds	 in	 relation	 to	which	 it	 could	have	a	 specific	 size.	
This	 is	 true	 of	 a	 line	 so	 long	 as	 it	 is	 considered	without	 being	 compares	 with	
others,	 or	without	 its	 own	parts	 being	 compared	with	 each	 other;	 it	 is	 neither	
short	nor	long,	but	lies	outside	the	whole	category.	(2004	[1900]:83-84).			In	order	for	the	SNP	to	portray	Scottish	values	as	progressive,	a	point	of	comparison	—	Westminster	and	the	values	it	is	seen	to	embody	—	is	needed.	Values	do	not	exist	in	a	vacuum	but	require	a	comparator.		
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The	SNP’s	referendum	campaign	was,	as	explained,	built	around	the	expression	of	the	supposedly	 intrinsically	 ‘Scottish	 values’	 of	 democracy,	 fairness	 and	entrepreneurship/prosperity	 —	 and	 independence	 was	 justified	 as	 a	 means	 to	achieve	the	implementation	of	these	values.	This	process	was,	in	turn,	seen	as	being	hindered	 by	 Westminster	 politics,	 by	 the	 Conservatives	 in	 particular	 and	 their	austerity	 agenda.	 Indeed,	 Scottish	 values	 and	 their	 enactment	 were	 portrayed	 as	being	in	direct	opposition	to	Westminster	and	the	actions	of	the	UK	government:	
Right	now,	UK	government	reforms	to	welfare	risk	punishing	vulnerable	people.	
The	 approach	 of	 a	 Scottish	 government	 will	 be	 more	 closely	 aligned	 with	
Scotland’s	 social	 democratic	 values	 than	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 Westminster	
government.	(Your	Scotland,	Your	Future,	2011:16)	
In	the	face	of	appalling	financial	pressures,	we	have	have	chosen	a	different	path	
from	Westminster	—	a	path	that	reflects	Scotland’s	social	democratic	consensus,	
our	shared	progressive	values,	our	priorities	as	a	society.	(FM	Alex	Salmond,	SNP	Spring	conference	address,	23	March	2013)	 	
With	each	passing	day	it	becomes	clearer	that	the	Westminster	system	is	not	fit	
for	any	purpose	—	it	is	further	away	than	ever	from	Scotland’s	values,	and	past	
its	time.	(FM	Alex	Salmond,	SNP	Spring	conference	address,	23	March	2013)			As	 these	examples	demonstrate,	FM	Alex	Salmond,	and	 the	SNP	more	broadly	 in	 its	independence	White	 Paper,	 directly	 position	 Scotland’s	 shared	progressive	 values	 as	different	from	those	being	supported	at	Westminster	(again,	SNP’s	claims	are	clearly	made	with	 reference	 to	Westminster,	 rather	 than	England).	 In	 the	36	SNP	 speeches	analysed,	Westminster	was	mentioned	in	25.	Interestingly,	the	case	for	independence	was	illuminated	vis-à-vis	policies	implemented	by	Conservative	governments	such	as	the	 poll	 tax	 (instituted	 by	 Thatcher’s	 government	 in	 1989),	 and	 the	 more	 recent	bedroom	tax	(instituted	by	Cameron’s	government	in	2013).			
Now,	 these	 two	 taxes	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 —	 with	 great	 justification	 —	 as	detrimental	to	social	and	economic	equality.	In	the	36	SNP	speeches	analysed,	the	poll	tax	 was	 mentioned	 in	 two	 and	 the	 bedroom	 tax	 in	 eight.	 Salmond,	 for	 example,	concluded	that	after	independence,	“Westminster	governments,	rejected	at	the	ballot	box	in	Scotland,	will	no	longer	be	able	to	inflict	the	poll	tax	or	the	bedroom	tax	on	the	
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most	 vulnerable	 people	 in	 our	 society”	 (The	 Scottish	 Government,	 2013:x).	 These	policies	 do	 heighten	 social	 and	 economic	 inequalities	 and	 they,	 thus,	 deserve	 to	 be	criticised.	What	 is	of	 interest	here	 from	a	nationalism	point	of	view	 is	 that	 they	are	linked	to	arguments	about	Scottish	distinctiveness.		
Recently,	Mooney	(2016:68)	has	noted	how,	
…in	the	hands	of	the	SNP	in	particular,	though	this	is	not	confined	to	the	SNP,	the	
idea	 of	 Scotland	 as	 progressive	 on	 social	 welfare	 is	 used	 as	 a	 way	 of	
distinguishing	 Scotland	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	UK.	 In	 particular	 it’s	 been	 used	 to	
distance	 Scotland	 from	England.	 So	 all	 the	 ‘bad’	 things	 in	welfare	 and	welfare	
‘reform’,	as	well	as	other	policies	taking	place	in	England	(…)	are	seen	as	driven	
by	a	 London-based	government	 that	was/is	 seriously	 out	 of	 tune	with	 Scottish	
values	and	aspirations.	Mooney	 and	 Poole	 note	 the	 “long-standing	 assumptions	 about	 ‘Scottish	distinctiveness’	that	embody	a	number	of	inter-related	claims”	—	that	is,	claims	to	do	with	institutional	differences	regarding	the	organisation	and	delivery	of	social	welfare	and	policy.	The	claims	are	
…that	Scottish	social	and	political	actors	engage	with	the	issue	of	social	welfare	
within	 a	 distinctive	 discursive	 context	 using	 different,	 at	 times	 less	 normative	
language,	 to	 that	used	 in	England;	and	 that	 ‘the	Scots’	 are	more	 committed	 to	
social	 democracy,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 social	 welfare	 policy	 and	 delivery.	(2004:459)	Nonetheless,	it	must	be	pointed	out	that	Lord	Ashcroft’s	immediate	snap	poll	of	2,000	voters	 following	 the	 referendum	 showed	 that	 the	main	 issues	 driving	 the	 yes	 vote	were,	 firstly,	 “disaffection	 with	 Westminster	 policies”	 —	 that	 is,	 that	 the	 UK	parliament	is	“increasingly	out	of	touch	with	the	needs	of	Scotland”	—	and,	secondly,	there	 were	 worries	 about	 the	 future	 of	 the	 NHS	 in	 Scotland	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	concerns	 of	 privatisation	 (Mooney	 and	 Scott,	 2015:10).	 Thus,	 there	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	genuine	and	real	appetite	for	change	which	was	due	to	people	feeling	removed	from	Westminster	 policies.	 However,	 what	 is	 of	 importance	 is	 that	 the	 SNP	 sought	 to	channel	this	feeling	into	a	claim	about	 ‘Scottish	values’	and	a	homogenising	vision	of	the	‘nation’s	character’.		
In	 addition	 to	 framing	Westminster	 as	 embodying	 ‘un-Scottish	 values’,	Westminster	
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was	 also	 othered	 by	 situating	 Scotland	 and	 Westminster	 in	 an	 unequal	 power	relationship.	 Therefore,	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘English	 oppression’	 surfaced	 during	 the	referendum	campaign.	In	order	to	illustrate	this,	let	us	consider	the	following	excerpt	from	one	of	the	SNP’s	referendum	publications:			
An	 independent	 Scotland	 would	 be	 following	 over	 50	 nations	 that	 were	 once	
ruled	 from	Westminster,	 like:	 United	 States,	 Ireland,	 Canada,	 Australia,	 South	
Africa,	India,	Pakistan,	New	Zealand,	Barbados,	Singapore.	(Choice:	An	Historic	Opportunity	for	Our	Nation,	2012:10)	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 certain	 powers	 are	 reserved	 to	 Westminster	 and,	 therefore,	Scotland	 is	 technically	 “ruled	 from	 Westminster”	 on	 some	 matters,	 Scots	 do,	 of	course,	vote	in	Westminster	elections	and	send	representatives	to	the	UK	parliament.	This	 is	 an	 obvious	 yet	 important	 qualification	 as,	historically,	 British	 colonies	—	as	listed	 above	—	 did	 not	 have	 the	 privilege	 of	 being	 represented	 in	 the	 parliament.	Thus,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	SNP	are	drawing	a	false	comparison	between	Scotland	and	the	colonial	experience	of	countries	such	as	India	or	Barbados.			
This	 excerpt	 does	 not	 only	 disregard	 this	 imbalance	 of	 representation;	 more	fundamentally,	 it	disregards	 the	power	 imbalance	between	 the	 former	colonies	and	the	 British	 Empire	—	 which	 Scotland	 was	 a	 part	 of	 —	 and	 it	 also	 disregards	 the	central	 role	 played	 by	 many	 Scots	 within	 that	 Empire	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	 By	 listing	Scotland	alongside	such	countries	as	India,	Pakistan	and	Barbados,	the	SNP	seem	to	be	implicitly	presenting	Scotland	as	an	equally	colonised	nation	which,	to	me,	seems	misguided	 and	 perplexing.	 During	 the	 campaigning	 period,	 I	 attended	 an	independence	referendum	debate	in	Glasgow	on	9	March	2014	where	Anas	Sarwar	(a	then	Labour	MP,	currently	a	Labour	MSP)	“criticised	the	Yes	camp	for	trying	to	make	the	 referendum	 about	 the	 British	 Empire	 or	 British	 imperialism	 and	 its	 rights	 and	wrongs”.	Furthermore,		
…he	 noted	 how	 Scotland	 was	 not	 a	 victim	 of	 the	 empire	—	 and	 we	 shouldn’t	
pretend	as	if	this	was	the	case	—	but,	rather,	at	the	very	heart	of	 it	and	not	on	
the	 sidelines.	 He	 noted	 how	 fifty	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 governments	 that	 have	 ruled	
Punjab	were	British	—	or	Scottish.	(fieldnotes,	Glasgow,	9.3.2014)		
Interestingly,	this	idea	of	‘Scottish	victimhood’	was	also	a	narrative	echoed	by	some	of	
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the	participants	in	the	interviews.	Indeed,	I	am	deliberately	using	these	interviews	to	explore	 the	 effects	 and	 the	 real	 life	 consequences	 of	 coded	 expressions	 of	 Scottish	exceptionalism.	 What	 transpires	 through	 the	 data	 is	 that	 Scotland	 was	 often	portrayed	as	being	controlled	and	ruled	by	England.	Ahsan	explains	what	he	sees	as	the	Scots’	dislike	of	the	English	as	being	due	to	England’s	control	over	Scotland:	Ahsan:	 They	 [Scots]	 just	 don’t	 like	 them	 [the	 English],	 I	 don’t	 know	 why.	
Obviously,	 um,	 they	 think,	 um,	 see	 the	 English	 people,	 they,	 like,	 took	 over	
everything	from	Scotland	and	they’re	ruling	them,	you	know.	And	um,	everything	
is	 coming	 from	England	 to	 Scotland,	which	 is	 like	 their	 benefits	 and	 their,	 um,	
economic	 things	 and	 obviously...obviously	 it’s	 like	 a,	 it’s	 like	 a	 different	 thing	
which	 is	happening	and	which	they	don’t	 like.	They	want	their	own	things.	 (38	years	old,	Pakistani,	shopworker;	cab	driver;	student,	did	not	disclose	how	he	voted)			Chalwe,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 goes	 a	 step	 further	 and	 refers	 to	 Scots’	 hatred	 of	 the	English:	Chalwe:	 Right.	 I	 thought	 the,	 I	 thought	 the	 Yes	 campaign…was	 about	 being	
patriotic.	Minna:	Mmm.	Chalwe:	 It	was	about	being	Scottish,	 it	was	about	 the	hatred	 for	 the	English.	 I	
was	 -	 -	 you	 see,	 I’m	 speaking	 from	 -	 -folk	 I	 spoke	 on	 the	 grassroots.	 I	 give	 an	
example:	one	woman	said	‘I	hate	the	English,	look	at	what	they	did	to	us’.		But	the	
same	person,	interviewed	on	telly,	will	not	say	that.	They’ll	probably	just	say	‘oh	
no,	we	 just	want	 to	be	 independent’.	 (…)	 [O]thers	 thought	 independence	meant	
being	 Scottish,	 now	 you	 can	 stand	 on	 your	 own,	 you	 don’t	 need	 the	 English,	
they’ve,	 they	 killed	 our	Queen	Mary.	 Look	 at	what	Margaret	 Thatcher	 did,	 she	
took	away	our	jobs	and	so	on.	They	bring	up	that	history.	(…)	And,	they	looked	at	
that	as	being,	umm,	patronised	and	therefore	they	wanted	something	that	they	
could	do	on	their	own	as	Scots.	They	wanted	to	manage	their	own	moneys,	you	
know,	 revenue	 from	 the	 oil,	 um,	 reserves.	 You	 know,	 it’s	 patriotism	 in	 that	
particular	sense.	You	know,	the	Scottish	have	been	a	great	nation,	we	don’t	really	
need	the,	the	English.	Um,	they	would	cite,	umm,	Robert	Burns,	they	would	cite,	
umm,	 is	 it	Adam	Smith.	(Zambian,	 46	 years	 old,	 university	 student	 and	 office	worker,	voted	no)	Chalwe	suggests	that	the	Yes	campaign	was	about	being	patriotic,	and	that	patriotism	in	the	Scottish	context	involves	hatred	of	the	English.	Interestingly,	he	suggests	there	is	a	marked	difference	between	the	official,	public	discourse	seen	on	TV,	for	example,	and	what	 transpires	 on	 the	 grassroots	 level.	While	 there	was,	 in	 Chalwe’s	 view,	 an	underlying	 current	 of	 anti-Englishness	within	 the	 Yes	 campaign	—	 certainly	 on	 the	
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grassroots	level	as	he	sees	it	—	this	does	not	surface	and	enter	the	more	public	realm.			
Other	 interviewees	were	more	critical	about	 the	 idea	of	Scottish	victimhood.	Eilidh,	who	 is	 from	Guernsey	but	 often	mistaken	 as	English,	 and	Paula,	whose	parents	 are	English,	 both	 brought	 up	 the	 issue	 of	 Scotland	 being	 presented	 as	 the	 victim	 of	English	oppression:	I	asked	Eilidh	what	her	experience	of	Scottish	nationalism	is	and	how	does	it	affect	her	life.	She	replied	by	saying	that	“Oh,	I	have	been	abused	on	the	street	 when	 I’ve	 been	 heard	 speaking”	which	 is	 “not	 often”	 but	 “it	 has	 happened”.	Because	Eilidh	speaks	in	a	Standard	English	accent,	this,	then,	led	me	to	ask:		 Minna:	Yeah.	Is,	is	that-	-	do	you	feel	then	that	kind	of	Scottish	nationalism	is,	it’s	
a	lot	of	it	is	about	anti-Englishness	and	kind	of..i—is	that	a	big	part	of	it?	Eilidh:	I,	I	think	it	depends	on	who	you’re	talking	to,	but	yes.	Umm,	yeah,	a	lot	of	
it	 is	more	outgroup	stuff.	Umm,	or	umm	casting	ca-	-	people	casting	themselves	
as	oppressi-	-	oppressed	people,	victims,	you	know,	victims	of	English	oppression	
et	cetera,	et	cetera.		Minna:	Mmm.	Eilidh:	 Which	 completely	 ignores	 Glasgow’s	 history	 as	 a	 slave	 centre.	 Not	 to	
mention	 the,	umm...the	 leading	role	 that	Scottish	people	played	 in...the	colonial	
times	generally.	(From	Guernsey,	54	years	old,	social	worker,	voted	no)	
	
	Paula,	who	identified	there	being	anti-Englishness	in	the	Yes	campaign,	put	is	thusly:	Minna:	Yeah.	What	 about	 then	—	you	 said	 there	was	 some...you	 felt	 like	 there	
was	a	bit	of	anti-Englishness	in,	in	the	umm,	in	the	kind	of…Yes	campaign	and	—	
how	did	that	kind	of,	manifest	itself,	like,	in	what	ways	do	you	think	that	-	-		Paula:	Umm,	um...it	was	—	it	was	the	kind	of...we’ve	been	tied	into	this	union	for	
this	many	 years	 and	 that	 kept	 coming	 through	 and	 as	 if,	 like,	 we	 had	—	 like,	
Scotland	had	no	choice	in	being	part	of	the	union,	it	was	all	England	just	being	
bossy.	And	it	was	as	if	they	still	kind	of	were	holding	on	to	that	view	like,	we’re	
just	 under	 England’s	 thumb	 and	 I	 think...yeah,	 that’s	 just	 England	 and	
Westminster	kind	of	being	put	under	 the	 same	category.	 (…)	Mmhm,	yeah,	and	
even	 just…the	 formation	 of	 the	 union	 being	—	 like,	when	 it	 happened	 back	 in	
history,	 there	were	 using	 that	 as	 such	 a	 negative,	 like,	 we’ve	 been	 part	 of	 this	
union	for	this	long,	was	-	-	but	when	we	joined	the	union	the	history	wasn’t	-	-	the	
history	was	different	then	and	it	wasn’t	necessarily	England	taking	over,	 it	was	
kind	 of	 a	 bailout	 for	 England,	 so…	 (English,	 21	 years	 old,	 university	 student,	voted	no)	
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Both	 therefore	 underline	 Scotland’s	 active	 role	 in	 the	 Union,	 and	 Eilidh	 is	 highly	critical	 of	 Scotland	being	 cast	 as	 a	 victim	—	especially	due	 to	Scotland’s	prominent	role	 in	the	British	Empire	and	the	slave	economy.	Paula	notes	that	Scotland	was	not	dragged	 into	 the	Union	against	 its	will,	 and	she	criticises	 the	way	 in	which	England	and	 Westminster	 are	 often	 conflated.	 For	 these	 interviewees,	 the	 idea	 of	 seeing	Scotland	as	the	victim	has	little	traction.		
While	Westminster,	as	we	have	seen,	was	referred	to	as	the	polar	opposite	of	Scotland	especially	 in	 terms	 of	 values	 —	 as	 also	 identified	 elsewhere	 (Mooney	 and	 Scott,	2016:248)	—	the	Nordic	countries	and	the	Nordic	model	of	a	welfare	state	were	often	evoked	 as	 a	 standard	 that	 Scotland	 should	 aspire	 to,	 and	 could	 reach,	 as	 an	independent	country.	Nordic	countries	often	surfaced	as	a	topic	of	discussion	during	the	referendum;	for	example,	in	the	36	SNP	speeches	analysed	they	were	mentioned	in	 12.	 This	 tendency	 did	 not	 go	 unnoticed	 by	 the	 participants:	 Eilidh,	 for	 example,	noted	 that	 “at	 the	 moment	 the	 SNP	 are	 promoting	 themselves	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 Scandi	party”.	She	was	not	sure	“how	long	that	will	last”	and	said	this	‘branding’	“certainly	is	very	new”	because	the	SNP	was	“not	always	so..inclusive	or	so..cuddly”.			
Agnieszka,	 a	 25-year-old	 Polish	 university	 student	 who	 voted	 yes,	 recalled	 how,	during	 the	 referendum,	 “out	 of	 a	 sudden	 there	 was	 so	 many	 questions	 about,	 eh,	Nordic	 heritage”.	 	 Having	 a	 Danish	 boyfriend	made	 her	 pay	more	 attention	 to	 how	often	Nordic	countries	were	mentioned,	and	Scotland’s	“Viking	past”	was	brought	up.	She	 interpreted	 this	 as	 being	 an	 attempt	 to	 “break	 away	 from..British	 heritage	 and	British	culture	and	English	as	well”	and	“sort	of	trying	to	develop	into	something	else,	sort	of	 the	other	side”.	Agnieszka	noted	how	there	was	a	desire	 to	break	away	 from	one	thing	“but	also	trying	to	forge	another	thing”	without	Scotland	really	“stand[ing]	by	 itself”.	 	 In	 these	 excerpts,	 we	 can	 indeed	 see	 how	 the	 SNP	 positions	 the	 Nordic	countries	—	Norway,	 Denmark,	 Sweden	 and	 Finland	—	 as	 bastions	 of	 fairness	 and	equality:		
Nations	that	are	similar	to	Scotland	—	such	as	Norway,	Finland,	Denmark	and	
Sweden	—	 sit	 at	 the	 top	 of	world	wealth	 and	well-being	 league	 tables.	 Unlike	
Scotland,	 they	 are	 independent	 and	 are	 able	 to	 take	 decisions	 in	 the	 best	
interests	 of	 their	 own	 economies.	 They	 do	 not	 leave	 the	 important	 decisions	
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about	 their	 economy	 to	 parliaments	 whose	 interests	 necessarily	 lie	 elsewhere.	
That	 is	 their	 independence	 advantage	 and	 they	 have	 used	 it	 to	 build	 societies	
that	deliver	a	higher	quality	of	life	for	their	citizens.	(The	Scottish	Government,	2013:43)	
European	 nations	 such	 as	 Denmark,	 Sweden	 and	 Norway	 are	 among	 the	 ten	
most	 equal	 countries	 in	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	
Development.	Under	devolution	we	can	frame	policies	which	allow	us	to	do	a	bit	
better	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 UK,	 to	 mitigate	 Westminster’s	 mistakes.	 (FM	 Alex	Salmond,	 ‘Independence	 from	 the	 Political	 and	 Economic	 Union’,	 Dalrymple	Hall,	2	September	2013)			However,	such	characterisations	conjure	up	a	very	one-sided	and	idealised	picture	of	the	‘Nordic	welfare	model’.	It	is	important	to	note	that	we	have	witnessed	increasing	inequalities	in	the	Nordic	countries	(see	e.g.	Kvist	et	al	2012)	and	the	proliferation	of	austerity	 measures	 (Kvist	 &	 Greve,	 2011).	 Since	 the	 recession	 in	 the	 mid-1990s,	foodbanks	and	‘bread	lines’	(leipäjono)	have	been	a	stable	feature	of	Finnish	society.	While	 Finland	 identifies	 itself	 as	 a	 Nordic	 welfare	 state	 (Silvasti,	 2015:471),	 the	existence	of	 food	aid	seems	to	contest	 this	dominant	characterisation15.	 In	2015	the	Finnish	government	announced	major	budgetary	cuts	(Helsingin	Sanomat,	28.5.2015)	which	targeted	areas	such	as	education	and	social	security.	Thus,	it	is	crucial	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	way	in	which	the	SNP	frame	Nordic	countries	as	unproblematically	fair,	 equal	 and	progressive	 (let	 us	 also	not	 forget	 that	 right-wing	nationalist	 parties	such	 as	 the	 Sweden	 Democrats,	 Danish	 People’s	 Party	 and	 The	 Finns	 Party	 —	formerly	 known	 as	 True	 Finns	 —	 have	 had	 great	 political	 success	 recently)	 is	profoundly	misguided	and	unhelpful.			
Thus,	what	is	interesting	in	terms	of	the	SNP’s	rhetorical	use	of	the	Nordic	countries	and	 the	 Nordic	 welfare	model	—	 even	 if	 this	 understanding	 is	 flawed	 as	 has	 been	argued	above	—	is	what	the	SNP’s	approach	is	telling	and	revealing	in	terms	of	how	nationalist	narratives	operate.	As	argued	by	Zimmer	(2003),	 the	 focus	should	be	on	the	 processes	 and	 mechanisms	 which	 social	 actors	 use	 when	 reconstructing	 the	boundaries	of	national	 identity.	Rather	than	drawing	on	an	 idea	of	an	 ‘Other’	that	 is																																																									15	Although	it	has	been	argued	that	the	emergence	and	persistence	of	food	aid	in	Finland	cannot	fully	be	explained	as	a	social	and	poverty	policy	issue	(see	Silvasti,	2015).	
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different	from	Scotland	in	a	negative	way	(such	as	Westminster	is	in	terms	of	its	‘un-Scottish	 values’),	 Nordic	 countries	 are	 portrayed	 as	 positive	 examples	 of	 how	 the	state’s	welfare	structures,	for	example,	should	be	organised.	By	extension,	after	being	independent	—	 as	 the	 Nordic	 countries	 are	—	 the	 SNP	 would	 be	 able	 to	 build	 a	system	 akin	 to	 the	 Nordic	 societies	 that	 reflected	 the	 national,	 Scottish	 values	 in	practice.	 Thus,	 with	 reference	 to	 nationalist	 processes,	 comparisons	 to	 other	countries	 can	 also	be	 aspirational.	This,	 then,	 is	opposed	 to	 the	nationalist	 trope	of	portraying	the	‘nation’s	other’	in	antagonistic	terms	(‘who	or	what	we	are	not’).			
5.6.	Conclusion	
	In	conclusion,	drawing	on	data	from	my	content	analysis	and	interviews,	this	chapter	has	looked	at	the	ways	in	which	the	Scottish	nation	has	been	framed	and	imagined	as	a	‘value	community’,	and	I	have	argued	for	the	importance	of	understanding	values	as	a	 crucial	 building	 block	 in	 nationalist	 narratives.	 Theoretically,	 this	 chapter	 has	drawn	 on	 Zimmer’s	 (2003)	 approach	 which	 challenges	 the	 civic/ethnic	 dichotomy	and	focuses	on	different	boundary	mechanisms,	both	voluntaristic	and	organic,	social	actors	use	to	reconstruct	boundaries	of	national	 identity,	as	well	as	on	the	different	symbolic	resources	(such	as	values	and	history)	that	are	drawn	on	when	boundaries	are	 being	 constructed.	 While,	 as	 Lægaard	 notes,	 critics	 “are	 right	 in	 arguing	 that	shared	 political	 values,	which	 are	 among	 the	 symbolic	 resources	 listed	 by	 Zimmer,	cannot	by	themselves	generate	the	differentiation	or	boundary	which	is	necessary	for	them	 to	 qualify	 as	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 nation”,	 critics	 are	 nonetheless	 wrong	 to	deduce	“that	shared	political	values	cannot	provide	the	content	of	a	conception	of	the	nation”	 (2007:45).	 Thus,	 values	 are	 an	 important	 symbolic	 resource	 drawn	 on	 by	political	actors,	among	others,	in	their	narratives	of	the	nation.		
This	chapter	put	forward	a	number	of	arguments	based	on	the	research	data.	Firstly,	it	was	 shown	 how	 certain	 values	 such	 as	 fairness,	 democracy	 and	 prosperity	were	heavily	drawn	on	by	 the	SNP	during	 the	 referendum	campaign.	These	values	were,	importantly,	 framed	 as	 being	 Scottish	 or	 Scotland’s	 values	—	 ‘our	 values’	—	which	would	 eventually	 be	 enshrined	 in	 a	 constitution.	 Secondly,	 these	 values	 were	
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explained	as	being	rooted	in	history	and	especially	the	Scottish	Enlightenment.	Here,	it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 how	 history	 is	 consciously	 used	 to	 justify	 claims	 about	Scottishness	while,	 in	relation	to	Homecoming	for	example	(as	discussed	in	Chapter	4)	certain	historical	events	are	not	spoken	about.			The	SNP	uses	claims	about	what	are	traditionally	termed	universal	values	—	such	as	fairness	and	equality	—	in	their	vision	of	Scotland	and	why	Scotland	should	become	independent.	Arguably,	a	national	 identity	based	on	values	can	be	a	 fairly	open	and	accessible	one:	as	 long	as	you	sign	up	 to	 the	 ‘national	values’,	you	are	a	member	of	said	 nation.	 As	 Henderson	 and	 McEwen	 note,	 “defining	 nation	 according	 to	 its	commitment	 to	 shared	values	can	serve	as	a	means	of	 inclusion”	 (2005:188).	Thus,	sharing	 what	 are	 framed	 as	 the	 core	 principles	 or	 ‘content’	 (see	 section	 1.6.)	 of	 a	specific	 national	 identity	 may	 give	 ethnic	 minorities	—	 especially	 recently	 arrived	migrants	—	a	stronger	sense	of	belonging	to	the	‘national	community’.				However,	 supposedly	 open	 and	 universal	 values	 can	 also	 be	 used	 in	 an	 exclusivist	way	 (by	 right-wing	 parties	 especially).	 Halikiopoulou	 et	 al’s	 (2013:109)	 study	 asks	“how	does	a	party	movement	pushing	what	amounts	to	an	ethnic	exclusivist	agenda	annex	the	values	of	tolerance,	liberalism	and	diversity	in	the	interest	of	mobilising	a	nation”?	In	answering	this,	the	authors	note	that	these	parties	identify	“these	values	as	 the	unique	patrimony	of	 the	nation,	 threatened	by	an	 influx	of	outsiders	who	do	not	share	and	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	adopt	them”	(2013:109).	Interestingly,	while	the	SNP,	of	course,	is	not	a	right-wing	party	and	as	such	does	not	fall	within	the	same	category	as	parties	covered	in	Halikiopoulou	et	al’s	study,	the	SNP	nonetheless	frame	certain	values	as	‘the	unique	patrimony	of	the	nation’.	However,	this	is	not	done	in	an	exclusivist	way	that	would	target	racialised	groups,	such	as	Muslims,	and	paint	them	as	 ‘incompatible	 with	 Western	 values’	 as	 has	 been	 evident	 in	 radical	 right	 wing	parties’	political	rhetoric	elsewhere	(e.g.	Swedish	Democrats,	The	Finns	Party,	Front	National,	Jobbik).	As	Zimmer	puts	it,		
…what	matters	with	regard	to	the	construction	of	national	identities	is	less	what	
resources	 political	 actors	 draw	 upon	 than	 how	 they	 put	 these	 resources	 to	
practical	use:	 the	 voluntarist	 conception	of	nationhood	processes	 the	available	
resources	 in	 voluntaristic	 terms	—	 as	 a	 product	 of	 human	 action;	 the	 organic	
conception	of	nationhood,	by	 contrast,	 processes	 the	 resources	 in	deterministic	
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terms	 —	 as	 manifestations	 of	 the	 communal	 organism	 called	 ‘the	 nation’.	(2003:181)			However,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 values	 are	 used	 in	 the	 SNP’s	 rhetoric	 is	 somewhat	paradoxical.	On	the	one	hand,	as	mentioned,	having	‘national	values’	as	the	basis	for	belonging	 can	 open	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 non-Scots	 laying	 claim	 to	 the	 national	community	 by	 declaring	 support	 and	 taking	 ownership	 of	 ‘national	 values’.	 On	 the	other	 hand,	 however,	 these	 values	 are	 constructed	 as	 inherent	 to	 Scottishness	 via	history.	 Thus,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 ethnic	 undertone	 to	 the	 seemingly	 open-ended	‘national	 community’.	 The	 framing	 of	 Scotland	 as	 a	 ‘value	 community’	 is	 done	organically;	that	is,	these	values	are	framed	as	Scottish	through	using	physiological	or	embodied	 analogies	 (such	 as	 ‘fairness	 runs	 through	 Scotland	 like	 a	 vein’).	Importantly,	 these	 perceived	 Scottish	 values	 —	 whose	 universality	 is	 at	 times	acknowledged	—	 are	 juxtaposed	 to	Westminster	 politics	 and	 values	 (furthermore,	these	politics	and	values	come	to	be	understood	as	specifically	 ‘English’	in	everyday	settings	as	will	be	further	discussed	in	Chapters	6	and	7).			Thirdly,	this	chapter	also	discussed	how	the	participants	echoed	the	SNP’s	views	and	understood	that	there	was	a	stronger	commitment	to	community	in	Scotland,	and	the	society	being	more	 ‘leftist’	or	 ‘socialist’.	They	thus	positioned	the	Scottish	society	as	adhering	 to	 more	 left-leaning	 values.	 Others,	 however,	 challenged	 the	 ‘Scotland	 as	more	equal’	 trope,	and	they	did	this	especially	with	regard	to	racism	and	a	sense	of	mythmaking	around	Scottishness.	This	raises	interesting	—	and	difficult	—	questions	with	regard	to	causation:	did	the	progressive	popular	understandings	push	the	SNP	to	 amend	 their	 construction	 and	 presentation	 of	 Scottish	 nationalism,	 or	 has	 the	SNP’s	 construction	 of	 Scotland	 as	 a	 value	 community	 gained	 traction	 among	 the	public?	It	is	difficult	to	draw	definitive	conclusions	but	it	seems	to	me	that	there	is	a	mutual	process	at	play.				Participants	—	 with	 some	 exceptions	—	 portrayed	 Scotland	 as	 being	 more	 leftist.	Even	 ‘the	 exceptions’,	 i.e.	 those	who	 did	 not	 sign	 up	 to	 this	 view,	 noted	 that	 there	exists	 a	 popular	 myth	 of	 Scotland	 being	 more	 ‘socially	 minded’.	 As	 Noor	 saw	 it,	Scotland	 ‘has	 always	 shown	 itself	 wanting	 to	 be	 a	 fairer	 society	 anyway’	 thus	
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suggesting	 there	exists	a	deeper	appetite	 for	advancing	equality.	 It	 therefore	makes	sense	 for	 the	 SNP	 to	 capitalise	 on	 this	 popular	 opinion	 and	 to	 transform	 it	 into	political	 capital	 and	 authority	 (in	 terms	 of	 representing	 the	 ‘popular	 opinion’).	Because	the	SNP	made	constant	use	of	the	‘Scottish	exceptionalism’	trope	during	the	referendum,	it	is	also	likely	that	this	message	was	picked	up	by	the	public	(especially	by	those	who	were	receptive	to	the	‘fairness	myth’	to	begin	with).	As	a	political	party,	the	SNP	remain	somewhat	of	an	enigma:	while	policies	such	as	universal	baby	boxes,	free	NHS	prescriptions,	and	lack	of	tuition	fees	can	certainly	be	perceived	as	 ‘leftist’	—	 and	 thus	 the	 party	 has	 come	 a	 long	 way	 since	 its	 ‘Tartan	 Tory’	 days	 —	commentators	are	hesitant	to	label	the	party	as	social	democratic	(Gall,	2015).			Finally,	this	chapter	focused	on	the	idea	of	 ‘Scottish	exceptionalism’	and	the	ways	in	which	rather	 than	merely	 focusing	on	the	positive	 ideas	around	what	defines	 ‘us’,	a	vision	of	 the	other	was	also	evident	 in	 the	SNP’s	understanding	of	 ‘Scottish	values’.	While	 the	 SNP’s	 use	of	 values	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 framing	of	 their	 nationalism	as	 civic,	these	 values	 are	 nonetheless	 presented	 as	 an	 innate	 feature	 of	 Scots	 passed	 down	through	 history	 and	 they	 are	 used	 to	 draw	 boundaries	 and	 to	 exclude	 others.	Specifically,	 it	 is	Westminster	(and	England)	that	comes	to	represent	this	other,	and	embody	 ‘un-Scottish’	values.	 Interestingly,	during	 the	 interviews	a	 related	 theme	of	‘Scottish	victimhood’	 also	 surfaced	which	was	 seen	as	 a	 valid	 framing	by	 some	and	challenged	by	others.		
So	 far,	 the	 focus	has	been	mainly	on	narratives,	 social	constructions	and	discourses	both	 from	 above	 as	 well	 as	 below.	 While	 these	 are	 important	 to	 map	 out	 and	understand,	 is	 it	 crucial	not	 to	 lose	 sight	of	 the	material	 and	very	 real	 effects	 these	often	fairly	abstract-seeming	imaginings	have	in	people’s	lives.	Thus,	the	next	chapter	will	 focus	on	 the	everyday	 lives	of	ethnic	minorities	and	how	nationalist	narratives	shape	and	impact	on	the	lives	of	ordinary	people	—	especially	those	whose	claim	to	the	 nation	 (McCrone	 and	Bechhofer,	 2010)	might	 come	under	 challenge.	 Chapter	 6	will	build	on	the	ideas	and	theories	which	have	been	introduced	and	discussed	so	far,	but	the	focus	will	be	on	the	lived	realities	of	people	and	the	ways	in	which	they	make	sense	of	and	understand	their	experiences.	
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Chapter	6		Friendly	and	Welcoming?:	Experiencing	nationalism	in	Scotland			
6.1.	Introduction	
The	previous	two	chapters	have	investigated	nationalism	in	Scotland,	as	represented	by	the	SNP,	in	relation	to	their	alleged	civicness	(and	challenged	such	definitions	both	conceptually	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 substantive	 evidence)	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	idea	of	 ‘values’	are	taken	advantage	of	 in	the	SNP’s	nationalist	narratives.	Chapter	4	has	focused	more	firmly	on	nationalism	‘from	above’,	and	Chapter	5	has	considered	views	 from	 both	 ‘above’	 and	 ‘below’.	 This	 chapter,	 however,	 focuses	 firmly	 on	people’s	 everyday	 experiences	 and	 understandings	 with	 regard	 to	 Scotland,	Scottishness	 and	 nationalism.	 Thus,	 it	 seeks	 to	 uncover	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ethnic	minorities	 (including	 more	 recent	 migrants	 and	 those,	 though	 native-born,	 whose	parents	or	grandparents	migrated	to	Scotland	—	see	section	3.3.1.1.)	make	sense	of	Scottish	public	political	rhetoric	around	nationalism,	as	well	as	how	the	participants	experience	—	and	potentially	 challenge	—	nationalist	 ideas	 and	narratives	 in	 their	daily	lives.			
The	chapter	will	start	by	considering	the	importance	of	studying	the	everyday	more	generally,	and	in	relation	to	‘ethnicity’	more	specifically.	As	argued	in	Chapter	2,	while	everyday	 nationalism	 studies	 have	 highlighted	 an	 important	 research	 agenda	 and	added	 valuable	 knowledge	 to	 how	 we	 understand	 and	 study	 nationalism,	 ethnic	minorities	have	remained	rather	 invisible	within	 this	area	of	study.	The	majority	of	studies	pertaining	to	everyday	nationalism	have	focused	on	the	‘white	majority’	and	the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 people	 —	 whose	 belonging	 often	 goes	 unquestioned	 —experience	 nationalism	 in	 mundane	 settings.	 Interesting	 and	 important	 as	 this	 is,	considering	the	experiences	of	those	who,	perhaps,	do	not	unproblematically	belong	to	 the	 national	 imaginary	 might	 open	 up	 new	 vistas	 for	 understanding	 how	nationalist	 narratives	 operate	 across	 time	 and	 space,	 and	 what	 their	 (im)material	consequences	on	people’s	lives	may	be.	
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Following	a	brief	overview	of	studies	of	the	everyday,	this	chapter	moves	on	to	look	at	 the	ways	 in	which	 Scotland	was	 often	 portrayed	 as	 a	 ‘welcoming’	 and	 ‘friendly’	place	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	 the	 participants.	 Importantly,	 as	 with	 the	 SNP’s	 contrast	between	 ‘Scotland’s	 values’	 and	 those	perceived	 to	 emanate	 from	Westminster,	 the	participants	juxtaposed	Scotland’s	‘friendliness’	to,	as	they	saw	it,	the	lack	thereof	in	England.	Following	this	discussion,	the	differences	between	urban	and	rural	Scotland	will	be	interrogated.	The	participants	flagged	up	that	rural	areas	were	often	imagined	or	deemed	 to	be	unwelcoming	or	even	hostile	 towards	 ‘outsiders’.	 Importantly,	 the	chapter	will	consider	the	ways	in	which	visibility	and	difference	operate,	and	what	it	means	to	go	unnoticed	or	to	be	inconspicuous.	Because	anti-Englishness	surfaced	as	a	key	theme	during	the	interviews,	this	chapter	will	briefly	consider	its	significance	in	Scottish	nationalist	narratives	and	understandings.				
6.2.	Studying	everyday	nationalism,	‘ethnicity’	and	racism		This	chapter	will	focus	on	the	participants’	everyday	experiences	of	living	in	Scotland,	especially	 from	 the	 vantage	 points	 of	 everyday	 nationalism,	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 racism.	Scott	 (2009:2-3)	notes	how	 the	 ‘everyday’	as	an	object	of	 study	 “enjoyed	an	absent	presence”	in	sociology	—	while	classic	studies	focusing	on	poverty	(Rowntree	1901),	family	and	kinship	(Willmott	and	Young	1960)	and	deviance	(Becker	1963)	sought	to	demonstrate	 general	 social	 trends	 based	 on	 an	 examination	 of	 such	 trends	 on	people’s	lived	experiences,	it	is	only	recently	that	the	everyday	has	become	a	focus	of	study	in	its	own	right.	Here,	people	like	Lukács,	Lefebvre	and	de	Certeau	have	worked	as	‘path	breakers’	(Scott,	2009:3).				Scott	(2009:3)	notes	how	Bennett	and	Watson	(2002)	offer	three	perspectives	as	to	why	 this	 shift	 came	 about.	 Firstly,	 they	 note,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 change	 in	 our	understanding	regarding	what	is	worthy	of	public	representation,	and	there	has	been	an	 increased	 interest	 in	 ‘ordinary’	 people’s	 lives.	 Secondly,	 there	 is	 a	 Foucauldian	argument	to	be	made:	because	we	live	in	a	 ‘disciplinary	society’	where	our	lives	are	subject	 to	 control,	 regulation	 and	 surveillance,	 the	 everyday	merits	 close	 attention.	
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Finally,	 they	 argue	 that	 the	 rise	 of	 social	 movements	 (such	 as	 women’s	 and	 civil	rights)	 brought	 questions	 of	 identity	 and	 lifestyle	 differences	 to	 the	 vanguard	 of	political	 consciousness	 and	 changed	 the	 way	 in	 which	 we	 think	 about	 the	 social	world.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 three	 developments,	 individuals’	 private	 lives	 became	more	and	more	visible	to	academics	as	objects	worthy	of	study.			Essed	notes	that	the	everyday	is	vaguely	defined:	it	has	been	branded	as	that	which	is	‘ordinary’	by	Antaki	and	‘common	sense’	by	Furnham	(1991:47).	For	Scott,	everyday	life	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 those	 sites	 in	 which	 people	 do	 (i.e.	 perform,	 reproduce,	challenge)	social	life;	it	is	that	which	is	often		—	but	not	always	—	mundane,	familiar	and	unremarkable	as	well	as	routine,	repetitive	and	rhythmic	(Scott	2009:1-2).	You	get	 up	 in	 the	 morning	 as	 your	 alarm	 goes	 off;	 you	 brush	 your	 teeth;	 you	 have	breakfast;	you	run	down	the	street	in	order	to	catch	the	bus	to	work	—	and	so	it	goes.	However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 everyday	 phenomena	 are	 “trivial,	 benign	 or	insignificant:	 Martin	 (2003)	 reminds	 us	 that	 the	 everyday	 world	 is	 infused	 with	power,	politics	and	historical	significance”	(Scott,	2009:2).				Rather	than	conceptualising	the	notion	of	‘the	everyday’	in	terms	of	the	philosophy	of	everyday	 life,	 following	 Smith	 (1987),	 Essed	 (1991:47)	 seeks	 to	 understand	 it	 in	terms	of	the	categories	and	social	relations	operative	in	everyday	life	—	a	focus	which	this	 chapter	will	 also	 take.	 Essed	 explains	 that	 “everyday	 life	 always	 takes	 place	 in	and	 relates	 to	 the	 immediate	 environment	 of	 a	 person”;	 “a	world	 in	which	we	 are	located	 physically	 and	 socially”	 (1991:47).	 The	 content	 and	 structure	 may	 change	from	 person	 to	 person	 and,	 indeed,	 these	 can	 be	 different	 in	 different	 periods	 of	people’s	lives.	The	reason	why	everyday	life	matters	analytically	is	that	“everyday	life	is	not	only	 reproductive	of	persons	but	also	positions	of	persons	 in	 social	 relations	and	 of	 social	 relations	 themselves”	 (Smith,	 2016:6).	 Thus,	 what	 happens	 to	 and	between	us	contributes	 to	who	we	are,	 impacts	on	our	social	 location	as	well	as	on	the	ways	 in	which	 our	 interconnections	 and	 interrelations	 are	 structured.	 Further,	the	everyday	also	matters	because	“it	is	at	the	level	of	the	everyday,	not	at	the	level	of	abstract	structure,	that	much	of	the	‘persuasiveness’	of	‘race’”	—	or,	indeed,	any	other	concepts	such	as	‘nation’	—	“happens,	socially	speaking”	(Smith,	2016:6).			
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Andrew	 Smith	 urges	 us	 to	 remember	 that	 “understanding	 everyday	 racism”	—	 or	everyday	 nationalism	 for	 that	 matter	—	 “requires	 us	 to	 grasp	 the	 complexity	 and	political	significance	of	the	concept	of	everyday	itself”	(2016:8).	This	is	significant	in	at	 least	 two	 respects.	 Firstly,	 the	 everyday	 as	 a	 site	 of	 mundane,	 unreflective	 and	unremarkable	 events	 and	 happenings	 is	 a	 privilege.	 Smith	 (2016:9),	 drawing	 on	Essed’s	work	(1991),	notes	how	those	who	are	racialised	are	denied	the	possibility	of	acting	in	the	unreflective	ways	“that	characteriz[e]	much	of	what	we	do	in	everyday	life”.	That	is,	going	about	your	daily	business	unnoticed	and	in	an	unreflective	way	is	not	 always	 a	 possibility	 for	 those	who	 are	marked	 as	 ‘different’,	 as	 a	 ’threat’,	 or	 as	’inferior’	due	to	the	colour	of	their	skin	or	their	assumed	religion	(especially	Muslims	contemporarily).	Those	marked	out	as	different	often	cannot	pass	through	space	and	time	without	 someone,	 at	 some	point,	 challenging	 them,	 their	 very	being,	 and	 their	right	 to	occupy	a	certain	space.	The	same	goes	with	respect	 to	nationalism	(and,	as	will	 become	 clear	 in	 this	 chapter,	 everyday	 racism,	 nationalism	 and	 ‘ethnicity’	 are	closely	linked):	those	deemed	not	to	belong	to	the	nation	are	constantly	reminded	of	this,	and	of	their	status	as	a	‘stranger’.				Secondly,	 grasping	 the	 complexity	 and	 political	 significance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	everyday	 life	 is	 also	 significant	 because	 “the	 denial	 of	 everyday	 racism	 rests	 on	construing	 the	everyday	as	 that	which	 is	 trivial	or	 incidental	and	 thus	discrete:	not	meaningfully	connected	to	anything	beyond	itself”	(Smith,	2016:9).	Thus,	it	becomes	crucial	 to	 recognise	 the	 repetitiveness	 of	 experiences	 of	 everyday	 racism;	 to	recognise	experiences	which	happen	“day	after	day”	and	are	“routine	and	continuous	rather	 than	 arbitrary	 and	 discontinuous”	 (Smith,	 2016:9).	 Once	 the	 constant	 and	unrelenting	nature	of	racism	which	“systematically	shapes	daily	 life”	becomes	clear,	“its	 complicity	with	structures	of	 inequality	and	 their	endurance	comes	much	more	immediately	into	view”	(Smith,	2016:9).				What	is	of	interest	presently	are	the	ways	in	which	nationalism,	‘ethnicity’	and	racism	are	connected	as	well	as	experienced	and	understood	—	and	potentially	challenged	—	 by	 the	 participants	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives	 and	 everyday	 spaces.	 The	 key	 ideas	around	everyday	nationalism	studies	have	been	covered	in	Chapter	2	in	more	detail	and	need	not	be	discussed	at	length	again.	It	is	worth	pointing	out	here	however,	that	
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although	 nationalist	 ideas	 and	 rhetoric	 operate	 at	 the	 institutional	 level	 of	 politics,	and	 these	 ideas	 are	 given	 a	 platform	 through	 speeches	 and	 party	 political	publications,	 for	 example,	 it	 is	 mainly	 through	 everyday	 incidents	 that	 the	participants	 experienced	 and	 negotiated	 their	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 national	community.	 Of	 course,	 these	 everyday	 experiences	 are	 often	 informed	 by	 and	intimately	 linked	 to	 broader	 political	 debates,	 agenda	 and	 rhetoric.	 Everyday	situations	and	experiences	can	also	work	as	a	space	where	that	official	rhetoric	may	come	 under	 challenge.	 As	 Skey,	who	 studies	 everyday	 nationhood,	 puts	 it,	 through	“the	study	of	everyday	life”	we	can	uncover	“the	ways	in	which	a	complex	matrix	of	knowledge,	social	practices	and	institutional	settings	contribute	to	the	(re)production	of	a	relatively	consistent	and	meaningful	sense	of	 ‘reality’	 for	disparate	 individuals”	(2011:14).				Brexit	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 populist	 movements	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 US	 are	 examples	 of	“nationalism	on	steroids”	(Fox,	2017:26).	Though	these	“nationalist	fireworks”	attract	attention,	they	are	mere	“intermittent	bursts	of	nationalist	fervour	that	punctuate	an	otherwise	 flaccid,	 humdrum	 nationalism,	 the	 nationalism	 of	 everyday	 life”	 (Fox,	2017:26).	Once	 these	 fireworks	go	out,	nationalism	does	not	disappear	 “but	 it	does	fade	from	view,	receding	into	the	fissures	of	everyday	life,	guarded	from	the	gaze	of	prying	 eyes”	 (Fox,	 2017:26).	 Thus,	 “the	 success	 of	 this	 nationalism	 rests	 not	 upon	commitment	and	attachment,	but	indifference	and	apathy;	the	people	in	whose	name	it	speaks	silently	ignore	it,	submitting	to	its	invisible	power”	(Carter	et	al	2011	cited	in	Fox,	2017:29).				As	 argued	 by	 Fox	 (2017),	 everyday	 nationalism	 becomes	more	 pronounced	 at	 the	edges	of	 the	nation.	These	 edges	 can	be	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 on	 the	one	hand,	 but	also	political	on	the	other.	Importantly,	Fox	argues	that	the	political	edge	of	the	nation	can	 be	 discernible	 through	 the	 study	 of	 immigration	 and	 migrants,	 and	 that	devolution,	 and	 Scottish	 independence	 specifically,	 provides	 “fertile	 ground	 for	tapping	 into	 people’s	 otherwise	 self-evident	 assumptions	 of	 what	 the	 nation	 is”	(2017:38).	 This	 is	 what	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 do:	 it	 focuses	 ethnic	 minorities’	(including	migrants’)	views	and	experiences,	and	seeks	to	tease	out	the	ways	in	which	the	nation	is	made	visible	in	everyday	life.	Further,	it	does	this	within	the	context	of	
	184		
the	 independence	 referendum	 which	 offered	 a	 fruitful	 moment	 to	 focus	 on	 issues	around	nationalism	due	to	the	reflexive	quality	of	that	moment	when	the	conceptual	bordering	of	the	nation	was	explicitly	up	for	discussion.				This	chapter	will	focus	on	the	more	general	ways	in	which	the	nation,	‘ethnicity’	and	‘race’	 were	 discussed	 during	 the	 interviews.	 	 Chapter	 7	 will	 then	 build	 upon	 this	discussion,	and	focus	specifically	on	the	independence	referendum.		
	
	
6.3.	‘Welcoming’	Scotland?	
During	 the	 interviews,	 I	 tended	 to	 ask	 the	 participants	 very	 early	 on	 what	 their	experience	of	living	in	Scotland	was,	and	if	they	liked	being	here.		Scotland	was	often	—	 to	 begin	 with	 —	 depicted	 as	 welcoming.	 Thus,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 sense	 of	congruence	between	the	view	put	forward	by	the	participants,	and	that	put	forward	by	 the	 SNP	 which	 depicts	 Scotland	 as	 open	 and	 inclusive,	 and	 welcoming	 of	 ‘new	Scots’:	
And	we’re	comfortable	with	the	 idea	of	overlapping	 identities	—	we	know	that	
you	 can	 be	 Scottish	 and	British,	 Scottish	 and	European,	 Scottish	 and	Polish	 or	
Scottish	 and	 Pakistani.	 Tartan	 is	 the	 distinctive	 national	 cloth	 of	 Scotland.	 It’s	
made	 up	 of	 patterned	 threads	 of	 different	 colours.	 I	 like	 to	 think	 that	 Scottish	
identity	is	like	the	tartan.	There	are	many	colours,	many	threads,	many	strands	
to	the	Scottish	tartan	of	identity.	(FM	Alex	Salmond,	Scotland’s	Place	in	Europe,	College	of	Europe,	Bruges,	28	April	2014)	Salmond’s	use	of	the	analogy	of	tartan,	of	course,	links	with	what	was	said	before	in	Chapter	4	with	regard	to	‘Highlandism’.	While	minorities	are	included	in	the	‘tartan	of	Scottish	national	 identity’,	 it	 is	nonetheless	telling	that	 it	 is	 the	Highland	tartan	that	figures	 as	 an	 image	of	what	 Scotland	 is	 imagined	 to	be	 and	 to	 consist	 of,	 culturally	speaking.		
This	 sense	 of	 Scotland	 being	 welcoming	 was	 articulated,	 in	 particular,	 through	 the	idea	of	 Scots	being	 ‘friendly’	during	 the	 interviews.	Agnieszka	 (Polish,	25	years	old,	
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university	 student,	 voted	yes),	 for	 example,	 professed	 to	 liking	 Scottish	 culture	 and	“the	 way	 people	 are	 here”,	 i.e.	 “extremely	 friendly”	 and	 “polite”.	 Similarly,	 Chalwe	(Zambian,	46	years	old,	university	student/office	worker,	voted	no)	found	Scots	very	“friendly”,	 Tom	 (English,	 age	 unknown,	 teacher,	 voted	 no)	 said	 he	 liked	 living	 in	Glasgow	“because,	umm	—	probably	 the	people”	who	override	 the	effect	of	 the	bad	weather,	 and	 without	 whom	 the	 decision	 to	 live	 in	 Glasgow	 would	 have	 been	 a	tougher	 one	 to	make.	 Eilidh	 (from	Guernsey,	 54	 years	 old,	 social	worker,	 voted	 no)	also	mentioned	 Glasgow	 being	welcoming	 (“hence	 I’m	 still	 here”)	 and	 spoke	 about	how	she	enjoys	“the	crack”	and	the	“banter”	which	is	“second	to	none”:	“here	people	are	immediate,	and	I	used	to	love	that,	standing	at	bus	stop	and	getting	someone’s	life	story	kind	of	 thing”.	Although	you’re	not	always	 “in	 the	mood”	 for	 such	stories,	 it	 is	nonetheless	“just	so	typical”	of	Glasgow.	Here,	Eilidh	professes	a	sense	of	localism	(a	point	I	will	return	to	subsequently)	where	she	consciously	connects	her	experiences	to	a	specific	location	(Glasgow,	in	her	case).			
Further,	similarly	to	Eilidh’s	comments,	Chalwe	went	on	to	say	that	“I’ve	experienced	it	 [people’s	 friendliness	 in	 Scotland]	 from	 the	 street	 and	 the	 shops,	 umm,	 at	work,	university,	 so	 I	 suppose..I,	 I’m,	 I’m	 speaking	 from	 a	 solid	 base,	 a-ha”	—	 that	 is,	 in	everyday	situations	and	spaces,	much	like	Eilidh	(on	bus	stops).	Chalwe’s	reference	to	speaking	 “from	 a	 solid	 base”	 is	 interesting.	 This,	 to	 me,	 seems	 to	 highlight	 the	importance	 of	 everyday	 situations	 and	 places	 and	 those	 often	 fleeting	 connections	and	moments	people	share	when	passing	each	other	on	the	street	or	places	of	work,	connections	which,	subsequently,	 leave	a	person	 feeling	 like	 they	are	welcomed	and	thus	contribute	 to	a	certain	sense	of	belonging.	Thus,	everyday	 interactions	hold	an	important	 formative	 power	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 ways	 in	which	 a	 person	 comes	 to	experience	 their	 surroundings	and	 social	 contexts,	 and	 their	understanding	of	 their	place	within	them.		
In	making	claims	of	this	sort,	participants	often	drew	a	comparison	between	Scotland	and	England,	whereby	Scotland	and	Scottish	people	were	portrayed	as	friendlier	and	more	welcoming	 in	 comparison	 to	 England	 and	 the	 English.	 Thus,	 as	with	 the	 SNP	drawing	comparisons	to	Westminster	vis-à-vis	values,	 the	participants	did	 the	same	
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with	respect	to	the	perceived	characters	of	the	two	countries.	Padma	(Indian,	36	years	old,	 works	 for	 a	 third	 sector	 organisation,	 did	 not	 vote)	 lived	 in	 England	 for	 three	years	before	moving	to	Scotland	in	2009.	Asked	if	she	liked	living	in	Scotland,	Padma	asked	if	I	was	referring	to	“the	people	experience”	or	“the	weather	experience”	—	the	latter	being	“quite	not	nice	[laughs],	to	be	polite”.	With	reference	to	people,	she	went	on	to	say:	
Umm,	I	like	the	people,	I	think	they’re	much	more	warmer	up	so-	-	up	north	than	
down	 south,	 and	 that’s	 something	 I’ve	 said	 to	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 from	England	 as	
well.	People	are	a	lot	more	open,	lot	more	receptive,	and..I	don’t		know	if	it’s	got	
to	do	with	the	university	environment	or	it	has	to	do,	you	know	there	-	-	you’re	
the	social	scientist,	you	probably	have	more	answers	to	that,	but	I	quite	like	the	
people	 in	 Scotland.	 And,	 um,	 it’s	 been	 an	 enjoyable	 ride,	 and	 I’ve	 been	 quite	
surprised	-	-	you	know,	you	walk	in	with	your	own	biases	about	certain	cultures	
and	environment,	and	um	—	well,	maybe	from	your	personal	experience	-	-	in	my	
case,	my	personal	experience	is	down	south.	And	I	was	quite	pleasantly	surprised	
that	Scots	are	a	lot	more	warmer,	um,	compared	to..English.	Like	many	others,	Padma	offered	this	comparison	between	Scotland	and	England	—	or	the	people	in	the	two	countries	—	voluntarily	as	an	answer	to	a	question	regarding	the	experience	of	living	in	Scotland.			
The	 Polish	 participants,	 especially,	 drew	 a	 comparison	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 ways	 in	which	they	viewed	migrants	being	treated.	Agnieszka	lived	briefly	in	England	and	said	how	 she,	 when	 visiting	 England,	 misses	 Scotland	 and	 feels	 “a	 bit	 more	 excluded”	south	of	the	border.	She	has	also	heard	second-hand	reports	of	Poles	living	in	England	not	 feeling	welcome,	and	she	concluded	that	she	does	not	have	“the	same	feeling	of	belonging	in	England”	as	she	does	in	Scotland,	and	that	this	has	to	do	with	“just	the	way	people	are”	down	there.	When	discussing	the	differences	between	Scotland	and	England	she	went	on	to	say	that:	
I	think	people	here	are	a	lot	more	friendly	and	a	lot	more	welcoming.	Umm,	also	
just	 to..people	 from	 the	 outside	 basically,	 so	 I	 felt..a	 lot	more	welcome,	 so.	 And	
sort	of	accepted	in	the	society,	‘cause	when	I	came	here,	I	went..almost	straight	to	
the	highlands	and,	umm,	 the	high	 school	 I	went	 to	was	maybe..[unclear]	 that’s	
1,300	pupils,	and	I	was	one	of	the,	sort	of,	only	outsiders.	And	I	think	there	was	
another	 Polish	 girl	 with	 me	 umm,	 and	 German	 girl	 and	 a	 guy	 from	 Africa	 or	
somewhere,	a	country	in	Af-	-	and	that	was	about	it,	so	for	the	entire	school.		Thus,	Agnieszka	felt	that	people’s	attitudes	towards	and	outlook	on	“people	from	the	outside”	or	“outsiders”	 is	more	open	and	 inclusive.	Fellow	Poles	Pietr	(31	years	old,	
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health	 care	worker,	 Yes	 campaigner)	 and	Lukasz	 (21	 years	 old,	 college	 student	 and	cleaner,	voted	yes)	put	it	in	the	following	terms:	Pietr:	(…)	Umm,	but	why	I	did	the	research	[on	the	referendum]	—	because	that’s	
the	reason	—	I	did	the	research	because	of	the	fear	and	hate	 	—	 fear	and	hate	
towards,	 I	would	 say,	Teresa	May	—	 she’s	 the	minister	of	 the…	 (…)	Yeah,	 yeah,	
Home	Affairs	Secretary,	yeah.	Since	2010	David	Cameron,	umm,	got	into	power,	
yeah.	Her	ideas	were	to	do	how	to	impose	some	extra	things	en	masse	on	all	your	
migrants	 from	 the	 European	Union	—	 their,	 their,	 their	 language	 full	 of	 hate,	
xenophobia,	 this	 rhetoric	 coming	 out	 from	 the	Westminster	 parties	 plus,	 umm,	
umm,	this	Europhobia	I	would	say,	yeah.	It	actually	has	driven	me	towards	the,	
the	 Scottish	 independence	 idea,	 I	 knew	 that..Great	 Britain	 is	 not	 the	 same	
country	as	 it	was	 in	 still	March	2008	when	 I	arrived,	yeah.	 It’s	 totally	different	
now,	 especially	 England,	 yeah.	 I	 realise	 that	 yes,	 Scotland	 is	 different,	 yeah.	
Scotland	is	still	opposing	those	ideas.	 I	 just	wonder	for	how	long.	I	knew	that	 if	
they	would	remain	the	part	of	Great	Britain..sooner	or	later,	umm,	this,	this,	this	
virus	 will	 come	 here,	 yeah.	 (…)	 Umm..so	 yeah,	 so,	 so,	 so	 that’s	 why	 I	 actually	
realised	that	I	need	to	stand	on	some	side	—	which	side	to	choose.	Do	I	choose	the	
side	which	was	actually,	umm,	see	 the	potential	 in	me	or	 should	 I	 stand	on	 the	
side	of	the	people	who	are	spitting	on	me,	yeah.	Lukasz:	 (…)	 [T]here	 is	 not	 really	 a	 racism	 like	 in	 England,	 and	 through	 living	
here	and	reading	news,	‘cause	I	had	to	read	some	news,	umm,	information	to	get,	
to	 get	 some	 knowledge	 about	 Scotland,	 I	 notice	 that	 they	 don’t	 treat	 as	 umm	
parasites	or	anything,	especially	when	most	of	the	Poles	stopped	sending	money	
back	to,	back	to	the	country.	‘Cause	they	took	whole	families	with	them	here.		Pietr	 and	 Lukasz,	 then,	 directly	 compared	 their	 positive	 experience	 in	 Scotland	 to	their	perception	of	Westminster	and	England.	Pietr	related	this	to	what	he	viewed	as	Westminster	parties	making	xenophobic	 comments	and	Lukasz	 to	his	perception	of	there	being	less	racism	in	Scotland.	For	Pietr,	 it	was	important	to	cut	Scotland	loose	from	the	UK	before	the	‘xenophobic	virus’	would	make	its	way	to	north	of	the	border.	Thus,	 along	with	Agnieszka,	 their	positive	 experience	was	 specifically	 to	 do	with	 a	feeling	of	being	‘accepted’	and	not	being	treated	as	‘parasites’.		
Many	of	the	participants’	experiences	of	England	were	to	do	with	London	specifically	and,	 as	 a	 result,	 London	 became	 a	 proxy	 for	 what	 they	 imagined	 England	 and	 the	English	to	be	like.	London	was	characterised	by	its	fast	pace	of	life	—	Violet	(Zambian,	40	years	old,	university	student,	voted	no)	noted	that	“Everybody’s	busy	(…)	people	here	 [Scotland]	will	 pay	 attention,	 they	will	 listen	 to	 you	 and..rather	 than..London”	and	Mary	(Kenyan,	46	years	old,	works	in	housing,	voted	no),	who	lived	in	London	for	a	while,	found	it	difficult	to	cope	there,	and	chose	Scotland	as	she	“liked	it	so	much”	when	she	tried	it	out	for	a	week.	Mary	found	that	“life	wasn’t	so	fast”	in	Scotland	and	
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that	“people	are	quite	nice”	which	made	it	“easier	to	settle	with	the	kinds	and	things	like	that”.	Ahsan	(Pakistani,	38	years	old,	works	in	a	shop,	drives	a	cab	and	studies	—	did	not	disclose	how	he	 voted)	 felt	 that	England	was	 “quite	 congested”.	 Padma	did,	however,	point	out	that	London	“in	itself	is	a	different	country”	where	people	seem	“a	lot	 colder”	 compared	 to	people	 in	Scotland	who	she	characterised	as	warmer,	more	honest	and	more	laid	back.			
Another	 contrast	 that	 cropped	 up	 in	 the	 participants’	 accounts	 was	 the	 difference	between	 Scots	 being	 more	 ‘polite’	 (as	 mentioned	 by	 Agnieszka	 previously)	 and	English	 people	 being	 deemed	 as	 ‘rude’.	 Talking	 about	 England,	 Ahsan	 noted	 that	 “I	have	 to	 say	 but	 the	 people	 are	 really	 rude	 kind	 of”	 and	 that,	 in	 contrast,	 “here	 in	Scotland	 it’s	 nice,	 friendly,	 you	 always	 get	 a	 smile	 from	 even	 from	 a	 stranger,	 you	know”.	Towela	(Zambian,	19	years	old,	college	student,	did	not	vote)	noted	that	“I	feel	English	people	are	very	 rude”	 and	discussed	asking	 for	directions	as	 an	example	of	this:	
They	 [the	English]	 are	 very	 rude	people,	 ‘cause	when	 you	go	down,	 even	when	
you’re	just	asking	for	directions,	you	know,	somebody	will	just	ignore	you,	look	at	
you	and	just	ignore	you.	And	it’s	like	really	difficult	to	talk	to	them.	But	when	you	
come	over	here,	everything	is	different,	everybody’s	nicer,	you	know,	they’ll	listen	
to	 you,	when	 you	 need	 directions	 and	 all	 of	 that.	 And	we	 don’t	 say	 ‘oh	 no,	we	
don’t	accept	this	currency,	 like	 it’s,	 it’s	 foreign’,	you	know.	[laughs]	That	kind	of	
thing,	yeah.			Thus,	once	again,	those	fleeting	moments	when	you	interact	with	people	—	as	noted	in	 relation	 to	 Chalwe	 and	 Eilidh	 previously	 —	 become	 extremely	 important	 for	forming	a	sense	of	what	a	perceived	group	of	people	(the	English	or	the	Scots)	are	like	and	what	your	place	within	that	national	context	is.	What	is	more,	this	feeds	into	how	the	 entire	 imagined	 community	—	 those	 beyond	 the	 individual	 interactions	—	 is	envisaged	 to	 be.	 Those	 encounters	 with	 ‘rude’	 individuals	 come	 to	 affect	 how	 an	entire	 ‘nation’	 is	 seen.	 Paula	 (English,	 21	 years	 old,	 university	 student,	 voted	 no),	however,	 argued	 that	 she	 saw	 “more	 similarities	between	 the	north	of	England	and	Scotland	than	she	did	“with	the	north	of	England	and	south	England”	(though	she	did	concede	“but	then,	I	don’t	know	the	south	of	England	that	well”).		
	189		
Some	of	the	participants	did,	however,	acknowledge	the	danger	of	generalising.	While	Violet	said	 that	 “ah,	 there	 is	a	difference,	people	here	are	 friendly..than	 in	London,	 I	think”,	she	qualified	this:	“Though	not	everybody,	but	there	are	some	in	London,	that	are	 friendly	 as	well”.	 Chalwe,	 for	 example,	 having	 briefly	 lived	 in	 England,	 said	 the	following:	Chalwe:	And	admittedly	the	Scots	do	seem,	umm,	friendlier	than	the	English	—	
it’s	 funny,	but	umm,	a-ha.	Well,	 the	Scots	are	more	—	 they	keep	 to	 themselves.	
The	English	are	a	bit	loud,	a	bit	outspoken.	The	Scots	are	a	bit,	umm,	reserved,	if	I	
could	use	that,	umm,	expression.		Minna:	Yeah.	Chalwe:	But	umm,	on	the	whole	they	seem	to	be	friendly,	umm.	You	do	have	bad	
and	 good	 where	 you	 go	 but	 umm,	 you	 know,	 it’s	 not	 as	 compared	 to,	 um,	
England.	Mmhm.	Following	this	Chalwe	then	went	on	to	discuss	the	ways	in	which	he	had	experienced	Scots’	friendliness	on	the	streets	and	shops	as	already	previously	discussed.	Notably,	there	 seems	 to	be	a	paradox	here	 in	what	Chalwe	says:	on	 the	one	hand,	he	argues	that	Scots	are	friendly	yet	on	the	other	hand	that	they	are	reserved.	However,	to	him	Scots	nonetheless	seem	“friendlier	than	the	English”	although,	like	Violet,	he	qualifies	this	by	pointing	out	that	you	get	good	and	bad	people	wherever	you	go.			
Ahsan	—	while	conceding	that	Scots	he	comes	across	at	work	are	“nice	people”	and	“friendly”		—	explains	that	he	is		
…not	saying	 like	all	of	them	were	good	but	obviously	you	get	some	mad	people	
and,	you	know,	 the	crazy	people	who	had	a	bad	night	and..obviously	 so,	and	 in	
the	morning	they	started	like	shouting	and	sometimes	and,	you	know,	being	rude.	
But	obviously	it’s	not	like	in	majority,	it’s	minority.	Ma-	-	majority	of	people	are	
good,	yeah.	Here	we	see	Ahsan	beginning	to	disrupt	the	dominant	narrative	of	Scotland	and	Scots	being	 friendly,	 polite,	 welcoming.	 Indeed,	 the	 interviews	 would	 often	 proceed	following	 this	pattern	whereby	 the	positives	about	Scotland	were	discussed	 first	—	especially	 in	 relation	 to	 England	—	 following	 which	 this	 narrative	 was	 eventually	challenged	 either	 implicitly	 (by	 dropping	 hints)	 or	 explicitly	 through	 ‘demotic	discourses’	 (Baumann,	 1996:9-36).	 I	 interpreted	 this,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree,	 as	connected	 to	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	 common-sensical	 ‘Scotland	 as	 welcoming’	narrative	which	can	make	it	difficult	and	even	intimidating	to	challenge.		
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This,	then,	links	to	Ahmed’s	(2010:	158)	idea	of	the	‘happiness	duty’.	She	argues	that	“migrants	as	would-be	citizens	are	(…)	increasingly	bound	by	the	happiness	duty	not	to	speak	about	racism	in	the	present”	and	“not	to	speak	of	the	unhappiness	of	colonial	histories”.	Ahmed,	further,	argues	that		
The	happiness	duty	for	migrants	means	telling	a	certain	story	about	your	arrival	
as	 good,	 or	 the	 good	 of	 your	 arrival.	 The	 happiness	 duty	 is	 a	 positive	 duty	 to	
speak	of	what	is	good	but	can	also	be	thought	of	as	a	negative	duty	not	to	speak	
of	what	is	not	good,	not	to	speak	from	or	out	of	unhappiness.	(Ahmed,	2010:158)	Thus,	those	participants	who	were	more	recent	migrants	tended	to,	at	 least	 initially,	focus	on	the	positives.	However,	as	the	interviews	went	on,	this	depiction	of	Scotland	—	which	was	 in	keeping	with	 the	requirements	of	 the	 ‘happiness	duty’	—	began	 to	take	 on	 a	 more	 nuanced	 and	 complex	 shape,	 leading	 to	 disclosures	 of	 profoundly	racist	experiences	as	will	be	discussed	later	on	in	this	chapter.			
I	 also	 witnessed	 the	 tendency	 to	 frame	 Scotland	 as	 welcoming	 at	 Radical	Independence	Campaign’s	(RIC)	conference	in	Glasgow	in	November	2014.	This	is	an	excerpt	from	my	fieldnotes:	
I	also	attended	one	of	the	workshops	which	focused	on	issues	termed	as	UKIP	and	
Westminster’s	‘divide	and	rule’	tactics	in	relation	to	immigration.	(…)	I	felt	some	
of	the	speakers	highlighted	the	positives	of	Glasgow	as	a	welcoming	place	at	the	
expense	of	perhaps	turning	a	blind	eye	to	the	racism	we	are	also	witnessing.	This	
was	pointed	out	by	a	young	man	 in	 the	audience,	probably	about	18	years	old,	
who	pointed	out	how	he	found	it	very	problematic	that	the	panellists	seemed	to	
paint	an	overly	positive	picture	of	Glasgow.	He	told	a	story	about	how	he	and	his	
friends,	 11	 boys	 altogether,	 had	 flown	 to	Amsterdam,	 and	 it	was	 the	 10	 ‘white	
guys’	 that	 got	 through	 security	 without	 any	 problems	 whereas	 their	 Muslim	
friend	was	taken	aside	for	more	questioning.	As	a	response	to	this	challenge,	the	
panellists	—	many	of	them	coming	from	minority	backgrounds	—	conceded	that	
they	 had	 witnessed	 and	 experienced	 racism.	 Anum	 Qaisar,	 for	 example,	 noted	
how,	when	she	had	worn	a	hijab	when	going	to	a	mosque	to	meet	a	friend,	had	
noticed	a	total	change	in	the	way	people	looked	at	her;	wearing	the	hijab	made	
her	 feel	 like	people	were	a	 lot	more	hostile	 towards	her.	 Similarly,	Rozah	Salih	
said	she	had	experienced	and	witnessed	racism.	(Fieldnotes,	22.11.2014)	The	RIC	operates	from	an	explicitly	anti-racist	viewpoint	and	thus	the	attendees	and	speakers	could	be	expected	to	be	more	attuned	to	the	problematic	notion	of	‘Scottish	exceptionalism’.	 Yet,	 even	within	 this	 context,	 the	myth	 of	 Scottish	 progressiveness	had	purchase,	which	highlights	the	potency	of	this	idea.		
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6.4.	Migrants	as	strangers	Although	many	of	the	participants	who	were	more	recent	migrants	depicted	Scotland	and	Scots	as	 ‘friendly’	or	 ‘welcoming’,	as	we	have	seen,	 it	was	 interesting	 that	many	nonetheless	also	described	themselves	as	 ‘outsiders’	or	 ‘visitors’.	Chalwe,	who	spoke	about	 Scots	 being	 friendly	 yet	 reserved,	 explains	 that	 there	 is	 an	 older	man	 in	 his	block	 of	 flats	 who,	 when	 he	 sees	 Chalwe	 walking	 out,	 always	 says	 hello.	 He	 is,	however,	“the	only	one	—	the	others,	they	keep	to	themselves	and,	you	know,	it’s	a..it’s	just	—	as	if	they’re	not	interested	in	knowing	who	you	are	and	that	sort	of	thing”.	To	Chalwe,	 “they	 just	 don’t	 seem	 sort	 of	 um,	 umm,	bother”.	 Interestingly,	 directly	 after	this	 observation	 Chalwe	 goes	 on	 to	 conclude	 “so..as	 a	 society,	 I	 mean,	 we’re	 the	visitors,	 inverted	 commas”.	 Thus,	 Chalwe	 seems	 to	 attribute	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	disregard	or	disinterestedness	towards	him	and	his	family	to	their	status	as	‘visitors’	—	 that	 is,	 people	 do	 not	 bother	 because	 they	 are	 seen	 as	 transient	 due	 to	 their	migrant-ness.			
Simmel,	 famously,	wrote	 about	 the	 ‘stranger’	 as	 a	wanderer	 “who	 comes	 today	 and	stays	 to	 morrow”	 (1950[1908]:1).	 The	 stranger	 remains	 “the	 potential	 wanderer:	although	he	[sic]	has	not	moved	on,	he	has	not	quite	overcome	the	freedom	of	coming	and	going”	(Simmel,	1950[1908]:1,	original	emphasis).	The	suggestion	therefore	is,	in	Chalwe’s	 case,	 that	 Scots	 seem	distant	 or	 uninterested	 because	 of	 his	 visitor	 status	and	because	he	may	leave	—	he	is,	after	all,	a	potential	wanderer.	Therefore,	he	is	not	seen	as	completely	‘rooted’.			
Relatedly,	Towela	draws	attention	to	how	this	label	of	stranger	or	wanderer	is	hard	to	shake	off:	
And	see	the	funny	thing	is,	obviously	when	you	meet	other	people	here,	like	other	
black	people,	or	foreign	people,	when	they	come	and	ask	you,	they	don’t	assume	
that	you’ve,	you,	you	stayed	here	that	long,	or	that		-	-	the-		-they	say,	where	are	
you	from?	They	ask	you	where	you’re	from.	You	know,	immediately,	so	then	you	
have	to	say	I’m	from	Zambia.	I	think	it	will	always	stick,	though,	it	will	always	be	
there	even	if	I	decide	to	stay	here	in	Scotland,	people	will	always	ask	me	where	
I’m	from,	first	instead	of	just,	you	know,	thinking	I	just	live	here.	And	will	always	
be	there.	[laughs]	Here	Towela	draws	our	attention	to	processes	of	racialisation	that	those	marked	out	
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as	ethnic	minorities	go	through	in	terms	of	othering	on	the	one	hand,	as	well	as	to	her	status	as	a	migrant	on	the	other.	As	regards	this	latter	point,	we	can	again	take	our	cue	from	Simmel	who	argues	that	the	stranger	“is	fixed	within	a	particular	spatial	group,	or	 within	 a	 group	 whose	 boundaries	 are	 similar	 to	 spatial	 boundaries”	(1950[1908]:1).	 He	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 (1950[1908]:1)	 that	 “his	 [sic]	 position	 in	 this	group	 is	determined,	essentially,	by	 the	 fact	 that	he	has	not	belonged	 to	 it	 from	 the	beginning,	 that	he	 imparts	qualities	 into	 it,	which	do	not	and	cannot	 stem	 from	the	group	itself”.	Thus,	for	someone	not	born	in	Glasgow	(or	someone	who	has	to	answer	the	question	“where	are	you	really	from?”	due	to	their	different	skin	colour	in	a	white	majority	 country,	 for	 example),	 there	 is	 the	 frequent	 experience	 of	 being	deterministically	fixed	with	a	specific	identity	(national	or	otherwise).			
Simmel	 also	 discusses	 the	 issue	 of	 objectivity,	which	 is	 closely	 connected	 to	 points	raised	 by	 Catherine	 and	 Stefania.	 Simmel	 argues,	 in	 relation	 to	 objectivity	 and	 the	stranger,	 that	 “he	 [sic]	 is	 not	 radically	 committed	 to	 the	 unique	 ingredients	 and	peculiar	 tendencies	 of	 the	 group,	 and	 therefore	 approaches	 them	with	 the	 specific	attitude	 of	 ‘objectivity’”	 (1950[1908]:1-2).	 This	 objectivity	 is	 not	 simply	 about	“passivity	and	detachment”	but	“it	is	a	particular	structure	composed	of	distance	and	nearness,	 indifference	 and	 involvement”	 (1950[1908]:2).	 Catherine	 (Nigerian,	 32	years	old,	university	student,	did	not	vote	but	would	have	voted	no),	 contemplating	the	 independence	 referendum,	 noted	 that	 she	 was	 a	 ‘bystander’	 because	 “I	 have	no..like,	I	don’t	have	a	horse	in	the	race,	to	me	I	just	feel	like	I’m	neutral	kind	of”.	Thus,	Catherine	would	—	in	Simmel’s	terms	—	be	more	‘objective’	vis-à-vis	the	referendum.			
Besides	the	idea	of	neutrality	or	 ‘not	having	a	horse	in	the	race’,	Stefania	(Polish,	32	years	old,	college	student,	voted	no)	highlighted	that	her	outsider	status	affords	her	a	different	perspective:	
…immigration	to	the	UK,	or	to	Scotland,	taught	me	one	thing	—	I’ve	got,	my	real	
asset	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 I’ve	 been	 through	 a	 completely	 different	 political	 system,	
umm,	educational	system,	and	I	can	see	—	I	look	at	Scotland	from	a	kind	of,	from	
a	perspective.	Despite	being	nine	years	in	this	country,	I	look	at	this	country	from	
a	different	perspective.	In	order	to	make	sense	of	this,	it	is	useful	to	revisit	Simmel’s	discussion	of	objectivity	as	freedom:	
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…the	objective	individual	is	bound	by	no	commitments	which	could	prejudice	his	
perception,	 understanding,	 and	 evaluation	of	 the	given.	The	 freedom,	however,	
which	allows	the	stranger	to	experience	and	treat	even	his	close	relationships	as	
though	 from	 a	 bird's-eye	 view,	 contains	 many	 dangerous	 possibilities.	 In	
uprisings	 of	 all	 sorts,	 the	 party	 attacked	 has	 claimed,	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	
things,	 that	 provocation	 has	 come	 from	 the	 outside,	 through	 emissaries	 and	
instigators.	Insofar	as	this	is	true,	it	is	an	exaggeration	of	the	specific	role	of	the	
stranger:	 he	 [sic]	 is	 freer	 practically	 and	 theoretically;	 he	 surveys	 conditions	
with	 less	 prejudice;	 his	 criteria	 for	 them	are	more	 general	 and	more	 objective	
ideals;	 he	 is	 not	 tied	 down	 in	 his	 action	 by	 habit,	 piety,	 and	 precedent.	(1950[1908]:2)	Stefania	 explains	 how	 she,	 having	 grown	 up	 in	 Poland,	 looks	 at	 Scotland	 and	 the	different	 societal	 issues	 ‘from	 a	 different	 perspective’.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	freedom	in	that	migrants	—	like	Stefania	indicates	—	may	feel	removed	from	political	and	educational	contexts	in	a	way	which	allows	them	to	look	at	issues	from	a	different	angle	 even	 after	 living	 in	 a	 country	 for	 a	 prolonged	 period	 of	 time.	 Stefania	 and	Catherine’s	‘objectivity’	—	or	their	different	perspectives	on	the	social	—	are	however,	of	 course,	 influenced	 and	 affected	 by	 their	 previous	 experiences	 outside	 Scotland.	Their	objectivity	is	thus	not	non-normative	or	value-free	but,	rather,	different.		
	
	
	
6.5.	‘Race’	and	space:	Urban	versus	rural	Scotland		
It	quickly	became	clear	in	the	interviews	that	not	all	of	Scotland	was	imagined	in	the	same	way,	and	there	was	an	acknowledgement	among	the	participants	that,	perhaps,	they	would	not	be	as	welcome	beyond	the	big	cities	of	Glasgow	and	Edinburgh,	and	especially	 in	the	Highlands.	Thus,	there	are	perceived	limits	to	Scotland’s	 ‘welcome-ness’.			
Agnieszka,	 who	 now	 lives	 in	 Glasgow	 but	 lived	 in	 the	 Highlands	 before,	 begins	 to	allude	 to	 the	 perceived	 differences	 by	 noting	 that	 she	 finds	 people	 living	 in	 the	Highlands	“extremely	patriotic”.	She	highlights	this	by	saying	how	there	were	lots	of	Yes	banners	“on	hills	and	everywhere,	over	cities	and	small	towns”.	Eilidh	remarks	on	how	 her	 experience	 of	 people	 being	 friendly	 is	mainly	 based	 in	 Glasgow,	 and	 that	when	travelling	for	work	she	“found	that	it’s	a	different	kind	of	atmosphere”	in	other	
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parts	—	 for	 example,	 “working	 in	 the	East	 coast	 or	 -	 -	 and	 although	people	 have	 a	warmth,	it	sometimes	takes	a	little	bit	of	warming	up	[laughs]”.	Considering	space	is	important	when	seeking	to	understand	how	‘race’	and,	by	extension,	ideas	regarding	the	nation	and	who	belong	to	 it	operate.	Goldberg	(1993	quoted	in	Neal,	2002:450)	persuasively	argues	that,	
The	category	of	space	is	discursively	produced	and	ordered.	(…)	Racisms	become	
institutionally	 normalised	 in	 and	 through	 spatial	 configuration,	 just	 as	 social	
space	is	made	to	seem	natural,	a	given,	by	being	conceived	and	defined	in	racial	
terms	(…).	After	all,	social	relations	are	not	expressed	in	a	spatial	vacuum.		
Both	De	Lima	(2008)	and	Neal	(2002)	note	how	there	has	been	a	longstanding	gap	in	literature	 regarding	 ‘race’,	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	 the	 rural.	 The	 focus	 of	most	 research	 has	been	 on	 ‘race’	 in	 the	 urban	 context.	 Further,	 Neal	 (2002:456)	 highlights	 the	importance	 of	 local,	 geographic,	 social	 and	 economic	 factors	 to	 understanding	 and	studying	 race	 in	 different	 social	 contexts:	 stating	 that	 “racism	 is	 the	 same	 in	Birmingham	as	 it	 is	 in	Cornwall”	 is,	 to	Neal,	 very	problematic.	 She	 argues	 that	 it	 is	important	 to	 recognise	 “the	 context	 specific	 nature	 of	 racism”	 and	 that	 “racism	 in	rural	areas	is	able	to	operate	through	different	discourses	and	social	mechanisms”	in	comparison	to	urban	areas	(2002:259).	Further,	Neal	notes	how	there	is	a	tendency	amongst	 those	 living	 in	 rural	 locations	 to	 downplay	 the	 existence	 of	 racism	suggesting	 that	 “there	 is	 a	 rural	 tradition	 of	 hostility	 to	 all	outsiders”	 (2002:456).	Indeed,	 Garland	 and	 Chakraborti	 (2006:163)	 found	 exactly	 this	 when	 their	interviewees	suggested	that	“any	discrimination	directed	against	those	from	different	ethnic	backgrounds	was	merely	a	symptom	of	this	 intense	 ‘localism’	and	not	racism	per	se”	—	rather,	“it	was	caused	simply	by	the	fact	that	‘outsiders’	simply	did	not	‘fit	in’	 with	 the	 standard	 norms	 of	 the	 community”.	 Neal	 notes	 how	 these	 kinds	 of	arguments	naturalise	racism	and	conceal	processes	“which	make	certain	outsiders	(of	which	‘ethnicity’	is	a	particular	marker)	more	unwelcome	than	others”	(2002:457).			
With	regard	to	this,	Farnod	(Iranian,	39	years	old,	land	surveyor,	did	not	have	a	vote),	in	 relation	 to	 a	 question	 about	 whether	 Scotland	 is	 welcoming,	 notes	 that	 “not	 in	every	part	of	Scotland”	and	that,		
…for	example	if	I	go	to	Inverness,	I,	I	don’t	think	people	accepted	me.	Or	if	I	go	to,	
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um,	some	kind	of	Highland	cities,	no,	I	don’t	think	so.	Thus,	he	 finds	 that	 there	 is	a	difference	between	Glasgow	—	which	 is,	as	he	says,	a	university	 city	 and	 thus	 quite	 international	—	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 Scotland,	 apart	 from	Edinburgh	 and	 Aberdeen	 which	 also	 attract	 other	 nationalities	 due	 to	 their	universities	 and	 the	 oil	 business.	 Similarly	 to	 Farnod,	Mary	 (Kenyan,	 46	 years	 old,	works	in	housing,	voted	no)	singled	out	Inverness	as	potentially	more	unwelcoming:	Mary:	 Yeah,	 but	 here,	 y-	 -you	 find	 that	 people	 talk	 to	 you	 –	 not	 everybody	 of	
course,	 but	 people	 talk	 to	 you	 normally.	 Ehm,	 ask	 you	 how	 you	 feel,	 how	 the	
weather	is	like	and	things	like	that.	Minna:	Yeah.	Mary:	 Which	 is,	 which	 makes..ehm,	 it	 makes	 it	 easier	 to	 live	 here	 so,	 because	
you’re	not	feeling	isolated.	I,	I	feel	that	I’m	no	isolated.	(…)	Umm,	I,	I	don’t	have	
any	experience	of	other	parts	of	Scotland	so	I’m,	I’m	not	speaking	for	the	whole	
of	Scotland.	Minna:	Yeah,	yeah.	Absolutely.	Mary:	Yeah,	a-ha.	 ‘Cause	y-	-you	never	how,	say	if	you	went	to	Inverness	where	
there’s	very	few	people	from	out-	-	from	outside.	Maybe	they	would	see	you	as	a,	
as	somebody	different,	you	know.			Thus,	 both	Mary	 and	 Farnod	 view	 Inverness,	 a	 key	 highland	 city,	 as	 a	 place	where	people	 might	 react	 to	 them	 differently	 compared	 to	 bigger	 cities.	 Further,	 both	 of	them	 link	 this	 to	 their	perception	of	 Inverness	as	 less	diverse	—	Farnod	notes	 that	university	and	oil	cities	tend	to	be	more	international	and,	similarly,	Mary	points	out	that	 there	 are	 “very	 few	 people…from	 the	 outside”	 in	 Inverness	 (something	 that	would,	in	her	view,	lead	locals	to	view	her	as	“somebody	different”).	Once	again,	the	importance	of	everyday	 interactions	 is	highlighted	as	Mary	explains	 that	where	she	lives	now	“people	talk	to	you	normally”	about	the	weather,	for	example,	which	makes	you	feel	part	of	the	social	sphere	(“you’re	not	feeling	isolated”)	and	not	marked	out	as	different.	 Furthermore,	 while	 some	 of	 the	 participants	 had	 direct	 experience	 of	dealing	 with	 people	 beyond	 the	 big	 cities,	 there	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 certain	 way	 of	
imagining	the	countryside	as	unwelcoming.	As	seen	above,	Farnod	noted	that	“I	don’t	
think	people	accepted	me”;	that	is,	he	is	not	sure	but	he	has	a	strong	feeling	about	it.	Similarly,	Mary	—	although	she	does	not	have	experience	of	living	outside	Glasgow	as	she	notes	—	suggests	that	she	would	perhaps	not	feel	as	included	in	Inverness.	While	
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this	has	to	with	Glasgow	and	Edinburgh	being	more	diverse	—	or	‘dynamic’	as	many	of	the	participants	put	it	—	it	is	also	to	do	with	the	perception	of	the	countryside	and	its	character.		
Other	 research	 certainly	 supports	 Farnod’s	 and	 Mary’s	 ‘hunch’	 regarding	 the	countryside	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 rurality	 is	 entangled	 with	‘whiteness’.	Neal	(2002:444),	referring	to	England,	notes	that	“in	a	post-colonial	era	the	 importance	 of	 English	 rurality	 has	 developed	 around	 the	 politics	 of	 (invisible)	whiteness	 and	 constructions	 of	 ethnicity,	 identity	 and	 belonging”	 thus	 echoing	Agyeman	and	Spooner’s	(1997:197)	views	who	argue	that	“dominant	common-sense	and	 populist	 discourses	 (re)present	 the	 English	 countryside	 as	 a	 timeless	 ‘white	landscape’”.	Garland	and	Chakraborti	(2006:160)	found,	through	their	research,	that	notions	of	rural	English	tradition,	belonging	and	community	“can	result	in	a	process	of	 exclusion	 of	 perceived	 ‘outsiders’	 from	 many	 village	 communities”.	 While	 they	found	 that	 a	 process	 of	 ‘othering’	 is	 usually	 applied	 to	 any	 ‘newcomer’	 “who	 looks	different	or	 leads	an	alternative	 lifestyle,	 it	 is	especially	marked	 for	 those	who	 look	visibly	 different	 from	 the	 ‘white	 norm’”	 (2006:160).	 Agyeman	 and	 Spooner	 further	argue	that	excluding		
…minority	 ethnic	 people	 from	 English	 rurality	 in	 historical,	 cultural	 and	
symbolic	terms	can	also	be	read	as	the	exclusion	of	minority	ethnic	people	from	
Englishness	per	se:	the	denial	of	a	relationship	to	English	pastoralism	precludes	
inclusion	in	the	nation.	(Neal,	2002:445)	Indeed,	Garland	and	Chakraborti	agree,	 suggesting	 that	 “conceptions	of	Englishness	are	 still	 strongly	associated	with	notions	of	 the	 ‘rural	 idyll,	which	 itself	 is	 conflated	with	‘whiteness’”	(2006:161).				
Within	 these	 imaginings	 of	 the	 rural	 spaces	 lies	 a	 link	 to	 ideas	 of	 ‘white	 safety’:	 as	argued	by	Solomos	and	Back,	the	countryside	is	depicted	as	a	safe	haven	away	from	urban	malaise	and	the	diverse	—	or	‘unEnglish’	—	spaces	beyond	English	pastoralism	(Neal,	 2002:445).	 Murdoch	 and	 Pratt,	 similarly,	 argue	 that	 “the	 rural	 is	 easily	portrayed	as	a	’civilised	retreat’”,	that	is,	“a	zone	where	Sameness	(British	or	English	middle-class	whiteness	 and	 heterosexuality)	 is	 reasserted	 in	 the	wake	 of	 profound	postcolonial	 anxiety”	 (1997:56).	 Here,	 ‘whiteness’	 nonetheless	 carries	 with	 it	 a	
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fractured	 and	 a	 hierarchical	 character,	 i.e.	 that	 there	 is	 desirable	 and	 undesirable	whiteness,	which	is	often	concealed	in	idealised	depictions	of	the	‘white	countryside’	(Dyer	1998	in	Neal	2002:	447).			
The	 Scottish	 Highlands	 and	 ‘Highland	 culture’	 feature	 as	 a	 central	 theme	 in	 the	imaginary	of	the	SNP,	especially	in	relation	to	the	Homecoming	franchise,	as	has	been	established	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	 Thus,	 rural	 Scotland	 comes	 to	 be	 represented	 as	‘quintessential	Scotland’	—	this,	in	turn,	links	to	the	ways	in	which	the	rural	and	the	nation	overlap	and	how	the	two	are	mutually	constitutive.	 	By	excluding	themselves	—	and	feeling	excluded	—	from	rural,	‘traditionally	Scottish’	spaces,	Farnod	and	Mary	limit	their	belonging	to	cosmopolitan	or	international	cities	where	it	is	easier	to	feel	a	sense	of	inclusion.		
Nirmal	Puwar,	 in	her	 excellent	book	Space	Invaders:	Race,	Gender	and	Bodies	Out	of	
Place	(2004),	considers	who	are	the	insiders	and	outsiders	vis-à-vis	particular	spaces,	and	what	the	‘somatic	norm’	of	such	spaces	is.	As	argued	by	Mean	and	Tims,	“public	space	 is	better	understood	 less	 as	 a	predetermined	physical	 space,	 and	more	as	 an	experience	created	by	an	interaction	between	people	and	place”		(quoted	in	De	Lima,	2008:36)	—	thus,	a	space	does	not,	of	course,	carry	a	‘somatic	norm’	in	and	of	itself;	rather,	 spaces	acquire	a	meaning	 through	social	 interaction.	Puwar	argues	 that	 it	 is	illuminating	to	study	spaces	from	which	women	and	racialised	minorities	have	been	conceptually	 and	 historically	 excluded	 —	 until	 now.	 This	 “moment	 of	 change”	 is	intriguing	as	the	arrival	of	those	previously	excluded	“sheds	light	on	how	spaces	have	been	 formed	 through	 what	 has	 been	 constructed	 out”	 (2004:1).	 Furthermore,	 the	arrival	 of	women	 and	 ethnic	minorities	 disturbs	 the	 status	 quo	 “while	 at	 the	 same	time	 bearing	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 sedimented	 past”	 —	 an	 encounter	 which	 “causes	disruption,	necessitates	negotiation	and	invites	complicity”	(2004:1).			
Importantly	for	nationalism	studies,	bodies	that	are	out	of	place	have	the	capacity	to	invoke	 “the	 constitutive	 boundaries	 of	 the	 imagination	 of	 the	 nation”	 (Puwar,	2004:5).	Puwar	sums	up	her	key	argument	by	noting	that	“some	bodies	are	deemed	
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as	having	the	right	to	belong,	while	others	are	marked	out	as	trespassers”	and,	thus,	“out	 of	 place”.	 Due	 to	 “not	 being	 the	 somatic	 norm”	 these	 bodies	 are	 consequently	“space	 invaders”	 (2004:8).	 Importantly,	 the	 arrival	 of	 space	 invaders	 “brings	 into	clear	 relief	 what	 has	 been	 able	 to	 pass	 as	 the	 invisible,	 unmarked	 and	 undeclared	somatic	 norm”	 (2004:8).	 Thus,	 the	 arrival	 of	 ‘new	 bodies’	 is	 revealing	 as	 they	“highlight	 the	 constitutive	 boundaries	 of	 who	 can	 pass	 as	 the	 universal	 human”	(Puwar,	 2004:8).	 Whites,	 as	 the	 “ghosts	 of	 modernity”,	 Goldberg	 argues,	 “could	assume	 power	 as	 the	 norm	of	 humanity,	 as	 the	 naturally	 given”	 (quoted	 in	 Puwar,	2004:55).	Occupying	the	status	of	a	‘universal	human’	is,	as	Puwar	notes,	a	powerful	and	 disembodied	 position	whereby	 you	 are	 unmarked	 by	 your	 body	—	 “its	 power	emanates	 from	 its	 ability	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 just	 normal,	 to	 be	 without	 corporeality”	(2004:56-57).			
Keeping	 Puwar’s	 arguments	 in	 mind,	 let	 us	 turn	 to	 Padma	 (Indian,	 36	 years	 old,	works	in	the	third	sector,	did	not	vote),	who	now	lives	in	Glasgow	but	used	to	live	in	Dumfries.	She	reflected	on	her	experience	of	living	in	the	Borders,	and	I	asked	if	she	felt	 that	 there	 was	 a	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 places,	 to	 which	 she	 responded	“absolutely”	(her	emphasis)	and	went	on	to	explain:		Padma:	 Absolutely.	 I	 don’t	 know,	 if	 you’re	 talking	 the	 rural/urban	 thing,	 I	
[laughs]	-	-	I’m	gonna	be	very	blunt.		Minna:	A-ha.	Padma:	I	was	probably	one	of	the	few	brown	faces	in	Dumfries.	And	there	was	a	
time,	and	perhaps	-	-	there	was	a	Thai	restaurant	in	Dumfries,	so	I’m	presuming	
people	from	that,	um,	area	were	kind	of	familiar	with	other	ethnicities.	Minna:	Mmm.	Padma:	 But	when	—	 I	 remember	 the	 first	 time	 I	walked	 into	 the	 town	 centre,	
and	I	—	 I’m	not	even	-	-	kind	of	feel..your	typical	brown	woman	but	I	did	come	
across	as	someone	who’s	not	[unclear],	I	got	a	lot	of	stares	and	it,	it	happened	for	
quite	a	few	months	and	-	-	it’s	a	very	-	-	I	don’t	know	if	you’ve	been	to	Dumfries,	
it’s	a	very,	very	small	town	centre.		
Here	 Padma	 talks	 about	 being	 the	 object	 of	 people’s	 prolonged	 looks	 and	 stares.	Frantz	 Fanon	 famously	 spoke	 about	 being	 “an	 object	 in	 the	midst	 of	 other	 objects”	and	being	“sealed	into	that	crushing	objecthood”	evidenced	by	such	exclamations	as	
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“Look,	 a	Negro!”	 ([1952]	 2008:82).	 Puwar	 (2004:41)	 explains	 how	Fanon	 observes	‘the	 look’	 taking	 place	 “often	without	 verbal	 communication,	 in	 everyday	 spaces	 in	the	city	(bars,	cafés	and	trains),	as	well	as	more	enclosed	institutional	spaces	(lecture	halls,	doctor’s	surgeries	and	psychiatric	hospitals)”	—	or,	indeed	on	the	street.	Thus,	bodies	marked	out	 as	different	do	not	have	an	undisputed	 right	 to	occupy	a	 space;	rather,	 they	 are	 seen	 as	 “suspiciously	 out	 of	 place”	 —	 that	 is,	 “to	 use	 Fanon’s	vocabulary,	 they	 are	 burdened	 by	 the	 claims	 black	 bodies	 can	make	 on	 the	world”	(Puwar,	 2004:42).	 Padma,	 moving	 through	 the	 streets	 and	 everyday	 spaces	 in	Dumfries,	 was	 marked	 as	 ‘out	 of	 place’	 and	 reminded	 of	 her	 difference	 from	 the	somatic	norm	via	the	looks	people	gave	her,	and	of	which	she	was	very	aware.			
Padma	 went	 on	 to	 recount	 an	 incident	 that	 took	 place	 in	 Dumfries	 as	 she	 was	spending	an	evening	with	her	friends	and	they	decided	to	go	to	a	pub.	Padma:	…there	was	this	incident,	it’s	too	funny	not	to	tell	you.	We	were	—	this	is	
-	-	an	international	group	of	students	who	I	was	hanging	around	with.	One	of	our	
friends	told	us,	who’s	my	partner	now,	he	told	us	that,	um,	there	 is	a	very	nice,	
um,	music	—	he’s	a	musician	—	there’s	a	very	nice	music	scene,	yeah	let’s	go	and	
check	 it	 out,	 like	 fine.	 So	 we	 were	 a	 group	 of	 ten	 people,	 all	 of	 different	
nationalities,	nobody,	not	a	single	Scottish	person	in	there.	And	it	was	actually	a	
pub,	it	was	a	typical	working	man’s,	white	man’s	pub	[laughs]	—		we	didn’t	know	
that.	And	what	live	music	-	-	was	actually,	there	was	a	karaoke	scene,	and	I	kid	
you	not,	we	actually	walked	into	this	pub,	all	ten	of	us,	and	you	know	how	you	sh-	
-	 they	 show	 them,	 those	western	 films	where..people	 just	 stop	 talking.	And	 you	
can	hear	the	pin	drop.	We	literally,	we	walked	in,	and	we	got	stared	at	[laughs]	—	just	turned	around	so.	It	was-	-		Minna:	So	you	didn’t	go	in.	Padma:	Of	course	no,	no,	we	 just	walked	out.	We	knew	it	was	gonna	be,	 it	was	
awkward.	So	—	had	a	couple	of	incident	like	that.	But	nothing	overtly,	you	know,	
nobody	would	come	up	and	say	 -	 -	you	would	get	stared	at.	There	have	been	a	
couple	of,	um,	kind	of,	 I	don’t	know	how	relevant	 it	 is	—	 racist	 incidents	when	
I’ve	travelled.		Padma	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 points	which	 are	 of	 great	 interest	with	 regard	 to	 ‘race’,	class,	gender	and	space.	As	argued	by	Puwar	(2004),	some	bodies	—	often	 those	of	women	 and	 racialised	minorities	—	 are	marked	 out	 as	 ‘out	 of	 place’.	 Here,	 Padma	describes	the	pub	as	a	space	for	white	working	men	(something	her	and	her	friends	did	not	know	before	entering).	She	thus	seems	to	conjure	up,	at	 least	 implicitly,	 the	idea	 of	 the	white	working	 class.	 Importantly,	 in	 her	 understanding,	 white	working	class	men	become	associated	with	hostility	to	non-white	‘strangers’	and	she	feels	the	
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group	 is	not	welcome	within	 this	 space.	Thus,	 they	do	not	occupy	 the	 right	kind	of	corporeality	to	fit	in	in	this	specific	gendered	and	classed	space.		
Going	 back	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 ‘white	 gaze’,	 Towela	 (Zambian,	 19	 years	 old,	 college	student,	 did	 not	 vote)	 discussed	 a	 similar	 experience	 to	 that	 of	 Padma.	 Towela’s	family	had	moved	to	Scotland	(nearby	Glasgow)	when	she	was	about	13.	She	noted	that	 it	was	quite	difficult	 to	adapt	 to	 life	 in	Scotland	at	 first	—	especially	at	 school.	Asking	what	were	the	biggest	issues	in	terms	of	settling	in	to	life	in	Scotland,	Towela	explained	 that	 the	weather	 in	 Zambia	was	different	 as	well	 as	 the	people:	 “you	 get	used	 to	 seeing	 a	 lot	 of	 black	 people	 [laughs],	 and	 then	 you	 come	 here	 and	 it’s	 like	really	different”.	She	went	on	to	note	that	“I	was	actually	the	only	black	person	in	high	school”.	Asking	how	she	felt	about	it,	Towela	recounted	that	she	“wasn’t	comfortable	with	it	at	first	‘cause	people	did	look	at	me	funny,	you	know	what	I	mean,	like,	I	don’t	know,	 some	 people	 were	 acting	 like	 they’ve	 actually	 never	 seen	 a	 black	 person	[laughs]	before”.	Not	 stopping	at	merely	 looking	at	her	 “funny”,	 “they	would	ask	 to	touch	my	hair,	you	know,	things	like	that”.	Although	it	all	felt	too	much	when	she	first	started	at	the	school,	Towela	explained	that	she	is	“used	to	it	now”.			
I	asked	if	there	has	been	a	change	since	Towela	started	school	in	terms	of	there	being	not	as	much	focus	on	her,	as	she	noted	previously	that	she	found	the	attention	quite	uncomfortable.	Towela:	 Yes,	 yes,	 a-ha.	 It’s	 changed	because	 there’s,	 there’s	actually,	 like,	 a	 l-	 -	
quite	a	few	of	black	people	in	[my	old]	high	school,	I	know	a	lot	of	blacks	that	go	
there	now,	so	I’m	sure	they’re	used	to	seeing	that	now.	And	just	not	the	same	-	-	
even	when	you’re	on	the	bus,	though,	like	you	get	kids,	it’s	so	uncomfortable,	you	
get	kids	like	staring	[laughs].	Minna:	Oh	yeah?	Towela:	Yeah.	But	I	don’t	know,	I,	I	think	some	people	not	come	like	that	close	to	
black	people.	 In,	 in	England,	 though,	 there’s	a	 lot	of	black	people	 there.	 So	 I’m	
sure	 they’re	used	to	seeing	everybody	but	whereas	 in	Scotland,	 there’s	not	 that	
many.	(…)	Because	there’s,	I	think	loads	of	them	in,	in	England.	So	more	people	
need	to	come	down	here,	so	they	can	get	used	to	it	‘cause	-	-you	know,	I	mean,	it’s	
the	 same	 thing	 though,	 if	 a	white	 person	went	 to	 Africa,	 they	would	 probably	
stare	at	you	[laughs].	(…)	‘Cause	they’re,	they	are	like	surprised,	like	how	can	—	
obviously	 in	 Africa,	 like,	 I	 remember	 before	 coming	 here,	 would	 always	watch	
white	people	on	TV	and	you	would	see	like	loads	of	white	people	in	New	York,	in	
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films,	 and	 there	weren’t	 a	 lot	 of,	 like,	movies	with	 like	 black	 people	 or	 Indian,	
Asian,	you	know,	so	it’s	always	like	just	white	people	on	TV,	white	people	on	TV.		Minna:	Yeah.	Towela:	And	when	you	go	 to	 like	a	private	 school,	obviously	you	 see	 them	and	
you	get	used	to	 it,	but	 there’s	people	 that	don’t	 see	 them	at	all.	So	when,	when	
you	see	like	a	white	person	like	crossing,	you	get	people	staring,	some	will	follow	
you	around,	like	a	celebrity	[laughs].		Here,	Towela	draws	a	comparison	between	being	black	in	Europe,	and	being	white	in	Africa,	and	through	this	understanding	seeks	to	make	sense	of	people	staring	at	her.	Yet,	she	also	links	this	to	the	lack	of	representation	—	Towela	notes	that	she	did	not	see	many	black	people	on	TV	(especially	on	American	TV	shows	and	films).	This,	of	course,	 is	 connected	 with	 broader	 debates	 such	 as	 the	 recent	 #OscarsSoWhite	campaign	 which	 sought	 to	 challenge	 and	 bring	 change	 to	 the	 whiteness	 of	 the	Academy	 Awards.	 Bonilla-Silva	 (2012:178),	 in	 his	 2011	 Ethnic	 and	 Racial	 Studies	Annual	Lecture,	discusses	‘watching	whiteness’.	He,	thus,	draws	attention	to	the	ways	in	 which	 racial	 minorities	 are	 underrepresented	 in	 films	 and	 on	 TV.	 Importantly,	Towela	 touches	 upon	 something	 important:	 power	 and	 representation.	 While	 she	begins	by	making	a	comparison	between	black	people	in	Europe	and	white	people	in	Africa,	 she	 nonetheless,	 implicitly,	 acknowledges	 the	 global	 power	 imbalance	between	what	we	are	used	to	seeing	on	mainstream	western	TV	shows	and	who	we	are	 not	 —	 or,	 as	 Puwar	 would	 put	 it,	 who	 is	 the	 ‘universal	 human’	 and	 who	 is	constantly	marked	out	as	‘the	other’.	Further,	she	attributes	this	to	there	being	fewer	black	people	in	Scotland	as	opposed	to	England.			
Similarly,	 Mary	 (Kenyan)	 explained	 that,	 “some	 people	 I	 know	 have	 thought,	 have	moved	 to	 England	 ‘cause	 they	 thought,	 they	 feel	 like	 they	 are	more	 at	 home	 there	because	 there’s	more	black	people	 there”.	She	however	 felt	 “more	at	home	here	 [in	Scotland]”	than	she	did	in	England	because	she	found	people	to	be	“welcoming”	and	because	“you	don’t	feel	so	conscious	that	you’re	actually	a	foreigner”	—	“even	though	you	are”,	she	goes	on	to	say.	However,	Mary	concedes	that	“obviously	I’m	not	saying	it’s	 100	 per	 cent,	 there	 are	 obv-	 -	 because	 I’ve,	 I’ve	 struggled	 so	much	 in	 terms	 of	getting	the	right	job	and	things	like	that	but..socially	I	think	it’s	fine”.	Thus,	she	seems	to	me	 to	 suggest	 that	 although	her	 “social	 experience”	with	 people	 in	 Scotland	 has	
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been	fine,	she	may	have	encountered	structural	barriers	—	here	she	does	not	identify	whether	she	thinks	this	 is	caused	by	 institutional	racism,	although	elsewhere	 in	the	interview	 she	 discusses	 her	 lack	 of	 connections	which	 locals	may	 often	 have	when	looking	for	work.			
While	 some	participants	professed	 to	 liking	Glasgow	due	 to	 it	 being	 “multicultural”	(Stefania)	 and	 “international”	 (Tom),	 this	 diversity	 is	 relative.	 Rachel	 (English,	 33	years	old,	development	officer,	voted	yes)	notes	how	she	experienced	a	“real	culture	shock”	 when	 she	moved	 to	 Glasgow	 having	 come	 from	 one	 of	 the	 most	 ethnically	diverse	 neighbourhoods	 in	 London.	 When	 she	 moved	 to	 Glasgow,	 it	 was	 the	whiteness	 of	 the	 city	 that	 struck	her:	 “couldn’t	 [laughing]	 stop,	 like,	 staring	 at	 how	white	 it	was,	the	city	 is	 just	white,	yeah	—	‘wow’…’wow’”.	Though	her	husband	had	warned	 her,	 she	 “kind	 of	 thought	 he	was	 joking”	 and	 she	 “didn’t	 realise	—	when	 I	lived	 in	 London,	 I	 had	 absolutely	 no	 understanding	 of	 how	 different	 Scotland	 is”.	Similarly,	Farnod	(Iranian,	39	years	old,	land	surveyor,	did	not	have	a	vote),	who	lived	in	London	briefly	described	London	as	a	 “very	cosmopolitan	city”	where	you	“don’t	feel	a	stranger”	because	“many	people	are	from	outside	England”	and	the	city	is	thus	“very	 dynamic”.	 Thus,	 not	 only	 was	 the	 countryside	 or	 rural	 Scotland	 imagined	 as	‘white’,	the	diversity	of	Glasgow	was	also	seen	as	limited,	especially	vis-à-vis	London.		
	
	
6.6.	‘Universal	humanity’,	visibility	and	difference		The	 previous	 section	 focused	 on	 ‘race’	 and	 space,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	participants	 imagined	 rural	 and	urban	Scotland.	Within	 this	dichotomy,	 the	 rural	 is	very	 much	 understood	 and	 experienced	 as	 a	 ‘white	 space’.	 Urban	 spaces,	 notably	Glasgow,	are	seen	as	more	‘dynamic’	and	‘cosmopolitan’	but	this	diversity	is	relative	when	compared	to	metropoles	such	as	London.		Being	non-white	in	a	white	majority	country	 —	 even	 when	 moving	 through	 more	 ‘cosmopolitan’	 urban	 spaces	 —	 is	connected	with	 issues	around	visibility.	That	 is,	 rather	 than	being	 inconspicuous	or	going	unnoticed,	 the	differences	of	 those	deviating	 from	the	 ‘national	(white)	norm’	are	pointed	out	or	made	known.	
	203		
While	 Ignatieff	 has	 noted	 that	 “the	 repressed	 has	 returned,	 and	 its	 name	 is	nationalism”	(1993:2),	and	thus	sees	nationalism	as	something	that	comes	and	goes	(Billig	 2005:193),	 for	 non-nationals	 nationalist	 narratives	 and,	 by	 extension,	 ideas	about	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 national	 community	 and	 the	 national	 norm,	 are	constantly	 present.	 They	 may	 not	 be	 major	 occurrences,	 but	 even	 if	 they	 are		‘bubbling	under’	 or	 for	 the	majority	 of	 time	 go	unnoticed,	 nationalist	 demarcations	are	ever-present,	making	their	appearance,	however	fleeting,	in	the	hustle	and	bustle	of	the	everyday	—	on	the	streets,	in	shops,	or	at	the	hairdresser’s.	Thus,	rather	than	being	 an	 “intermittent	 mood	 in	 established	 nations”,	 nationalism	 is	 “the	 endemic	condition”	(Billig	1995:6).				
In	 a	 white	 majority	 country,	 however,	 the	 experiences	 of	 visibly	 ‘white’	 ethnic	minorities	(though	there	are	of	course	‘shades	of	whiteness’	—	see	e.g.	Garner	2007;	2010)	 often	 differ	 from	 those	 of	 ethnic	minorities	 of	 colour	 given	 their	 capacity	 to	’pass’	 and	 be	 rendered	 inconspicuous.	 Rachel,	 as	 discussed,	 was	 shocked	 by	 the	whiteness	 of	 Glasgow	 in	 comparison	 to	 London	 and	 noted	 how	 she	 could	 not	 stop	
staring	at	the	 lack	of	diversity	as	she	saw	it.	 	Thus,	she	highlights	the	 idea	of	seeing	diversity	—	that	is,	seeing	visible	(non-white)	difference	out	on	the	streets	and	public	spaces	in	and	around	the	city.	Of	course,	ethnic	diversity	extends	beyond	non-white	skin	colour	(and	hence	I	have	included	people	from	English	and	Polish	backgrounds	in	my	sample),	but	 in	a	white-majority	country	those	who	are	visibly	different	from	the	 ‘somatic	 norm’	 are	 often	marked	 out	 as	 ‘the	 other’	 from	 the	 ‘national	 norm’	 in	their	everyday	lives	and	interactions.			
Understanding	 the	ways	 in	which	 ‘race’,	 ‘ethnicity’,	 the	 nation	 and	 nationalism	 are	connected,	 overlap	 and	 work	 vis-à-vis	 one	 another	 is	 a	 key	 consideration	 for	 this	thesis.	Finding	an	answer	—	or	even	a	fragment	of	an	answer!	—	to	this	question	is	challenging.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	drawing	a	clear-cut	line	between	‘nation’	and	‘ethnicity’	is	difficult	as	the	two	are	often	defined	similarly	in	both	academic	and	non-academic	spheres.	A	central	issue	with	regard	to	the	imagined	national	community	is	the	 question	 of	 who	 can	 unproblematically	 belong	 to	 the	 nation;	 that	 is,	 whose	presence	 goes	 passively	 unquestioned	 and	 unchallenged	 and	 whose	 presence	 is	
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actively	declared,	pointed	out	or	even	challenged?	While	 those	who	 live	 in	Scotland	and	consider	themselves	Scottish	are	not	homogenous,	research	has	pinpointed	to	the	fact	that	whiteness	and	accent	(e.g.	Kiely	et	al	2005;	Kyriakides	et	al	2009;	McCrone	&	Bechhofer	 2010;	 Bechhofer	 &	 McCrone	 2012)	 usually	 function	 as	 key	 markers	 of	‘Scottishness’.	Thus,	those	who	 look	and/or	sound	different	from	the	 ‘national	norm’	are	 codified	 as	 ‘different’	 or	 as	 ‘the	 other’	 by	 people	 who	 see	 themselves	 as	unambiguously	 belonging	 to	 the	 nation.	 The	 nation	 therefore	 becomes	 closely	entangled	 with	 ‘race’	 and	 language	 (the	 latter	 is	 often	 taken	 to	 be	 an	 element	 of	‘ethnicity’),	among	other	things.		
The	 experience	 of	 not	 being	 white	 in	 a	 predominantly	 white	 country	 highlights	specific	issues	with	regard	to	a	person’s	sense	of	belonging.	Chalwe	recalled	a	time	he	went	to	the	get	his	hair	cut	with	his	wife:	Chalwe:	This	woman	looked	at	us,	said	‘yes,	can	I	help	you’.	We	said	we’d	like	to	
have	 our	 hair	 done.	 My	 wife	 [wants?]	 something.	 She	 says	 ‘wow,	 okay,	 umm,	
sorry,	umm,	we	never	done	like	so	hair	before’	[laughs].	Minna:	Okay,	yeah.	Chalwe:	So	I	was	thinking,	wow,	so	if	-	-	I	think	I	-	-	you	can’t	blame	them!	If	the	
numbers	 are..insignificant,	 maybe,	 d’you	 know,	 our	 voices	 may	 not	
be..umm..important.	Chalwe	 and	 his	 wife	 decided	 to	 visit	 a	 hairdresser	 which	 is	 a	 mundane,	 everyday	space	 where	 people	 go	 to	 look	 after	 or	manage	 their	 appearance	 (or	 part	 of	 their	decorum,	to	put	it	in	a	Goffmanian	sense	(1990	[1959]).	Chalwe’s	remarks	show	how	they	were	marked	out	—	or,	more	specifically	their	bodies	—	as	different	 from	‘the	norm’.	 In	 this	 space,	 Chalwe	 and	 his	 wife	 were	 visibly	 different,	 and	 embodied	difference	(non-white;	different	kind	of	hair).	Thus,	their	difference	and,	by	extension,	non-belonging	 to	 the	 (national)	 norm	 (rather	 than	 visiting	 ‘standard’	 hairdressers,	they	are	expected	to	visit	‘specialised’	hairdressers)	was	actively	made	known.			
As	was	discussed	previously,	Towela,	who	is	Chalwe’s	daughter,	also	mentioned	hair:	she	was	discussing	her	experience	of	being	one	of	the	few	black	people	the	children	in	her	school	had	met,	and	of	being	stared	at	and	of	people	asking	permission	to	touch	her	 hair.	 Instances	 like	 these,	 where	 a	 person’s	 difference	 is	 pointed	 out	 or	 their	
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embodied	 difference	 is	 used	 as	 a	 reason	 not	 to	 offer	 a	 service,	 serve	 as	 constant	reminders	 and	 ‘flaggings’	 of	 that	 person’s	 outsider	 status	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 of	broader	debates	regarding	the	nation	and	who	belongs	to	 it	on	the	other.	While	the	incident	at	the	hairdresser’s	is	perhaps,	at	first	sight,	more	of	an	example	of	everyday	ethnicity	(see	Karner,	2007)	at	work,	because	of	the	complex	ways	in	which	‘ethnicity’	and	 nation	 intersect	 it	 cannot	 be	 removed	 from	 understandings	 of	 the	 nation.	Instances	 like	 the	 one	 described	 by	 Chalwe	 feed	 into	 people’s	 personal	understandings	 and	 experiences	 of	 (not)	 belonging	 to	 the	 nation’s	 imagined	community.			
Many	 participants	 also	 spoke	 of	 racism	 they	 had	 personally	 experienced	 or	witnessed.	Thus,	there	are	different	ways	in	which	minorities	are	reminded	that	they	do	not	belong	or	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	not	belonging,	 they	are	 also	 told	 that	 they	are	inferior.	 Along	 this	 continuum	 you	 will	 find	 staring,	 for	 example,	 as	 well	 as	 racist	violence	(I	use	the	term	violence	broadly	to	refer	to	physical,	emotional	and	psychic	trauma).	Violet	shared	the	following	story	with	me:			Violet:	So	sometimes	you	 just	 feel	oh	no,	you	don’t	 -	 -	 that’s	when	now	you	feel	
okay,	 you	 don’t	 belong	 anywhere	 if	 people	 can	 treat	 you	 like	 that	—	why	me.	
Now	this	time	I	don’t	even	ask,	yeah.	The	other	time,	I	didn’t	know,	I	was	on	a	bus	
and	there	was	this	guy	with	a	black	dog.	Minna:	Mmhm.	
Violet:	 The	 dog	 sat	 next	 to	me,	 and	 then	 ‘hey,	 you	 dog!’.	 I	 realise	 that	 he	was	
talking	about	[me?]	[laughs],	just	literally	‘you	black	dog!’	—	‘black	dog!’.		Now,	
he	kept	on	insisting	on	the	colour	and	stuff,	so	I	was	just	like	oh	my	god,	I	think	
this	is	terrible,	you	know.	And	then	guess	what,	there’s	a	lady	who	stood	up	and	
they	said,	you	know,	sh-	-	she	shouted	abo	-	-at	this	man	and	just	said,	you	know,	
you	can’t	do	 that,	 can	you	please	get	up.	You	know,	and	 this	 lady	 spoke	 to	 the	
driver	and	that	man	was	just-	-		Minna:	Thrown	out?	Violet:	Yeah!	So	I	was	like	oh	my	god,	and	I	said	thank	you,	you	know.	Yeah,	so	
after	 that	 I	 think	my	husband	wrote	an	article	about	 this	 lady	because	 I	didn’t	
even	talk	to	her,	and	I	 just	explained	I	said	oh	my	god,	he	said	what	happened,	
and	this	woman	just	came	to	my	rescue.	And	that’s	when	you	feel	oh	no,	because,	
at	home	yes,	at	home	you	meet	—	you	know,	I	think	bad	people	are	everywhere,	
even	 where	 you	 belong,	 people	 will	 treat	 you	 badly.	 So	 it	 just	 depends,	 that’s	
what	 I	 can	 say.	People	will	 steal	 from	you.	When	 I	went	home,	 that’s	 home,	 in	
Zambia.	 (…)	 Anyway,	 it’s	 just	 that	 sometimes	 we	 pay	 attention	 to	 bad	 things	
rather	 than	 good	 things.	 Honestly,	 a	 good,	 umm,	 most	 of	 the	 things	 that	 I’ve	
experienced	here,	they’re	really	good,	I	can’t	even	say	no,	it’s	a	bad	place,	no.	
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Prior	to	Violet	discussing	her	experience	of	being	subjected	to	racist	violence	on	the	bus,	she	discussed	an	incident	that	happened	at	the	cinema	where	she	had	gone	with	her	 family.	 She	 explained	 that	 someone	 threw	 a	 bottle	 at	 her	 although	 she	 “wasn’t	talking”	and	she	“wasn’t	on	the	phone”	—	“[she]	was	just	there”.			
What	is	telling	is	that	Violet	did	not	disclose	these	events	—	which,	it	would	be	fair	to	assume,	 would	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 one’s	 sense	 of	 inclusion,	 belonging	 and	welcome-ness	—	until	late	on	in	the	interview.	Indeed,	it	is	not	until	page	17	(out	of	22)	of	the	transcript	that	she	begins	discussing	these	racist	incidents.	This,	then,	links	back	to	Ahmed’s	 ‘happiness	duty’	and	migrants’	reservation	to	discuss	that	“what	 is	not	 good”	 (2010:158),	 and	 to	 the	 ‘dominant	 discourse’	 (Baumann,	 1996:	 9-36)	positioning	Scotland	as	‘friendly’	and	‘welcoming’.			
Through	 these	 incidents,	 Violet	 is	 othered,	 her	 difference	 is	 pointed	 out,	 and	 her	belonging	 challenged	 based	 on	 her	 perceived	 ‘race’	 —	 therefore,	 these	 attacks,	although	much	more	extreme	incidents,	exist	on	the	same	continuum	alongside	with	what	happened	at	the	hairdresser’s.	Despite	the	attacks,	Violet	nonetheless	concludes	that	Scotland	is	not	“a	bad	place”,	and	that	“people	will	treat	you	badly”	wherever	you	go.	For	her,	the	two	different	incidents	—	someone	stealing	from	you	in	Zambia,	and	someone	inflicting	racist	violence	upon	you	in	Scotland	—	are	understood	through	an	individualised,	rather	than	structural,	framework	whereby	some	people	are	‘bad’.	As	such,	 these	ways	 of	 individualising	 racism	 enable	migrants	 (who	 are	 racialised)	 to,	ultimately,	maintain	the	dominant	narrative	of	Scotland	as	‘welcoming’.				
6.7.	From	audible	difference	to	inconspicuousness		For	ethnic	minorities	of	colour	(including	both	more	recent	migrants	and	native-born	minorities),	the	experience	of	living	in	Scotland	tends	to	be	characterised	by	a	sense	of	‘being	different’	from	the	‘national	norm’	—	or,	more	specifically,	of	being	made	to	feel	 different,	 of	 being	 made	 to	 feel	 like	 bodies	 out	 of	 place.	 When	 considering	
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national	belonging,	there	seem	to	be	two	levels	at	play:	on	the	one	hand	there	is	that	personal	understanding	or	sense	of	self	(‘identity’)	in	terms	of	national	consciousness	—	your	personal	feeling	regarding	an	affinity	to	a	nation.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	that	fleeting	impression	you	make	on	others	in	everyday	contexts	—	that	is,	who	you	are	 assumed	or	 imagined	 to	be.	However,	with	 regard	 to	 the	 latter,	white	minority	groups	have	the	potential	to	be	positioned	differently:	you	may	not	feel	Scottish	and	therefore	do	not	consider	yourself	to	belong	to	that	particular	nation.	If	you	are	white	in	 a	 white-majority	 country	 (which	 corresponds	 with	 an	 imagined	 national	community),	you	may	go	unnoticed	or	‘under	the	radar’.			
There	 is	a	tendency	to	understand	 ‘ethnic	minorities’	as	being	 ‘non-white’,	and	thus	‘being	 an	 ethnic	 minority’	 is	 linked	 with	 visible	 difference.	 This	 is	 linked	 to	 the	dominant	 position	 of	 considering	 ‘white’	 as	 the	 norm	 (or	 ‘universal	 humanity’	 as	Puwar	(2004)	would	put	it),	and	thus	positioning	everything	else	as	deviant	(Garner,	2010:34).	 ‘Whiteness’	 becomes	 unmarked	 and	 —	 for	 most	 people	 —	 it	 does	 not	function	 as	 a	 racial	 or	 ethnic	 identity	 (Garner,	 2010:35)16.	 A	 particular	 skin	 colour,	after	 all,	 comes	 to	mark	 or	 symbolise	 other	 phenomena,	 or	 comes	 to	 be	 used	 as	 a	social	 mark,	 only	 through	 a	 process	 of	 signification.	 Thus,	 no	 given	 skin	 colour’s	visibility	is	inherent	in	its	existence	as	such	(Miles	and	Torres,	1999:32).			
Being	white	in	a	white	majority	country	thus	accords	certain	privileges	with	regard	to	race	 and	 space:	 it	 allows	 the	possibility	 to	 go	unnoticed	 in	public	 spaces;	 that	 is,	 it	allows	 certain	 people	 to	 ‘pass’.	 By	 passing	 I	mean	 social	 instances	where	 someone	who	 would	 otherwise	 be	 marked	 out	 as	 ‘different’	 or	 ‘other’	 passes	 as	 what	 is	understood	to	be	the	dominant	‘norm’	or	as	what	is	seen	to	be	‘standard’.	According	to	Schlossberg	(2001),	passing	disrupts	the	logics	and	conceits	around	which	identity	categories	are	established	and	maintained.	She	notes	that	(2001:2):	
If	passing	wreaks	havoc	with	accepted	systems	of	social	recognition	and	cultural	
intelligibility,	 it	also	blurs	 the	carefully	marked	 lines	of	race,	gender,	and	class,	
calling	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 identity	 categories	 intersect,	 overlap,	
construct,	and	deconstruct	one	other.																																																										16	Although,	of	course,	recent	political	events	and	the	rise	of	the	so-called	‘alt-right’	(notably	in	the	US)	have	brought	issues	around	‘white	pride’	very	much	to	the	fore.	
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Furthermore,	 the	 passing	 subject’s	 ability	 to	 transcend	 his/her	 ‘authentic’	 identity	“calls	into	question	the	very	notion	of	authenticity	itself”	(Schlossberg	2001:2).	Thus,	passing	 threatens	 to	 call	 attention	 to	 the	performative	 and	 contingent	 nature	 of	 all	seemingly	 ‘natural’	 and	 ‘obvious’	 identities.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 authors	 do	 point	 out	how	 passing	 can	 be	 fundamentally	 conservative	 because	 it	 “generally	 holds	 larger	social	hierarchies	firmly	in	place”	(Schlossberg,	2001:3).	Schlossberg	does,	however,	seem	 to	 conclude	 that	 passing	 is	more	 about	 the	 creation	 and	 establishment	 of	 an	alternative	set	of	narratives	and	a	way	of	creating	new	stories	out	of	unusable	ones.	According	to	Epps	(2001:115),	although	passing	can	be	a	strategy	of	domination,	“it	more	 often	 than	 not	 involves	 the	 resistance	 to	 domination”.	 He	 sees	 passing	 as	“generated	in	and	out	of	fear,	insecurity	and	relative	lack	of	power”,	and	passing	is	a	tactic	of	empowerment,	“weak	and	partial”	though	it	may	be	(2001:115).			
Picking	up	this	argument,	Sara	Ahmed	notes	how	the	discourse	around	passing	tends	to	position	 it	 as	 a	 radical	 and	 transgressive	practice	which	 seeks	 to	destabilise	 and	traverse	 the	 system	 of	 knowledge	 and	 vision	 upon	which	 subjectivity	 and	 identity	precariously	 rest	 (1999:88).	However,	 she	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 a	 failure	 to	 theorise	“the	means	by	which	relations	of	power	are	secured,	paradoxically,	through	this	very	
process	of	destabilization”	 (Ahmed,	1999:89	—	emphasis	 in	original).	Therefore,	she	calls	 for	 more	 analysis	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 instability	 and	 crisis	 can	 enable	 the	stabilisation	of	relations	of	power	(Ahmed,	1999:90).	Furthermore,	Ahmed	goes	on	to	say	that	“ambiguous	bodies	that	do	not	fit	existing	criteria	for	identifications	keep	in	place,	or	are	even	the	condition	of	possibility	for,	the	desire	to	tell	bodies	apart	from	each	 other	 through	 the	 accumulation	 of	 knowledge”	 (1999:92).	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	constant	urge	to	categorise,	compartmentalise	and	label	people,	for	example	based	on	their	ethnic	or	national	identity,	and	failing	to	do	this	based	on	visible	criteria,	other	methods	of	differentiating	between	people	need	to	be	drawn	upon.		
For	 many	 of	 the	 participants,	 especially	 those	 who	 were	 white,	 it	 was	 accent	 that	functioned	as	a	(non-visible)	signifier	of	difference.	As	mentioned	previously,	accent	has	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 key	 marker	 of	 Scottishness	 in	 research	 focusing	 on	understandings	of	national	identity.	I	asked	Towela	whether,	after	living	in	Scotland	for	six	years,	she	identified	as	being	Scottish	in	any	way.	She	replied	“no”,	and	went	
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on	 to	 explain:	 “no,	 ‘cause,	 ‘cause	 I	 struggle	 with	 the	 accent	 as	 well”	 and	 that,	ultimately,	 “people	 would	 automatically	 just	 know	 that	 I	 wasn’t	 born	 here,	 or	 I’m	foreign	 by	 the	 way	 I	 speak”.	 I	 asked	 if	 accent	 was	 a	 “a	 big	 part	 of,	 kind	 of,	 being	Scottish”	 to	 which	 she	 said	 “yes”	 —	 thus,	 for	 her,	 ‘sounding	 Scottish’	 was	 key	 to	feeling	Scottish	as	well	as	to	other	people	considering	you	as	Scottish.	When	the	white	participants	 did	 not	 speak,	 and	 their	 audible	difference	 was	 not	made	 known,	 they	were	able	to	move	through	spaces	straightforwardly	—	or	to	‘pass’.	In	relation	to	this,	Towela	discussed	accents	and	mentioned	her	Polish	friend	who,		
…came	 here	 when	 she	was	 about	 ten,	 but	 somehow,	 she	 sounds	 very	 Scottish,	
very	Scottish.	And	I	know	in,	umm,	like	before	Romania,	Poland,	you	can	tell	from	
the	 accent	 that	 they’re	 from	 the	EU,	 and	without	 it’s	 very,	 it’s	 very	 Scottish	 so	
people	can’t	tell.	People	are	actually	surprised	when	they	find	out	that	she’s,	she’s	
Polish,	a-ha.			Some	are,	 thus,	able	 to	pass	 through	space	and	 time	without	undue	attention	being	paid	to	them.	As	was	suggested	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	(as	per	Smith’s	(2016)	argument),	 in	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 everyday’,	 its	 political	significance	 has	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 our	 understandings.	 The	 everyday	 as	 a	mundane,	 seemingly	 unreflective	 experience	 is	 a	 privilege	 —	 the	 ability	 to	 be	inconspicuous	 is	 not	 open	 to	 everybody	 or,	 indeed,	 every	 body.	 Puwar	 notes,	 in	relation	to	gender	and	race,	the	privilege	those	in	oppressed	positions	can	still	hold:		
The	relative	degree	to	which	white	women	are	the	somatic	norm,	on	the	grounds	
of	whiteness,	gets	overlooked.	The	extent	to	which	their	whiteness	grants	them	a	
certain	 level	 of	 ‘ontological	 complicity’	 (c.f.	 Bourdieu	 1990b:11-12)	 with	
normative	 institutional	cultures,	even	while	 they	are,	on	 the	grounds	of	gender	
and	possibly	class,	‘space	invaders’,	remains	hidden.	(Puwar,	2004:9-10)				Farnod,	 for	 example,	 made	 a	 distinction	 between	 audible	 difference	 and	 visible	difference	when	he	notes	that,	“if	I	walk	in	the	street	nobody	recognise	me	as	a..Asian	or	Iranian	guy”,	and	he	can	therefore	 ‘pass’	as	a	 local	 if	he	does	not	have	to	speak.	I	asked	if	Farnod	had	experienced	“negativity	from	people”	to	which	he	replied,	“not	to	me,	actually”.	He	did,	however,	go	on	to	reflect	on	his	friend:	“but	I	had	some	friend	
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from	 Iran,	 different	 face	 and	 different	 colour,	 yeah	 they	 had	 bad	 experience.	Sometimes	 they	had,	 they	were	 angry	 about,	 um,	 I	mean,	 how	 they,	 um,	 the	 -	 -	 the	relationship	 between	 refugees	 and	 Scottish	 people”.	 Thus,	 Farnod	 draws	 our	attention	to	audible	and	visible	difference,	and	potential	to	 ‘pass’	and	move	through	everyday	spaces	unnoticed.			
Farnod,	 discussing	 audible	 differences,	 concluded	 that	 “when	 I	 started	 speaking	 it,	everybody	says	yeah,	you’re	not	British”.	For	him,	“one	of	the	main	things	in	Scotland”	is	the	“different	accent”.	Eilidh,	similarly,	brought	up	the	importance	of	accents,	that	is,	 the	 idea	 of	 sounding	 Scottish.	 I	 asked	 her	 what	 her	 experience	 of	 Scottish	nationalism	was	like,	and	how	it	affected	her	life.	She	replied:	“Oh,	I	have	been	abused	on	the	street	when	I’ve	been	heard	speaking.	(…)	I	mean	not	often.	It	has	happened”.	She	went	 on	 to	 say	 that	 targeting	 of	 people	 “because	 of	 something	 that’s	 essential	about	 them”	 is	 completely	 unacceptable,	 and	 that	 that	 is	 something	 that	 the	nationalist	 agenda	 lets	 in	 through	 the	 door	 “even	 if	 it	 doesn’t	 intend	 to”.	 Eilidh,	further,	mentioned	a	time	at	work	when	she	was	interviewing	someone	about	racially	aggravated	behaviour,	which	happened	to	be	against	an	English	person.		Eilidh:	And	as	soon	as	I	s-	-	started	to	speak	to	the	person	who’s	perpetrated	it	he	
was	 immediately	 on	 the	 defensive	 thinking	 I	 had	 an	 agenda	 about	 it.	 Oh,	 you	
know,	where	are	you	from	and	I	 -	 -	all	of	a	sudden,	well	that’s	really	 irrelevant	
and	that’s	the	point	of	this	whole	conversation.		Minna:	Yeah.	Eilidh:	 So,	people	often	 try	and	guess,	with	 the	accent,	where	 it’s	 from.	So	 that	
kind	of-	-	or	they	assume	that	I’m	English.	
	
Though	Eilidh	 is	 from	Guernsey	 and	 therefore	 not	 English,	 because	 of	 the	way	 she	sounds	 she	 is	 habitually	misrecognised	 as	 being	 English,	which	 has	 led	 to	 negative	experiences.	However,	 for	 Eilidh,	 these	 incidents	 only	 occur	 when	 she	 opens	 her	mouth	 and	 directly	 engages	 with	 people,	 or	 is	 overheard	 speaking.	 	 Further,	 it	 is	worth	mentioning	what	McIntosh	et	al	(2004)	call	“degrees	of	Englishness”	—	that	is,	certain	accents	 (especially	 from	the	North	of	England)	are	regarded	as	being	“more	acceptable	to	Scottish	ears”.	 Indeed,	Tom	(age	unknown,	English,	 teacher,	voted	no)	found	himself	accentuating	his	Geordie	accent.	
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Two	 things	 are	worth	 noting	 here.	 Firstly,	 the	 importance	 accorded	 to	 the	 Scottish	accents	 by	 the	 participants	 speaks	 to	 Kiely	 et	 al’s	 (2001;	 2005)	 and	McCrone	 and	Bechhofer’s	 (2008)	 work,	 which	 has	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Scottish	accent	as	an	identity	marker.	That	is,	Scottish	accent	plays	a	key	part	when	refuting	or	accepting	 an	 individual’s	 claim	 to	 Scottishness.	 Secondly,	while	 accents	 function	 as	markers	 of	 similarity	 or	 difference	 in	 many	 national	 contexts,	 there	 is	 something	specific	to	Scotland	at	play	here.	The	Scottish	accent	(and	of	course	there	are	regional	variations	within	Scotland),	 I	would	argue,	has	a	certain	symbolic	charge	due	to	the	extent	 to	 which,	 historically,	 the	 Scots	 accent	 itself	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 a	 kind	 of	stigmatisation	which	is	closely	linked	to	understandings	of	class	(see	Cheyne,	1970).			
Among	many	of	the	participants,	there	was	a	strong	sense	of	a	desire	to	fit	in	—	or	to	be	 inconspicuous,	 to	 go	 unnoticed.	 Stefania	 talks	 about	 her	 sons’	 struggles	 to	 find	friends,	and	attributes	this	to	their	obvious	Polishness,	due	to	their	names:	Stefania:	But	because	they	were	given	Polish	names,	I	think	that	makes	-	-	people	
don’t	 think	 like,	umm,	people	 -	 -	my	son	struggles	 to	have	 friends	because	 they	
hear,	 you	 know	 -	 -	 when	 someone	 says	 even	 Tomas,	 or	 his	 name	 is	 Tomasz,	
Tomas	 sounds	German,	 so	 they	 still	 kind	of	know	he’s	not,	he	 is	not	 from	here.	
And	I	sometimes	wonder,	how	can	I	make	them…it	went	to	the	point	of	I	actual-	-	
umm,	tell,	told	my	son	to	introduce	himself	as	Tom.	Minna:	Tom,	yeah,	yeah.	Stefania:	So	he	can	blend	within	the,	you	know,	within	the	community.	Further,	and	leading	on	from	the	previous	discussion,	apart	from	anglicising	Tomasz’s	name	to	Tom,	Stefania	also	suggests	that	if	Tomasz	were	to	acquire	a	Scottish	accent,	that	might	also	alleviate	the	situation:	Stefania:	And	I	can	clearly	see,	he’s	gonna	end	up	—	if	I	stay	in	Scotland	for	the	
next	couple	of	years	—	he	is	gonna	get	that	Scottish	accent,	you	know.	He,	he,	he	
is	much	more,	and	maybe	then	—	so	maybe	that’s	the	solution.		Minna:	Yeah.	Stefania:	We	can	try	and	mix	him.	But	you	know,	 if	 I	can’t	mix	him,	umm,	with	
Scottish	children,	how	am	I	 supposed	 to,	you	know,	how	am	I	 supposed	 to	give	
him	those	opportunities?	You	know,	school	is	not,	you	know,	you,	you,	you	are	not	
gonna	make	friends,	really,	if	you	only	see	them	at	school.	And	I’m	trying	to	make	
every	effort	(…).	For	Stefania,	having	her	children	‘blend	in’	—	that	is,	going	unnoticed	—	is	important	because,	in	her	view,	there	is	a	lot	at	stake:	making	sure	that	her	child	is	not	different	
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from	the	‘norm’	and	that	he	mixes	with	‘indigenous’	children	means	he	will	have	more	opportunities	in	life.			
Noor,	who	was	born	 in	Scotland	but	whose	parents	migrated	 to	 the	UK	 from	 India,	spoke	about	not	wanting	 to	be	different	 from	other	children	when	growing	up.	She	explained	how	people	at	school	would	ask	“do	you	speak	a	 funny	language	at	home	and	do	you	dress	in	a	different	way”	to	which	her	and	her	siblings	would	say	“no,	no,	no,	no,	we	speak	English”.	She	did	not	want	to	speak	Punjabi	out	on	the	street	in	case	anyone	heard	and	she	wanted	to	dress	the	same	way	as	other	children.	“If	it	was	like	parents	 meeting”,	 Noor	 and	 her	 siblings	 would	 feel	 embarrassed	 as	 she	 thought	“everyone	is	gonna	find	out	my	mom’s	English	is	not	good”	—	“because	you	just	want	to	be	like	every	other	child”.	However,	as	she	got	older	she	became	“proud	of	the	fact	that,	you	know,	that	you	can	speak	two	languages	and	then	you	can,	you	know,	you’ve	got	that	-	-	and	people	are	then	a	bit	more	fascinated”.			
Ahsan,	who	has	lived	in	Scotland	for	five	years,	said	he	was	“trying	to	adopt	to	things”	and	to	speak	like	‘locals’	(I	noted	to	him	that	I	noticed	he	used	a	lot	of	Scottish	words,	such	as	‘aye’,	‘cannae’,	‘wouldnae’).	He	explained	that	he	believed	that,	
…when	you	move	to	a	country	and	you	know	you’re	gonna	live	there	for	lifetime,	
so	you	should	struggle	to	get	their	language	adopted,	and	their	c-	-	you	try,	you	
have	to	try	to,	to	mix	up	with	the	local	people.	This	is	because	“you	don’t	want	to	be	like	a	(…)	separate	character”.	Ahsan	recalls	that	when	he	arrived	from	Pakistan,	he	had	a	big	moustache.	He	explained	how	“back	in	Pakistan	most	people	have	a	moustache”	but	when	he	came	to	Scotland,	he	saw	that	“nobody	have	a	moustache	[laughs]”	which	led	him	to	“feeling	like	an	odd	person	in	this	 culture,	 you	know,	 in	 this	 environment”.	 Thus,	 “after	 a	 couple	 of	weeks,	 I	 took	mine	off,	I	 just	shaved	myself	and	I	said	no	-	-	because	I’m	living	here,	and	I	have	to	live	 here	 for	 long,	 so	 I	 need	 to	 adopt	 to	 things	 from	 these	 local	 people”.	 Thus,	 the	participants	adopted	various	strategies	in	relation	to	the	way	they	spoke	or	the	way	they	looked	in	order	to	‘fit	in’	with	the	‘national	norm’.			
Before	moving	on	to	the	next	section,	it	is	—	finally	—	important	to	linger	on	Stefania,	
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Noor	and	Ahsan	and	the	ways	in	which	they	sought	to	‘fit	in’	or	‘blend	in’.	It	is	crucial	to	 recognise	 and	 acknowledge	 Stefania’s	 and	 her	 children’s	 whiteness	 within	 this	context.	 Let	 us	 consider	 this	 excerpt	 from	 Claire	 Heuchan’s	 Sister	 Outrider	 blog	(2016):	
I	 am	Black.	 I	 am	Scottish.	 To	 some,	 it’s	 obvious	 that	 the	 two	are	 not	mutually	
exclusive.	 To	 others,	 Black	 Scottish	 identity	 is	 a	 contradiction	 in	 terms:	 either	
you’re	of	 this	place,	Scottish	and	therefore	white,	or	Other,	Black.	Rest	assured,	
the	two	fit	together	—	admittedly	there	are	tensions,	but	those	mostly	arise	from	
the	expectations	of	other	people	(read:	white	people)	rather	than	any	aspect	of	
what	it	actually	is	to	be	Black	and	Scottish.	The	plurality	of	Black	identity	often	
gets	lost	in	how	this	discussion	is	approached,	because	constructions	of	national	
identity	 are	 so	 often	 treated	 as	 binary	 and	 static.	 “Where	 are	 you	 from,	
originally?”	 Five	 words	 that	 plague	 people	 of	 colour	 across	 Britain.	 It’s	
essentially	 code	 for	 “if	 you’re	 here,	 then	why	 aren’t	 you	white?”	When	 I	was	 a	
child	that	question	left	me	feeling	sick,	scared.	I	dreaded	it,	and	have	developed	
something	of	a	sixth	sense	for	when	it’s	coming.	What	caused	me	discomfort	was	
that	 it	 positioned	 me	 as	 Other,	 and	 was	 often	 asked	 because	 white	 people	
couldn’t	 wrap	 their	 heads	 around	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 Black	 child	 belonging	 in	 an	
otherwise	 white	 family.	 Now,	 having	 grown	 up	 and	 inhabited	 this	 world	 as	 a	
Black	woman	for	24	years,	 I	have	a	much	thicker	skin	when	it	comes	to	micro-
aggressions.	 But	 people	 still	 ask	 it.	 Random	 strangers	 still	 feel	 entitled	 to	 ask	
that,	completely	out	of	the	blue,	their	curiosity	outweighing	basic	courtesy.	That	
question	 can’t	 be	 separated	 from	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 Black	 and	 Scottish.	 It’s	 an	
indicator	 of	 how	 white	 people	 consider	 Scottishness,	 what	 can	 and	 cannot	 be	
Scottish.	The	underlying	assumption	around	which	the	question	is	framed	is	that	
Scottish	identity	is	inherently	white.		
It	can	be	hard	to	distinguish	a	Polish	child	who	is	white,	has	an	anglicised	name,	and	has	a	Scottish	accent	from	a	‘white	Scottish’	child.	However,	the	possibility	of	so-called	‘white’	minority	groups	‘passing’	as	Scottish17,	or	being	inconspicuous	does	not	mean	that	 they	 do	 not	 experience	 exclusion	 and	 oppression.	 	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	bear	 in	 mind	 that	 racism	 does	 not	 come	 in	 one	 shape	 or	 form;	 rather,	 there	 are	
racisms	through	which	racialised	minorities	are	excluded,	 inferiorised,	subordinated	and	exploited	in	different	historical	and	social	contexts.	Further,	different	racisms	are	experienced	in	different	ways	by	various	class,	ethnic,	and	gender	categories	(Anthias	and	Yuval-Davis,	1993:2).		
																																																								17	As	mentined	before,	Scottishness	is	—	according	to	e.g.	social	attitudes	survey	data	—	still	strongly	connected	with	the	idea	of	‘whiteness’	(McCrone	and	Bechhofer,	2010).	
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Whiteness	 is	 a	 continuous	 variable	 “whose	 hues	 are	 a	 product	 of	 processes	 of	racialisation”	 (Fox	 et	 al,	 2012:692),	 and	 the	 racialisation	 of	minority	 groups	 occurs	when	migrants	are	collectively	disparaged	with	reference	to	a	combination	of	cultural,	social	 and/or	 quasi-biological	 traits	 (Fox	 et	 al,	 2012:689).	 Garner	 (2007)	 refers	 to	‘contingent	hierarchies’	of	whiteness,	by	which	he	means	the	internal	borders	within	the	white	category	that	are	produced	by	processes	of	racialisation;	i.e.	that	there	are	socially	 observable	 degrees	 of	whiteness	 between	 different	 groups	 that	 seem	 to	 be	unproblematically	 white	 (Garner,	 2010:121).	 Thus,	 sociologically,	 ‘white’	 can	 be	interpreted	 as	 “encompassing	 non-material	 and	 fluid	 dominant	 norms	 and	boundaries”	(Garner,	2007:67).		
So	far,	within	the	British	context,	theories	have	been	advanced	about	such	groups	as	Central	 and	 East	 European	 immigrants	 (e.g.	 Dawney,	 2008;	 Fox	 et	 al,	 2012),	 Roma	(e.g.	 Poole,	 2010),	 the	 Irish	 (e.g.	 Finn,	 1991;	 Devine,	 2000;	 Garrett,	 2002)	 and	 the	English	 (in	 Scotland)	 (McIntosh	 et	 al,	 2004;	 Hussain	 &	 Miller,	 2005).	 Importantly,	understanding	the	‘contingent	hierarchies	of	whiteness’	“is	not	an	attempt	to	take	the	focus	away	from	the	dominant	racialised	groups’	constructions	of	alterity	but	to	stress	continuity	and	 change	 in	 the	way	 the	Other	 is	represented	and	dealt	with”	 (Garner,	2004:108).	Thus,	 the	way	 in	which	we	understand	white	groups	has	 to	be	nuanced	and	 has	 to	 account	 for	 both	 white	 privilege	 as	 well	 as	 the	 different	 modalities	 of	racism.				
6.8.	Scotland	and	anti-Englishness		A	theme	that	emerged	very	strongly	during	the	interviews	was	anti-Englishness,	and	it	 thus	 merits	 a	 closer	 consideration.	 Here,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 foreground	 the	discussion	by	drawing	a	clear	line	between	racism	and	anti-Englishness	because	the	latter	is	not	an	instance	of	the	former.	In	order	to	do	this,	it	is	helpful	to	refer	to	Miri	Song’s	excellent	work	on	what	she	terms	as	the	culture	of	racial	equivalence	(2014).	Song,	alongside	Miles	(1989),	for	example,	argues	that	racism	is	more	often	than	not	over-used	 and	 defined	 and	 understood	 too	 loosely	 which	 leads	 to	 the	 term’s	“conceptual	 inflation”	 and	 “declining	 utility”	 (2014:108)	 —	 almost	 anything	 and	
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anyone	can	be	labelled	racist.				Song	takes	her	cue	from	Omi’s	and	Winant’s	(1994:162)	influential	‘racial	formation’	theory,	which	 argues	 that	 racism	 is	 “a	 fundamental	 characteristic	 of	 social	 projects	which	create	or	reproduce	structures	of	domination	based	on	essentialist	categories	of	 race”.	 As	 Song	 argues	 (2014:113),	 this	 conceptualisation	 is	 “helpful	 because	racially	 essentialist	 claims	 on	 their	 own	 are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 constitute	 ‘racism’	 as	such:	rather,	such	essentialist	categories	or	ways	of	thinking	must	be	shown	to	‘create	or	 reproduce	 structures	 of	 domination’	 in	 specific	 historical	 contexts”.	 Song	 argues	that	 while	 theorising	 on	 racialisation	 emphasised	 “the	 ambivalence	 and	contradictions	embedded	in	individuals’	racial	attitudes	and	behaviours”	and	has	thus	“enabled	us	to	analyse	multiple	racial	incidents	with	more	care	and	specificity”,	at	the	same	 time	 “in	 doing	 so,	 it	 has	 also	 fostered	 a	 highly	 individualistic	 and	 privatised	understanding	of	‘racism’	which	obscures	conceptualisations	of	racism	as	structured	systems	of	power	and	domination	which	have	a	historical	basis”	 (2014:122-123	—	original	 emphases).	Therefore,	 racialisation	or	 racial	 incidents	do	not	 automatically	signify	racism	—	indeed,	“the	growing	equivalence	in	how	racism	is	understood	(…)	is	worrying,	as	it	denudes	the	idea	of	racism	of	its	historical	basis,	severity	and	power”	(Song,	 2014:125	 —	 added	 emphasis).	 Consequently,	 “commonplace	 assertions	 of	racism	 (…)	end	up	 trivialising	 and	homogenizing	quite	different	 forms	of	 racialized	interactions”	(Song,	2014:125).			In	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 nationalism	 in	 Scotland,	 we	 need	 to	 understand	 the	relationship	between	Scotland	and	England,	or	Scottishness	and	Englishness.	We	also	need	 to	 understand	 how	 anti-Englishness	 relates	 to	 Scottish	 nationalist	 narratives	and	experiences	of	nationalism	in	Scotland,	but	I	would	argue	that	it	is	not	helpful	to	think	of	it	through	the	analytical	lens	of	racism.	In	Chapter	2,	it	was	pointed	out	that	imagining	‘an	Other’	is	a	key	component	of	nationalist	narratives.	In	reference	to	the	UK,	 many	 commentators	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 English	 are	 Scotland’s	 ‘significant	other’:	Hearn,	for	example,	notes	that	identities	are	“often	constructed	in	opposition	to	a	particularly	significant	other”	and	that	“Englishness	undoubtedly	plays	that	role	in	relation	to	Scottishness,	a	role	arising	out	of	a	long	and	complex	history	of	rivalry	and	interdependence”	(quoted	in	Watson,	2003:18)	and	McIntosh	et	al	(2004)	found	
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that	 several	 of	 their	 participants	 “observed	 that	 'Scottishness'	 explicitly	 involved	asserting	difference	from	'Englishness’”.				In	 relation	 to	 this,	Ahsan	 (Pakistani,	 38	years	old,	 didn’t	 disclose	how	he	voted)	—	who	 among	 other	 jobs	 drives	 a	 taxi	 —	 explained	 how	 he	 had	 witnessed	 Scots	becoming	“more	patriotic”	when	they	are	drunk.	Asking	what	kinds	of	things	he	had	heard,	Ahsan	said:		
Oh..well,	obviously,	I	don’t	born	here	and	I	don’t	know	their	um,	s-	-	national	kind	
of	 songs	 and	 that	—	 which	 they	 sing	 that	 time	 of,	 I’m	 -	 -	 sometimes	 I	 don’t	
understand	what	 they	are	 singing,	what	 they	are	 talking	about.	But	 the	 things	
you	 in	 general	 get	 from	 their	 appearance	 and	 their	 expressions	 is	 like	 more	
patriotic	 ‘I’m	Scottish,	 I’m	not	English,	 I’m	not	British,	 I’m	Scottish’.	 They	have	
this	thing	in	them,	yeah.	Here,	Ahsan	highlights	the	connection	of	England	to	Scotland	as	its	‘significant	other’.	McIntosh	et	al	(2004)	conducted	a	qualitative	study	whereby	they	sought	to	uncover	English	 people’s	 experiences	 of	 anti-Englishness	 in	 Scotland.	McIntosh	 et	 al	 (2004:	n.p.)	concede	that	while	the	participants	“were	relatively	powerful	and	privileged	in	relation	to	other	minority	groups	in	the	UK”,	nonetheless	“this	relative	power	did	not	prevent	 their	 sense	 of	 ‘belonging’	 to	 Scotland,	 being	 undermined	 or	 cast	 in	 some	doubt	 in	 regular	 and	 routine	 interactions	with	 Scots”.	McIntosh	 et	 al	 (2004)	 noted	that	 amongst	 those	 they	 interviewed,	 there	 was	 a	 sense	 that	 “their	 experiences	 of	anti-Englishness	 often	 revolved	 around	 assumptions	 of	 a	 deep	 rooted,	 almost	'natural',	 difference	between	 them	and	Scottish	people”.	Thus,	McIntosh	et	 al	 argue	that	there	are	essentialist	constructions	of	’The	English’	at	play,	and	that	the	English	have	 been	 racialised	 to	 some	 extent.	 However,	 drawing	 on	 Song	 (2014),	 I	 would	argue	 that	 though	 the	 English	 in	 Scotland	may	 experience	 racialised	 incidents	 and	racialisation,	 these	experiences	cannot	be	understood	 through	 the	analytical	 lens	of	
racism	as	the	English	have	not	been	the	victims	of	systemic	structures	of	power	and	domination	 historically	 (unlike,	 for	 example,	 the	 Irish	 in	 Scotland).	 	 However,	 it	 is	important	to	understand	that	“overcoming	such	'racialised	boundaries'	(Anthias	and	Yuval-Davis,	 1992;	 Miles,	 1993)	 can	 be	 a	 very	 tiresome,	 wearing	 and	 at	 times	 for	some	a	deeply	offensive	and	threatening	feature	of	daily	life	in	Scotland”	(McIntosh	et	al,	2004).			
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Considering	 this	 antagonism	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 England	 and	 the	 English	 as	 Scotland’s	other	from	the	recent	migrants’	perspective	is	interesting.	The	participants	who	were	relatively	new	to	Scotland	had	quickly	picked	up	on	what	they	saw	as	a	sense	of	anti-Englishness	in	Scotland.	Catherine	(Nigerian,	32	years	old,	student,	didn’t	vote),	who	lived	in	England	for	a	while,	shared	her	experience:	
I	 feel	 like	 there	are	differences	 [between	England	and	Scotland],	 but	 then	 they	
are	not	like-	-	I	understand	like	there’s	the	history	and	everything	but	I	feel	like	-	
-	 because	 when	 you’re	 in	 England	 and	 you	 talk	 about	 Scotland,	 people	 are	
normally	 really	 nice	 about	 Scottish	 people,	 they	 are	 like	 ‘oh,	 those	 people	 are	
friendl-	 -	 like,	 when	 I	 told	 my	 friends	 in	 England	 that	 I	 was	 coming	 down	 to	
Scotland	they	were	like	‘wow,	they	are	people-	-	nice	people	there,	the	weather	is	
cold	but	then	the	people	are	friendly’	and	everything	and	then	I	got	to	Scotland	
and	I	—	when	I	talk	to	people	about	England	and	it’s	like	the	other	way	around,	
like,	‘those	devils’,	those	-	-	it’s	like,	I	don’t	know	[laughs].	
			I	 asked	why	 Catherine	 thought	 there	 existed	 this	 animosity	 between	 Scotland	 and	England.	She	argued	this	was	probably	to	do	with	the	history	and	she	knew	that	there	was	 “something	 about	 the	 English	 people	 taking	 over	 Scotland	 by	 force	 and	 all	 of	that”.	 Interestingly,	 she	 alludes	 to	 the	 process	 of	 learning	 about	 the	 underlying	processes	and	attitudes	which	guide	social	interactions	and	understandings:		
…sometimes	I	just	feel	really	bad,	‘cause	I	feel	like	to	me,	like	to	an	outsider,	you	
just	see	like	everybody’s	the	same	kind	of	thing,	but	then	by	the	time	you	get	to	
know	them,	you	know	that	there’s	like..this	animosity.			Thus,	 as	 an	 ‘outsider’	 —	 or	 a	 stranger	 in	 Simmelian	 sense	 —	 little	 by	 little,	 she	learned	 about	 the	 ‘animosity’	 that	 exists	 among	 Scots,	 as	 she	 sees	 it,	 against	 the	English.	 I	 asked	 if	 she	 picked	 up	 on	 the	 animosity	 quite	 quickly,	 to	 which	 she	responded	“I	did.	(…)	I	did	like	almost	immediately	actually.	Because	when	people	ask	me	like	 ‘oh,	where	are	you	coming’	I’m	like	 ‘oh,	I	 just	moved	up	from	England’,	they	say	‘oh,	England’”.				In	 the	 interview	situation,	Catherine	went	on	 to	say	 that	 she	would	 like	 to	move	 to	England	after	finishing	university	in	Scotland,	which	led	me	to	ask	why	she	wanted	to	live	 in	 England.	 At	 this	 point,	 Catherine	 looked	 around,	 lowered	 her	 voice	 and	confirmed	with	me:	“nobody’s	listening”.	Thus,	she	had	internalised	the	idea	of	anti-
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Englishness	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 she	 did	 not	 want	 to	 be	 overheard	 by	 Scots	 saying	positive	 things	 about	 England.	 Similarly	 to	 the	 points	 raised	 by	 Catherine,	 Ahsan	spoke	at	length	about	the	anti-Englishness	he	had	witnessed.	Going	back	to	his	point	about	Scots	being	“more	patriotic”	when	they	are	drunk	and	about	them	saying	that	“we’re	 Scottish,	 we’re	 not	 English”,	 I	 asked	 if	 Ahsan	 felt	 there	 was	 a	 lot	 of	 anti-Englishness	in	Scotland.	He	said	“yes,	there	is”	and	“it’s	a	lot,	it’s	a	lot”.	He	noted	how	Scots	 “don’t	 feel	 a	 hesitation	 telling	 you	 that	 they	don’t	 like	English	people,	 they’re	quite	bold	on	that”	and	that	“you	get	harsh	comments	and	statements	against	English	people”.	 	 Like	 Catherine,	 Ahsan	 connected	 the	 perceived	 animosity	 to	 an	understanding	 of	 Scotland	 being	 ‘oppressed’	 by	 England.	 Consequently,	 he	understood	this	to	be	a	factor	that	affected	the	independence	referendum	debates	—	that	is,	Scotland	freeing	itself	from	English	control18.			Anti-Englishness	was	experienced	in	other	ways	by	the	participants	as	well.	“Banter	and	 joking”,	 McIntosh	 et	 al	 (2004)	 write,	 “were	 important	 for	 serving	 constant	reminders	 of	 these	 ‘differences’	 [between	 the	 Scots	 and	 the	 English]”.	 Among	Watson’s	participants,	verbal	abuse	was	the	most	common	type	of	anti-Englishness,	and	 was	 reported	 as	 being	 “banter”,	 “teasing”,	 “joking”	 and	 “occasionally	 abuse”	(2003:130).	Rachel	 (33	 years	 old,	 English,	 development	 officer,	 voted	 yes)	 said	 she	has	set	her	roots	in	Scotland	as	she	bought	a	house	here,	has	a	long-term	job	and	has	a	son	who	was	born	in	Scotland.	Thus,	she	feels	“part	of	the	community”.	Nonetheless,	she	has	been	left	“with	an	odd	sense	of	identity”	which	manifests	itself	in	her	telling	anti-English	jokes:	Rachel:	 Umm,	 because…[sighs	 and	 laughs]	 Because…	 Why..I’m	 not	 quite	 sure	
how	this	works.	I	quite	frequently	come	up	with	anti-English	jokes.	
	Minna:	[laughs]	Rachel:	 [laughs]	And	I	think	it’s	 just	because	my,	 like…my	husband	has	a	really	
black	 humour.	 And	 I	 think	 he	—	 I	 don’t	 know	 if	 this	 a	 wide	 term	 or	 if	 it’s	 a	
particular	Glaswegian	thing,	but	he	talks	about	 [unclear]	humour	which	 is	 like	
jokes	you	would	only	say	to	people	who	know	you	don’t	mean	it,	it’s	that	kind	of	
like	 Frankie	 Boyle	 kind	 of	 stuff.	 Umm,	 it’s	 only	 funny	 because	 it’s	 completely	
outrageous	and	if	you	meant	it	you	would	never	say	it.	Minna:	Yeah.																																																									18	Catherine’s	and	Ahsan’s	points	are	closely	connected	to	the	discussion	of	‘Scottish	victimhood’	(see	Chapter	5).	
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Rachel:	So,	he..he	would	always	make,	like,	outrageous	anti-English	jokes	to	me.	
Umm,	and..like,	on	the	understanding	that	I	know	that	he	doesn’t	[laughs]	mean	
it.	But	the	problem	is,	I’m	now	the	one	who	thinks	of	them,	and	they	come	out	of	
my	mouth	and	I’m	like	‘what	are	you	saying?’.				Here,	rather	than	other	people	labelling	anti-English	comments	as	 ‘banter’	or	 ‘jokes’	(apart	from	Rachel’s	Scottish	husband),	Rachel	confesses	to	making	anti-English	jokes	herself.	 Her	 use	 of	 irony	 or	 humour	 vis-à-vis	 her	 national	 identity	 is	 revealing.	Feminist	literature	speaks	about	irony	being	used	as	a	form	of	agency	—	that	is,	it	is	used	 as	 a	 strategic	means	 of	 countering	 or	 questioning	 established	 truths	 or	 ideas	(Rainford,	2005:3).	While	operating	“from	within	the	structure	it	interrogates”,	irony	entails	a	repetition	of	structurally	dominant	beliefs	in	a	way	that	negates	their	value	and	 implies	 that,	 in	 actuality,	 “the	 real	 truth”	 is	 something	 completely	 different	(Rainford,	 2005:3	 —	 original	 emphasis).	 Speaking	 with	 reference	 to	 gender	 and	patriarchy,	Rainford	(2005:4)	notes:	
…the	ironic	woman	does	not	simply	seek	a	subjectivity	of	her	own	to	replace	the	
masculine	 ideal.	 Instead,	 she	 uses	 her	 secondariness	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “negative	
freedom”,	 repeating	 it	back	 to	 the	patriarchal	 structure	 in	order	 to	undermine	
the	 authority	 of	 (sexed)	 subjectivity	 itself.	 Irony	 creates	 a	 way	 to	 unravel	 the	
prevailing	“truth”	of	gender	positions	without	being	obliged	to	step	outside	these	
positions.	Similarly	 to	 the	 point	 raised	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘passing’	 and	 its	 transgressive	 capacity,	irony	 thus	 emerges	 from,	 and	 operates	 within,	 the	 structures	 it	 seeks	 to	 negate	(Rainford,	2005:11).	Humour	or	irony,	nonetheless,	offers	an	interesting	insight	into	the	workings	of	nationalist	narratives	and	identity.			
Though	not	related	to	anti-Englishness,	 it	 is	useful	 to	bring	 in	something	that	Rahul	said	here.	During	 the	 interview,	Rahul	 (Scottish-Indian,	28	years	old,	 student,	voted	no)	—	whose	family	comes	from	India	but	he	was	born	and	brought	up	in	Glasgow	—	referred	to	India	as	the	“mother	nation”:	Rahul:	 Ehm	 [long	 pause].	 Yeah.	 [pause]	 You	 could	—	 okay,	 so	 there’s	 another	
nation,	 India	—	 it’s	 -	 -	 from,	 from	my,	ehm,	homeland	 if	you	wanna	call	 it	 that	
[laughs].	Minna:	[laughs]	
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Rahul:	[laughs]	The	mother	nation,	ehm.	[laughs]	This	exchange	really	stuck	with	me,	and	I	wrote	about	it	in	my	fieldwork	diary	later:	
Transcribing	Rahul’s	interview	from	last	August,	I	find	in	interesting	how	there	is	
a	 sense	 of	 self-deprecating	 humour	 coming	 through.	 He	 refers	 to,	 rather	
sarcastically,	‘homeland’	and	‘mother	nation’	when	referring	to	India	(where	his	
parents	 are	 from).	 Both	 of	 us	 laugh	 loud	 and	 heartily	 after	 this.	 I	 think	 this	
moment	 just	 crystallised	 the	 certain	 ridiculousness	 of	 national	 ties	 and	
identities/consciousness.	Due	to	his	heritage	he’s	 ‘supposed’	to	view	India	as	—	
maybe	not	formative	as	such	—	but	as	a	defining	element	of	his	being	and	self-
understanding.	 I	 suppose	 the	 ridiculousness	 is	 the	 weight	 &	 emphasis	 that	 is	
placed	 on,	 and	 expected	 of	 people	 to	 place	 on,	 their	 national	 allegiances.	 As	
someone	 who	 has	 a	 hybrid	 sense	 of	 self	 such	 overarching	 and	 rigid	
identifications	seem	rather	futile	and	constricting.	(8.6.2016)	Thus,	through	ironic	or	self-deprecating	remarks,	the	socially	constructed	contours	of	the	 nation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 expectations	 and	 assumptions	 regarding	 national	identifications	—	their	supposed	‘naturalness’	—	become	newly	visible.				
Following	this	slight	detour,	let	us	return	to	the	issue	of	anti-Englishness.	A	key	way	of	 understanding	 the	 relationship	between	Scottishness	 and	Englishness	 is	 through	the	analytical	lens	of	class.	As	Mcintosh	et	al	(2004)	note,		
…from	a	 Scottish	perspective,	 an	English	national	 identity	 is	 one	which	 is	 very	
often	understood	as	being	quintessentially	'middle	class'	and	is	often	contrasted	
with,	 and	provides	 reinforcement	 for,	 Scots	 sense	 of	 themselves	 as	 being	much	
more	'proletarian'	in	nature	and	outlook.	
	Watson	(2003:93)	came	to	a	similar	conclusion:	“One	of	the	most	striking	effects	of	an	English	 accent	 was	 the	 perception	 by	 many	 Scots	 that	 this	 ascribed	 middle-class	status	to,	or	upon,	the	speaker”.	More	broadly,	McCrone	argues	that	“the	narrative	of	class	in	Scotland	is	one	in	which	issues	of	national	identity	play	across	class”	(quoted	in	Watson,	2003:94).			
Eilidh	 (54	 years	 old,	 social	 worker,	 voted	 no),	 who	 is	 from	 Guernsey	 but	 is	 often	assumed	to	be	English	due	to	her	accent,	admitted	to	experiencing	“quite..assumptive	reactions”	from	people	which	often	“include	an	assumption	about	m-	-	my	politics	(…)	which	is	usually	that	I’m	a	Tory	of	some	sort”.	Thus,	“based	on	the	way	that	I	speak,	some	people	make	assumptions	about	my	class	and	they’re	not	necessarily	valid”	(she	
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explains	 how	 she	 is	 “from	 a	 family	 of	 five,	 we	 never	 had	 any	 money”).	 Eilidh	nonetheless	 accepts	 that	 “people	make	 assumptions	 based	 on…what	 they	 can	 see	 I	suppose,	and	what	they	can	hear”.	She	finds	herself	in	difficult	territory	because	while	the	 attitudes	 can	 be	 “negative”	 and	 “dismissive”,	 “if	 I	 try	 and	 explain	 that	 I’m	 not	English,	 then	 I	 get	 into	 territory	 where...I’m	—	 I	 feel	 sometimes	 I’m	 implying	 that	being	 English	 is	 a	 bad	 thing	 in	 itself	 but	 I	 don’t	 want	 to	 be	 on	 that...,wave	 length”	which	makes	the	whole	thing		“quite...fraught	at	times”.			
As	alluded	to	by	Eilidh,	due	to	the	way	in	which	the	English	in	Scotland	sound,	they	often	 come	 to	 be	 symbolically	 representative	 of	 Westminster	 and	 right-leaning	politics.	As	has	been	discussed	at	length	previously,	Scottish	people	seem	to	be	only	marginally	 to	 the	 left	 in	 comparison	 to	 their	 neighbours	 south	 of	 the	 border.	 The	recent	 gains	 by	 the	 Conservative	 Party	 in	 Scotland	 in	 the	 2017	 general	 election	certainly	 challenges	 the	 view	 that	 Conservative	 politics	 does	 not	 have	 any	 traction	among	the	Scottish	voters19.	Nonetheless,	 in	order	to	distinguish	Scotland	and	Scots	from	 England	 and	 the	 English,	 there	 is	 a	 powerful	 myth	 of	 Scotland	 being	 more	socialist	 or	 left-leaning	 in	 its	 outlook.	 This,	 I	 have	 argued,	 has	 been	 attributed	 to	‘Scotland’s	values’	by	the	SNP	political	elite.	Thus,	anti-Englishness	 in	the	context	of	Scottish	nationalism	carries	a	 strong	 link	 to	class.	That	 is,	 Scottishness	comes	 to	be	understood	 through	 class,	 and	 this	 classed	 framing	 segues	 into	 nationalised	identification.			
6.9.	Conclusion		This	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 outline	 and	 critically	 discuss	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	participants	 experience	 Scotland	 and	 Scottishness	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives.	 The	participants	come	from	different	ethnic	minority	backgrounds,	and	most	of	them	are	connected	by	 a	 sense	of	migrant-ness:	while	 some	are	 recent	migrants	 to	 Scotland,	others	 are	 native-born	 whose	 parents	 or	 grandparents	 have	 migrated	 to	 Scotland	previously.	 This	 chapter	 has	 specifically	 focused	 on	 everyday	 nationalism,	 i.e.	 the																																																									19	Alex	Salmond,	of	course,	 famously	joked	that	there	were	more	pandas	in	the	Edinburgh	Zoo	(two)	than	Scottish	Tory	MPs	in	Westminster	(The	Guardian,	2014).	
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ways	in	which	the	perimeters	of	the	nation	are	experienced	and	made	sense	of	in	the	daily	lives	of	people.	As	ethnic	minorities	have	not	been	focused	on	in	great	detail	in	everyday	nationalism	studies	literature,	this	chapter	has	sought	to	address	this	gap	—	especially	 as	 studying	 those	 whose	 belonging	 to	 a	 nation	 may	 not	 be	 “beyond	question”	can	offer	some	interesting	insights	into	how	nationalist	narratives	operate	and	impact	the	lives	of	people.			What	transpired	from	the	data	was	that,	firstly,	participants	tended	to	depict	Scotland	and	 Scots	 as	 ‘friendly’	 or	 ‘welcoming’,	 especially	 in	 comparison	 to	 England	 and	 the	English.	 However,	 as	 each	 interview	 progressed,	 the	 participants	 began	 to	 disrupt	and	 challenge	 this	 dominant	 narrative,	 which	—	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 Chapter	 5	—	gains	 traction	 and	 credence	 through	 relations	 of	 the	 ruling	 (D.E.	 Smith,	 2005).	Further,	the	participants	—	especially	those	who	were	more	recent	migrants	—	often	described	themselves	as	 ‘outsiders’	or	 ‘visitors’	who,	 thus,	do	not	see	themselves	as	fully	 belonging.	 Interestingly,	 this	 sense	 of	 ‘outsider-ness’	 gave	 the	 participants	 a	feeling	 of	 ‘objectivity’	 and	 a	 unique	 perspective	 vis-à-vis	 independence,	 sometimes	resulting	in	participants	comparing	and	contrasting	the	Scottish	case	to	that	of	their	‘homeland’.	 Padma	 and	 Ahsan,	 for	 example,	 discussed	 independence	 in	 relation	 to	Pakistan	and	India.				Secondly,	drawing	on	literature	on	‘race’	and	space	(especially	on	Puwar,	2004)	and	considering	 the	 idea	of	 the	 ‘white	 gaze’,	 this	 chapter	 focused	on	 the	ways	 in	which	‘the	 rural’	was	 often	 imagined	 as	more	hostile	 and	unwelcoming	 to	 especially	 non-white	 ethnic	minorities	 while	 Glasgow	was	 seen	 as	more	multicultural	 where	 it	 is	easier	to	blend	in.	There	were,	however,	limits	to	this	blending	in,	with	issues	around	non-Scottish	accents	being	especially	pertinent.			Thirdly,	 this	 chapter	 considered	 experiences	 of	 feeling,	 and	made	 to	 feel,	 different	(both	 visibly	 and	 audibly)	 from	 the	 ‘national	 norm’	 and	 the	 outright	 racist	 abuse	some	 of	 the	 participants	 had	 encountered.	 This	 ties	 in	 with	 Balibars’	 argument	introduced	 in	 Chapter	 2;	 he	 argues	 that	 	 “the	 racial-cultural	 identity	 of	 the	 ‘true	nationals’	remains	invisible,	but	it	is	inferred	from	(and	assured	by)	its	opposite,	the	
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alleged,	 quasi-hallucinatory	 visibility	 of	 the	 ‘false	 nationals’”	 (1991:	 284-5;	 added	emphasis).	However,	when	considering	difference	in	a	country	where	the	majority	of	the	 population	 is	 white,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 think	 about	 the	 privilege	 that	 whiteness	accords	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘passing’,	 going	 unnoticed	 or	 remaining	 inconspicuous.	Nonetheless,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 processes	 of	 racialisation	 do	 not	 affect	 those	ostensibly	white	and	whose	ability	to	‘pass’	may	be	rather	limited.				Fourthly,	this	chapter	discussed	the	issue	of	anti-Englishness,	and	the	ways	in	which	the	 participants	 regarded	 it	 as	 playing	 a	 central	 role	 in	 their	 understanding	 of	Scotland	 and	 Scottishness.	 I	 argued	 that	 though	 anti-Englishness	 should	 not	 be	understood	 through	 the	 analytical	 lens	 of	 racism,	 England	 (and	 Englishness)	 as	Scotland’s	 ‘significant	 other’	 is	 crucial	 for	 making	 sense	 of	 Scottish	 nationalist	narratives.	Importantly,	in	everyday	understandings,	Englishness	was	seen	as	closely	connected	to	class.				The	 next	 chapter	will	 build	 on	 the	 issues	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 and	 focuses	 on	ethnic	minorities’	experiences	of	the	independence	referendum	specifically.			 	
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Chapter	7	When	the	Nation	Becomes	Louder:	Experiencing	the	2014	independence	referendum					
7.1.	Introduction	
	This	chapter	will	discuss	a	key	theme	that	emerged	during	the	data	analysis	process,	namely	 emotion	 (and	 affect).	 Thus,	 it	 will	 consider	 the	 emotional	 and	 affective	character	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 more	 broadly,	 and	 the	 respondents’	 affective	responses	to	nationalist	narratives	within	the	context	of	the	referendum	in	particular	(that	is,	how	the	referendum	made	them	feel).	Emotion	is	a	theme	that	also	surfaces	in	 the	 other	 chapters:	 Chapter	 5	 considered	 the	 emotional	 pull	 of	 the	 concept	 of	‘community’	and	the	ways	in	which	the	participants	framed	Scotland	as	a	community.	Moreover,	 the	 SNP	—	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 4	—	 sought	 to	 distance	 themselves	from	emotions,	and	frame	the	independence	argument	in	terms	of	rationality.	During	her	 SNP	 spring	 conference	 address,	 DFM	Nicola	 Sturgeon	 argued	 that	 “at	 its	 heart,	ours	is	not	an	emotional	argument”	(23	March	2013).			The	 previous	 chapter	 focused	 on	 ethnic	 minorities’	 —	 both	 recent	 migrants’	 and	native-born	minorities’	—	everyday	experiences	of	national	belonging	and	otherness.	Drawing	on	Smith	 (2016),	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 capacity	 to	experience	 the	everyday	as	unreflective	 whereby	 people	 ‘just	 get	 on’	 with	 their	 everyday	 lives	 is	 a	 privilege.	Those	who	do	not	‘unproblematically’	belong	to	the	national	community	—	or	whose	belonging	to	the	nation	is	not	 ‘beyond	question’	—	are	constantly	reminded	of	their	difference	 by	 others	 and	 often	 critically	 reflect	 on	 their	 own	 national	 belonging	 in	their	everyday	 lives.	 Importantly,	 this	self-reflection	happens	within	spaces	—	such	as	 the	 hairdresser’s	—	 and	 situations	which,	 for	many,	 are	 sites	 of	mundanity	 and	which	usually	 are	not	 seen	or	experienced	as	 loci	 for	deep,	personal	 reflection.	The	previous	chapter	demonstrated	that	in	non-nationally	heightened,	‘ordinary’	contexts	issues	 around	 difference	 and	 belonging	 shape	 and	 impact	 upon	 ethnic	 minorities’	everyday	lives.		
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My	research	took	place	at	a	unique	point	in	time,	namely	during	and	after	the	Scottish	independence	 referendum.	 Thus,	 this	 final	 findings	 chapter	 will	 focus	 on	 the	independence	 referendum	 specifically,	 and	 on	 the	 participants’	 views,	 experiences,	and	 —	 notably	 —	 feelings	 regarding	 the	 debates,	 campaigns,	 the	 vote	 and	 its	aftermath.	Based	on	interview	data	and	my	fieldnotes	from	observing	independence	events,	 this	chapter	will	 interrogate	the	ways	 in	which	nationalist	narratives	played	out	 both	 implicitly	 and	 explicitly	 in	 the	 political	 context	 of	 the	 independence	referendum,	and	how	the	participants	made	sense	of	these	nationalist	narratives	and,	in	some	cases,	challenged	them.				As	 previously	 explained,	 Fox	 (2017:26)	 encourages	 us	 to	 look	 to	 the	 ‘edges	 of	 the	nation’	 —	 that	 is	 to	 “the	 places,	 times	 and	 situations	 where	 the	 nation	 is	 on	 the	periphery	—	the	edges	—	of	consciousness”.	Through	 ‘breaching’	—	i.e.	challenging	the	‘background	expectancies'	that	govern	and	structure	our	everyday	social	order	—	the	everyday	processes	and	understandings	 that	are	used	 to	 construct	and	 imagine	the	 ‘nation’	 can	 be	 teased	 out	 and	 made	 visible	 (Fox,	 2017:30).	 	 Fox	 (2017:30)	identifies	‘the	political	edges	of	the	nation’	as	a	site	where	the	contours	of	the	nation	become	 more	 easily	 discernible	 —	 especially	 with	 regard	 to	 immigration:	“Immigration	is	a	provocation:	it	challenges	our	cherished	notions	of	who	we	are,	and	it	does	so	in	an	explicitly	national	register”.			
Besides	 immigration,	 Fox,	 drawing	 on	 Condor,	 notes	 that	 other	 areas	 “might	 also	prove	fruitful”	to	focus	on,	and	argues	that	devolution	in	the	UK	more	generally,	and	Scottish	 independence	 more	 specifically,	 “provide	 fertile	 ground	 for	 tapping	 into	people's	 otherwise	 self-evident	 assumptions	 about	 what	 the	 nation	 is”	 (2017:30).	Thus,	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	do	 just	 that	 but,	 importantly,	 considers	 the	 referendum	from	ethnic	minority	participants’	viewpoints.	The	referendum	was	not,	of	course,	an	
everyday	event.	Thus,	 an	 analytical	 line	 should	be	drawn	between	 the	previous	 and	the	 current	 chapter.	 Chapter	 6	 focused	 on	 the	 mundane,	 everyday	 contexts	 and	spaces.	 	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 an	 extraordinary	moment	 of	 political	mobilisation	and	political	reflexivity	during	which	the	‘nation’	and	its	future	was	open	for	debate.	The	referendum	came	to	shape	interactions	within	everyday	spaces,	and	there	were	
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limits	 with	 regard	 to	 who	 could	 debate	 it,	 and	 how	 it	 could	 be	 debated.	 The	referendum,	thus,	created	a	kind	of	‘breaching	moment’	with	regard	to	understanding	the	edges	of	the	nation.		
That	 being	 said,	 it	 must	 also	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 that	 the	 data	 presented	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	 although	much	 of	 it	 not	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 referendum,	 was	gathered	not	long	before	and	after	the	referendum.	Thus,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	participants	 might	 have	 been	 more	 attuned	 to	 the	 ‘nation’	 overall	 —	 even	 when	recounting	 non-referendum	 related	 events	 (particularly	 in	 the	 referendum’s	aftermath).		In	 terms	 of	 structure,	 this	 chapter	 will,	 firstly,	 begin	 by	 discussing	 some	 key	theoretical	 contributions	 in	 relation	 to	 nationalism	 and	 emotions.	 Following	 this,	 I	will	return	to	the	theme	of	anti-Englishness	(which	was	also	discussed	in	Chapter	6).	I	will	then	discuss	the	pervasiveness	of	the	referendum;	a	theme	which	the	majority	of	participants	brought	up.	Thirdly,	the	discussion	will	move	to	the	limited	visibility	—	as	the	participants	saw	it	—	of	the	No	campaign,	and	the	participants’	interpretations	as	to	why	this	was	the	case.	Finally,	before	concluding,	I	will	consider	participants’	—	who	 are	 more	 recent	 migrants	 —	 reflections	 vis-à-vis	 having	 a	 vote	 in	 the	referendum.				
7.2.	Nationalism	and	emotion		Multiple	 authors	 (e.g.	 Berezin,	 2001;	 Guibernau,	 2013;	 Heaney,	 2013)	 have	commented	on	the	relative	absence	of	 theories	of	emotion	 in	the	social	sciences.	As	Heaney	notes,	historically,	emotions	were	relegated	to	a	“subordinate”	position	 in	a	“binary	 opposition”	 of	 reason	 and	 emotion	 (2013:243).	 Sociologists,	 however,	 have	been	interested	in	uncovering	and	re-evaluating	the	role	that	emotions	play	in	social	life	since	the	1970s,	and	there	has	been	a	flurry	of	activity	since	the	1990s	(Heaney,	2013:243-4).	 Recently,	 literature	 around	 social	 movement	 theory	 has	 been	
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particularly	 good	 at	 integrating	 emotions	 to	 the	 broader	 process	 of	 analysis	 (e.g.	Berezin,	2001;	Bleiker	and	Hutchison,	2008;	Eresin,	2018).	This	 literature	has	been	interested	in	interrogating	the	role	that	emotions	play	in	the	“formation,	maintenance	and	dynamics”	(Heaney,	2013:245)	of	social	movements.				While	 sociological	 literature	 in	general	has	been	engaging	with	emotions,	 literature	on	nationalism	has	not	engaged	with	emotions	 in	great	detail.	Although	Anderson’s	(2006)	conceptualisation	of	 ‘imagined	communities’	 is	central	to	the	way	in	which	I	understand	 ‘nations’,	Heaney	raises	an	important	point	 in	relation	to	the	absence	of	emotions	 in	 Anderson’s	 writings.	 Heaney	 notes	 that	 Anderson’s	 understanding	regarding	 “processes	 of	 national	 identification”	 operate	 “almost	 exclusively	 on	 a	cognitive	 level,	 with	 little	 regard	 to	 the	 emotional	 dimensions	 to	 such	 a	 process”	(2013:248).	 While	 Anderson	 writes	 that	 we	 need	 to	 understand	 why	 nation-ness	commands	 “such	 profound	 emotional	 legitimacy”	 (2006:4),	 the	 issues	 regarding	emotions	 “remains	 either	 under-addressed	 in	 his	 analysis,	 or	 emotion	 acts	 as	unspecified	‘under-labourer’,	 implicitly	subsumed	under	notions	of	 ‘comradeship‘	or	‘community’”	(Heaney,	2013:248).					Heaney,	 further,	 argues	 that	 literature	 pertaining	 to	 nationalism	 and	 emotion	 has	been	 problematic	 on	 three	 fronts	 (2013:248).	 Firstly,	 “some	 literature	 reduces	nationalism	 to	 emotion”;	 secondly,	 some	 approaches	 reproduce	 the	 simplistic	“reason/emotion	dichotomy”	(2013:248);	and	thirdly,	some	authors	are	‘expressively	cognitive’	 in	 their	orientation,	 thus	either	 ignoring	emotions	completely,	or	 treating	them	 tokenistically	 (2013:248).	According	 to	Heaney,	 “the	 old	dichotomies	 (appear	to)	 hold	 sway”	 in	 nationalism	 literature	 (2013:243).	 That	 is,	 when	 emotions	 are	discussed,	“they	are	again	cast	in	negative	terms,	seen	as	motors	of	irrational	violence	and	ethnic	hatred”	—	thus,	they	are	“associated	with	‘hot’	or	‘bad’	nationalism”	while	“civic	or	liberal	nationalism,	by	contrast,	is	‘cold’,	rational	and	‘good’	(2013:243).				Thus,	herein	 lies	a	 further	critique	of	 the	civic/ethnic	distinction.	When	 the	SNP,	as	was	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 implicitly	 and	 explicitly	 identify	 the	 form	 their	nationalism	 takes	 as	 ‘civic’,	 a	 further	 implicit	 normative	 judgement	 is	 evident	 —	
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namely,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 ‘civic’	 nationalism	 is	 rational.	 As	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 4,	independence	was	 framed	as	being	 the	 ‘rational	 choice’	 by	 the	SNP.	Furthermore,	 I	also	discussed	Nicola	Sturgeon’s	argument	that	her	nationalism	is	of	the	‘utilitarian’,	as	 opposed	 to	 ‘existential’,	 kind.	 When	 making	 this	 statement	 she	 was	 therefore	actively	distancing	herself	from	the	emotionality	or	‘hotness’	that	is	often	connected	with	nationalist	 ideas	and	narratives	 in	public	and	political	understandings.	That	 is,	her	nationalism	was	of	the	pragmatic	—	it	is	a	rational	means	to	an	end.	Yet,	as	I	have	demonstrated,	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 rhetoric	 relies	 heavily	 on	 symbolic	 resources	(Zimmer,	 2003)	 such	 as	 history,	 values	 and	 heritage,	 which	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	evoke	emotional	responses.				This	 chapter,	 therefore,	 seeks	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 referendum	was	 felt,	 and	 to	understand	the	centrality	of	emotions	that	nationalist	narratives	can	trigger.	That	is,	what	 is	 the	affective	experience	of	nationalism	 like?	This	 is	 important	because	how	we	feel	has	consequences	on	our	material	choices	and	lifeworlds;	for	example,	where	we	 choose	 to	 live	 (both	 nationally	 as	 well	 as	 locally).	 Although	 the	 focus	 is	 on	participants’	emotions	‘on	the	ground’,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	affect	played	a	part	in	elite	discourses	as	well.	During	the	referendum	—	although	the	SNP	sought	to	frame	 the	vote	 in	pragmatic	 and	 rational	 (or	 ‘utilitarian	nationalist’)	 terms	—	 their	rhetoric	made	use	of	emotive	language	(as	seen	in	Chapter	5	in	relation	to	 ‘national	values’).	For	example,	in	his	speech,	FM	Alex	Salmond	said	that,				
Firstly,	 I	want	 to	emphasise	 that	contrary	 to	 the	destructive	campaigning	style	
and	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 Westminster	 establishment,	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 will	
continue	to	be	constructive	and	positive	about	the	future	of	this	country.	I	believe	
that	a	positive	campaign	will	always	win	out	over	a	negative	campaign	(…).	They	
also	 badly	 misread	 the	 nature	 of	 Scotland	 and	 the	 character	 of	 the	 Scottish	
people.	 (…)	 With	 all	 this	 accumulated	 negativity,	 it’s	 little	 wonder	 the	 no	
campaign	calls	itself20	Project	Fear.	(Speech	in	Edinburgh	17/2/2014)	Besides	again	making	reference	to	the	homogenous	entities	of	‘Scotland’	and	‘Scottish	people’	 which	 share	 a	 ‘character’	 and	 a	 ‘nature’,	 Salmond	 is	 framing	 the	 two	campaigns	 in	 emotionally	 charged	 ways:	 as	 positive	 (Yes)	 and	 negative	 (No	 as	‘Project	Fear’).																																																										20	This	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 suggestions	 that	 “privately,	 some	 inside	 Better	 Together	 even	 refer	 to	 the	organisation	as	Project	Fear”	(Gordon,	2013:	n.p.).		
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7.3.	Referendum	and	anti-Englishness		
	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	6,	anti-Englishness	was	a	central	 theme	 in	 the	participants’	understandings	of	Scottish	nationalist	narratives,	and	this	theme	was	also	discussed	specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 referendum.	 As	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 while	 anti-Englishness	 cannot	be	understood	as	an	 instance	of	 racism,	 it	needs	 to	be	 carefully	accounted	 for	 in	 an	effort	 to	understand	nationalism	 in	Scotland.	Further,	 it	 should	also	 be	 remembered	 that	 being	 at	 the	 receiving	 end	 of	 any	 kind	 of	 abuse	 or	essentialised	 notions	 is	 psychically	 difficult	 and	 damaging.	 During	 her	 interview,	Eilidh	(from	Guernsey,	54	years	old,	voted	no)	shared	a	story	about	her	English	friend	who	used	 to	 live	 in	Scotland.	Eilidh	explained	 that	her	 friend	“said	 that	at	 the	 time,	because	she	was	English,	people	would	round	on	her	and	give	her	a	hard	time	about	Thatcher,	and..you	know,	she	was	meant	to	be	some	kind	of	figurehead	for	the	politics	of	this,	of	the,	the	metropolitan	elite”.			
Thus,	Eilidh’s	 friend	came	 to	 represent,	due	 to	where	she	was	 from	and	 the	way	 in	which	 she	 spoke,	 Thatcher’s	 politics	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 some	 Scottish	 people.	 Indeed,	Eilidh’s	friend	found	that	the	referendum,	and	the	debates	surrounding	it,	reminded	her	about	the	hard	time	she	would	get	when	she	used	to	live	in	Scotland,	and	that	she	was	happy	not	to	be	living	up	north	during	the	referendum.	Therefore,	working	class	politics	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 anger	 at	 Conservative	 attacks	 on	 the	 working	 class	 in	particular,	can	become	routed	through	a	national	 imaginary.	That	 is,	on	the	ground,	those	who	sound	English	come	to	represent	or	mark	‘collective	guilt’.			
Many	of	the	participants	interpreted	the	core	argument	on	the	Yes	side	boiling	down	to	 an	 argument	 about	 ‘Scotland	versus	England’.	Noor	put	 it	 thus:	 “I	 suppose	 some	people,	umm,	 I	 think	the	 fear	was	—	which	 it	did	happen	of	course	—	the	 fear	was	that	some	people	would	vote	yes	purely	because	it’s,	like,	you	know,	the	Scots	versus	the	English”.	For	Paula,	though	not	“wanting	to	be	generalising”,	she	felt	people	were	“quite	 anti-English	 in	 the	 referendum”	 which	 manifested	 itself	 as	 a	 hatred	 of	Westminster	 (and	 Westminster,	 in	 turn,	 was	 in	 her	 view	 equated	 with	 England).	Thus,	as	previously	discussed,	 in	everyday	encounters	the	 line	between	Englishness	
	230		
and	 Westminster	 became	 blurred,	 and	 the	 latter	 became	 coded	 as	 ‘England’	 or	‘Englishness’.		
Similarly	 to	 Paula,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 independence	 campaign,	 Rachel	remembered	articulating	 that	she	could	not	 “engage	with	 the	debate	because	 (…)	 it	was	 drawn	 on	 the	 lines	 of	 anti-Englishness”	 which	 “immediately	 alienated”	 her.	Eventually,	 as	 the	 debates	 progressed,	 she	 began	 to	 hear	 about	 “more	 positive”	reasons	for	independence	such	as	the	democratic	deficit	argument.	Rachel	felt	that	it	was	 the	 media	 that	 “played	 on	 the	 anti-Englishness”.	 Certainly,	 during	 the	referendum,	 a	 number	 of	 articles	 were	 published	 on	 the	 ostensible	 anti-English	motivation	behind	the	referendum	(Johnson,	2012;	Clegg,	2013;	Gilligan	,	2014;).	For	Rachel,	“the		closer	we	got	to	the	referendum”	the	more	she	noticed	that	“it	wasn’t	an	anti-English	 campaign”	—	 “but	 it	 suited	 (…)	 certain	people	 to	 try	 and	portray	 it	 as	that”.	 John,	 an	 English	 Yes	 campaigner,	 underlined	 his	 view	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 anti-Englishness	in	the	SNP	or	the	Yes	campaign”	which	does	not	mean	that	“there	aren’t	any	anti-English	people	out	there	that	support	these	campaigns”.		
Najuma,	 a	 No	 campaigner,	 told	 me	 she	 did	 witness	 anti-Englishness	 during	 the	campaign.	Like	Paula,	she	felt	the	debates	framed	Westminster	and	England	as	“bad”	where	 “all	 bad	 things	 radiate	 from”.	 Najuma	—	 although	 “having	 lived	 in	 Scotland	longer	 than	 anywhere	 else”	—	 speaks	with	 an	 English	 accent.	 She	 remembered	 an	occasion	when	she	was	phone	canvassing:		Najuma:	…I	was	sitting	in	my	kitchen	one	evening,	umm,	and	I	phoned	someone	
up.	And	I	asked,	you	know	–	I’m	from	Better	Together	campaign,	you	know,	have	
you	 decided	 which	 way	 you’ll	 be	 voting	 yet,	 umm,	 ‘I’m	 not	 going	 to	 tell	 you’.’	
That’s	absolutely	fine,	it’s	perfectly	alright	to,	to	not	tell	me	–	you	don’t	need	to	
tell	me,	thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	anyway’.	Umm,	 ‘but	can	I	ask	you	a	
question’,	 he	 said	 to	 me	 and	 I	 said	 ‘yeah,	 go	 ahead’,	 you	 know,	 ‘my	 role	 is	 to	
inform	as	much	as	possible,	ask	anything	you	want’.	 ‘Have	you	been	bussed	up	
here	from	England?’	Minna:	What	did	you	say	to	that?	Najuma:	 [laughs]	 I	 said..’could	 I	 ask	 you,	 if	 you’re	 asking	 me	 that	 question	
because	of	the	way	that	I	speak?’	–	‘yes’.	And	I	said	‘I	have	to	say,	I’m	really,	really	
offended	by	 that,	 I’m..I	have	 lived	 in	Scotland	 for	11	years,	and	 I’m	calling	you	
from	my	kitchen’	 and	 I	 told	him	where	 in	 [city]	 I	was	 calling	 from,	which	was	
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literally	around	the	corner	 from	the	street	 that	he	was	 in.	 (…)	Umm,	but..there	
was	that…that	nastiness,	umm…	And	a	lot	of	it	was	directed	at	Westminster,	but	
a	lot	of	it	was	anti-Englishness	as	well.	
	Here,	Najuma	was	marked	out	as	different	due	to	her	audible	Englishness	(see	Bond	et	 al,	 2010),	 and	 the	 person	 on	 the	 phone	 suggested	 she	 had	 been	 sent	 over	 from	England	to	campaign	for	Better	Together.	As	already	discussed	(see	Chapter	6)	and	as	noted	 by	 McIntosh	 et	 al	 (2004),	 accent	 is	 the	 main	 way	 in	 which	 the	 English	 are	“marked	 out	 as	 ‘different’”.	 Consequently,	 the	 participants	 would	 use	 different	strategies	 in	 different	 social	 contexts	 to	 either	 adapt	 their	 accent	 or	 vocabulary,	 or	remain	 altogether	 silent	 (see	 also	 discussion	 regarding	 inconspicuousness	 and	passing	in	Chapter	6).				In	relation	to	remaining	silent,	Marissa	discussed	the	day	after	the	referendum,	and	on	her	way	to	the	office,	she	stopped	at	George	Square:		Marissa:	 It	was	 really	bleak!	 I	 think	on	 the	way	 in	 I	had	gone	down	 to	George	
Square,	 just	 because	 I	 wanted	 to	 see	—	 ‘cause	 I	 knew	 there	 was	 gonna	 be	
celebration	if..it	went	the	other	way		[laughs].	So	I	was	kind	of	like	oh	I	wonder	
what’s	 happening.	 And	 there	 was	 a	 group	 of	 people	 who	 were	 all	 rioting	
[laughs].	[unintelligible]	[laughs]	Minna:	No,	no..	Marissa:	Umm..	Yeah	there	was	just	like	a	small	group	of	Yes	campaigners	stand	
there	and	it	was	one	guy	who	made	a	huge	like	‘look,[unintelligible]	get	out	our	
feelings,	talk	about	it’	and	like	one	by	one	going	to	the	middle	just	express	how	he	
felt	 about	 it.	 Which	 was	 really	 interesting	 but	 I	 felt,	 like,	 out	 of	 place	 there,	
especially	with	an	English	accent	I	was	like	‘oh	crap	I	need	to	go’	[laughs].		Within	 this	 context,	Marissa,	 feeling	 “out	 of	 place”,	 chose	 not	 to	 speak.	 She	 did	 not	elaborate	what	 she	 thought	might	 have	 happened	 had	 she	 said	 something,	 but	 she	was	careful	not	to	draw	attention	to	herself.	Thus,	what	Marissa’s	account	reveals	is	also	the	underlying	assumptions	governing	who	is	seen	to	have	the	right	to	speak	—	or	who	 feels	 they	have	 the	 right	 to	 speak	—	 in	 certain,	nationalistically	heightened	situations.	She	had,	thus,	an	internalised	sense	or	intuition	that	she	was	not	welcome	to	 speak,	 and	 she	—	specifically	—	 links	 this	 to	her	audible	difference	and	obvious	Englishness.			
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In	 conclusion,	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 referendum,	 the	 English	 participants	 felt	aware	of	their	Englishness.	They	reported,	on	the	one	hand,	a	sense	of	being	unable	to	speak	out	(Marissa)	or,	on	the	other	hand,	being	challenged	if	they	did	(Najuma),	and	they	explicitly	connected	these	feelings	to	their	Englishness.	Furthermore,	the	English	(sounding)	 participants	 argued	 that,	 on	 the	 ground,	 anti-Westminster	 or	 anti-Conservative	 views	 come	 to	 be	 directed	 at	 English	 sounding	 people	 who	 serve	 as	‘figureheads’	 for	 the	political	 elite.	 Importantly,	 at	 times	 class	politics	 are	 therefore	routed	 through	 a	 national	 imaginary.	 In	 the	 process,	 the	 ‘national	 others’’	 actual	political	views	or	their	class	position	may	be	ignored	(as	is	the	case	with	Eilidh	who	is	self-confessedly	 on	 the	 left	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 yet	 feels	 she	 is	 seen	 as	 a	representative	of	Conservatives’	politics).			
7.4.	Pervasiveness	of	the	referendum		As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 it	 was	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 escape	 the	 independence	referendum	in	Scotland	before	and	after	the	vote.	Debates	and	discussions	concerning	the	vote	took	place	almost	everywhere	—	be	it	at	work	places,	pubs	or	the	back	seats	of	taxis.				Indeed,	what	immediately	came	through	strongly	from	the	participants’	accounts	was	the	pervasiveness	of	 the	 referendum.	Catherine	 (Nigerian,	 32,	 didn’t	 vote)	 summed	up	many	of	the	participants	feelings	succinctly	when	she	explained	that	she	“felt	like	there	was	no	escaping	them	[the	campaigners]”.	For	Catherine,	then,	the	referendum	(and	 those	 campaigning	 around	 it)	 became	 somewhat	 overbearing	—	 especially	 as	she	 characterised	 herself	 as	 an	 ‘outsider’	 multiple	 times	 during	 the	 interview	 (see	also	Chapter	6).	Catherine,	 therefore,	signalled	that	she	was	not	personally	 invested	in	the	debates,	and	did	not	have	a	“horse	in	the	race”	(I	will	return	to	the	reasoning	behind	this	comment	in	section	7.6.).	As	a	result,	she	found	the	Yes	campaigners	who,	as	she	put	it,	were	“in	your	face”	especially	overbearing:		
I	think	it	was	like	the	yes	people,	so	they	were	like	in	your	face	kind	of	thing,	so	I	
felt	like	I	was,	I-	-	like,	the	barbecue	thing	that	I	went	for,	I	didn’t	even		-	-	I	just	
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went	for,	 just	an	 innocent	barbeque	and	then	it	 turned	out	 like,	we	had	like	an	
hour	with	politicians	coming	to	talk	about	-	 -	 I	was	 like...dude,	 like,	 I	didn’t	ask	
for	this	[laughs].	If	you,	if	you	told	me	I	was	going	to	have	like	one	hour,	probably	
I’d	 just	gone	out	 for	 that	one	hour	and	 then	come	back	after	what	 -	 -	 ‘cause	 it	
was	like,	just	kind	of	in	your	face,	so.	I	know.	I	felt	like	I	was	passive	in	all	of	-	-	I	
felt	like	I	was	being	dragged	into	those	things	where	I	wasn’t	really	interested	in	
that,	like,	you,	you’re	not	trying	to	give	me	like	a	choi-	-	maybe	that	made	me	like,	
dislike	the	yes	thing	more	because	of	that,	because	they	were	like	so...in	your	face.					This	feeling	of	pervasiveness	of	the	referendum	extended	to	all	spheres	and	spaces	of	people’s	 everyday	 lives.	 Agnieszka	 (Polish,	 25	 years	 old,	 votes	 yes)	 noted	 that	wherever	 she	went,	 independence	 “was	 the	main	 topic”	—	 “even	 if	 it	 wasn’t,	 then	eventually	 it	 became	 it	 [laughs]”.	 She	 concluded:	 “it	 wasn’t	 possible	 to	 talk	 about	anything	else	[laughs]”.	Similarly,	Lukasz	(Polish,	21	years	old,	voted	yes)	explained	how	he	ended	up	having	an	“argument	all	 the	time”	—	be	it	at	work	or	“just	on	the	streets,	you	went	to	post	office	and	you	had	argument	with	post	lady	[laughs]	about	the	 referendum”.	Here,	 both	Agnieszka	 and	 Lukasz	were	 laughing	 out	 loud	 as	 they	made	their	comments.	Indeed,	this	emotional	response	signals	the	all-encompassing	nature	of	 the	 referendum:	 that	 is,	 they	 find	 it	 amusing,	on	 the	one	hand,	how	often	they	ended	up	discussing	(or	arguing	about)	the	vote	and,	on	the	other	hand,	how	the	arguments	or	discussions	took	place	in	unusual	places	(e.g.	the	post	office).			Mary	 (Kenyan,	 46	 years	 old,	 voted	 no)	 recounted	 that	 the	 referendum	 was	 a	 key	discussion	point	in	the	office.	Although	she	found	the	referendum	“an	exciting	time”,	people	in	her	office	were	“falling	out	because	of	it”.	She	ended	up	taking	the	day	of	the	vote	off	work	“because	I	just	didn’t	want	to	discuss	it	(…)	because	everybody	had	very	strong	views”.	She	made	a	particular	reference	to	“some	people	in	the	office	who	had	very,	 very,	 mhm,	 nationalistic	 kind	 of	 views”.	 During	 the	 interview,	 one	 of	 Mary’s	colleagues	knocked	on	 the	door	and	entered	 the	room	to	 talk	about	a	work	matter.	Mary	turned	to	me	and	said,	“so	this	one,	this	guy	here,	listen,	he,	he’s	the	one	I	was	fighting	 with”.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 light-hearted	 exchange	 between	 the	 two	 about	 the	referendum	(the	colleague,	unlike	Mary,	was	a	yes	voter).	After	the	colleague	leaves,	I	observe	 that	 “it	 seems	 to	 be	 all,	 kind	 of,	 good	 humour	 now”.	 To	 this	Mary	 replies:	“Yeah.	Not	at	the	time,	though”.	Thus,	as	the	debate	crept	into	and	became	part	of	the	work	 environment,	 this	 had	 repercussions	 on	 people’s	 relationships	 within	 the	
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workplace.	Though	Mary	and	her	colleague	can	laugh	and	joke	about	the	referendum	now,	at	the	time	of	the	vote	the	atmosphere	was	more	serious	and,	from	Mary’s	point	of	view,	repressive	to	the	point	where	she	did	not	want	to	come	into	the	office	after	the	vote.			Apart	 from	 the	 more	 outward-facing,	 public	 arenas	 such	 as	 the	 workplace,	 the	referendum	 was	 also	 evident	 in	 the	 private	 sphere;	 namely,	 in	 the	 home.	 Noor	(Scottish	 Indian,	 45	 years	 old,	 college	 teacher,	 voted	 yes)	 explained	 that	 her	 family	(which	 consists	 of	 her	 parents,	 her	 six	 siblings,	 and	 her	 nieces	 and	 nephews)	was	divided	on	the	issue	of	independence	with	some	voting	yes,	others	voting	no,	and	the	remaining	being	undecided.	 	In	order	to	help	with	the	decision,	Noor	and	her	family	decided	to	stage	question	and	answer	sessions	at	her	parents’	house.	Noor:	And	ehm,	one	of	the	things	that	—	one	of	the	things	that	we	did	as	a	family	
was	very	 interesting,	was	 that	umm..as	 it	kind	of	got	closer	and	 they	had	done	
more	research,	we	decided	to	have	a	kind	of	Q&A	session.	
	 Minna:	Oh	yeah!	That’s	brilliant.	
	 Noor:	And	ehm..it	was	—	it	started	off	as	being	quite	fun	and	actually	it	became	
really,	it	became	quite	serious	and	kind	of	in-depth.		
	 Minna:	Yeah.	
	 Noor:	We	 had	 three	 Q&A	 sessions	 and	 the,	 umm,	when	 people	were	 over,	 and	
basically	it	was,	ehm,	there	was	the	-	-	just	kind	of	like	the	kind	of	political	sort	of	
debates.	 There	was	 the	 yes,	 the	 no	 and	 the	 undecided.	 And	 the,	 the	 undecided	
were	 allowed	 to	 then	 bring	 their	 questions	 forward.	 And	 ehm..and	 it	 was	
fantastic	 because	 they	were	 able	 to	 present	 their	 questions	 and	 say	 ok,	 you’ve	
done	a	lot	more	research	so	convince	me	(…).			In	addition	to	the	pervasiveness,	and	perhaps	as	a	result	of	it,	there	was	also	a	sense	of	 expected	 openness	 with	 regard	 to	 people’s	 voting	 intentions.	 That	 is,	 voting	preferences	were	openly	disclosed	and	publicly	manifested	as	badges	pinned	on	the	lapels	of	 jackets,	and	 in	certain	social	 contexts	 there	was	an	expectation	 to	disclose	how	you	were	planning	to	vote.	At	the	time	of	the	referendum,	Ahsan	(Pakistani,	38	years	old,	didn’t	disclose	how	he	voted)	was	working	 in	a	post	office.	He	explained	that	the	customers	would	directly	tell	him	how	they	wanted	the	vote	to	turn	out,	and	
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asked	Ahsan	how	he	 intended	to	vote.	Ahsan	said	he	would	sometimes	“take	 it	as	a	fun	 but	 sometimes	 you	 take	 it	 as	 ‘sorry,	 excuse	 me,	 [unclear],	 that’s	 my	 personal	thing’”.	Thus,	 “sometimes	 I	would	say	 	 ‘how	you	are	voting’	and	 ‘obviously	yes’	and	‘then	I’m	voting	no’,	 just	 for	a	 fun’s	sake,	you	know”.	Ahsan	said	that	“obviously”	he	was	not	going	to	tell	people	how	he	will	vote,	and	he	used	humour	to	deal	with	the	recurring	 discussions	 about	 the	 referendum.	 For	 Ahsan,	 the	 vote	 was	 personal.	Marissa	 (English,	 28	 years	 old,	 voted	 no)	 found	 the	 openness	 of	 the	way	 in	which	many	people	around	her	spoke	about	their	yes	or	no	preference	surprising:	Marissa:	[Talking	about	the	people	in	her	office]	And	really,	 like,	good	people	–	
like,	 I	 get	 on	 with	 them	 really,	 umm,	 they’ve	 been	 very	 welcoming	 with	 me	
coming	back	to	the	office.	But	they	were	so	fiercely	Yes	campaigners,	umm,	that	
our	office	kind	of	turned	into	Yes	banners…			Minna:	[laughs]	Marissa:	…and	I	was	like	‘wow,	we’re	not	hiding	this’.	Minna:	Yeah.	Marissa:	‘Cause	I’m	kind	of	used	to,	yeah	General	Election,	you	don’t	really..have	
huge	discussion	or	you	don’t	–	you	might	discuss	 it	but	you	might	 -	 -	you	don’t	
always	disclose	what	you’re	gonna	vote.		Minna:	Yeah,	private.	Marissa:	Yeah,	it’s	a	private	like,	well	I’ll	consider	it	and	I’ll	do	it	myself.	Umm…	
Whereas	this	is	not	how	it	went	[laughs]!	
			Noor	also	discussed	the	openness	of	the	debate.	She	began	by	noting	that	“politics	is	something	 —	 I	 mean	 politics	 is	 something	 that	 the	 UK	 is…	 is	 renowned	 for	 not	discussing,	you	know”.	At	her	job	at	the	college,	where	she	works	with	many	students	who	come	from	outside	the	UK,	she	makes	this	known	to	them:	
…and	 you	 always,	 when	 you	 teach	 your	 students,	 you	 know,	 there	 are	 certain	
things	 that	 the	 British	 people	 don’t	 like	 to	 talk	 about	 and	 it’s	 like	money,	 you	
know,	so	never	ask	on	their	salary,	umm,	don’t	ask	really	personal	question	and	
also,	we	don’t	like	to	talk	about	politics.			Here	 she	 frames	 not	 discussing	 politics	 as	 a	 quintessentially	 British	 approach.	National	 identity	—	 rather	 than	 being	made	 up	 of	 things	we	 actively	 do	—	 is	 also	made	up	of	things	we	actively	do	not	do,	and	of	knowing	which	topics	not	to	broach.	However,	the	Scottish	referendum,	for	Noor,	was	different:	
However,	what	I	 found	with	the	Scottish	referendum	was	that	there	was	a	real	
open	discussion,	and	that	was	something	that	Scotland	showed	the	rest	of	the	UK	
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that	 you	 really	 can	 talk	 about	 politics.	 And	 also	 you	 can	 have	 huge	 discussion	
and	fights	with	your	friends	and	with	your	colleagues	and	then	you	get	on	with	
things	—	it’s	not	about	‘oh	I	can’t	believe	it’s,	it’s	not	about,	you	know,	it’s	not	the	
sa-	-	to	me	it	wasn’t	the	same…	it’s	just	not	the	same	as,	umm…	umm…	you	know	
being	 in	 a	 room	with	 someone,	 a	 friend,	 who	 doesn’t	 share	 the	 same	 political	
beliefs	as	you.	You	know,	if	you’re	a	Labour	person	and,	and	they’re	Conservative	—	that’s	really...	that’s	not	the	same	thing.		For	her,	the	handling	of	the	debates	was	something	“Scotland	should	be	really	proud	of”	as	“they	were	able	to	show	that	you	could	sit	and	have	a	big	fighting	match	with	a	friend	and	then	you	accept	that	your	friend’s	going	to	vote	yes	or	no	and	you	agree	or	disagree	and	then	you	get	on	with	it”.				Although	 not	 an	 everyday	 occurrence	 itself,	 the	 referendum	 infiltrated	 everyday	spaces	and	came	to	dominate	(“independence	was	the	main	topic”)	and	shape	(“you	had	 an	 argument	 with	 post	 lady”	 or	 everybody	 was	 “falling	 out”)	 interactions,	emotions	 and	 dynamics	within	 those	 settings.	 As	 Tom	 (English,	 late	 20s/early	 30s,	voted	no)	put	 it,	 “I’ve	never	known	politics	 just	 infiltrate	every	 sphere	of	 lives,	 like	couldn’t	—	like,	couldn’t	go	anywhere	without	interacting	with	it”.	Furthermore,	the	family	home	alongside	cafés,	post	offices	and	work	places	became	scenes	where	the	
supposedly	British	norm	of	not	discussing	politics	became	subverted	and	challenged.		Interestingly,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 participants	 seemed	 quite	 ambivalent	 about	 the	prevalence	and	almost	suffocating	 force	of	 the	referendum.	This	demonstrates	how,	under	exceptional	circumstances,	something	that	is	not	everyday,	becomes	integrated	in	everyday	settings	and	interactions:	that	is,	we	accommodate	it.			Despite	 this	 integration,	 however,	 some	of	 the	 participants	 noted	 that	 people	were	feeling	“tired”	(Lukasz)	of	the	constant	focus	on	independence.	Tom	explained	how		
…everywhere	was	talking	about,	it	was	—	like	you	got	on	a	train	you	hear	it,	it’s	
on	the	radio,	it	was	just…	we	couldn’t	go	anywhere	with	like	[unclear]	the	week	
before,	I	was	so	sick	of	hearing	about	it	and	I	just…	I	just	don’t	care	about	what	
the	outcome	is,	I	just	want	it	to	stop.		Similarly,	Marissa,	referring	to	her	friends,	noted	that	she	thought	“they	were	so	fed	up	 with	 talking	 about	 it	 for	 months	 in	 the	 end.	 And	 a	 lot	 of	 my	 friends	 [unclear]	campaign	‘I	just	can’t	wait	til	it’s	over’”.			
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Tom	 and	 Marissa,	 thus,	 signal	 their	 wish	 to	 return	 to	 ‘normality’:	 the	 referendum	occupied	space	within	everyday	settings	and	interactions	in	a	way	that	could	not	be	avoided.	 	 This	 also	 tells	 us	 something	 about	 the	 nation	 and	 the	 everyday	 more	generally.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 ethnic	 minorities	 are	 reminded	 of	 their	difference	often	and,	as	a	result,	a	reflexive	negotiation	with	regard	to	belonging	is	an	on-going	process.	 Thus,	 the	 everyday	 is	 never	 apolitical	 (consider	 also	 for	 example	the	 ‘Everyday	 Sexism’	 project),	 but	 when	 the	 everyday	 becomes	 —	 even	 if	momentarily	—	 profoundly	 and	 tangibly	 shaped	 by	 significant,	 nationalist	 political	upheaval	and	mobilisation,	you	become	‘tired’,	 ‘sick	of	hearing	about	it’	and	‘fed	up’.	As	a	result,	the	spaces	and	interactions	usually	experienced	as	mundane	or	‘ordinary’	—	 though	 ethnic	minorities’	 experience	 of	 ‘ordinary’	 does	 not	 often	 come	with	 the	privilege	 of	 unreflectiveness	 —	 become	 the	 sites	 of	 obvious	 nationalist	 struggle.	Through	 nationalist	 narratives	 the	 nation,	 rather	 than	 a	 whisper	 caught	 up	 in	 the	banality	of	the	everyday,	becomes	loud;	it	becomes	‘in	your	face’.	National	belonging	and	 difference	 from	 the	 ‘national	 norm’	 tend	 to	 be	 ever-present	 in	 the	 everyday	encounters	and	experiences	of	ethnic	minorities	—	but	they	do	become	louder	during	moments	of	nationalist	mobilisation.		
	
	
7.5.	Public	space	and	(in)visibility	
Although	 the	 vote	 dominated	 everyday	 interactions	 as	 a	 topic	 of	 discussions,	 the	public	manifestations	 of	 the	 referendum	 tended	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 Yes	 campaign.	That	is,	the	Yes	movement	was	more	visible	in	public	spaces	—	or	as	Jim	put	it,	there	was	an	apparent	“occupation	of	public	space”	by	the	Yes	side.	This	was	particularly	evident	in	Glasgow:	you	would	quickly	lose	count	of	Yes	posters	seen	on	tenement	flat	windows	 on	 Byres	 Road;	 Yes	 campaigners	 often	 set	 up	 their	 stalls	 on	 Buchanan	Street;	 there	were	Yes	 stickers	on	 lamp	posts;	Yes	badges	were	pinned	on	people’s	bags	and	clothes	—	and	so	on.	During	 the	 referendum,	George	Square	 in	Glasgow’s	city	 centre	 became	 unofficially	 branded	 ‘Freedom	 Square’	 (I	 will	 return	 to	 the	significance	of	 the	name	 later),	and	 it	hosted	a	number	of	 independence	rallies	and	demonstrations	in	the	lead	up	to	the	vote	as	well	as	after	it.				
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This	 ‘occupation’	 of	 George	 Square	was	 significant.	 City	 squares	 play	 an	 important	role	 in	 our	 everyday	 lives	 as	 sites	 for	 meeting,	 conversing,	 observing	 and	entertaining.	 Low,	 for	 example,	 illustrates	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 ‘plaza’	 in	 her	ethnography	of	two	public	squares	in	San	José,	Costa	Rica	(2000).	Public	squares	also	transform	into	sites	of	political	significance	during	times	of	political	unrest	or	change.	George	Square	—	apart	from	being	an	everyday	space	for	sitting	down	on	a	bench	and	watching	 the	world	go	by	—	has	 long	been,	 and	continues	 to	be,	 a	 site	 for	political	mobilisation	 and	 gatherings.	 For	 example,	 in	 1919,	 during	 the	 Battle	 of	 George	Square,	 or	 ‘Bloody	 Friday’,	 over	 60,000	 demonstrators	 gathered	 at	 the	 Square	 “in	support	of	 the	40-hours	strike	and	to	hear	 the	Lord	Provost's	reply	 to	 the	workers'	request	for	a	40-hour	week”	(Glasgow	Digital	Library).		In	 2014,	 the	 Square	 once	 again	 became	 a	 site	 of	 political	 mobilisation,	 and	 this	everyday	 space	 came	 to	 be	 identified	 with	 and	 occupied	 by	 the	 independence	movement.	 Although	 I	 am	 not	 sure	 of	 the	 exact	 motivations	 behind	 the	 unofficial	naming	 of	 the	 space	 as	 ‘Freedom	 Square’,	 ‘freedom’—	 in	 the	 Scottish	 context	—	 is	meaningful.	 It	 quickly	 conjures	 up	 associations	with	 the	 film	Braveheart.	The	 1995	Hollywood	 blockbuster	 portrays	 the	 First	 War	 of	 Scottish	 Independence	 whereby	William	Wallace	led	his	men	against	Edward	I	of	England’s	army.	Braveheart	includes	a	 famous	 scene	where	Wallace,	played	by	Mel	Gibson,	delivers	a	 speech	 to	his	men	before	battle	saying	that	their	enemies	—	the	English	—	“may	take	our	lives,	but	they	will	never	take	our	freedom”.		In	a	later	scene,	Wallace	has	been	taken	as	a	prisoner	and	 the	 only	way	 for	 him	 to	 escape	 hanging	 is	 to	 cry	 out	 ‘mercy’.	 Instead,	Wallace	gathers	all	his	strength	and	cries	out	‘freedom!’.			
Wallace	is	a	prominent	figure	in	the	Scottish	heritage	industry	in	and	around	Stirling	especially,	 where	 the	 Wallace	 Monument	 stands	 (Edensor,	 1997:135).	 Around	 the	time	 of	 the	 release	 of	 the	 film	 in	 the	 mid-1990s,	 the	 SNP	 sought	 to	 capitalise	 on	
Braveheart’s	success,	and	—	as	a	result	—	“opinion	polls	(…)	recorded	a	dramatic	rise	of	eight	points	 in	those	intending	to	vote	for	the	party”	(Edensor,	1997:	147).	Films	such	 as	 Braveheart	 are	 “important	 cultural	 forms	 which	 reconstruct	 the	 nation	through	 the	mass	 shared	 experience	 of	 various	 symbolic	 ingredients	—	 traditions,	ways	 of	 life,	 landscapes,	 histories	 and	 myths”	 (Edensor,	 1997:	 137).	 Braveheart	
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continues	 to	 occupy	 a	 central	 role	 in	 Scottish	 nationalist	 imaginary	 and	 self-understanding,	 and	 the	 SNP	 have	 not	 distanced	 themselves	 from	 the	 film:	 “in	 a	documentary	accompanying	the	new	DVD	release	Fiona	Hyslop,	Scotland’s	secretary	for	 culture,	 praises	 it	 for	 boosting	 ‘pride	 and	 confidence	 in	 our	 country’”	 (Dickie,	2014:	n.p.).				The	 significance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘freedom’	 in	 the	 Scottish	 context	 can	 further	 be	illustrated	through	this	exchange	with	Rachel	(English,	33	years	old,	voted	yes).	She	“grew	 up	 going	 to	 Mayfairs	 and	 country	 dancing”	 and	 “dated	 a	 Morris	 dancer”	—	Rachel	therefore	explains	“there	is	no	escaping	the	fact	that	I’m	really	English”	yet	she	feels	 “like	 I	 belong	 to	 Scotland	 now”.	 After	 this	 preface,	 she	 goes	 on	 to	 recount	 an	incident	when	her	family	was	travelling	back	to	Scotland	from	England:	Rachel:	 And	my	 family,	 you	 know,	my	 husband	 and	my	 sons,	 you	 know	—	my	
eldest	was	5	when	he	moved	here	—	he	considers	himself	to	be	Scottish,	he	would	
only	 ever,	 umm…	 And	 occasionally	 he	 will	 say	 he’s	 both,	 but	 umm…	 [laughs]	
He…[laughs]…he	was	—	we	were	driving	up,	umm,	from	visiting	family	and	we	
went	across	the	Scotland	border	and	he	shouted	‘freedom!’	at	the	back	of	the	car.	Minna:	Classic.	Rachel:	And	I	was	like	[laughs]…	he	was	born	in	[English	city]!	[laughs]	What…	
Where	is	this	freedom	coming	from?		Here,	 Rachel	 acknowledges	 the	 importance	 of	Braveheart’s	 and	 ‘freedom’s’	 cultural	purchase	 and	 significance	 as	 a	 nationalist	 marker	 of	 identification.	 My	 comment,	“classic”,	 emphasises	 the	 ordinariness	 and	 commonness	 of	 using	 ‘freedom’	 as	 an	interpretative	 repertoire	 (Potter	 and	 Wetherell,	 1987)	 in	 everyday	 interactions.	Further,	 the	 interaction	highlights	the	relational	character	of	 ‘freedom’	—	it	 is	to	be	understood	 as	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 antagonistic	 relationship	 between	 Scotland	 and	England.	 As	 such,	 the	 naming	 of	 George	 Square	 as	 Freedom	 Square	 is	 revealing:	inherent	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘freedom’	 is	 freedom	 from	 something.	 In	 Braveheart,	Wallace	shouted	‘freedom’	in	relation	to	England;	the	Yes	movement	wanted	freedom	from	 outside	 (Westminster)	 political	 rule.	 However,	 Westminster,	 as	 has	 been	established,	 is	 often	 codified	 as	 ‘English’	 in	 everyday	 encounters.	 The	 principle	 of	freedom,	as	it	is	so	deeply	written	in	modern	political	self-identification,	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	appeal	or	contest.	However,	what	is	significant	is	the	link	between	the	idea	of	freedom	and	Westminster	and	England	in	Scottish	nationalist	narratives.	
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Beyond	the	visibility	of	the	square,	the	participants	commented	on	the	prevalence	of	Yes	paraphernalia.	Padma	(Indian,	36	years	old,	did	not	vote)	and	Chalwe	(Zambian,	46	years	old,	voted	no)	made	reference	to	what	they	regarded	as	the	overwhelming	majority	 of	 Yes	 posters,	 placards	 and	 stickers	 especially	 in	 Glasgow	 and	 the	surrounding	areas.	Padma	explained	 that	she	 followed	the	debates	attentively,	 read	Yes	and	No	materials,	and	closely	observed	what	kinds	of	posters	were	displayed	in	public	 in	order	to	try	and	gage	the	views	of	other	people.	Padma	noted	that	she	did	not	see	a	lot	of	No	posters	displayed	—	“at	least	not	overtly	displayed,	they	were	all	yes”	—	around	Glasgow21.				
Chalwe	recalled	thinking	it	would	be	the	Yes	side	that	would	win	“‘cause	everywhere	you	went	it	was	blue	and	white22”.	For	him,	“the	Yes	campaign	made	more	noise	on	the	streets	than	the	No	campaign”	with	those	choosing	to	vote	no	knowing	“what	they	were	doing	but”	not	wanting	“to	make	noise	about	it”.	Similarly	to	Padma	and	Chalwe,	Marissa	(English,	28	years	old,	voted	no)	thought	the	Yes	side	would	succeed:	
And	 Glasgow	 was	 so	 persuasive	 in	 the	 Yes	 campaign,	 probably	 more	 so	 than	
other,	umm,	counties	that...	I	think	it	was	kind	of….	i--it	almost	made	feel	like	‘is	
this	how	everyone	feels	in	Scotland’,	like	-	-	Odogwu	 (Nigerian,	 36	 years	 old,	 Yes	 campaigner),	 who	 I	 interviewed	 a	 couple	 of	months	 after	 the	 referendum,	 pointed	 out	 that	 “every	 single	 place	 you	 went	 to”	during	 the	 referendum	 “people	 had	 posters	 in	 their	 windows”.	 At	 the	 day	 of	 the	interview,	he	said	he	had	seen	a	woman	with	a	Yes	sticker.	This	led	him	to	lift	up	his	shirt	under	which	he	was	wearing	a	Yes	t-shirt	and	to	say	that	even	months	after	the	referendum,	“I	still	wear	my	badge”.			
However,	as	hinted	at	by	Chalwe	above	—	who	said	that	no	voters	did	not	want	“to	make	noise	about	it”	(my	emphasis)	—	there	was	a	sense	of	invisibility	with	regard	to	the	 no	 vote	 and	 voters.	 Although	 Paula	 (English,	 21	 years	 old,	 voted	 no),	 Najuma	(English,	30	years	old,	No	campaigner)	and	Chalwe	reported	initial	excitement	for	the																																																									21	The	 majority	 of	 people	 in	 Glasgow	 voted	 Yes	 —	 53.5	 per	 cent.	 46.5	 per	 cent	 voted	 no.	 See	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results	for	other	areas. 	22	Blue	and	white	were	the	colours	of	the	Yes	campaign	—	and	of	course	the	colours	of	the	Saltire.	
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debates	 to	 come,	 as	 time	 went	 on,	 all	 three	 described	 experiencing	 a	 feeling	 of	animosity	or	hostility.	For	Paula,	 the	 “political	unrest”	made	her	 feel	 that	 the	 social	and	 political	 world	 around	 her	 was	 less	 stable	 and	 more	 insecure,	 and	 thus	 the	experience	seemed	to	be	unsettling.	Eilidh	(from	Guernsey,	54	years	old,	voted	no)	—	“as	somebody	who	never	wanted	to	be	asked	that	question	in	the	first	place”	—	also	found	the	referendum	to	be	“quite	an	unsettling	experience”.	For	her,	this	came	down	to	“particularly	the	aftermath”	and	the	way	in	which	it	“set	people	against	each	other”	and	was	“divisive”.			
What	 particularly	 contributed	 to	 participants’	 negative	 experiences	 of	 the	referendum	 was	 a	 hesitance	 about	 ‘outing’	 themselves	 as	 no	 voters.	 During	 both	participant	observation	and	interviews,	it	became	clear	that	the	participants	felt	that	the	no	vote	was	framed	as	being	‘unpatriotic’.	According	to	Ahsan,	no	vote	was	widely	taken	to	signify	that	“you	are	not	sincere	with	our	country”.	Marissa,	considering	the	different	 campaigns,	 noted	 that	 the	 “No	 campaign	 was	 quite	 a	 quiet	 campaign”	because	 “the	 national	 identity	 argument”	 was	 aligned	 more	 clearly	 with	 the	 Yes	campaign.	Consequently,	“it	did	kind	of	feel	like	you’re	more	Scottish	if	you	vote	yes”.	Similarly,	Paula	explained	how	a	yes	vote	was	branded	as	an	 “I	 love	Scotland	vote”	and	Tom	noted	that	there	was	a	sense	of	“if	this	is	truly	your	nation	you	will	vote	for	us,	 if	 you	 vote	 yes”.	 Jim	 (Scottish,	 48	 years	 old,	 No	 campaigner)	 criticised	 the	 Yes	campaign	 for	 creating	 an	 ‘out-group’	 consisting	 of	 those	 who	 voted	 against	independence:		
You	got,	you	got	stuff	quite	like	that,	you	know,	and	it	was	an	attempt	to	like	not	
be	 an	 ethnic	 nationalist	—	 anybody	 can	 be	 Scottish.	 But	 this	 increasingly	 -	 -	
anybody	could	 -	 -	but	 to	be,	but	 the	 flipside	of	 that	was	to	be	properly	Scottish	
you	had	to	support	independence.	You	know,	so	on	one	level	it’s,	you	know,	it,	it	
pretends	 to	 inclusivity	 but	 actually	 it’s	 creating	 an	 out-group	 just	 as	 [laughs],	
you	know,	 just	as	 firmly	—	 and	you	can	 see	 that	 in	 the	whole	 spiralling	 social	
media,	 you	 know,	 you	 know	—	 you’re	 not	 Scottish,	 you’re	 x	 because	 you	 don’t	
support	independence.	So	the	—	it’s	a…	it’s	self-selecting,	umm,	in	a	way	that…	is	
no	more	-	-	it’s,	it’s	as	exclusionary	a	philosophy.					I	 have	 argued	before	 that	 contradictions	 are	 inherent	 in	 nationalist	 narratives,	 and	can	 be	 revealing.	 Here,	 Jim	 highlights	 one	 such	 contradiction	 as	 he	 sees	 it:	 though	anyone	 can,	 technically,	 be	 Scottish,	 to	 be	 truly	 Scottish	 requires	 you	 to	 vote	 yes.	
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Although	 the	 SNP	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 people	 had	 a	 ‘choice’	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 they	decided	 to	 vote	 (indeed,	 one	 of	 their	 key	 referendum	 publications	 from	 2012	was	entitled	Choice	–	A	historic	opportunity	for	our	nation),	Salmond	nonetheless	signalled	in	 the	 aforementioned	publication	 that	 “we	 can	 choose	 a	 different	 and	better	 path”	(The	 SNP,	 2012:1	 —	 added	 emphasis).	 Thus,	 according	 to	 the	 SNP,	 although	Scottishness	is	portrayed	as	being	inclusive,	and	the	referendum	was	about	 ‘choice’,	the	referendum	was	also	about	choosing	a	better	future.	Consequently,	those	voting	against	 this	 supposedly	 brighter	 future	 could	 be,	 on	 the	 ground,	 either	 actively	labelled	as	being	‘unpatriotic’	by	others	or	implicitly	left	to	feel	this	way.	There	is	an	apparent	contradiction	in	the	SNP’s	statements:	in	everyday	contexts,	these	messages	are	interpreted	or	experienced	in	different	ways	and	they	serve	to	shape	individuals’	sense	of	self	and	belonging.	Some	no	voters,	 thus,	 felt	alienated	and	 labelled	as	 ‘not	properly	Scottish’.					In	relation	to	this,	at	the	independence	events,	the	unionist	politicians	tended	to	voice	their	commitment	to	Scotland	in	no	uncertain	terms.	At	a	meeting	in	Edinburgh,	Jim	Murphy	(Labour)	declared	that	he	“loved	Scotland”	(fieldnotes,	30.4.2014)	and	Anas	Sarwar	(Labour)	said	that	“he	is	a	proud	Scot,	and	is	a	proud	Scot	even	when	Scotland	is	part	of	the	UK”	(fieldnotes,	Glasgow,	9.3.2014).	Similarly	to	Sarwar,	Ken	Macintosh	(Labour	—	though	currently	 independent)	argued	 that	 “he	 is	 ‘proud	 to	be	Scottish’,	and	that	voting	to	stay	in	the	union	does	not	make	him	‘any	less	Scottish’”	(fieldnotes,	Glasgow,	 26.3.2014).	 Thus,	 among	 the	unionist	 politicians,	 there	was	 a	 tendency	 to	emphasise	 their	 affinity	 to	 the	 Scottish	 nation,	 and	 to	 highlight	 their	 emotional	commitment	to	Scotland	despite	seeking	a	no	vote.	The	political	elite,	on	the	No	side,	thus	 seemed	 aware	 of	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 positioning	 no	 voters	 as	 unpatriotic	and	sought	to	address	it	through	explicit	pronouncements	of	national	belonging.				In	a	context	in	which	voting	no	was	framed	as	‘unpatriotic’,	some	no	voters	chose	to	remain	invisible.	Thus,	this	is	in	direct	contrast	to	Noor’s	earlier	point	regarding	the	openness	 and	 publicness	 of	 the	 political	 debate.	 What	 Eilidh	 found	 particularly	“disturbing”	was	that	people	were	“afraid	to	stand	up	and	say	I	voted	no”,	which	led	to	 her	 making	 a	 point	 of	 admitting	 it	 unless	 it	 was	 “really	 [going	 to]	 cause	tumbleweed	to	go	past	me”.	Catherine	noted	how	most	no	voters	had	to	be	“secretive”	
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about	 their	 vote	 “because	 it	 wasn’t	 very	 popular	 to	 say	 you	 were	 against	[independence]”.	As	a	no	voter,	Paula	“was	quite	shy”	and	kept	her	voting	intention	to	herself.	 She	 felt	 like	she	could	not	be	a	 “proud	no	voter”	and	her	and	her	 family	—	who	also	voted	no	—	“didn’t	kind	of	have	anything	to	show	that	we	were	no	voters”;	rather,	the	identity	of	being	a	no	voter	became	personal	and	private	—	something	you	would	not	speak	of	or	actively	present	to	the	outside	world.				At	the	more	extreme	end	of	the	spectrum,	some	of	the	participants	felt	that	there	was	real	danger	in	their	political	persuasion	becoming	known	or	visible	to	other	people.	Catherine	 said	 she	 was	 “secretly”	 supporting	 the	 no	 vote	 “so	 I	 don’t	 get	 killed	[laughs]”.	 Though	 she	 said	 it	 jokingly,	 there	 is	 something	 to	 this	 feeling	 of	 threat:	Chalwe	explained	that	he	“couldn’t	even	see	myself	wearing,	you	know,	a	no	thanks	badge	 or	 a	 t-shirt”	 (unlike	 the	 Yes	 supporters	 who	 he	 observed	 wearing	 Yes	paraphernalia)	because	“then	you	fear	for	your,	you	fear	for	your	life,	you	know,	it’s	not	wise”.	As	a	result,	though	Chalwe	was	excited	and	looking	forward	to	the	vote,	he	was	left	feeling	“alienated”	and	not	being	able	to	express	his	views	—	because	he	felt	“threatened”,	he	became	“withdrawn”	from	the	political	process.				In	direct	contrast	to	Odogwu	who	still	wore	his	Yes	t-shirt	after	the	vote	and	proudly	exhibited	it	to	me,	Chalwe	and	Paula	did	not	carry	any	markers	—	such	as	badges	or	t-shirts	 —	 that	 would	 identify	 them	 as	 no	 voters	 out	 in	 the	 public.	 Jim,	 who	 has	“championed	 some	 deeply	 unpopular	 causes	 over	 the	 years,	 or	 at	 least	 minority	pursuits”,	 said	he	was	“wary”	and	“dubious”	about	walking	around	with	a	no	badge	on,	 although	he	had	previously	 never	 thought	 twice	 about	 attaching	 a	 badge	 to	 his	clothes.	Thus,	he	was	“worried	about	wearing	a	No	badge	(…)	at	the	bus	stop	and	this	kind	of	thing	[laughs]”	in	case	he	got	hit.	Najuma	recalled	her	frustration	during	the	campaigning	period	as	she	and	 fellow	Better	Together	campaigners	put	up	posters:	“not	 sooner	 would	 they	 go	 up	 they	 were	 getting	 pulled	 down	 again”.	 Further,	 she	explained	that	as	they	spoke	“to	people	on	the	doorsteps	who	were	very,	very,	very	firmly	 in	the	Better	Together	camp”	and	offered	them	Better	Together	posters,	 they	would	refuse	to	take	these	as	they	were	worried	about	the	reaction	of	other	people	who	would	see	 the	posters.	For	Najuma,	 “that	was	a	very,	very	genuine	 fear”.	Thus,	Najuma	 felt	 there	 was	 a	 kind	 of	 “subtle	 hostility”	 which	 left	 people	 thinking	 “they	
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couldn’t	 open	 up	 and	 express	 their	 opinions”	 and	 which	 she	 found	 “very	uncomfortable”.			
What	 the	 data	 therefore	 reveal	 is	 that	 the	 no	 voters	 I	 interviewed	 experienced	 a	pressure	 to	 hide	 their	 voting	 intention	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 —	 being	 a	 no	 voter	became	a	private	identity.	Yes	voters,	in	contrast,	made	their	voting	intentions	known	by	displaying	or	wearing	Yes	badges,	posters	and	t-shirts.	Crucially,	Sawer	(2007:39)	discusses	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 colours	 and	 related	 symbols	 are	 used	 in	 politics	 to	convey	 meanings	 and	 engage	 the	 emotions	 of	 social	 movement	 participants.	 In	addition,	 these	 colours	 and	 symbols	 also	 perform	 a	more	 instrumental	 purpose	 in	terms	of	branding	 specific	movements	or	parties.	Thus,	 Sawer	 (2007:39)	highlights	the	 “relative	 significance	 of	 emotion	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 rational	 pursuit	 of	interest	on	 the	other”	 in	relation	 to	political	and	social	movements’	use	of	symbols.	Importantly,	 she	points	out	 that	 “the	 colours	not	only	 [serve]	 the	purpose	of	 visual	identification	with	 ‘the	 cause’	 and	 the	 outward	 display	 of	 values	 but	 also	 [play]	 an	important	role	in	sustaining	a	sense	of	community”	(2007:40).	Thus,	“the	wearing	of	political	colours	is	a	significant	statement	of	identity	and/or	values”	and	“such	public	displays	 help	 engender	 an	 emotional	 unity	 and	 can	 be	 an	 important	 resource	 in	building	social	movements	and	other	campaigns”	(Sawer,	2007:46).			Those	voting	yes	wore	and	displayed	Yes	symbols	openly.	No	voters,	however,	as	we	have	 seen,	were	more	hesitant	—	 sometimes	due	 to	 fear	—	 to	make	 their	 political	conviction	 known.	 Thus,	 emotions	 are	 not	 only	 connected	 to	 the	 willingness	 to	display	 political	 symbols	 (e.g.	 pride	 or	 passion	 regarding	 a	 cause)	 as	 discussed	 by	Sawer	before,	but	also	with	the	unwillingness	to	display	certain	symbols	(e.g.	fear	for	being	‘beaten	up’	—	like	Jim	—	for	wearing	a	No	badge).	Many	no	voters	felt	excluded	from	 the	 broader	 political	 debates,	 and	 chose	 to	 remain	 silent.	 Indeed,	 what	 came	through	the	data	was	the	way	in	which	the	referendum	was	talked	about	as	a	sensory	experience.	That	 is,	 the	 referendum	was	visible	(posters,	 stickers,	badges)	or	 it	was	
invisible	 (lack	 of	 No	 posters/badges).	 Further,	 the	 referendum	 was	 explained	 in	relation	 to	 the	 concepts	 of	 noise	 and	 silence	 (the	 ability	 to	 voice	 your	 views;	 the	choice/necessity	 to	keep	your	views	unspoken;	and	 in	 terms	of	 the	 loudness	of	 the	Yes	campaign).	As	Bull	et	al	(2006:5)	argue,	“senses	mediate	the	relationship	between	
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self	and	society,	mind	and	body,	idea	and	object”.	That	is,	“the	senses	are	everywhere”	and	 they	 are	 “fundamental	 to	 our	 experience	 of	 reality”	 (2006:5	 —	 original	emphases).	Therefore,	we	can	observe	the	world	around	us	through	our	senses,	and	through	emotions,	we	attach	meaning	and	respond	to	that	world.							
7.6.	Participating	as	a	non-Scot	
In	addition	 to	discussing	 the	pervasiveness,	 supposed	openness	and	(in)visibility	of	the	debate,	 the	participants	—	especially	 those	who	were	more	 recent	migrants	—	also	reflected	on	their	own	ability	to	vote	in	the	referendum.	Many	people	who	would	not	 ordinarily	 have	 a	 vote	 in	 key	 political	 events	 in	 the	 UK	 were	 able	 to	 vote	 in	September	2014.		
Having	a	vote	was	 regarded	as	a	way	of	 inclusion	by	many	of	 the	participants	who	were	more	 recent	migrants.	 Ahsan	 (Pakistani,	 38	 years	 old,	 didn’t	 disclose	 how	he	voted)	argued	 that	having	a	vote	was	a	good	 thing,	and	made	“you	 feel	part	of”	 the	country.	Violet	 (Zambian,	 40	 years	 old,	 voted	no)	 explained	 that	 being	 able	 to	 vote	gave	her	a	feeling	of	being	included:	Minna:	Okay,	 yeah.	Do	—	 do	you	 still	—	 like,	 do	you	 feel	at	home	 in	Scotland,	
would	you	say	it’s	home	now	or?	
	Violet:	Yeah,	honestly,	 I	do	 feel	 like	home	because	—	 I	don’t	know,	when	 I	 just	
came	I	didn’t	know	I	was	even	allowed	to	vote,	do	you	know-	-			Minna:	Yeah.		Violet:	 --	so	at	least	with	voting	it	made	me	feel	part	of,	you	know,	the	crowd-–	
being	part	of	the,	you	know,	the	is	the	nation,	yeah.	
	
Minna:	Yeah.	
	Violet:	So	I	feel	-	-	I	felt	a	sense	of	belonging.	Okay,	I	know,	I’m	not	Scottish	and	
stuff	 but,	 I	 just	 felt	 like	 oh,	 so,	 I’m	 also	 included,	 I	 can	 also	 decide,	 you	 know.	
Mmhm,	yeah.		Minna:	How	did	that	feel,	when	you	got	that	kind	of	power	to	-	-		
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	Violet:	 Yeah,	 it	 just	 felt	 like	 oh	 yes!	 [laughs]	 You	 just	 -	 -	 is,	 is,	 you	 know,	 it	
empowers	you	to	have	a	say	 in	certain	things,	yeah,	 to	be	heard,	 so	–	yeah,	 it’s	
quite,	it’s	quite	a...	good	feeling,	for	feeling	and	kind	of	like	yes.		Violet	went	on	to	say	that	if	you	are	not	given	a	vote,	“automatically	you	are	excluded”	which	makes	you	feel	like	“you	should	just	pack	and	go”.	Agnieszka	(Polish,	25	years	old,	voted	yes)	explained	feeling	“privileged”	that	she	could	vote	 in	the	referendum,	and	Mary	 (Kenyan,	46	years	old,	voted	no)	 said	having	a	vote	made	her	 feel	 “I	was	part	of	it”	and	that	she	was	included.	Stefania	(Polish,	32	years	old,	voted	no)	noted	that	being	granted	a	vote	made	her	feel	“I	am	actually	treated	as	a	person”.		
The	 granting	 of	 voting	 rights	 in	 the	 referendum	 beyond	 the	 holders	 of	 British	passports	 poses	 some	 interesting	 questions	 with	 regard	 to	 national	 belonging	 and	indeed	citizenship.	Jacobson	notes	that	“determining	who	may	become	a	member	and	a	citizen	is	the	state’s	way	of	shaping	and	defining	the	national	community”	(1997:5).		The	right	to	vote	has,	traditionally,	been	seen	as	a	right	and	responsibility	of	citizens	of	 nation	 states,	 whether	 they	 reside	 within	 or	 beyond	 its	 borders.	 Soysal	 (1994),	however,	 talks	 about	 a	 post-national	 form	 of	 citizenship	 whereby	 there	 is	 an	expansion	of	rights	and	an	allocation	of	 these	rights	 to	 those	who	would	have	been	denied	them	before.			
With	 regard	 to	 the	 Scottish	 case,	 the	 referendum	 voting	 rights	 offer	 an	 interesting	case	in	point	with	regard	to	Soysal’s	remarks.	The	right	to	vote	was	extended	to	those	who	 can	 vote	 in	 the	 Scottish	 parliamentary	 and	 local	 elections,	 as	well	 16	 and	 17-year-olds.	 Thus,	 British	 citizens	 resident	 in	 Scotland;	 Commonwealth	 citizens	resident	 in	Scotland	who	have	a	 leave	to	remain	 in	the	UK	or	do	not	require	such	a	leave;	citizens	of	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	other	EU	countries	resident	in	Scotland;	members	of	the	House	of	Lords	resident	in	Scotland;	service	personnel	serving	in	the	UK	 or	 overseas	with	 the	 armed	 forces	who	 are	 registered	 to	 vote	 in	 Scotland;	 and	Crown	personnel	serving	outside	the	UK	with	HM	Government	who	are	registered	to	vote	 in	 Scotland	 were	 able	 to	 vote	 in	 the	 Scottish	 independence	 referendum	 (The	Scottish	 Government	 –	 Scotland’s	 Referendum).	 While	 many	 people	 resident	 in	Scotland	were	excluded	from	the	vote	—	such	as	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	—	the	
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vote	was	nonetheless	opened	up	to	a	broader	constituency	than,	for	example,	the	UK	parliamentary	elections	or,	indeed,	the	recent	referendum	on	Britain’s	membership	of	the	European	Union	that	was	held	in	June	2016.			
Nonetheless,	despite	 the	 feeling	of	 inclusion	or	belonging	that	some	people	 felt	as	a	result	of	having	a	vote	in	the	independence	referendum,	the	participants	(especially	those	who	were	more	recent	migrants)	also	reported	a	lingering	sense	of	—	as	Violet	put	it	—	not	knowing	“where	my	place	was	exactly”.	This	made	her	feel	“scared”	and	meant	that	she	shied	away	from	debating	issues	to	do	with	independence.	Agnieszka	(Polish,	 25	 years	 old,	 voted	 yes)	 recalled	 overhearing	 people’s	 conversations	regarding	whether	 EU	nationals	 should	 be	 able	 to	 vote	 and	 some	holding	 the	 view	that	maybe	“Polish	or	EU	nationals	shouldn’t	be	really	allowed	to	vote”.	Tom	(English,	voted	 no),	 though	 he	 “gets	 to”	 vote,	 described	 feeling	 as	 if	 he	 was	 “a	 guest	 in	 the	womb”	regarding	his	suffrage.			
Beyond	 feeling	 removed	 or	 unsure	 of	 “one’s	 place”,	 others	 felt	 a	 sense	 of	 hostility	when	engaging	in	debates	and	discussions	about	the	referendum.	Chalwe	(Zambian,	46	years	old),	who	voted	no,	went	to	work	the	day	after	the	vote.	As	he	walked	in,	and	his	 colleagues	 knew	 he	 was	 —	 in	 his	 words	 —	 a	 “unionist”,	 a	 co-worker	 said	 to	Chalwe:	“well	it’s	fine	for	you	to	whistle,	but	you	were	not	here	in	the	80s”.	Thus,	“you	get	such	comments,	you	voted	out	of	 ignorance,	you	were	not	here,	you	don’t	know	what	 these	 people	 did	 to	 us,	 it	 was	 that	 bad”.	 Consequently,	 Chalwe	 said	 he	 felt	“alienated”	and	came	across	“animosity”	when	the	debates	started.	Many	people,	he	thought,	 expected	 him	 not	 to	 vote.	 Specifically,	 he	 linked	 the	 animosity	 and	 the	perceptions	that	he	should	not	vote	to	being	black	in	Scotland:	
Umm,	I	think	being	a…	black	person…	in	Glasgow,	showing	an	interest	in	a	topic	
which	was	out	of	bounds	for	black	folk.	 I	say	out	of	bound	because	I	remember	
[laughs]	–	one	person	that	works	at	the	-	-	‘are	you	going	to	vote?’	and	I	said	yes,	
and	the	person	went	on	to	ask	–	she	said,	umm,	‘but..you’re	not,	you’re	not	even	
Scottish,	you’re	-	 -	you	don’t,	you	know,	you	could,	you	could	even	go	back,	you	
know,	this	is	not	really	your,	your	home’.		
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Chalwe	felt	that	the	colour	of	his	skin,	thus,	marked	him	as	‘obviously’	non-Scottish23	—	 the	 person	 “judged	 [him]	 as	 a	 foreigner”	—	 and	 thought	 he	 “wasn’t	 entitled	 to	vote”.	Chalwe	explained	that	he	“learned	later	on	to	sort	of	(…)	keep	quiet”	which	was	“really	hard	(…)	because	I	love	politics”.	Chalwe	was	made	to	feel	like	an	outsider,	and	his	 decision	 to	 exercise	 his	 right	 to	 vote	was	 challenged	 and	 undermined	 by	 a	 co-worker	due	to	him	not	being	Scottish	in	her	eyes.	Thus,	the	right	to	have	a	say	on	the	Scottish	 independence	matter	was,	 in	her	eyes,	 limited	 to	 those	who	were	Scottish.	Indeed,	here	we	can	also	return	to	Simmel’s	(1950	[1908])	concept	of	 ‘the	stranger’	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6.	 For	 Chalwe’s	 co-worker,	 Chalwe	 remained	 a	 “potential	wanderer”	who	 “had	 not	 quite	 overcome	 the	 freedom	 of	 coming	 and	 going”	 (1950	[1908]:1)	—	rather	than	prioritising	Chalwe	as	someone	who	indefinitely	abodes	 in	Scotland,	 Chalwe	 was	 still	 fixed	 in	 his	 Zambian-ness	 in	 his	 colleague’s	 eyes.	Consequently,	his	perspectives	were	devalued	and,	 indeed,	his	entitlement	to	hold	a	position	at	all	was	questioned.			
However,	 the	 co-worker’s	 comment	 regarding	 Chalwe	 not	 being	 here	 in	 the	 1980s	needs	to	be	considered	carefully.	While	this	may	have	been	a	coded	way	of	referring	to,	and	talking	about,	‘race’,	it	may	have,	also,	signalled	genuine	concern	with	regard	to	Chalwe’s	potential	unawareness	of	political	 lessons	of	 the	past.	However,	what	 is	significant	is	that,	in	the	broader	context,	this	comment	made	Chalwe	feel	as	if	he	was	being	 shut	 down	 and	 alienated	due	 to	 his	 ‘blackness’.	 It	 is	 also	 telling	—	given	 the	focus	 on	 the	 ‘edges’	 of	 the	 nation	—	 that	 Chalwe	 used	 the	 phrase	 “out	 of	 bounds”.	That	is,	he	resides	beyond	‘the	bounds	of	the	nation’,	and	is	thus	unqualified	to	make	and	affect	a	decision	that	relates	to	the	nation’s	future.	This	incident	therefore	draws	attention	both	to	the	ways	in	which	Chalwe	is,	and	feels	he	is,	racialised	(“being	black	in	Glasgow”)	and	how	his	migrant-ness	is	emphasised	(“you	weren’t	here	in	the	80s”)	—	and	these	two	facets	are,	of	course,	closely	interlinked.				
Violet	 (Zambian,	 40	 years	 old,	 voted	 no)	 raised	 similar	 issues	 to	 Chalwe,	 and	explained	feeling	scared	to	say	she	was	voting	yes	or	no	“because	it	was	bringing	a	lot	
																																																								23	The	 link	 between	 public	 perceptions	 of	 ‘Scottishness’	 and	 ‘whiteness’	 have	 been	 highlighted	 in	McCrone	and	Bechhofer’s	studies	of	Scottish	Social	Attitudes	Surveys	(see	e.g.	2015)	
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of	problems”	—	specifically,	she	was	worried	about	losing	friends	and	thus	“just	kept	quiet,	 knowing	 in	my	 heart”.	 She	 suggested	 that	 “maybe	 if	 I	 was	 Scottish	maybe	 I	could	say	something	and	nobody	would	hurt	or	nobody	would	say	something”.	I	also	witnessed	 this	 hesitance	 to	 speak	 or	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 independence	 debates.	 I	attended	a	referendum	debate	in	Edinburgh	at	the	end	of	April	in	2014	where	“there	was	 also	 a	 question	 from	 a	 young	 man	 from	 the	 audience	 who	 said	 he	 was	 from	Glasgow,	 lives	 in	Edinburgh,	and	 is	 from	Sierra	Leone”.	He	went	on	to	apologise	 for	his	accent,	“to	which	the	chair	said	there	was	no	need	to	apologise	and	that	it	was	a	beautiful	accent”	(fieldnotes,	30.4.2014).			
Within	 this	 context,	 thus,	 the	 young	man	 from	 Sierra	 Leone	was	 very	 aware	 about	sounding	different	amongst	an	audience	that,	at	least	on	surface,	seemed	to	be	made	up	of	mainly	‘white	Scots’.	While	the	panel	encouraged	him,	what	is	telling	is	that	the	man	 felt	 that	he	 should	apologise	 in	 the	 first	 instance.	That	 is,	 he	 felt	he	needed	 to	qualify	 and	 explain	 his	 difference	 before	 he	 could	 put	 a	 question	 to	 the	 panel.	Although	no	one	was	acting	 in	an	exclusionary	way	towards	him	(indeed,	 the	panel	was	 encouraging	 him),	 his	 qualification	 potentially	 reflected	 past	 experiences	 of	having	your	sense	of	belonging	and	views	—	and,	by	extension,	your	very	sense	of	self	—	questioned,	scrutinised,	and	possibly	challenged.			
Finally,	 others	 felt	 ambiguous	 as	 regards	 the	 referendum,	 and	 chose	 not	 to	 vote.	Catherine	explained	to	me	why	she	felt	like	she	did	not	have	a	“horse	in	the	race”:	
Because	 I’m,	 I’m	 not	 Scottish,	 and	 I’m	 not	 English	 —	 I’m	 just	 like,	 umm,	 a	
bystander,	kind	of	like,	somebody	who	has...I	have	no...like,	I	don’t	have	horse	in	
the	race,	to	me	I	just	feel	like	I’m	neutral	kind	of,	which	is	we-	-	‘cause	I,	I	know	I	
live	in,	umm,	Scotland,	so	I	should	probably	say	yes	‘cause	of	that	but	then	I	lived	
in	England	as	well	 and	 I	 loved	 the	 experience.	 So	 it’s	 like,	 I	 really,	 I	 don’t	 care	
[laughs],	but	at	the	same	time	I	really	wanted	them	to	stay	together	‘cause	I	felt	—	to	me,	they’re	like,	brothers,	like	family,	so	why	would	you	want	to...go	apart.			While	Catherine	connects	her	decision	no	 to	vote	explicitly	 to	not	being	Scottish	or	English	(and,	in	the	process,	she	contradicts	herself	by	saying	“I	don’t	care”	on	the	one	hand,	and	“I	really	wanted	them	to	stay	together”	on	the	other	hand),	Padma	(Indian,	36	 years	 old,	 did	 not	 vote)	 saw	 not	 voting	 as	 taking	 a	moral	 stance.	 She	 began	 by	
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explaining	that	she	is	“mindful”	(her	emphasis)	of	the	fact	that	she	“treat[s]	[herself]	as	a	guest	here”	—	“as	a	welcomed	guest”24.	She	goes	on	to	say:	
Um,	 I	 think	 it	 partly	 has	 to	 do	with	 the	 fact	 that	 I’ve	 travelled	 so	much,	 and	 I	
usually	don’t	stay	for	more	than..four,	five	years	in	one	place	—	four,	five	years	is	
saying	 lot,	 it’s	 usually	 not	more	 than	 two	 or	 three	 years.	 So	when	 you	 kind	 of	
travel	 like	 that,	 and	 you	 li-	 -	 you’ve	 lived	 in	 different	 places,	 you’re	 attitude	
towards	home	 is	 very	different	 from	people	who	have	 lived	 in	 that	place,	 born	
and	brought	up	and	probably	die	there.	And	you’re	—	you,	don-	-	the	way	-	-	well,	
this	 is	 my	 understanding,	 could	 be	 wrong,	 the	 way	 I	 see	 it,	 the	 way	 you	 view	
relationships,	the	way	you	view..friendships	or	the	way	you	view	permanence	in	
life	 is	 very	different.	Because	 you’ve	been	uprooted	 so	many	 times.	And	 I	 think	
that	 has	 been,	 in	my	 case	 as	well,	 I..I	 don’t,	 umm…[long	 pause]	 I’m	passionate	
about	 what	 is	 morally	 right,	 but	 if	 it	 means	 I	 have	 to	 step	 away	 because	 it’s	
morally	right	—	and	I	know	why	you	ask	me	that,	 ‘cause	I	will,	 I’ll	come	to	the	
decision	why	I	didn’t	vote.	Umm,	so	 I	 think	 it	was	morally	right	 for	me	to	vote,	
even	though	I	would	have	voted	no.	Is	because...I’ve	not	been	here	long	enough,	
I’m	not	been	born	and	brought	up	here.	And	I	will	probably	not	live	here	for	more	
than	another	two	or	three	years	—	I’ll	move	away.			Due	to	her	experience	of	being	transient,	Padma	felt	it	was	not	morally	right	to	vote.	She,	thus,	reveals	the	struggles	of	Simmelian	‘strangers’	—	in	addition	to	the	external	challenges	 to	migrants’	 voting	 rights	 (as	 experienced	 by	 Chalwe),	 Padma	 discusses	her	internal	doubts	as	to	whether	it	is	‘her	place’	to	have	a	say	in	the	referendum.				
7.7.	Conclusion	
The	participants	—	especially	 those	 voting	 yes	 or	 involved	 in	 the	 Yes	 campaign	—	spoke	 at	 length	 about	 the	 “energy”	 and	 “passion”	 evident	 at	 the	 referendum	gatherings,	and	how	“there	was	just	so	much	hope	and	positivity	[that]	it	was	almost	overwhelming”	 (George).	Following	 the	vote,	 those	who	had	voted	yes	—	 like	Pietr	and	Noor	—	reported	feeling	“depressed”,	with	Pietr	explaining	that	he	started	“to	cry	in	the	afternoon”	the	day	after	the	vote	when	the	result	was	clear.	Lukasz	remembers	going	to	college	the	day	after	the	vote,	and	seeing	“all	those	faces	who	voted	no	being	like	ha-ha!”	while	him	and	his	“yes	voters	mates”	were	feeling	“like	really	depressed”.	Furthermore,	 Lukasz	 recalls	 the	 emotional	 rollercoaster	 during	 the	 debates	 —																																																									24	Here,	 it	 is	worth	emphasising	that	while	Padma	started	off	 the	 interview	by	making	this	comment	about	being	a	‘welcomed	guest’,	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	6,	she	also	experienced	instances	of	‘othering’	in	different	contexts	(e.g.	her	experience	of	walking	into	the	‘working	man’s	pub’).	
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“during	 the	 referendum	 it	 was	 crazy,	 you	 got	 sadness,	 you	 had	 happiness,	 just	everything,	 you	 know,	 the	 excitement”,	 that	 is,	 “actually,	 every	 feeling,	 umm,	possible”.				Those	who	voted	no	also	registered	the	sombre	mood	among	yes	voters	the	next	day.	Marissa	went	to	the	office	where	he	saw	her	colleague	Paul	who	was	upset	and	who	she	thought	had	been	crying.	She	explained	feeling	“shocked”	noticing	how	much	the	vote	meant	to	Paul,	and	feeling	“really	guilty”:	“so	I	was	like	‘god,	I	was	part	of	that	not	happening’”.	 Rahul,	 who	 voted	 no,	 noted	 that	 the	 result	 was,	 in	 the	 end,	 “a	 sad	moment”	as	 “there	was	 that	 little	bit	of	an	emotional	pull	 there	 thinking	ach,	 (…)	 it	might	have	been…	something	there”	in	terms	of	Scotland	becoming	independent.			
The	referendum,	thus,	evoked	deep	emotions	in	the	participants,	and	on	both	sides	of	the	 debate.	 This	 chapter	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 somewhat	 neglected	 relationship	between	 nationalism	 and	 emotion.	 It	 is	 precisely	 this	 emotional	 pull	 of	 nationalist	narratives	 that	 grand	 theories	 of	 nationalism	 (see	 Chapter	 2)	—	 especially	 on	 the	modernist	side	—	tend	not	to	capture.	On	the	one	hand,	I	suspect	this	to	be	the	case	due	to	emotions	being	relegated	to	and	seen	as	a	property	of	the	private	sphere.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 although	 “emotions	 are	 central	 in	 social	 structure	 and	 social	processes”,	 nonetheless	 “they	 are	 often	 neglected	 or	 studied	 as	 a	 negative	 and	disruptive	 element	 capable	 of	 blinding	 actors	 to	 the	 advancement	 of	 reason	 and	rationality”	 (Guibernau,	 2013:145-6).	 However,	 emotions	 have	 an	 “important	 role	both	as	a	trigger	for	political	action	and	as	the	invisible	cement	indispensable	in	the	construction	 of	 social	 and	 political”	 —	 including	 national	 —	 “attachments”	(Guibernau,	2013:154).			
This	chapter	has,	firstly,	argued	that	on	the	ground,	Westminster	becomes	codified	as	‘English’	 or	 ‘England’.	 Consequently,	 the	 English	 (sounding)	 participants	 tended	 to	report	 feeling	 like	 they	were	 representatives	or	 ‘figureheads’	 (as	 ‘Conservatives’)	 in	relation	 to	 Westminster	 politics.	 Secondly,	 I	 discussed	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 the	referendum,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 came	 to	 structure	 everyday	 interactions.	Importantly,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 participants’	 reflections	 on	 the	 pervasiveness	 were	
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revealing	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 everyday	 nationalism	 from	 ethnic	 minorities’	standpoint.			
In	relation	to	this	second	point,	although	the	edges	of	the	nation	(Fox,	2017)	became	more	 visible	 to	 everyone	 during	 the	 referendum	 (including	 those	 whose	 national	belonging	 is	 ‘beyond	 question’),	 there	 was	—	 in	 actuality	—	 not	 much	 difference	between	ethnic	minorities’	mundane	experiences	of	nationalism	and	their	experience	of	 nationalism	 in	 a	 ‘hyper-nationalist’	 context	 (such	 as	 the	 referendum).	 So,	 what	transpires	 is	 that	 the	 ethnic	 minorities’	 experience	 and	 existence	 are	 continuously	impacted	 upon	 and	 shaped	 by	 nationalist	 narratives	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 having	 to	negotiate	belonging.	During	the	referendum,	nationalist	narratives	did	become	louder	and	came	to	shape	everyday	interactions	in	more	intense	ways	(e.g.	in	the	workplace)	—	 to	 the	 point	 where	 some	 participants	 felt	 ‘fed	 up’.	 This,	 thus,	 reinforces	 Smith’s	(2016)	 point	 that	 the	 capacity	 to	 experience	 the	 everyday	 in	 unreflective	ways	 is	 a	privilege.		
Thirdly,	 I	 discussed	 the	 visibility	 of	 the	 Yes	 campaign	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	invisibility	of	the	No	campaign	on	the	other.	I	explained	the	hesitance	of	the	no	voting	participants	to	‘out’	themselves	as	being	against	independence.	They	also	argued	that	because	 the	 yes	 vote	 was	 publicly	 branded	 as	—	 in	 Paula’s	 words	—	 the	 ‘I	 love	Scotland	 vote’,	 voting	 no	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 unpatriotic.	 Fourthly,	 and	 relatedly,	although	being	able	 to	vote	 served	as	a	means	of	 feeling	 included	 in	 the	 ‘nation’,	 as	discussed	 by	 Violet,	 others	 reported	 feeling	 ‘alienated’	 and	 feeling	 like	 the	 political	debates	were	‘out	of	bounds’	to	non-Scots.		Discussing	 “the	 symbolic	 and	 emotional	 practices	 that	 nation-states	 marshal	 to	mobilize	 affection	 for	 the	 polity”	 (2001:84),	 Berezin	 argues	 that	 “public	 political	rituals	 create	 ‘communities	 of	 feeling’”	 (Berezin,	 2001:93;	 added	 emphases)	 —	 a	concept	which	Berezin	derives	from	Raymond	Williams’	‘structures	of	feeling’.		Those	who	 were	 involved	 in	 or	 supported	 the	 Yes	 side	 spoke	 about	 the	 political	galvanisation	 and	 excitement	 of	 being	 part	 of	 something	 bigger.	 Those	 who	 were	
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voting	no	tended	to	feel	like	they	had	to	hide	their	voting	intentions.	As	explained	by	Collins	 (cited	 in	 Heaney,	 2013:245),	 involvement	 in	 a	 group	 creates	 ‘emotional	energy’	 “that	 serves	 to	 reinforce	 group	 solidarity	 and	 produce	 a	 particularized	cultural	capital	for	those	within	the	group”.				Berezin	explains	that,		
The	repeated	experience	of	ritual	participation	produces	a	feeling	of	solidarity	-	
‘we	 are	 all	 here	 together,	 we	 must	 share	 something’;	 and	 (…)	 it	 produces	
collective	memory	—	‘we	were	all	here	together’.	What	is	experienced	and	what	
is	remembered	 is	 the	act	of	participating	 in	the	ritual	event	 in	the	name	of	the	
polity	(2001:93	—	original	emphases).			Such	 an	 act	 could	 be,	 for	 example,	 opposing	 Conservative	 politics	 in	 the	 1980s,	 or	being	involved	in	or	feeling	an	affinity	to	the	Yes	campaign.	Political	rituals	—	such	as	Yes	rallies	in	George	Square	—	thus	produce	shared	memories.	While	elite	nationalist	discourses	draw	on	distant	historical	events	or	people	as	symbolic	resources	(such	as	the	 Enlightenment	 or	 William	 Wallace),	 individual	 actors	 also	 draw	 on	 symbolic	resources	such	as	shared	memories	(“you	weren’t	here	in	the	1980s”)	to	demarcate	the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 nation.	 Understanding	 the	 connection	 between	 nationalist	narratives	and	emotions	is	key	because	“belonging	includes	an	emotional	component;	it	 implies	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 commitment	 and	 identification	 with	 the	 group’s	objectives,	 ideals,	 practices	 and	 categorization	 of	 other	 individuals	 and	 groups	 as	both	‘friends’	and	‘enemies’.”	(Guibernau,	2013:144).	Emotions	are,	thus,	“intrinsic	to	social	 and	 political	 attachments	 and,	 as	 such,	 are	 essential	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	belonging”	(Guibernau,	2013:145).	In	this	sense,	accounting	for	the	emotional	pull	or	push	of	nationalist	narratives	in	the	context	of	the	referendum	highlights	the	complex	and	 	 —	 once	 again	 —	 contradictory	 nature	 of	 nationalist	 narratives	 and	 claims.
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Chapter	8	Conclusion			Nationalism	 is	 a	 difficult	 topic	 to	 study	 especially	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 uncovering	everyday	 understandings	 of	 nationhood.	 As	 argued	 by	 Fox	 and	 Miller-Idriss	(2008a:540),	“most	of	the	time	nationhood	does	not	frame	people’s	understanding	of	themselves,	 their	 interactions	 or	 their	 predicaments”.	 Nations	 are	—	 therefore	 —	often	 taken	 for	 granted	with	 little	 explicit	 attention	 being	 paid	 to	 them	 in	 people’s	everyday	lives	(though	nations	are,	of	course,	in	banal	ways	ever-present).	However,	for	those	whose	national	belonging	may	at	any	given	time	come	under	challenge,	the	nation	seems	consistently	salient	in	everyday	interactions	and	contexts.	Furthermore,	as	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 Scottish	 independence	 referendum	 provided	 an	opportune	moment	 for	 studying	 nationalism	 as	 ‘the	 nation’	was	more	 prominently	discussed	and	reflected	upon.			Overall,	 this	 thesis	has	addressed	the	broad	themes	of	nationalism,	 ‘ethnicity’,	 ‘race’	and	belonging.	Empirically,	as	mentioned,	it	has	used	the	2014	Scottish	independence	referendum	as	a	 focal	point,	but	 the	discussion	has	been	situated	within	a	broader,	post-devolutionary	 context.	Using	 a	 variety	 of	methods,	 this	 thesis	 has	 investigated	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	narratives	are	made	use	of	and	constructed	from	above	by	 political	 elites	 (the	 SNP)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 are	 experienced,	understood	 and	 potentially	 challenged	 from	 below	 by	 ethnic	 minorities	 from	different	 backgrounds.	 The	 backgrounds	 I	 chose	 to	 focus	 on	 are	 African,	 English,	Indian,	Pakistani,	 and	Polish.	Though	 I	 am	aware	of	 the	dangers	of	 such	 ‘groupism’	(Brubaker,	 2002),	 in	 Chapter	 3	 I	 offered	 a	 rationale	 for	 my	 choice	 of	 sample.	Importantly,	 I	 argued	 that	 because	public	 debates	 and	understandings	 surrounding	these	 ‘ethnic	 groups’	 are	 politically	 charged	 in	 different	 ways,	 they	 merit	 closer	inspection.			This	final	concluding	chapter	will,	firstly,	revisit	the	aims	and	research	questions	that	this	 thesis	 sought	 to	 address.	 Secondly,	 I	 will	 consider	 the	 implications	 for	 further	research	in	Scotland	and	beyond.		Thirdly,	this	chapter	will	explain	the	key	arguments	
	255		
that	were	advanced	and	that	arose	from	analysis	of	the	qualitative	data	gathered	for	this	 thesis	 —	 that	 is,	 how	 the	 research	 questions	 were	 answered.	 Finally,	 it	 will	consider	the	analytical	and	methodological	significance	and	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	the	field	of	nationalism	studies,	and	to	understandings	of	how	‘the	nation’	is	linked	to	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity’.					
8.1.	Aims	and	research	questions	revisited			
	I	will	begin	by	returning	to	the	aims	and	research	questions	as	a	brief	reminder.	As	previously	explained,	this	research	was	interested	in	studying	nationalist	narratives	at	 two	 levels:	 that	 is,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 considering	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 and	rhetoric	 are	 constructed,	 developed	 and	 expressed	 in	 Scotland	 from	 above	 by	 the	leading	political	party	in	the	country,	the	SNP,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	exploring	how	ethnic	 minorities	 in	 Scotland	 interpret,	 make	 sense	 of	 and	 possibly	 challenge	 or	embrace	 nationalist	 narratives	 in	 their	 daily	 lives	 and	 experiences.	 Thus,	 both	 the	structural	and	institutionalised	forms	of	the	nationalist	project	 ‘from	above’,	as	well	as	 ethnic	 minorities’	 understandings,	 interpretations,	 and	 contestations	 of	 the	nationalist	narratives	‘from	below’	are	considered.			
The	 first	 substantial	 aim	 was,	 therefore,	 to	 investigate	 the	 post-devolutionary	relationship	 between	 nationalism	 and	 minority	 communities	 within	 Scotland,	considering	 both	 the	 public,	 discursive	 construction	 of	 nationalism	 with	 regard	 to	‘ethnicity’,	 and	 the	 interpretative	and	 formative	responses	of	minority	communities	to	nationalist	projects.	Secondly,	this	research	aims	to	understand	and	investigate	the	legislative,	 institutional	and	structural	contexts	 for	 the	management	and	creation	of	‘the	 Scottish	 nation’	 as	 well	 as	 the	 individual,	 subjective	 understandings	 and	negotiations	of	this	‘nation’.	In	order	to	meet	these	aims,	I	have	been	guided	by	these	research	questions:		
1. How	 have	 different	 projects	 and	 narratives	 of	 nationalism	 been	 imagined,	
mobilised	and	contested	in	the	context	of	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	
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in	particular,	and	in	the	context	of	devolution	more	generally	by	the	SNP?	What	
are	these	narratives’	essential	components?		
	
2. What	 are	 the	 particular	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 public	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 SNP’s	
nationalism	has	addressed	questions	of	 ‘diversity’,	 ‘ethnicity’	and	 ’belonging’	 in	
Scotland;	 how	 has	 it	 addressed	 and	 engaged	with	 ethnic	minorities	 post-1999	
and	in	the	context	of	the	independence	referendum	more	specifically?		
	
3. How,	 if	 at	 all,	 have	 the	 SNP’s	 nationalist	 narratives	 intersected	 with	 the	
formation	 of	 policy	 with	 regard	 to	minority	 communities,	 anti-racism	 and	 so-
called	 ‘race	equality’,	and	with	approaches	to	the	treatment	of	recently	arrived	
migrants?	
	
4. How	 do	 nationalist	 narratives	 contribute	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	
ethnic	minorities,	 if	at	all?	How	do	minority	 communities	 respond	 to,	 interpret	
and	possibly	challenge	nationalist	ideas	and	narratives?		
			
8.2.	Implications	for	further	research		Although	this	research	advanced	a	number	of	key	arguments	and	made	analytical	and	methodological	contributions	(which	I	will	discuss	shortly),	more	remains	to	be	done.	Firstly,	more	work	should	be	done	on	studying	everyday	nationalism	from	racialised	minorities’	 points	 of	 view.	 This	 is,	 I	 believe,	 a	 potentially	 fertile	 angle	 to	 take	 as	exhibited	 by	 authors	 such	 as	 W.E.B.	 Du	 Bois	 in	 America	 (2005[1903]).	 Further	research	 within	 this	 field	 will	 improve	 our	 understandings	 with	 regard	 to	understandings	 and	 articulations	 of	 the	 nation	 in	 the	 everyday.	 For	 example,	 those	ethnic	 minority	 individuals	 who	 are	 more	 recent	 migrants	 to	 their	 country	 of	residence	 may	 be	 more	 attuned	 to	 different	 nationalist	 narratives	 and	 their	significance	in	structuring	their	everyday	experiences	(though	this	may	be	somewhat	counterbalanced	by	what	Sara	Ahmed	(2010)	terms	the	‘happiness	duty’).				Secondly,	the	constantly	evolving	political	landscape	in	Scotland	provides	an	exciting	context	 for	 further	work	 to	 take	place.	 	 It	would	be	worthwhile	 to	 look	 at	how	 the	
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themes	identified	here	continue	to	play	out	and	potentially	shift,	change	and	take	on	new	hues	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Brexit	 vote	 and	 the	 recent	 Conservative	 surge	 in	Scotland	following	the	2017	General	Election.				Finally,	although	I	planned	to	conduct	a	media	analysis	of	newspaper	articles	before,	during,	and	after	the	referendum,	I	could	not	fully	employ	method	due	to	the	time	it	would	take	to	properly	analyse	the	data.	However,	analysing	the	ways	in	which	 ‘the	nation’	 was	 discussed	 in	 news	 stories	 and	 think	 pieces	 during	 the	 referendum	—	especially	in	relation	to	the	themes	of	belonging	and	difference	—	would	be	valuable.	This	is	especially	so	because	of	the	centrality	different	media	play	in	the	circulation	of	nationalist	ideas	(Anderson,	2006).	For	example,	during	the	interviews	most	English	interviewees	 were	 aware	 of	 Jeremy	 Paxman’s	 comments	 with	 regard	 to	 Scots’	supposed	‘hatred	for	the	English’	(Harrison,	2014).	Thus,	a	content	analysis	of	media	sources	and	a	reception	study	of	people’s	understandings	and	experiences	of	media	messages	would	be	of	use.	This	would	help	us	understand	the	role	media	played	 in	circulating	 information	 and	 affecting	 experiences	 and	 understandings	 of	 the	referendum	vis-à-vis	issues	around	‘race’	and	‘ethnicity'.				
8.3.	Key	arguments	In	an	effort	to	answer	the	questions	I	set	for	this	research,	I	have	advanced	a	number	of	overarching	arguments	which	I	will	now	summarise	and	relate	to	one	another.			Firstly,	 in	 Chapter	 1	 I	 highlighted	 my	 commitment	 to	 understanding	 nationalism	within	a	historically	informed	framework.	My	key	underlying	argument	has	been	that	history	is	an	important	symbolic	resource	(Zimmer,	2003)	which	can	be	used	in	ways	that	 serve	 to	 demarcate	 the	 contours	 (who	 does	 (not)	 belong),	 and	 imagine	 the	content	 (nation’s	 ‘spirit’,	 shape,	 and	 character),	 of	 the	 nation.	 In	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5	especially,	I	demonstrated	the	ways	in	which	historical	remembering	(and	forgetting)	—	in	tandem	with	other	symbolic	resources	(notably	values,	heritage	and	culture)	—	occurs	in	the	processes	of	imagining	the	nation.					
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Secondly,	while	the	SNP	and	many	of	the	 ‘expert’	and	 ‘lay’	participants	continued	to	—	both	implicitly	and	explicitly	—	frame	the	SNP’s	nationalism	as	being	of	the	‘civic’	form,	I	have	argued	that	the	civic/ethnic	distinction	is	not	analytically	helpful	due	to	its	 elusiveness	 and	 its	 overlap	with	normative	 judgement.	The	 SNP	 tend	 to	use	 the	label	of	‘civic	nationalism’	as	a	legitimising	tool	to	frame	their	politics	and	nationalist	narratives.	While	 this,	 in	my	 opinion,	 leaves	 the	 concept	 unsound	 as	 a	 category	 of	analysis	 (Brubaker	and	Cooper,	2000)	as	 it	 serves	 the	normative	needs	of	 the	SNP,	this	 has	 notable	 consequences	 for	 the	 ‘race	 equality	 sector’	 in	 Scotland.	 It	 became	evident	 that	 organisations	 working	 in	 the	 field	 of	 ethnic	 minority	 rights	 and	 anti-racism	use	the	SNP’s	self-professed	commitment	to	a	civic	form	of	national	identity	as	leverage.	 That	 is,	 deviation	 from	 the	 supposed	 civic	 agenda	 becomes	 easier	 to	challenge	if	the	SNP	is	seen	to	fall	short	of	their	own	‘standard’.				Thus,	 while	 I	 do	 not	 support	 using	 ‘civic	 nationalism’	 as	 a	 category	 of	 analysis,	understanding	 it	 as	 a	 category	 of	 practice	 (Brubaker	 and	 Cooper,	 2000)	 should	 be	part	of	 the	 research	agenda	 in	 the	 field	of	nationalism	studies.	Drawing	on	Zimmer	(2003),	 it	 is	 important	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 processes	 through	 which,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	which,	nations	come	to	be	imagined,	and	what	symbolic	resources	are	used	in	these	processes.	 Rather	 than	 reifying	 nationalism	 as	 a	 thing,	 nations	 and	 how	 they	 are	constructed	and	narrated	should	be	seen	as	being	in	flux25.	Nationalist	narratives	are	the	 accomplishment	 of	 social	 actors	 from	 above	 and	 below	 who	—	 through	 their	interactions,	 ideas	 and	 actions	 —	 prop	 up,	 reproduce,	 reconstruct,	 and	 challenge	those	existing	narratives.					Notably,	the	SNP	—	as	argued	in	Chapter	4	—	sought	to	steer	clear	of	identity	politics	and	 frame	 the	 referendum	as	addressing	questions	of	 social	 justice	and	democratic	deficit.	Yet,	as	argued	 in	Chapter	5,	 these	 two	tropes	were	 firmly	 linked	 to	 ‘Scottish	values’	and	‘Scottish	exceptionalism’	—	that	is,	‘Scotland’s	values’	were	contrasted	to	‘Westminster	 values’	 and	 Westminster,	 in	 return,	 became	 codified	 as	 ‘English’	 in	everyday	 encounters	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 participants’	 observations.	 As	 such,	 the	SNP’s	 nationalist	 narratives	were	 significantly	 (albeit	 implicitly)	 structured	 around	essentialised	notions	—	drawing	on	notions	of	a	historical	Scots	ethnie	—	of	who	or	
																																																								25	Though,	of	course,	the	context	within	which	the	 ‘nation’	 fluctuates	is	confined	or	 limited	by	social,	historical	and	economic	factors.	That	is,	nations	are	in	flux	within	limits.	
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what	‘we’	are	or	are	not.			Thirdly,	I	also	argued	for	the	importance	of	including	the	voices	of	ethnic	minorities	in	 the	 everyday	 nationalism	 literature.	 Focusing	 on	 ethnic	 minority	 experiences	problematises	the	very	concept	of	the	‘everyday’	and	highlights	the	privilege	of	being	able	 to	move	 through	 everyday	 spaces	 and	 interactions	 in	 an	 unreflective	manner	(Smith,	 2016).	 Interrogating	 how	 ethnic	minorities	make	 sense	 of,	 understand	 and	experience	nationalist	narratives	in	their	everyday	lives	provides	us	with	new	insight:	those	 whose	 national	 membership	 or	 belonging	 may	 come	 under	 challenge	 or	questioning	more	often	bring	the	contours	of	the	nation	into	sharper	view.			Fourthly,	what	became	clear	 through	the	research	 is	 the	 importance	of	 the	national	‘other’,	 which,	 in	 Scotland’s	 case,	 predominantly	 remains	 its	 southern	 neighbour.	During	the	referendum	campaign,	this	difference	was	essentialised	through	the	idea	of	‘national	values’.	The	SNP	were	careful	to	refer	to	Westminster	and	emphasise	the	difference	in	‘Scottish	values’	as	opposed	to	‘Tory’	or	‘Westminster	values’;	however,	as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 participants’	 accounts,	 in	 everyday	 understandings	Westminster	came	to	be	codified	as	 ‘English’.	Those	who	are	English	or	perceived	 to	be	English	(e.g.	Eilidh	due	to	her	accent)	are	often	marked	out	as	other	 in	everyday	interactions,	 and	 all	 English	 (sounding)	 participants	 reported	 having	 experienced	anti-Englishness.	 Importantly,	 this	 otherness	 should	 be	 understood	 through	 the	prism	of	class	—	which,	at	times	becomes	routed	through	a	national	imaginary	—	and	not	as	an	instance	of	racism	as	argued	in	Chapter	6.			Finally,	what	 also	 transpired	was	 the	 difference	 in	 experience	 between	 ‘white’	 and	‘non-white’	 ethnic	 minorities.	 While	 the	 ‘non-white’	 participants	 —	 in	 a	 white	majority	 country	—	were	 often	marked	 out	 as	 different	 in	 everyday	 spaces	 (pubs,	hairdresser’s,	 school	 etc.),	 participants	 from	predominantly	 ‘white’	minority	 groups	could	sometimes	pass	especially	when	they	did	not	speak	and	their	audible	difference	was	not	made	known.	‘Non-white’	participants	reported	a	feeling	of	being	watched	or	stared	 at;	 that	 is,	 they	 were	 the	 objects	 of	 a	 ‘white	 gaze’	 in	 spaces	 where	 their	presence	 was	 questioned.	 Here,	 it	 was	 thus	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 issue	 of	
inconspicuousness	 and	 the	 different	 tools	 and	 resources	 that	 the	 participants	 were	
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able	 to	 mobilise	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 ‘fit	 in’	 or	 go	 unnoticed	 (e.g.	 anglicising	 children’s	names).	 Importantly,	 the	 geographical	 context	played	a	 crucial	 part	here:	 rural	 and	urban	 spaces	 were	 interpreted	 and	 experienced	 in	 different	 ways.	 These	interpretations	were	both	based	on	past	experience	(e.g.	Padma	walking	to	a	 ‘white	working	man’s	pub’	where	she	did	not	feel	welcome)	and	on	perception	(e.g.	Farnod	suggesting	he	would	not	be	as	welcome	in	the	Highlands	as	he	is	in	Glasgow).					Importantly,	while	‘white’	participants	may	be	able	to	‘pass’	or	remain	inconspicuous	in	certain	situations,	 this	does	not	mean	that	 they	escape	processes	of	racialisation.	The	Polish	participants	reported	very	distressing	experiences	of	racism,	and	Stefania	explained	she	felt	 like	she	was	being	 ‘watched’	 in	the	small	town	she	lives	 in	where	many	people	know	she	is	Polish:		
And	I	 like	 to	 just	mix	 in	 the	crowds,	 I	actually	enjoy	being,	you	know,	 in	places	
where	I	-	-	which	are	very	crowded.	‘Cause	I	find	myself	most,	you	know,	when	I’m	
in	 a	 crowded	 place,	 when	 it’s	 [huge?]	 like.	 I	 sometimes	 feel	 like..I’m	 kind	 of	
stalked	be-	-	because	I’m	kind	of	watched	so	closely.			Thus,	 in	 Stefania’s	 case,	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 othering	 ‘gaze’	 also	 surfaces.	 She	 found	 it	“difficult”	 to	 live	 in	 the	 town	 because	 there	 “seems	 to	 be	 a	 lot	 of	 stereotyping”	 as	regards	 Polish	 people.	 Thus,	 while	 it	 is	 important	 to	 account	 for	 the	 differences	between	‘white’	and	‘non-white’	participants,	it	is	important	not	to	fall	into	the	trap	of	essentialism.	Furthermore,	whether	someone	is	seen	or	regarded	as	 ‘white’	or	 ‘non-white’	 can	 also	 change	 depending	 on	 the	 social	 and	 historical	 context,	 or	 on	 the	person	looking.						
8.4.	The	contribution	and	significance	of	this	thesis	So,	what	is	the	significance	of	this	particular	piece	of	research?	What	was	noticeable	during	the	Khan/Heuchan	incident	discussed	in	Chapter	1	was	the	deafening	silence	from	the	SNP	on	the	matter.	The	debate	that	ensued	on	the	pages	of	The	Guardian	and	
The	Herald,	 among	 other	 papers,	 offered	 an	 excellent	 opportunity	 for	 the	 party	 to	address	 the	 relationship	between	nationalism,	 ‘race’,	 ‘ethnicity’	 and	racism.	Yet,	 the	SNP	and	its	key	figures	decided	to	remain	almost	silent	aside	from	a	few	soundbites	from	an	SNP	spokesperson	and	Nicola	Sturgeon	briefly	challenging	Khan’s	comments.	
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However,	 no	 extended	 discussion	 ensued;	 such	 a	 discussion	would	 have	 been	 very	welcome	 as	 academics	 (Donald	 et	 al,	 1995;	 Dimeo	 and	 Finn,	 2001),	 as	 well	 as	practitioners,	have	long	commented	on	the	prevalent	‘no	problem	here’	attitude	vis-à-vis	‘race’	and	racism	in	Scotland.			Thus,	the	myth	of	Scottish	exceptionalism	holds	its	ground	(though	recent	literature	(Davidson	et	al,	2018)	is	addressing	and	challenging	it).	As	we	have	seen,	the	idea	of	Scotland	being	somehow	fairer,	more	progressive	or	more	socialist/leftist	—	an	idea	that	was	 vocalised	 by	 both	 the	 SNP	 political	 elite	 as	well	 as	 the	 participants	—	 in	comparison	 to	 England	 has	 limited	 empirical	 validity;	 while	 there	 are	 some	differences	 in	 social	 attitudes	with	 regard	 to	wealth	 redistribution,	 for	 example	 (as	was	 established	 in	 Chapter	 5),	 the	 gap	 between	 England	 and	 Scotland	 is	 relatively	small		(Curtice	and	Ormston,	2011).	What	is	crucial,	however,	is	the	staying	power	—	and,	 by	 extension,	 the	 structuring	power	—	of	 this	myth.	 Further,	 egalitarianism	 is	often	 depicted	 as	 an	 inherent	 quality	 of	 Scotland	 and	 the	 Scots	 (i.e.	 that	 Scots	 are	more	progressive	‘by	nature’)	through	corporeal,	organic	analogies	such	as	the	idea	of	“fairness	run[ning]	through	Scotland	like	a	vein”	(The	SNP,	2011:16).	This	depiction,	in	turn,	raises	important	and	interesting	questions	in	terms	of	how	the	myth	occludes	a	 proper	 reckoning	with	 the	 in-egalitarian	 and	often	oppressive	 aspects	 of	 Scottish	history	and	present.				The	 importance	 of	 challenging	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 of	 Scottish	 exceptionalism	cannot	be	overstated.	It	is	important	to	give	credit	to	the	SNP	where	credit	is	due:	at	a	time	when	inflammatory,	xenophobic	and	racist	remarks	in	relation	to	migration	and	racialised	 minorities	 are	 part	 of	 our	 political	 everyday	 life,	 the	 positive	 rhetoric	emanating	 from	 the	 current	 Scottish	government	 in	 relation	 to	migration	has	 to	be	commended.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	ethnic	minorities	in	Scotland	are	more	likely	to	describe	 themselves	Scottish	compared	 to	ethnic	minorities	 in	England	(who	are	less	likely	to	describe	themselves	English)	(Simpson	&	Smith,	2014).	However,	at	the	same	time,	this	cannot	 lead	to	complacency	—	there	is	a	 long	way	to	go	in	terms	of	eradicating	 racism	 and	 racial	 inequality	 in	 Scotland.	 Further,	 this	 positive	 rhetoric	needs	to	be	understood	within	the	Scottish	neoliberal	context	and	in	relation	to	class	—	what	kinds	of	migrants	does	 the	SNP	welcome	and	envisage	as	making	Scotland	
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their	home?	The	myth	of	Scotland	as	friendlier,	more	inclusive	and	more	welcoming	makes	 for	 a	powerful	narrative	—	but	 it	 is	 important	 to	point	out	 the	 complexities	and	contradictions	as	well	 as	 silences	 inherent	 in	 these	particular	narrations	of	 the	Scottish	nation.				These	complexities	and	contradictions	are,	firstly,	interesting	from	an	academic	point	of	 view	 as	 we	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 nationalist	 narratives	 are	constructed	and	what	kind	of	work	 they	 are	 then	harnessed	 to	do	by	 social	 actors.	This	thesis	has	sought	to	make	a	contribution	to	literature	on	nationalism	in	Scotland	specifically,	and	to	the	field	of	nationalism	studies	more	broadly.	Importantly,	 it	has	brought	 the	 elite	 discourses	 of	 the	 SNP	 in	 conversation	 with	 minorities’	understandings	 and	 experiences	 from	 below	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 build	 a	 more	comprehensive	picture	of	 the	ways	 in	which	nationalist	narratives	are	drawn	upon,	understood	and	challenged.	Ethnic	minority	voices	have	been	largely	invisible	in	the	literature	on	everyday	nationalism,	and	the	data	addressed	in	Chapter	6	begins	to	fill	in	this	gap.	Especially	in	relation	to	studies	on	nationalism	within	the	Scottish	context,	this	 research	 has	 added	 to	 knowledge	 by	 moving	 beyond	 the	 largely	 quantitative	analyses	of	the	Edinburgh	School	to	a	more	nuanced	and	growing	field	of	qualitative	investigation	 regarding	 nationalism	 in	 Scotland.	 Importantly,	 as	 explained,	 the	referendum	provided	a	favourable	moment	to	study	nationalism	as	the	edges	of	the	nation	became	more	visible	(Fox,	2017).	Being	able	to	track	and	dissect	the	debates	and	 reactions	 to	 these	as	 they	were	happening,	 is	 a	unique	 feature	of	 this	 research	project.				Analytically,	 the	 findings	 reinforce	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 ‘other’	 for	 nationalist	narratives.	 While	 elite	 political	 discourses	 continuously	 framed	 ‘Westminster’	 as	Scotland’s	‘significant	other’	from	above,	in	everyday	encounters	and	understandings	Westminster	 became	 coded	 as	 ‘England’	 and	 ‘Englishness’.	 This,	 therefore,	 offers	insight	into	the	ways	in	which	ruling	relations	are	interpreted	on	the	ground	and	how	these	 understandings,	 in	 turn,	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 and	 come	 to	 shape	 and	 structure	everyday	 interactions.	 ‘National	 values’	were	a	 critical	 element	within	 this	 framing:	while	 some	 commentators	 (Norman,	 1995;	 Kymlicka,	 1996a)	 have	 argued	 against	understanding	 values	 as	 building	 blocks	 of	 nationalist	 narratives,	 my	 findings	
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demonstrate	the	centrality	of	values	to	processes	of	national	imaginings.			This	 thesis	 also	 offers	 new	 analytical	 insights	 into	 understandings	 of	 the	 everyday.	The	 findings	 support	 Smith’s	 (2016)	 claim	 that	 the	 capacity	 to	 experience	 the	everyday	as	unreflective	is	a	privilege	—	that	is,	the	participants	were	(made)	aware	of	 their	differences	or	qualified	belonging	 in	 various	 everyday	 spaces	 and	 contexts.	Thus,	while	the	referendum	provided	a	‘hyper-nationalist’	context	in	that	the	‘nation’	was	more	actively	and	consciously	reflected	upon	in	general,	the	difference	to	ethnic	minorities’	 (non-referendum	 related)	 everyday	 experiences	 was	 not	 particularly	striking.	Thus,	I	argued	that	the	nation	merely	became	louder	during	the	referendum.	Further,	I	also	drew	attention	to	the	deeply	affective	quality	of	nationalist	narratives,	and	the	ways	in	which	they	make	people	feel.	The	relationship	between	emotions	and	nationalism	has	long	been	ignored	in	literature	despite	nationalism	evoking	feelings	such	as	a	sense	of	“self-sacrificing	love”	for	your	country	(Anderson,	2006:	145).				Finally,	 this	 research	 is	 also	 important	 from	 an	 anti-racist	 viewpoint:	 if	 racism,	prejudice	 and	 discrimination	 are	 understood	 and	 portrayed	 as	 going	 against	 ‘an	egalitarian	Scottish	nature’,	such	understandings	risk	silencing	the	voices	of	racialised	minorities	 in	 Scotland.	 Thus,	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 anti-racist	 cause,	 it	 is	paramount	to	keep	critically	engaging	with	nationalist	narratives	and	uncovering	the	ways	in	which	they	overlap,	intersect,	inform	and	are	informed	by	understandings	of	‘race’	 and	 ‘ethnicity’.	 Importantly,	 and	 linked	 to	 this,	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	stressed	that	nationalist	narratives	are	not	only	about	‘storying’	the	nation.	The	ways	in	which	nations	are	imagined	and	narrated	carry	material	and	psychic	consequences	for	 the	 people	 within	 and	 outwith	 their	 borders.	 Understanding	 the	 processes	 of	nationalism	 and	 the	 different	 layers	 (public	 official	 discourses;	 the	 everyday)	 is	important	because	understanding	how	and	where	national	borders	are	being	drawn,	and	how	these	may	 fluctuate	over	 time,	helps	us	understand	and	map	out	what	 the	political,	 economic	 and	 social,	material	 and	 immaterial	 consequences	 of	 nationalist	narratives	are.						
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APPENDIX	I		Information	sheet	for	‘experts’		
Information	Sheet			
1.	Study	title		
Nationalism,	Devolution	and	Ethnic	Identity	in	Scotland	
	
2.	Invitation	paragraph		 	My	name	is	Minna	Liinpää	and	I	am	currently	doing	a	PhD	in	Sociology	at	the	University	of	Glasgow.	You	are	being	invited	to	take	part	in	a	research	study,	but	before	you	decide	to	take	part,	it	is	important	for	you	to	understand	why	the	research	is	being	done	and	what	it	will	involve.	Please	take	time	to	read	the	 following	 information	 carefully	 and	 discuss	 it	with	 others	 if	 you	wish.	 Please	 do	 not	 hesitate	 to	contact	me	should	you	have	any	further	questions.		Thank	you	for	reading	this.			
	
3.	What	is	the	purpose	of	the	study?	Taking	 place	 in	 the	 run-up	 to,	 and	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of,	 the	 Scottish	 independence	referendum,	 this	 study	 aims	 to	 find	 out	 how	 individuals	 from	 different	 ethnic	minority	 backgrounds	 engage	 with,	 interpret	 and	 experience	 the	 referendum	campaigns,	debates	 and	 the	 rhetoric	 surrounding	 it.	 In	 addition,	 I	 also	want	 to	 find	out	 how	 stakeholders	 working	 for	 different	 organisations,	 political	 parties	 and	campaigns	make	 sense	 of	 the	 referendum	 debate	with	 regard	 to	 ethnic	minorities.	Therefore,	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 build	 a	 broader	 picture	 of	 how	 the	referendum	debate	engages	with	and	is,	in	turn,	responded	to	by	people	from	various	ethnic	 backgrounds.	 Through	 this	 study	 I	 aim	 to	 improve	 our	 knowledge	 of	 how	nationalism,	diversity	and	belonging	interact,	what	their	relationship	is	like,	and	what	possible	problems	and	challenges	might	arise.			
	
4.	Why	have	I	been	chosen?	You	have	been	chosen	to	take	part	in	this	research	because	of	your	expertise	and	active	engagement	in	the	field	of	ethnic	minority	rights	and	representation	and/or	the	referendum	debate.				
	
5.	Do	I	have	to	take	part?	Participation	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	it	is	absolutely	down	to	you	whether	you	want	to	take	part	in	the	study.	 I	would,	of	course,	be	most	grateful	 for	your	input	 in	helping	me	to	complete	the	research	which	I	hope	will	benefit	the	wider	community	by	offering	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	issues	discussed	above.	You	 can	withdraw	at	 any	 time	without	 giving	 a	 reason,	 and	you	will	 not	have	 to	 answer	 any	questions	you	do	not	wish	to.		
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6.	What	will	happen	to	me	if	I	take	part?	Your	participation	would	involve	taking	part	in	an	interview	lasting	for	about	an	hour.	The	interview	would	 take	 place	 at	 a	 mutually	 convenient	 time	 and	 at	 a	 mutually	 convenient	 location.	 With	 your	consent	the	interview	would	be	audio	recorded.	
	
7.	Will	my	taking	part	in	this	study	be	kept	confidential?	I	will	treat	all	information	confidentially.	Any	documents	stating	your	name	will	be	stored	in	a	locked	cabinet,	 and	 all	 computer	 files	will	 be	 protected	 by	 a	 password.	Any	documents	 or	 files	mentioning	your	name	will	 be	 stored	 separately	 from	 the	data	 in	order	 to	 further	guarantee	 confidentiality	 and	anonymity.	Once	 the	research	process	 is	 finished,	 I	will	delete	all	 computer	 files	and	shred	any	hard	copies	 I	might	have	 that	state	your	name	or	other	personal	 information.	 I	have	 the	right	 to	keep	the	interview	data	(but	not	any	personal	information)	for	up	to	ten	years.			All	data	will	be	accessible	to	me	and	my	two	supervisors	only.	As	part	of	the	data	analysis	process,	 I	will	transcribe	the	interview,	and	I	will	use	pseudonyms	throughout	the	transcription	process	–	thus,	you	 will	 not	 be	 identified	 in	 any	 of	 the	 data	 arising	 from	 the	 research.	 I	 must,	 however,	 note	 that	although	I	will	protect	your	identity,	I	cannot	guarantee	that	someone	will	not	be	able	to	recognise	you	by	what	you	say,	for	example.		
	
8.	What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?	Following	the	completion	of	the	research,	I	will	include	and	analyse	the	findings	in	my	thesis.	I	would	be	more	than	happy	to	provide	you	with	a	copy	of	it,	should	you	wish	to	read	it.	The	findings	might	also	be	discussed	in	potential	articles	in	academic	journals	or	in	papers	presented	at	academic	conferences.	I	would,	of	course,	 respect	confidentiality	and	your	anonymity	 in	any	possible	articles	or	conference	papers	by	using	pseudonyms	throughout.			
9.	Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?		My	PhD	is	funded	by	the	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	(ESRC)	in	collaboration	with	Centre	on	Dynamics	of	Ethnicity	(CoDE).	
	
	
10.	Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	In	order	to	conduct	research,	I	have	obtained	an	ethical	approval	from	the	University	of	Glasgow	Social	&	Political	Sciences	Ethics	Committee.		
	
11.	Contact	for	Further	Information		Should	 you	 wish	 to	 ask	 further	 questions,	 or	 volunteer	 to	 be	 a	 participant,	 please	 contact	 me	 at	m.liinpaa.1@research.gla.ac.uk.			
	Should	 you	 have	 any	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 research	 project,	 you	 can	 contact	 the	College	 of	 Social	 Sciences	 Ethics	 Officer	 by	 contacting	 Dr	 Muir	 Houston	 at	Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk.	 You	 can	 also	 contact	 my	 first	 supervisor	 Dr	 Andrew	 Smith	 at	Andrew.Smith.2@glasgow.ac.uk.	
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	 APPENDIX	II		Information	sheet	for	voters		
	
Plain	Language	Statement			
1.	Study	title		
Nationalism,	Devolution	and	Ethnic	Identity	in	Scotland	
	
2.	Invitation	paragraph		 	My	name	is	Minna	Liinpää	and	I	am	currently	doing	a	PhD	in	Sociology	at	the	University	of	Glasgow.	You	are	being	invited	to	take	part	in	a	research	study,	but	before	you	decide	to	take	part,	it	is	important	for	you	to	understand	why	the	research	is	being	done	and	what	it	will	involve.	Please	take	time	to	read	the	 following	 information	 carefully	 and	 discuss	 it	with	 others	 if	 you	wish.	 Please	 do	 not	 hesitate	 to	contact	me	should	you	have	any	further	questions.		Thank	you	for	reading	this.			
	
3.	What	is	the	purpose	of	the	study?	Taking	 part	 in	 the	 run-up	 to,	 and	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of,	 the	 Scottish	 independence	referendum,	 this	 study	 aims	 to	 find	 out	 how	 individuals	 from	 different	 ethnic	minority	 backgrounds	 engage	 with,	 interpret	 and	 experience	 the	 referendum	campaigns,	debates	and	 the	 language	surrounding	 it.	Therefore,	 the	purpose	of	 this	study	is	to	build	a	broader	picture	of	how	the	referendum	debate	engages	with	and	is,	in	turn,	responded	to	by	people	from	various	ethnic	backgrounds.	Through	this	study	I	aim	to	improve	our	knowledge	of	how	nationalism,	diversity	and	belonging	interact,	what	 their	 relationship	 is	 like,	 and	 what	 possible	 problems	 and	 challenges	 might	arise.			
	
4.	Why	have	I	been	chosen?	You	have	been	chosen	to	take	part	in	this	research	because	I	am	interested	in	your	personal	views	and	opinions,	 and	 I	 want	 to	 hear	 about	 your	 thoughts	 and	 experiences	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 referendum	debate.			
	
5.	Do	I	have	to	take	part?	Participation	is	voluntary,	and	it	is	absolutely	up	to	you	to	decide	whether	you	want	to	take	part	in	the	study.	I	would,	of	course,	be	most	grateful	for	your	input	in	helping	me	complete	the	research	which	I	hope	will	benefit	the	wider	community	by	offering	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	issues	discussed	above..	
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You	can	withdraw	at	any	time	without	giving	a	reason,	and	you	will	not	have	to	answer	any	questions	you	do	not	wish	to.			
	
6.	What	will	happen	to	me	if	I	take	part?	Your	participation	would	involve	taking	part	in	an	interview	lasting	between	one	and	two	hours.	The	interview	would	take	place	at	a	mutually	convenient	time	and	at	a	mutually	convenient	location.	With	your	consent	the	discussion	would	be	audio	recorded.	
	
7.	Will	my	taking	part	in	this	study	be	kept	confidential?	I	will	treat	all	information	confidentially.	Any	documents	stating	your	name	will	be	stored	in	a	locked	cabinet,	 and	 all	 computer	 files	will	 be	 protected	 by	 a	 password.	Any	documents	 or	 files	mentioning	your	name	will	 be	 stored	 separately	 from	 the	data	 in	order	 to	 further	 guarantee	 confidentiality	 and	anonymity.	Once	 the	research	process	 is	 finished,	 I	will	delete	all	 computer	 files	and	shred	any	hard	copies	 I	might	have	 that	state	your	name	or	other	personal	 information.	 I	have	 the	right	 to	keep	the	data	arising	from	the	interview	(but	not	any	personal	information)	for	up	to	ten	years.	All	data	will	be	accessible	to	me	and	my	two	supervisors	only.	As	part	of	the	data	analysis	process,	I	will	transcribe	the	interview,	 and	 I	 will	 use	 pseudonyms	 throughout	 the	 transcription	 process	 –	 thus,	 you	 will	 not	 be	identified	in	any	of	the	data	arising	from	the	research.		
	
8.	What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?	Following	the	completion	of	the	research,	I	will	include	and	analyse	the	findings	in	my	thesis.	I	would	be	more	than	happy	to	provide	you	with	a	copy	of	it,	should	you	wish	to	read	it.	The	findings	might	also	be	discussed	in	potential	articles	in	academic	journals	or	in	papers	presented	at	academic	conferences.	I	would,	of	course,	 respect	confidentiality	and	your	anonymity	 in	any	possible	articles	or	conference	papers	by	using	pseudonyms	throughout.				
9.	Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?		My	PhD	is	funded	by	the	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	(ESRC)	in	collaboration	with	Centre	on	Dynamics	of	Ethnicity	(CoDE).	
	
	
10.	Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	In	order	to	conduct	research,	I	have	obtained	an	ethical	approval	from	the	University	of	Glasgow	Social	&	Political	Sciences	Ethics	Committee.		
	
11.	Contact	for	Further	Information		Should	 you	 wish	 to	 ask	 further	 questions,	 or	 volunteer	 to	 be	 a	 participant,	 please	 contact	 me	 at	m.liinpaa.1@research.gla.ac.uk.			
	Should	 you	 have	 any	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 research	 project,	 you	 can	 contact	 the	College	 of	 Social	 Sciences	 Ethics	 Officer	 by	 contacting	 Dr	 Muir	 Houston	 at	Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk.		
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		 APPENDIX	III		Sample26	interview	schedule	for	‘expert’	interviews			
• Can	you	tell	me	a	bit	about	yourself	?	
• How	did	you	come	to	be	involved	in	politics	and	the	Yes	campaign?	
• What	was	your	take	on	the	independence	debate	and	the	different	campaigns	in	the	run	up	to	the	referendum?	
• Can	 you	 tell	me	 a	 bit	more	 about	 the	 no	 campaign	 and	 your	 experiences	 of	being	part	of	it?	
o How	has	 your	 campaign	 been	 received	 generally	 -	 both	 by	 the	wider	Yes	Campaign	and	by	the	public?	
• Did	 the	 different	 independence	 campaigns	 engage	 with	 ethnic	 minority	communities?	
o How	(not)?	
o Could	they	have	done	anything	else?	
• In	your	opinion,	was	the	referendum	debate	inclusive	of	everyone	in	Scotland?	How	(not)?		
o If	it	wasn’t,	why	not?	What	is	the	effect	of	that?	
o If	it	was,	what	is	the	effect	of	that?	
• Is	 there	 a	 difference	 in	 the	way	 in	which	Better	Together	 and	 the	Yes	 camp	took	minority	communities	into	account	or	engaged	with	them?		
o If	yes,	in	what	ways?	
• What	if	we	turn	it	around	-	do	you	think	minority	communities	were	engaging	with	the	debate?			
o Yes:	How?		What	does	that	tell	you?	
o No:	Why	not?	What	might	have	stopped	them?	
• One	 thing	 that	 has	 been	 assigned	 to	 the	 Yes	 campaign	 was	 the	 grassroots	engagement;	did	you	see	similar	patterns	emerging	on	the	No	side?	
• Why	did	we	 see	 a	 proliferation	 of	minority	 Yes	 groups?	 (e.g.	 SAFI,	 Poles	 for	Yes,	AFIS…)	
																																																								26	The	questions	varied	slightly	depending	on	who	was	interviewed	(Yes	or	No	campaigner;	political	party	representative	etc.)	
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• Do	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 minority	 communities	 were	 involved	 in	 the	independence	debate	 tell	 anything	about	 their	wider	position	 in	 the	Scottish	society,	over	time?	
• There	has	been	talk	about	whether	this	debate	is	about	the	head	or	the	heart…	Has	 the	 referendum	 debate	 and	 the	 independence	 campaign	 been	 about	identity	at	all?	
• What	 do	 you	make	 of	 statements	 such	 as	 that	made	 by	 Jeremy	 Paxman	 re:	Scottish	independence	is	fuelled	by	‘hatred’	for	England?	
o Is	there	anti-Englishness	in	Scotland?	If	yes:	how	does	it	manifest	itself?	
• How	do	you	hope	to	see	Scotland	move	forward	now	that	the	campaigns	are	over	and	the	result	is	out?	
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APPENDIX	IV		Interview	schedule	for	voters’	interviews			 1. Can	you	tell	me	a	bit	about	yourself?	2. What	is	it	like	to	live	in	Scotland?	3. What	did	you	think	of	the	referendum	campaigns?	4. What	about	people	close	to	you	–	how	did	they	view	the	debate?	5. Did	you	engage	with	the	referendum?	a. 	In	what	ways?		b. Why	not?	6. In	your	opinion,	what	were	the	key	issues	being	discussed	and	debated	during	the	campaigns?		7. What	do	you	think	decided	the	result	of	the	referendum	vote?	8. [If	it	doesn’t’	come	up:]	Did	ideas	around	identity	feature	in	the	debates	and	campaigns	at	all?	9. What	about	nationalism	–	did	it	play	a	part	in	them?	10. What	do	you	understand	by	‘nationalism’?	11. 	Can	nationalism	be	observed	in	Scotland?	a. In	what	ways?	What	is	the	impact	of	it?	b. Why	not?	12. Who	is	‘Scottish’?	What	does	‘being	Scottish’	mean?	13. How	would	you	describe	yourself?	(In	terms	of	how	you	identify	yourself?)	14. What	kinds	of	things	affect	the	ways	in	which	you	see	yourself?																
	271		
APPENDIX	V	Details	of	participants		
Voters	and	campaigners	
(“C”	after	the	name	denotes	a	campaigner)	
	
Name	 Date	of	
Interview	
Background	 Gender/	
Age	
Occupation	 Yes/No	
voter	John	(C)	
	
29.7.2014	 English	 M/31	 Councillor	 Yes	Najuma	(C)	 17.10.2014	 English	 F/30	 Student	 No	Pietr	(C)	 19.11.2014	 Polish	 M/31	 Healthcare	worker	 Yes	Odogwu	(C)	 19.11.2014	 Nigeria	 M/36	 University	student	 Yes	Marissa	 21.11.2014	 English	 F/28	 University	student	 No	Rachel	 10.12.2014	 English	 F/33	 Development	Officer	 Yes	Jim	(C)	 18.12.2014	 Scottish	 M/48	 Trade	unionist	 No	Tom	 14.1.2015	 English	 M/Age		unknown	 Teacher	 No	Agnieszka	 21.2.2015	 Polish	 F/25	 University	student	 Yes	Paula	 25.2.2015	 English	 F/21	 University	student	 No	Lukasz	 26.2.2015	 Polish	 M/21	 College	student;	works	as	a	cleaner	
Yes	
Noor	 26.2.2015	 Scottish-Indian	 F/45	 Teacher	 Yes	George	 27.2.2015	 English	 M/28	 Stock	room	worker	 Yes	Eilidh	 17.3.2015	 Guernsey	 F/54	 Social	worker	 No	Chalwe	 22.4.2015	 Zambian	 M/46	 University	student;	works	at	an	office	
No	
Violet	 22.4.2015	 Zambian	 F/40	 University	student	 No	Farnod	 23.4.2015	 Iranian	 M/39	 Land	surveyor	 Didn’t	have		a	vote.	Mary	 23.4.2015	 Kenyan	 F/46	 Works	in	 No	
	272		
housing	Stefania	 24.4.2015	 Polish	 F/32	 College	student	 No	Catherine	 30.4.2015	 Nigerian	 F/32	 University	student	 Didn’t	vote	but	would	have	voted	no.	Towela	 1.5.2015	 Zambian	 F/19	 College	student	
	
Didn’t	vote.	Murtaza	 21.5.2015	 Scottish-Pakistani	 M/39	 Stay-at-home	dad.	 Yes.	Padma	 5.6.2015	 Indian	 F/36	 Works	in	the	third	sector.	 Didn’t	vote.	Rahul	 6.8.2015	 Scottish-Indian	 M/28	 University	student	 No	Ahsan	 7.9.2015	 Pakistani	 M/38	 Works	in	a	shop;	drives	a	cab;	studies.	
Didn’t	disclose.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Practitioners	
	
Code	 Date	of	interview	 Gender	 Role	in	
organsation	Practitioner	1	 8.8.2014	 Male	 CEO	Practitioner	2	 8.8.2014	 Female	 Policy	officer	Practitioner	3	 20.8.2014	 Male	 CEO	Practitioner	4	 26.8.2014	 Male	 Race	equality	mainstreaming	officer	Practitioner	5	 8.9.2014	 Male	 Policy	officer	
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APPENDIX	VI	Details	of	SNP	speeches	analysed	
	
FM	Launch	of	National	Conversation	White	Paper	(30/11/2009)	Available	at:	http://www.gov.scot/News/Speeches/Speeches/First-Minister/whitepaper	[Accessed	18/3/2015]			
FM	Alex	Salmond:	Scotland's	Place	in	the	World	(25/01/2012)		Available	at:	https://www.snp.org/speech/2012/jan/scotlands-place-world				[Accessed	4/9/2014]		
DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon:	Claim	of	Right	(26/1/2012)	Available	at:	http://www.snp.org/speech/2012/jan/claim-right	[Accessed	18/3/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond	gives	his	Spring	Conference	address	(23/3/2013)	http://snp.org/speech/2013/mar/first-minister-alex-salmond-gives-his-spring-conference-2013-address	[Accessed	9/4/2014]		
DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon:	Spring	Conference	address	(23/3/2013)	Available	at:	https://www.snp.org/speech/2013/mar/nicola-sturgeon-msp-spring-conference-address-2013	[Accessed	4/9/2014]		
Fiona	Hyslop	(Culture	Secretary):	Past,	Present	&	Future:	Culture	&	Heritage	in	
an	Independent	Scotland	(5/6/2013)	Available	at:	http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Culture-Heritage	05062013	[Accessed	1/5/2015]	
Fiona	Hyslop	(Cabinet	Secretary	for	Culture	and	External	Affairs)	Speech	to	the	
Descendants	of	the	Signers	of	the	(US)	Declaration	of	Independence	(4/7/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Speech-to-the-	Descendants-of-the-Signers-of-the-US-Declaration-of-Independence-e.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2014]	
FM	Alex	Salmond:	The	Currency	Union	(16/7/2013)		Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/The-Currency-Union-523.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond:	Defence	Union	through	NATO	(25/7/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Defence-Union-through-NATO-524.aspx		[Accessed	10/3/2014]	
FM	Alex	Salmond:	The	European	Union	(21/8/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/The-European-Union-527.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]	
FM	Alex	Salmond:	Social	Union	and	the	Union	of	the	Crowns	(28/8/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Social-Union-and-the-Union-of-the-Crowns-529.aspx	[Accessed	3/10/2014]	
FM	Alex	Salmond:	Independence	from	the	Political	and	Economic	Union	
(2/9/2013)	
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Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Independence-from-the-Political-and-Economic-Union-52d.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]			
FM	Alex	Salmond	-	Scotland	and	China:	Wealth	and	Wellbeing	of	Nations	
(5/11/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Scotland-and-China-Wealth-and-Wellbeing-of-Nations-5dd.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]			
FM	Alex	Salmond	-	Scotland	and	China:	Wealth	and	Wellbeing	of	Nations	
(5/11/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Scotland-and-China-Wealth-and-Wellbeing-of-Nations-5dd.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]			
FM	Alex	Salmond	speech	to	the	FT	International	Financial	Centers	(7/11/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-s-speech-to-the-FT-International-Financial-Centers-5eb.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]			
FM	Alex	Salmond	speech	to	the	FT	International	Financial	Centers	(7/11/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-s-speech-to-the-FT-International-Financial-Centers-5eb.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]			
DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon	-	speech	to	the	Institute	of	Charted	Accountants	of	
Scotland	(22/11/2013)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Speech-to-the-Institute-of-Chartered-Accountants-of-Scotland-697.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]				
DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon's	speech	to	the	David	Hume	Institute	(15/1/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Keynote-speech-to-the-David-Hume-Institute-848.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]			
FM	Alex	Salmond	Business	for	Scotland	speech	(17/2/2014)	Available	at:	http://www.news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-Speech-February-17-2014-95a.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond:	'Scotland's	Future	in	Scotland's	Hands'	(New	Statesman	
Lecture	in	London)	(4/3/2014)	Available	at:	http://www.news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-New-Stesman-lecture-a0f.aspx	[Accessed	10/3/2014]			FM	Alex	Salmond	speech	at	Bannockburn	visitor	centre	(28/3/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Fisrt-Minister-speech-at-Bannockburn-visitor-centre-a1b.aspx	[Accessed	22/4/2014]		
Fiona	Hyslop	(External	Affairs	Secretary):	What	Perspectives	for	an	
Independent	Scotland?	(3/4/2014)	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/-What-perspectives-for-an-independent-Scotland-b1f.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]				
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FM	Alex	Salmond	speech	at	Glasgow	Caledonian	University	(New	York	Campus)	
(7/4/2014)	Available	at:		http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Alex-Salmond-in-New-York-Glasgow-Caledonian-Univeristy-Speech-April-7-2014-b45.aspx	[Accessed22/4/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond's	SNP	Conference	address	(12/4/2014)	Available	at:	http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2014/apr/first-ministe-alex-salmond-snp-conference-address		[Accessed	27/5/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond's	Speech	to	the	Scottish	Trades	Union	Congress	(15/4/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-speech-to-2014-Scottish-Trades-Union-Congress-b86.aspx	[Accessed	16/7/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond's	George's	Day	Speech	(23/4/2014)	Available	at:	:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-St-George-s-Day-2014-speech-bbf.aspx[Accessed	16/7/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond:	Scotland's	Place	in	Europe	(28/4/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Scotland-s-Place-in-Europe-bdf.aspx	[Accessed	16/7/2014]		
Fiona	Hyslop	(Cabinet	Secretary	for	Culture	and	External	Affairs	)	Royal	
Television	Society	Speech	(21/5/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Royal-Television-Society-Speech-cbe.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]			
DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon:	All-Female	Cabinet	Speech	(9/6/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/All-female-cabinet-speech-d5b.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]			
FM	Alex	Salmond	speech	at	Oil	and	Gas	UK	conference	(11/6/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Oil-and-Gas-UK-Conference-d8c.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]				
DFM	Nicola	Sturgeon:	The	Constitutional	Future	of	an	Independent	Scotland	
(16/6/2017)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/The-constitutional-future-of-an-independent-Scotland-dbd.aspx	[Accessed	16/7/2014]		
FM	Alex	Salmond	at	the	Royal	Highland	Show	(19/6/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Royal-Highland-Show-df7.aspx	[Accessed	16/7/2014]	
	
FM	Alex	Salmond's	Speech:	International	Festival	for	Business	(17/7/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-Speech-International-Festival-for-Business.ec6.aspx	[Accessed	21/8/2014]	
	
Cabinet	Secretary	for	Culture	and	External	Affairs,	Fiona	Hyslop:	The	Future	for	
Culture	in	Scotland	(18/7/2014)	
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Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/The-future-for-culture-in-Scotland-ed6.aspx	[Accessed	16/9/2016]		
Humza	Yousaf:	Beyond	the	Games:	Living	the	Values	-	Humanity,	Equality,	
Destiny	(21/7/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Beyond-the-Games-Living-the-Values-Humanity-Equality-Destiny-f2e.aspx#downloads	[Accessed	21/8/2014]		
FM	outlines	'opportunity	of	a	lifetime'	of	Yes	(18/8/2014)	Available	at:	http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2014/aug/fm-outlines-opportunity-lifetime-yes	[Accessed	18/3/2015]		
FM	Alex	Salmond	on	Referendum	Outcome	(19/9/2014)	Available	at:	http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-on-referendum-outcome-106a.aspx	[Accessed	25/9/2014]			
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